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Thus my object in applying my mind to politics is not to make
any new or unheard of suggestions, but to establish by sound and
conclusive reasoning, and to deduce from the real nature of man,
nothing save the principles and institutions which accord best with
practice. Moreover, in order to investigate the topics pertaining to this
branch of knowledge with the same objectivity as we generally show in
mathematical inquiries, I have taken great care to understand human
actions, and not to deride, deplore, or denounce them. I have therefore
regarded human passions like love, hate, anger, envy, pride, pity, and
the other feelings that agitate the mind, not as vices of human nature,
but as properties which belong to it in the same way as heat, cold, storm,
thunder and the like belong to the nature of the atmosphere.
Inconvenient though they be, such things are necessary properties; they
have definite causes through which we try to understand their nature,
and a true understanding of them gives the mind as much satisfaction as
the apprehension of things pleasing to the senses.
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Abstract
My dissertation attempts to read David Hume's "A Treatise ofHuman Nature: an
attempt ofintroducing an experimental method ofreasoning into moral subjects", as
a consistent moral theory, by showing the underlying unity of the three Books of the
Treatise. In particular, I argue that the concept of the "general point of view" plays a
central role in unifying the Treatise, which in the final instance proves to be about
normativity. Most of all, I clarify the parallel between Hume's epistemology and his
moral theory. I attempt to present Hume's moral theory as what I call "a
constructivism ofperceptions".
I start by exploring Hume's epistemology and his concept of custom,
fundamentally understood as a principle of stability. I clarify that custom consists in
recognizing a particular perception in association with other resembling perceptions.
I claim this is what it means to take the general point of view. I then show that
custom is the basis ofHume's theory of causation, where the concept of custom
plays the central role of embodying the general point of view. I show that because of
the development of custom Hume's theory of causation is related to his theory of the
perception of external bodies, which completes our perception of physical
circumstances.
In the later chapters I argue that Hume's theory of sympathy should be
understood as a principle of sociability that confers shared value on both possessions
and human behaviour. I next explain Hume's theory ofjustice as a regulating
principle of social interaction that centres on property as causation. I argue that
justice exerts a binding force beyond personal interests because its normative force
derives from the sense of stability acquired in physical perceptions. Then, I discuss
Hume's theory of promise regulates future interaction between people. Finally, I
show that because of the authority of custom, government is allowed to demand
people's allegiance, just as an external body is required to stabilise causal perception.
My dissertation shows that the general point of view provides the foundation
ofmorality by establishing a stable relationship between human beings and their
circumstances: physical, psychological, moral, and political.
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Hume's General Point of View
My dissertation is an attempt to read David Hume's "A Treatise ofHuman Nature —
an attempt of introducing an experimental method into moral subjects —" as a
consistent moral theory. I attempt to show the consistency of three Books of the
Treatise. In particular, I argue that the concept of the general point of view serves a
central role to unify the Treatise. Hume's Treatise contains various kinds of theories
such as epistemology, associative psychology, ethics, and political philosophy. Some
of these are attracting the intense interest ofmany readers, while others are now more
or less regarded as peripheral topics. The theory of causation has attracted the most
attention, and Hume's moral theory is often viewed as only of historical interest.
Commentators tend to treat the three Books separately; those who discuss Hume's
causation rarely refer to his political theory, and vice versa.
Since Kemp Smith proposed the naturalistic reading ofHume's Treatise
(Kemp Smith, 1905, 1941), several commentators have suggested that Hume's
theory is systematic, and that Book 1 of the Treatise is consistent with his moral
theory. Despite these general suggestions, we do not yet have a clear and thorough
exposition of the moral significance ofHume's epistemology.1 Yet, the general
tendency of commentators' opinion shows that this assumption is not widely
accepted. Therefore, this dissertation purports to provide a vigorous rehabilitation of
the moral and political reading of the Treatise.
Most of all, my dissertation attempts to clarify the moral philosophical
significance ofHume's epistemology developed in the Treatise. I also attempt to
1
Kemp Smith was right in his conviction that "it was through the gateway of morals that Hume
entered into philosophy" but his conclusion was mistaken that "Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise are
in date of the first composition prior to the working out of the doctrines dealt with in Book 1"
(Kemp Smith, 1941: vi). Because morality was Hume's central concern, he dealt with the topics
in Book 1 as moral philosophy. For evidence that Hume did not write Book 3 first, see Mossner
1980:74.
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clarify Hume's moral philosophy in comparison to, among others, Hobbes, Locke,
and Smith. I thereby attempt to show that there is a perspective in their theories
which shapes central assertions. The central feature of this dissertation is to pursue
"the general point of view" as the core concept that, as I claim, consistently underlies
the whole development of the Treatise. In the first instance, readers are advised to
take it as a heuristic device for finding the consistency of the Treatise. If it is shown
to be a genuine guide in understanding the Treatise to the end, then it proves to be a
unifying and normative concept of the whole Treatise. Different topics in the
Treatise do not mean that it is a collection of independent expositions; on the
contrary, they prove to compose a single theory that explains human nature as the
realm ofmorality. Many topics in Hume's Treatise are to be understood as the
components that constitute morality. Each topic should be understood as inter-related
with the other and as a preparation for the next development, which culminates in
• . 9 # •
presenting the theory ofpolitical society. Thus, it must be shown that the perception
of the physical world serves in a way as the foundation ofmorality. In the final
instance, it will be shown that the general point of view serves as the normative
concept that sustains society, and that morality consists in establishing a stable
relationship between human beings and their circumstances: physical, psychological,
moral, and political.
In this introductory chapter I first outline the three Books of the Treatise.
Next, I explain my method of exploring Hume's Treatise in comparison to Hobbes,
Locke and Smith. Then, I introduce the philosophical problems that this dissertation
will tackle. Finally, I show how the concept of the general point of view can provide
an answer to these problems.
1. "A Treatise ofHuman Nature"
Is it possible to summarize Hume's whole philosophy in just five words? Yes! It is "a
treatise of human nature". One should not trust commentators who have not
2
The story of Hume's Treatise has a parallel structure with that ofHegel's Phenomenology of
Mind. Hume and Hegel have Spinoza as their common source. For book length arguments, see
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pondered the meaning and significance of this fundamental point. Some seem to read
the Treatise as though it were A Treatise ofScepticism. But, Hume's theory is a
theory of human nature. It means that it is neither "an essay concerning human
understanding", nor is it "a treatise concerning the principle of human knowledge"
nor is it "critique of pure reason". Hence, I will explore Hume's argument as an
exposition of "human nature". Let me hope that, at the end of the journey, we will
have a better understanding of human nature with its significant implications.
As John Rawls once remarked, there is a considerable discrepancy among
the understandings ofHume commentators (Rawls, 2000: 235-52). As most other
great philosophers, Hume commentary requires special care in articulating the basic
premises and nature ofhis argument. There are too many disagreements in even a
basic reading ofHume for us to take it for granted that one version is shared by
Hume scholars. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the basic structure of the
argument of the Treatise.
Hume's Treatise is separated into three Books. Usually it is understood that
Book 1, "OfUnderstanding", deals with epistemology and metaphysics, Book 2 "Of
Passions" deals with psychology, and Book 3 "OfMorals" deals with ethics and
political philosophy. But it is important to understand that Hume discusses moral
philosophy in all three Books. The common denominator in all three Books is the
theory of perception. He seems to echo Hobbes's ordering of argument that discusses
first objects, second humans, and third civil society. This indicates that Hume shares
with Hobbes the intention of subverting the Aristotelian teleological system with a
causal system, except that Hume does not understand the world by means of a
mechanical model.
Hume declares at the beginning of each Book that he deals exclusively with
perceptions as the only material ofmind. Hume's Treatise describes the development
that those perceptions create by associating with each other. The Human mind is the
theatre in which all of those associations take place. It is illuminating to think that
Hume transforms the Hobbesian theory of a development of physical motion into a
Berry, 1982; Pompa, 1990.
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theory of the development of perceptions. Both similarly explain the creation of the
human world which includes physical circumstances, psychological interaction, and
moral institutions. It is a fundamental project ofHume's Treatise to transform the
traditional natural law theories centring on reason into an empirical theory
(Haakonssen, 1990: 61-85). In this connection, it is crucial to bear in mind that Hume
learned, criticised and modified the theories of among others Cicero, Spinoza, and
Locke, apart from Hobbes. This requires two steps. The first step is to humanise
nature. Hume does this task by showing that perceptions, which are human qualities,
are the foundation of the understanding of nature. And the second step is to show that
morality can be elucidated in the same manner as the understanding of nature. Hume
demonstrates that nature provides human beings with a paradigm of normativity by
internalising normative rules. This is the situation which is usually understood as
"adaptation". In this way, human beings can escape from the direct and complete rule
of being moved by natural forces.3
As the central notion of normativity established in Book 1, "custom", whose
crucial function is to associate particular impressions with other similar impressions
plays a significant role. The association of impressions with past experiences enables
human beings to acquire belief in the qualities of an object. Because of those beliefs,
they can establish a stable pattern of behaviour recognised as custom. Book 1
culminates in establishing the perceptions of external objects.4 When we recognise
external objects, it signifies the end of the development of the perceptions of nature,
because our perceptions can go no farther than the recognition of external objects.
Thus, the common picture of the universe is a space composed of independent
objects. This also signifies the final stage ofnormativity provided by nature
especially in a Baconian sense. Because independent objects are a given fact of
nature, we must act with respect to their nature in order to cope well with them.
Therefore, the central concept that composes the essence of this normativity is
3
This idea can be traced to the influence of the Stoics on Hume.
4
As I argue in Chapter 4, Hume's theory of external bodies has a positive function in the
development of his moral theory. The problem of self apparently has a negative function in the
theory of morality, because one ofHume's central targets is to criticise the moral theory based on
the individuals. However, full discussion of the significance of self is not the purpose of this
dissertation.
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objectivity, whose significant ramifications include the concept of stability. It is
extremely intriguing that in his theory of "external body" Hume implies the
recognition of human being as its ultimate example.
While in Book 1, Hume explains the concept of order based on the
impressions of sensations, in Book 2, he explains an order based on the impression of
reflection. This signifies a change of stages of human activities from natural
circumstances to social circumstances. In Book 1, however, there are yet no human
beings with emotion, or in relationship with each other. Human relationships are the
central concern in Book 2. Because passions are the impressions of reflection, there
is an impression of sensation involved in the creation of human relationships. Here is
an explanation of how commodities, or properties come to assume value and enter
into the human world. Hume sensitively explains how human beings create the
evaluation of other people and also of oneself via the passions which arise from the
objects that belong to the person. This is described in his theory of sympathy, which
explains the basic orientation of our social and moral activities. In short, Hume
considers that because our self-evaluation is based on the impression of how other
people feel about our properties and behaviours, human beings strive to obtain good
commodities and good reputations. As is well known, this theory inspired Adam
Smith's theories of moral sentiments and of economics.
Though Book 2 explains the principle of communication and sociability,
which is the animating force for society, this force alone cannot create society.
Society cannot be made orderly and sustained without the principle that regulates its
formation. This is the general problem that Hume tackles in Book 3 of the Treatise.
At the beginning ofBook 3, Hume indicates the fundamental task of the discussion
ofmorals: how to make moral distinctions, whether by reason or by sentiment. It is
no wonder Hume denies the role of reason in making moral judgement, as he argued
the limitation of the faculty of reason so much in Book 1. Hume argues that moral
distinction is not based on reason but on moral sentiment. Then in the discussion of
justice, Hume strategically poses a related problem namely: on which sentiment is
the perception ofjustice based? This shows the same pattern of argument he makes
in his discussion of causation, where Hume claims there is no impression that
corresponds to cause. Thus he calls justice an artificial virtue, which means a product
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of human nature similar to the creation of causation. As he finds custom a solution in
his theory of causation, so Hume finds convention which is a counter concept of
custom a solution in his discussion ofmorality. In this way, he establishes the
stability of property as the first law ofjustice. He proceeds to show the necessity of
the "transference of property" as the second law ofjustice. Hume shows promise-
keeping as the third law ofjustice and as a foundation for establishing a system of
law, which in turn explains the formation of society based on the division of labour
and trade. Then, Hume discusses an allegiance to the government as a requirement to
sustain justice and to engage in large-scale cooperative schemes. After discussing
justice, Hume devotes the rest ofBook 3 to the discussion of natural virtue, which
should be possible within the framework ofjustice and is necessary to sustain and
develop the good life of the people. In this way, Hume's Treatise culminates in the
creation ofmorality as the final produce of the development of human nature.
2. Hobbes, Locke, and Smith
My dissertation attempts to explore Hume's theory in the context ofBritish
philosophy of his day. I understand Hume's Treatise fundamentally as a moral and
political philosophy. This means that the Treatise has a political agenda that is
deeply related to the political problems that his predecessors tackled through their
philosophy. In this sense, Hobbes and Locke are special figures for Hume. Hobbes
contemplates how to create a stable civil society, and Locke contemplates how to
create free society, and in this context, Hume contemplates how to create a stable,
free, and commercial society.5
Also, the Treatise itself is a product ofHume's intense study of philosophy
from Presocratics to his contemporaries. Among others, he is a devoted Ciceronian
(Jones, 1982: passim). It is well known that he, as well as Hobbes and Locke, has a
strong French connection. However, in my dissertation I deliberately consider his
British connections, because Hume's purpose is to propose a theory that sustains and
develops the new Britain, which had just reunited with Scotland at that time. When
5
Spinoza also shares a similar problem (cf. Steven, 1997: passim).
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studying Hume it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind the political situation of his
time, which included, among others the Jacobite Rising (cf. Phillipson, 1989: Ch. 2;
Hearn, 2000: passim).6
In this dissertation, I will pay particular attention to Hume's connections
with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke before him, and his contemporary, Adam Smith.
Hume's enterprise was triggered because he discovered something different from the
writings of his predecessors. For our purpose, comparison with Hobbes and Locke is
crucial in order to identify the originality ofHume's moral philosophy. Also, it is
impossible not to consider the understanding of his best and most talented friend
Adam Smith who constructed a different system in response to Hume, because
comparison with Smith provides a convenient means to learn the most characteristic
achievement ofHume. Let us briefly examine each of them in turn.
Hume has a strong sympathy with the Baconian experimental method. Most
of all, in Hume's explanation ofjustice, he adopts the Hobbesian approach of
considering the genesis ofjustice, though not as a thought experiment as in Hobbes
but as a natural course of human nature. Hobbes and Hume share the same idea that
justice is what differentiates a civil society from the state of nature. There is an
intriguing similarity between Hume's designation of the "artificial virtue" ofjustice
and Hobbes's sovereign as an "artificial person" (cf. Russell, 1985: 51-64). In this
respect, they are different from Locke and other natural law philosophers. I will show
that Hume's task is to transform Hobbes's description of civil society as a dynamic
mechanism into an organism ofperception. Hobbes explained the formation of civil
society based on the movement of, ultimately, atoms, and applies the same method in
explaining the moral world and the physical world. However, the result is that he
presents the moral world as the physical world. It is still an external object for human
beings, and not yet the "human world".
Locke plays an essential role for producing the Treatise. It is true that he and
Hume have a different orientation in theorising. Reason is the key concept of
Locke's philosophy, since a fundamental part of his task is to transform Cartesian
5
In a different sense from Hobbes and Locke, Hume was very aware of the ephemerality of
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philosophy into an empiricist system. On the other hand, Hume's principal concept is
custom. Hume criticises the Lockean concept of abstract ideas, which proves to be a
cornerstone of Locke's entire theory. Hume's disagreement with Locke characterises
the difference between them. In sum it is safe to say that there is no major topic in
Hume's epistemology that is not theorised in critical dialogue with Locke's An Essay
concerning Human Understanding, and Two Treatises ofGovernment. As Hume
himselfmakes substantial references to Locke, one cannot refer to Locke too often in
discussing Hume.7 Most of all, they share the strong interests in such concepts as
idea, quality, power, causation, belief, and liberty.
Locke's political theory and especially his social contract theory are the
central targets ofHume's theory of justice. Though Locke attempts to found
government on the consent of people, Hume reconceives the foundation ofpolitical
society as a development of convention. Hume considers that the Lockean
foundation of reason does not explain the creation ofmorality. He has a similar
dissatisfaction with Locke's explanation as he has with Hobbes; Locke's explanation
ofmorality is based on reason which fabricates an abstract world, and not on human
nature. Therefore, Hume is aware that Locke's theory of a political society is not
synonymous with a theory of a moral world. Political society needs a moral
foundation to be sustained and developed, which is possible only when that political
society is founded on morality. Hume shows that human nature is the most
comprehensive foundation ofmorality. This is why Hume starts discussing the
perception of the physical world before he elucidates an understanding of the moral
world.
Adam Smith is a peculiar presence for Hume. He is the most significant
witness ofHume's philosophy and real life. As a great philosopher himself, Smith
inherits two very central concepts from Hume; one is "sympathy", and the other is
the "spectator" (cf. Phillipson, 1983: 179-202; Raphael, 1975: 87).8 Smith takes note
government bom shortly after the Union of 1707.
Locke's name is referred four times the Treatise.
g
Peter Jones points out that Cicero "emphasises the importance of seeing ourselves from a
spectator's viewpoint" (Jones, 1982: 41). It is arguable that Hume derives the notion of general
point of view from the Epicurean and Stoic criteria of truth: proplepsis (preconception), physike
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of Hume's general point of view, which he develops into his "impartial spectator".
As I attempt to show that the general point of view vindicates the consistency of
Hume's system, it is significantly encouraging that Smith notes it as so core a
concept in Hume that he adopts it as a core concept of his own system. Smith does
not accept it as Hume conceives it, but adapts it to his own system. This means that
we can understand the Humean general point of view by comparing it with Smith's
impartial spectator. The difference between them, however, is reflected in their
understanding of "sympathy". I will argue in chapter 5 that this difference derives
from their different understandings of order.
Smith's theory is a theory ofmoral judgement, while Hume's is a theory of
human nature. Smith deals with notions of the good and the bad that stand outside
the causal order, but for Hume approval and disapproval are causal interactions that
create reality, not an ideal. In comparison with Smith, the formative nature of
Hume's moral theory becomes more apparent. This corresponds to the fact that
Hume bases his theory of morals on an epistemology in which perceptions are the
only material. The true significance ofHume's moral theory is presented in his
epistemology. Smith does not have an epistemology that replaces Hume's system.
Therefore, ifwe understand the comprehensive implications of the Humean
epistemology, it enables us to understand the real difference between Hume and
Smith.
Beside Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, there is another philosopher to refer to in
order to understand the Treatise. It is the author of, among other works, the An
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry concerning the Principle
ofMorals, David Hume himself. After the well-known disappointment regarding the
reception of the Treatise, Hume published the Enquiries. I recognise these are
different works. But I do not support the view that because the Enquiries are written
after the Treatise, the Enquiries better represent Hume's true theory (Strawson, 1989:
8). Nor do I support the view that since Hume denies the Treatise at the end of his
ennoia (natural conception), and especially koine ennoia (common conception). These concepts
are common heritage to all the later epistemological development ofWestern philosophy. Hume,
however, criticises the "enlarged views" (EPM 8.19; SBN 101) of the Stoics (cf. Long, 1974:
passim; Striker, 1996: Ch. 3).
Introduction 9
Hume's General Point of View
career, the Treatise is worthless. Instead, this dissertation attempts to elucidate the
theory that I find worth consideration in the Treatise.
The Enquiries are organised thematically, which is shown in their full titles:
An Enquiry ofHuman Understanding, and An Enquiry ofthe Principles ofMorals.
Thus the two Enquiries are independent of each other, unlike the systematic
treatment ofperceptions in the Treatise. Moreover, in the second Enquiry, Hume
explicitly concentrates on the "principles" ofmorals, presuming the concept of
"morals" that he explores in the Treatise. While, there is no doubt that the Enquiries
can serve as the best commentary for understanding the Treatise, my purpose is to
demonstrate the general point of view as the kernel concept in the systematic
development of the Treatise, which disappears in the Enquiries, though we find
ample examples of equivalent notions in it as well.
Hume explains the development of the object of perceptions from the most
primitive impressions into the political society. Hume demonstrates how perception
progresses from a primitive unit, through association, custom, causation, external
object, and interaction of people, to the formation of society. All of these are
connected, and all of these stages of development are characterised by the general
point of view, with each stage producing a particular type of association and
causation. All of them are necessary for human life and all of them have to do with
morals. And if these are all represented by the concept of the general point of view,
this can be regarded as the normative principle in Hume.
3. Philosophical Problems in this Dissertation
In this section, I wish to clarify what philosophical points my dissertation attempts to
establish. In his ambition of becoming the Newton ofmoral science, Hume intends to
elucidate the fundamental principle ofmorality. Thus, Hume's theory is concerned
with every element ofmoral theory; it is concerned with the concept ofmorality, the
origin ofmorality, the function ofmorality, the consequence ofmorality, the
institution ofmorality, and the standard ofmoral judgment. All of these are
elucidated by a single principle in a systematic manner. Hume holds that the
elucidation of human nature is enough to know everything about morality, because
Introduction 10
Hume's General Point of View
there is no element ofmorality that is not related to human nature, and vice versa,
there is no element of human nature that has nothing to do with morality, including
and especially the perception of the natural world. This represents at once Hume's
presupposition and his conclusion; by presenting a comprehensive moral theory on
this premise, Hume can show the truth of his premise. Most essentially, Hume's
theory is concerned with the foundation ofmorality, because Hume understands this
is the central task of the moral philosophy. It is true that Hume's theory is not a
prescriptive theory, because he thinks that morality just like natural science is not
subject to human commandment; just as it does not make sense to prescribe a
physical law that is not produced by nature, one cannot make a rational proposal
about morality that does not originate from experiences in accordance with human
nature. This is the fundamental implication of his criticism of a moral theory based
on reason, or rational design.
Thematically, therefore, this dissertation is a study of the naturalistic
foundation ofmorality. My claim that Book 1 is the basis ofHume's moral
philosophy signifies, first of all, that custom is the foundation ofmorality. It is less
controversial that there is a link on the one hand, between custom, causation and the
idea of external objects, and on the other hand, between morality, justice, and
political authority. In this connection, this dissertation will argue that custom is the
foundation ofmorality, causation is the foundation ofjustice, and the idea of external
objects is the foundation of government. By arguing these relations, it will be shown
that Hume's Treatise as a whole signifies a moral philosophy.
In a fundamental sense, Hume inherits the tradition concerning natural law,
and makes it fit into the unique framework of his theory of perceptions (cf. Forbes,
1975: Ch. 2). Most significantly, he considers that nature provides the initial sense of
"normativity". Hume's profound assertion is that normativity emerges not as an ideal
recognisable by reason, as many standard natural law theorists insist, but as a cause.
In other words, people come to acquire the initial sense of obeying law or order
positively. Hume takes this as the foundation ofmorality. Therefore, already in its
very origin, morality is reduced to a causality that regulates human behaviour; Hume
takes morality as a special kind of causation that applies to human relationships.
Though in Book 1 he mostly takes up the impressions of sensation, Hume is neither
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doing nor interested in a natural philosophy. On the contrary, his intention is to
clarify how human beings internalise physical experience, or the manner of their
interacting with their surroundings. Internalised experience is the only material for
creating a human world.
Through the process of avoiding conflicts and promoting pleasure, human
beings obtain the initial sense of learning and following the law in its most primitive
sense. This provides the primitive but core sense ofmorality as the norm for men to
follow which is to avoid pain and promote pleasure in the interactions with their
fellow beings. In this fundamental manner, nature supplies the paradigm for human
behaviour. Because there is only one human nature, human beings behave with the
same capacity and principle both when they interact with natural circumstances and
when they interact in human circumstances. The significance ofmorality is not
conceptually acquired by reason, but given physically or experientially by nature.
Also, it is incorrect to conceive that Hume's morality begins with any particular
sentiment because sentiments do not occur in themselves without perceptions;
perceptions ofphysical nature are the foundation ofmorality. Thus, Hume's
epistemology is the foundation of his theory of both passion and morals. Therefore,
rather than Book 2, Book 1 is the discussion of the development of the faculty of
dealing with natural object that serves as the foundation ofHume's moral theory.
It is a common allegation that Hume's theory contains explanation but not
justification (cf. Broils, 1964: Ch. 4). It is true that his theory of causation indicates
that our causal belief has no rational justification. However, if rational justification is
not the only kind ofjustification relevant for human behaviour, Hume's critics miss
the point. Hume's theory ofmorality is committed to the problem ofmoral
justification. This is shown in his persistent argument against founding morality by
reason. As Donald Livingston convincingly argues, at the centre ofHume's
philosophical enterprise comes the opposition between the "true philosophy" and the
"false philosophy". So it is Hume's fundamental task to present the principle for
distinguishing true belief from false belief, and thus the true moral belief from the
false moral belief. Hume by no means asserts any belief can represent morality. His
explanation ofmoral belief and moral judgment by implication signifies the standard
for true moral belief. Morality is defined as attaining normativity. That there exists a
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normativity means there can be a possibility of deviation, or the unjustifiable action
that is accompanied by pain of some kind.
Thus, moral beliefs are justified when they serve the formation, stabilization,
and development of human relations and social institutions in a manner similar to
how human relations and the social institutions have been formed. Put conversely,
justified beliefs are those that serve to form, stabilize, and develop human
relationships. Thus, when an action functions in the manner ofpromoting or at least
sustaining the stability of the whole situation, the action is justified. The moral value
of an action is evaluated from the standpoint of the overall moral activities of human
beings. However, Hume's position is different from political conservatism that
asserts the status quo as the moral standard, because his theory positively prescribes
the development of society and a moral system. His position is also different from
utilitarianism which justifies the action that maximizes total utility by the society.
Hume is decisively different from the utilitarians in the following point: unlike the
utilitarianism, Hume by no means considers promoting the total utility as the end of
morality. Morality for Hume is more concerned with the manner of human behaviour
rather than with the final result of behaviour on society as a whole. No action is
justifiable only because it produces the maximum amount of goods. Thus unlike
utilitarianism, Humean morality is not a rational system.
More concretely, my dissertation tackles concepts and problems concerned
with custom, belief, external objects, sympathy, property, justice, consent, promise,
government, allegiance, order, and the like. These are key concepts that compose the
moral system in the Treatise, that are also relevant in understanding morality by a
naturalistic approach. In the first instance, it is possible to specify two of the most
important concepts in the naturalistic explanation ofmorality in the Treatise. These
are "custom" and "belief', which are the central topics in chapters 2 and 3. Of these
two concepts, custom is more fundamental in that belief is a product of custom.
Hume identifies himself as an heir of the Aristotelian tradition by positing the
concept of custom as the basis of his moral theory. Custom dominates Hume's theory
as it does our common life. Thus, he explains such important concepts as causation,
or external objects by reference to the concept of custom. Moreover, in his social
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theory, he modifies the concept of custom into convention, by which he explains
justice.
It cannot be overstated that Hume takes morality as a particular kind of
causation that controls human behaviour in the Newtonian universe (cf. Schneewind,
1998: 361). Morality is a natural phenomenon when it is considered as a particular
cause of human behaviour. On the other hand, the causation ofmorality does not
exist externally but exerts its power through the beliefs adopted by people. Hume
understands that morality consists in the sense of necessity. The emergence of the
sense of necessity is the most important concept that is explained by the theory of
causation.
However, because Hume's moral theory is naturalistic, it is not apparent
how it can accommodate the modality that is explained by reason, which is the
problem of objectivity in chapter 4. It is important to clarify how Hume considers the
manner judgment based on perceptions attains objectivity that is usually regarded as
the condition of moral judgement. Regarding this problem, Hume's strategy is to
anatomise the concept of objectivity to reveal its human significance, and explain the
function the concept of objectivity plays in morality. I argue that the naturalistic
meaning of the concept ofobjectivity that underlies Hume's discussion on the
existence of external objects serves to elucidate this problem. Perception of external
bodies is very important for morality, because it procures the initial concept of
objectivity. Thus chapters 2 through 4 deal with epistemological topics in the
Treatise.
Since objectivity is generally regarded as the ground of fairness, impartiality
is another problematic concept in understanding Hume's moral theory, and is thus a
central problem in chapter 5. This concept is concerned with his theory of sympathy,
which is the principle that enables the communication of sentiments between people.
Adam Smith develops it as the principle ofmoral judgment after Hume, claiming
that sympathy of the impartial spectator represents propriety, and thus the standard of
moral judgement. Intriguingly, Hume does not count impartiality as a condition for
morality or moral judgment. For one thing, impartiality is not an empirical concept
since there is no impression corresponding to impartiality; for another, Hume
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understands that sympathy is the principle of partiality (cf. Gert, 1998: Ch.6). Thus,
the problem is how it is possible that partiality rather than impartiality results in
producing a moral quality. Instead of impartiality, and in compensation to the
function that is expected of impartiality, Hume presents a concept ofjustice as an
artificial device that can attain the effect of impartiality through the principle of
partiality.
The elucidation ofjustice in connection to epistemology is another focus of
my dissertation. In fact, providing a foundation for justice is a central task of every
comprehensive moral philosophy. Adam Smith directly connects sympathy with
moral judgment, and takes impartiality realised through sympathy as the condition of
justice. Hume, on the other hand, denies the direct connection between the principle
ofjustice and a morality based on sympathy. Thus justice is an artificial virtue in
Hume. And because he alleges justice to be artificial, Hume provides an empirical
foundation for justice. He needs to explain how moral behaviour is motivated by a
principle not existing in nature, i.e. among animals. Hume's explanation of justice as
an empirically based concept enables him to expel a non-empirical authority for
justice. Justice is clearly considered as the artificial causation of regulating human
behaviour and creating order in society. Because natural causation is based on human
nature, justice as causation can also be based on human nature. He then explains the
concept of consent and promise in continuity with the institution ofjustice founded
on property relationships. In this way, his theory does not presume autonomous
individuals who authorise the political authority by giving consent and making
promises. This signifies a totally different kind of foundation from the social contract
theories for political authority.
In accordance with his criticism of social contract theory, Hume needs to
supply his own explanation ofpolitical authority. Therefore, the last major problem
in this dissertation is the foundation ofpolitical authority. Hume's task is to give a
natural foundation to political authority. Hume excludes God, power (violence), and
reason as the origin ofpolitical authority. Morality is the only legitimate ground for
people to obey the government. Now, as indicated above, justice means to obey a
cause called the laws ofjustice. In Hume's epistemology, an external object is
postulated as the common source of various causations, for it is unnatural for human
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beings to have stable view of the world that there are causations where there is no
object that issues them. In the same sense, the laws ofjustice, especially because they
originate from custom, are ambiguous, and not complete unless there is a political
authority presupposed as their source. Thus though the real origin of the laws of
justice is convention, their formal parenthood is ascribed to the political authority.
It is no surprise that Hume regards both external objects and government as
a fiction or invention. There can be only one source of law natural or artificial
because there is only one manner people obey the law. In this way, Hume demolishes
the dichotomy between nature and morality. Similarly, there is only one way to
recognise an independent object as a source of law. Government has a similar
manner of existence as an external object that exists independently of one's own
perception. Therefore, Hume's theory of external objects prepares for the theory of
government as the authority that issues the laws ofjustice. Hume argues that external
existence is a fiction that is assumed by the working of the imagination. In nature, the
belief in external objects, though it is a fiction, perfects the order of the physical
world. Likewise, government, though it is a composition produced by people's
allegiance, perfects the order of the moral world. Government is a perfection of
human nature. In this way, Hume's Treatise proves to be a comprehensive moral
theory, ranging from the perception of sensory experience to life in a political society.
Thoroughly consistently, it is a theory of the creation of order based on the human
nature.
Underlying all those expositions, there is an idea that can appropriately be
called a Humean constructivism. Obviously this is contrasted with the famous
counterpart, Kantian constructivism (cf. Rawls, 2000: 235-252; O'Neill, 1990: chap.
11). Kant's theory maintains that the pure categories of human understanding
produce the recognition of objects, rather than the converse. Kant alleges that his
idea is a Copernican turn in philosophy. Before Kant, however, Hume shows a clear
consciousness of "Copernicus" as well as Newton (Cf. T 2.1.3.7; SBN 282).9 In a
nutshell, Humean constructivism means that imagination produces the belief in
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objects through the material ofperceptions. Humean constructivism provides a wider
basis for political authority.
This is related to the so called "New Hume Debate" regarding a realist
interpretation ofHume. The new Humeans assert that Hume is a sceptical realist who
posits the reality of causal power and existence of external objects and only denies
their right recognition. Ifmy exposition in this dissertation is correct, it will not only
lead to an understanding that is quite different from those who read Hume in this way,
but it will also show the difference between Humean and Kantian moral theory.
4. The General Point of View as a Key to the Problems
Now we have previewed the philosophical problems and the basic line of arguments
that this dissertation is ready to develop. Let me introduce the concept of the general
point of view in connection to those arguments. Custom functions as a key concept to
the elucidation of a naturalistic foundation ofmorality. Although custom has been
recognised as the origin of ethics since Aristotle, Hume's innovative argument is that
custom serves also as the principle ofmetaphysics. As there are no innate ideas,
human beings have no way of obtaining any concept except from experience. Thus,
custom should underlie both ethics and metaphysics. As Hume holds that moral
judgment should be made from the general point of view, it is necessary to consider
the relation between the general point of view and custom. If the general point of
view serves as the principle of custom, it can be shown that the general point of view
is the fundamental concept throughout the Treatise.
Custom is an elusive concept. There is no object that signifies custom. In
order for custom to obtain, there needs to be similar events and a subject on whom
those events have influences. No single event makes custom, nor does custom
directly indicate plural events. Custom is a tendency of the mind which recognises a
new event in connection to similar events. My proposal is that, in the first instance,
the general point of view represents custom in this sense. Taking the general point of
9
Nicholas Capaldi names the turn from an "I think" perspective to a "we do" perspective the
Humean Copernican turn. I disagree with him. My characterisation of Hume's constructivism as
Introduction 17
Hume's General Point of View
view means to see an event in connection to similar events. If custom can be
considered a specific function of association, there must be some principle by which
it exists. It is the general point of view that is the basis of the principle of custom.
Hume's fundamental empiricist position does not allow one to think that the general
point of view exists somewhere independently of experiences (cf. Sayre-McCord,
1994: 202-228).10
This has to do with the concept of the universal. No experience remains in
the mind except as its influence. There are two types of influences: one is "the
memory (T 1.1.3.1; SBN 8)" that signifies the particular experience, and the other is
the "the imagination (ibid.; SBN 9)" of the mind created as a result of the
experiences. The contents ofmemory are all particular, and memory cannot identify
one experience with other experiences. Therefore, only through imagination can the
numerous particular experiences of the mind be integrated. Hume tacitly suggests
that what are alleged to be universals can only be understood as this type of
imagination. Hume argues this in his criticism of Locke's "abstract ideas". Hume
denies any particular existence of the universal and explains the function of the
universal that which is represented by the general point of view. Thus, the general
point of view substitutes for the concept of universals. The general point of view, by
virtue of being a particular view assuming generality signifies the experiential
synthesis of the particular and the universal. This understanding confers a broad
perspective to Hume's theory; the general point of viewfunctions as a concept
equivalent to, e.g., the Aristotelian "form" or the Kantian "categories". As I will
argue in next chapter, Hume's moral sentiment is derived from the form or manner of
perception, rather than its content.
Once the concept of the general point of view is established as the principle
of custom, it is a fairly easy task to show the development of morality. Custom
produces general ideas out ofmany particular ideas. And the generality ofmany
particular interactions of numerous objects or the successions of events produce
causation. Finally, imagination produces the fiction of external object as the sole
his true Copernican turn will be clarified throughout this dissertation (cf. Capaldi, 1989: passim).
10
I will discuss Sayre-McCord's interpretation Chapter 1.
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source ofmany perceptions to complete the picture of the world. All of these
developments of perceptions are guided by the working of custom, and thus by the
general point of view which is also the principle of stability.
The perception of causation implies a particular manner of human behaviour
which is to be named normativity. As causation consists in the psychological sense
of necessity, human beings find it impossible to ignore it. Thus people behave in
accordance with the perception of causal law before being forced to. This is what it
means to have normativity. In this way, the relationship with natural objects provides
human beings with the example ofmoral behaviour. This is the Humean program for
the naturalistic foundation ofmorality. By connecting the theory of causation to
moral theory, it is possible to have a full understanding ofwhy the theory of
causation occupies the central significance in Hume's philosophy.
The general point of view is not an Archimedean point, but is itself in the
process of creation and development. The most significant implication of this is that
the general point of view is primarily a concept ofmoral judgment. Morality is
understood as the principle which sustains the progress of human nature. The general
point of view is the moral point of view because it serves to promote such
development. Here is the justification ofmorality and the justification ofmoral
judgment; thus the general point of view is the moral standard that produces moral
judgment. Human beings acquire the principle to create a stable relationship with
their surroundings first through their interaction with their natural surroundings. As
extension of this natural interaction, morality is the inclination people acquire to
obtain a stable relationship with their human surroundings. Thus, human beings can
only apply to moral judgements the same principle of the general point of view that
they acquired in their interaction with their natural surroundings. In this sense,
interaction with the natural surroundings provides the example ofmoral behaviour.
Humean constructivism illustrates how the system ofmorality has emerged
from human nature. Hume's method is characteristically historical. It illustrates that
human reality is a construct created by the association of perceptions. History, for
Hume is a process of creating a new stability out of the interaction of perceptions. It
is a dialectical process which is propelled by causation. The general point of view,
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being involved in the development of a new stage of stability culminating in a civil
society, is the principle by which history is constructed.
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Chapter One:
Moral Sentiments and the General Point of View
Introduction
Ever since Adam Smith took note of the concept and developed it into his distinctive
moral concept of the "impartial spectator", the general point of view has been
conspicuous by its absence in the Hume literature.11 Recently, however, discussion
regarding the concept has become quite active within Hume scholarship. There is no
doubt that Hume confers a significant role on the concept of the general point of
view. In accordance with the order of arguments in the Treatise, discussion of
morality comes at the end. However, as the fundamental purpose of this dissertation
is to read the whole Treatise as a moral philosophy, it is convenient to discuss
Hume's theory ofmorality narrowly so defined in this early part, so as to understand
the moral implication of earlier discussions.
In this chapter, I take up recent arguments regarding the general point of view
in Hume scholarship, and consider the general characteristic ofHume's concept of
morals. Usually, the general point of view is understood as a moral device for
making objective moral judgements. I argue that in order to understand the concept,
it is not enough just to consider Hume's argument ofmoral sentiments. The central
purpose of this chapter is to argue that the concept of the general point of view is
concerned with all the relevant concepts of human nature.
Hume himself does not systematically explain the concept of general point
of view. Moreover, the concept appears only in Book 3 of the Treatise. This is a
11
Scarcely any references of the general point of view are found in such famous commentators as
Norman Kemp Smith, John Laird, or Charles Hendel (Kemp Smith, 1941; Laird, 1932; Hendel,
1925).
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reason why the general point of view has received a biased treatment. I attempt to
show that Hume's general point of view cannot be properly understood until the
fundamental principle of the Treatise is clarified. In section 1,1 outline Hume's
argument in Book 3 of the Treatise. I argue the particularity of the moral sentiments.
Then in section 2,1 identify the context in which the concept of the general point of
view appears in the Treatise. In section 3,1 survey other commentators'
interpretation of the general point of view. In section 4,1 critically examine the
interpretations of other commentators, and maintain that the general point of view is
a predominantly epistemological concept. In section 5,1 survey the concept of
"general rules'. And in section 6,1 discuss the difference between general rules and
the general point of view.
1. Outline of Book 3
(a) Morality as Causation
In order to explore Hume's theory ofmorality, it is necessary to create a basic
understanding ofHume's moral theory. As a first step, let me outline Book 3 of the
Treatise, titled, "OfMorals" with references to the Enquiry into the Principle of
Morals, as appropriate. Hume does not spare the trouble of explaining the definition
• • 12of "impressions" and "ideas" at the beginning of each Book of the Treatise. Hume
classifies moral sentiments as impressions of reflection. In the theory ofmorals in
Book 3, the moral sentiments are dealt with as impressions. He says,
It has been observ'd, that nothing is ever present to the mind but its
perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving,
hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. ... perceptions
resolve themselves into two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas. (T
3.1.1.2-3; SBN 456)
12
This suggests that each Book of Hume's treatise can be read independently of each other,
which relates to the important problem concerning the relationship between the three Books, and
the problem of the chronological order Hume conceived and wrote them (cf. Price, 1995, 3-11).
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It is noteworthy that Hume classifies judging, thinking, loving and
hearing as perceptions.13 In this way, Hume deprives "thinking" of its privileged
status. According to Hume's terminology, the distinction between impressions
and ideas does not correspond to the distinction between emotion and intellect,
and his discussion indicates that he sees emotion as having the same cognitive
status as other activities. In this framework of perceptions, Hume sets up the
central problem of his enquiry as follows.
Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish
betwixt vice and virtue, andpronounce an action blameable or praise¬
worthy? This will immediately cut off all loose discourses and
declamations, and reduce us to something precise and exact on the
present subject. (T 3.1.1.3; SBN 456)
This problem is one of the common concerns among philosophers of
Hume's time (Norton, 1993- Ch. 6). It is a problem about the foundation of
morality, or about how human beings are related to morality. Among many theories,
two trends are especially important; one is theological thinkers who are influenced
by Platonic philosophy (Stewart, 2003) and the other is egoist theories ofmorality
that reduce morality to self-interest.14 To this problem, Hume unequivocally answers
that moral distinction is made by sentiments. Hume mentions the important reason
for it:
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and
affections, it follows that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that
because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any
such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.
Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of
morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. (T 3.1.1.6; SBN
457)
13
The corresponding explanations can also be found in T 1.1.1.1; SBN 1, and in T 2.1.1.1; SBN
276. Thomas Reid notes that "Mr. Hume gives the name of passion to every principle of action in
the human mind" (Reid, 1819, vol. 3: 221). Hume's usage of sentiments are much wider than
contemporary usages allow.
14
This is a group that is influenced by Epicureanism. Bernard De Mandeville and Thomas
Hobbes are the most important.
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Hume understands morality as what causes orderly behaviour. There is an
interesting parallelism between moral sentiment and causation in that both are
concerned with human behaviour. Based on his theory of causation, Hume first tries
to establish that morality is not a matter of reason. This is because reason is inactive
and cannot motivate human action. Both causation and moral sentiments represent
the qualities of objects, and influence the behaviour ofperceivers. Therefore, it is
possible to consider that Hume bases the argument ofmoral recognition on the same
theoretical structure as that of causation. In his theory of causation, Hume argues that
the "objectivity" of causation is a product of the custom of our mind. In a similar
way, Hume concludes that the morality is not derived from reason but from
sentiments.
By the positive assertion that morality motivates, he criticises his rationalist
rivals who argue that morality consists in a relation detectable by reason. John Locke,
for example, advocates a theory that morality consists in a relation that is
demonstrative by reason (Essay 2.28.4f.). Hume maintains that the factual
relationship that reason recognises in morality can be common both in humans and
non-humans. His famous examples are "parricide" among trees, and "incest" among
animals (Cf. T 466-468); while these would be regarded as hideous immorality in
humans, they are innocent in non-humans. As morality matters in human behaviour
alone, it means that no relation of fact is involved in moral judgement.
Hume's criticism of rationalism is based on the criticism of causality. Hume
demands that if someone tries to establish that morality consists in reason, they must
show the moral relation that obtains between inner activities and outside things (Cf.
T 464-465). Moreover, Hume demands that they must show that the relation has a
"necessary connection".
'Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to confirm the will to it. In
order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of right and wrong are
eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, 'tis not sufficient to
shew the relations upon which they are founded: we must also point
out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that
this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it
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must take place and have its influence; tho' the difference betwixt these
minds be in other respects immense and infinite. (T 3.1.1.22; SBN 465)
To indicate the answer to this problem, Hume refers to the conclusion he
has shown in this theory of causation, that:
in treating of the understanding, that there is no connexion of cause and
effect, such as this is suppos'd to be, which is discoverable otherwise
than by experience, and of which we can pretend to have any security
by the simple consideration of the objects. (T 3.1.1.22; SBN 466)
In Hume's discussion of causation, his intention is not to deny causation,
but to establish causation as a human matter. The same is true in his discussion of
morality; he denies the foundation ofmorality as an eternal truth detectable by reason,
but does not deny morality as human causation. He intends to establish morality as a
different type of causation in this Newtonian universe (cf. Schneewind, 1998, 361).
As Hume describes morality as human causation, he will argue how it creates a
moral world that enables people to live morally.
(b) Moral Sentiments
After establishing the basic claim that moral distinction is made by sentiments, Hume
then proceeds to clarify which sentiment it is that makes a moral judgement:
Now since the distinguishing impressions, by which moral
good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures. ...
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a
particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling
constitutes our praise or admiration. ... We do not infer a character to
be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after
such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The
case is the same as in our judgements concerning all kinds of beauty,
and tastes, and sensations. (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 417, italics Hume, bold
letters mine)
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This is the most significant place where Hume explains moral sentiments.
On the surface, Hume does not seem to give concrete definition to the moral
sentiments. He only describes that as "particular" pains or pleasures. But it is
necessary to understand wherein the particularity of moral sentiments consists. In
fact, Hume is straight forward: what is important in moral judgement is not so much
the content or rationality, it is the "manner" in which the observer perceives. We
might call it "the Humean manner-formalism" to contrast it to the more famous
Kantian formalism of universality.15 It is significant that Hume characterizes
morality by a particular manner of perception. The Humean general point of view is
a perception of order, which lies not in the content of what is perceived, but in the
way things are perceived. We should understand the manner literally as leading to
the notion of refinement and politeness, which is a key term for developing man's
moral capacity and society. For Hume politeness is the counter concept to
enthusiasm.16 To repeat the point, the general point of view consists in the manner of
our perception which accompanies the manner of our behaviour that best accords
with it.
Hume asserts that the object of our moral judgement is the motive of an
action. We can only observe external physical movements as a sign of someone's
character. Human character is treated in parallel with qualities of objects. Objects are
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known only through their quality. The same can be applicable in the recognition of
human character. Character is understood as a quality of a person that tends to cause
a certain type of actions. Hume's theory treats moral sentiments from the perspective
of an observer, rather than the cause of one's behaviour. In his criticism of Francis
Hutcheson's moral sense theory, Hume denies that the moral sentiments are
produced from any original quality ofmind. Hume says:
15
It is possible to recognise that Kant's concept of "reflective judgement" in his third critique
approaches the Humean position.
This is the point Hume emphasizes in his "The rise of arts and sciences" (Essays). For
convincing arguments, see Phillipson, 1987: 226-46; Klein, 1984-5: 186-214.
17
Regarding Hume's usage of the concept of "object", see Green, 1994.
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'tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular instance, these
sentiments are produc'd by an original quality andprimary constitution.
For as the number of our duties is, in a manner, infinite, 'tis impossible
that our original instincts should extend to each of them, and from our
very first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of
precepts, which are contain'd in the compleatest system of ethics. (T
3.1.2.6; SBN 473)
Hume's denial of the moral sense theory implies that moral sentiments are
independent of the direct governance of natural constitution; moral sentiments are
not the direct product of human constitution, but emerge through experiences. This
should be understood as part ofHume's strategic shift ofmoral theory from a
substance-centred to a relation-centred approach. There is no inborn moral norm.
Morality is exempted from the direct rule of innate nature, because morality is
concerned with how to react to the causal effects of an action. Past experiences are
the key for orienting ourselves to the present immediacy. This is the fundamental
sense in which I argue that Hume sees normativity as empirically produced. Because
of this essentially emergent character ofmoral sentiments, they can control natural
sentiments (cf. Baier, 1995). And because of this empirical nature, morality can
become a causal force for the formation of society as a system ofmorality.
In accordance with the tendency of an object to produce pleasure or pain,
one comes to have a feeling of either approval which is a pleasant sentiment, or
disapproval which is a painful sentiment. "The good" means something to be chosen,
and "the bad" something to be avoided. The distinction between the good and bad is
thus concerned with the real effects of things or situations, and not just with the
behaviour of people. Even if people's actual behaviour does not exactly correspond
to their perception ofmoral sentiments, they are not invalid as the principle of
morality. As Hume writes,
Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be
insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body, they must still
direct the determinations of our mind, and where everything else is
equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to
mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A moral distinction,
therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and
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approbation; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a
proportinable aversion to those of the other. (EPM 9.4; SBN 271)
Hume reduces morality to the principle guiding human behaviour; morality
literally means that something is chosen or avoided, other conditions being equal.
This is a causal perspective of the good and the bad. Things are naturally chosen
when they are pleasant, and naturally avoided when they are painful. In this way,
Hume rewrites the Thomistic tradition of the natural law that reads, "good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided" (Aquinas, 1988: Summa Theologiae, 1-2,
q. 94, a. 2). Hume considers that this is a perverse way of speaking, because if things
have their natural way, they need not be ordered to go that way, and it is in vain to
try to prescribe what is contrary to the course of nature.
Now it is clear that the Humean moral sentiments are concerned with human
behaviour. Therefore, the particularity ofmoral sentiments lies in its causal power to
make people generally choose or avoid an object. On the other hand, moral
sentiments have a function ofmaking moral distinctions that apply commonly among
people. Hume says in the Enquiries,
The notion ofmorals implies some sentiment common to all mankind,
which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes
every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision
concerning it. (EPM 9.5; SBN 272)
He also says that moral sentiments are "so universal and comprehensive as
to extend to all mankind" (ibid.). Hume's universality is different from the Kantian
universality, not a universality with no exception, but rather a generality. Everyone
has a personal relation to an object. Therefore, the personal sentiment toward the
object is different from person to person. If one object commands a general
approbation among human beings, it is because of theparticularity that causes
similar sentiments in observers. Moral sentiments have the particularity of
commending the same object as equally pleasant for people in general. This is
particular because objects have a different effect on people in accordance with their
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particular situation. For example, someone's ambition, say his high social status, does
not cause everyone the same pleasure as the person himself. Hume's fundamental
innovation is to seek for the locus of generality not in the original constitution of
human beings, but in the perception ofmoral objects. This is why moral sentiments
10
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can produce an agreement among people. Agreement regarding the perception of
moral situations is crucial for moral behaviour. It is the basis for meaningful
discussion; by sharing the same recognition as to a moral situation, human beings
can have similar responses, which make human cooperation possible.
On the other hand, in the moral sense theories that have individual human
beings as independent moral agents, common sentiments can only be those that
originate from individuals. Most typically the egoistic sentiments are such: selfish
sentiments to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain are common.19 However, the selfish
sentiments cannot serve as moral sentiments, even if found commonly among human
beings, because they cannot commend the same things as good to be pursued to
everyone. For example, precious metal, apart from its aesthetic pleasure, can cause a
particular pleasure only to its possessor; to the selfish sentiment, precious metal is
good only to the possessor, but worthless for others. This is why Hume thinks selfish
20 • •sentiment cannot become a moral sentiment. By the same token, altruistic
sentiments, were they to be found universally among human beings, could not be
moral sentiments as they are, because an altruistic act for one person does not mean
the same thing for another. Among perfectly altruistic persons, there will be a
conflict as to how to make the desire for altruism compatible among them. In terms
ofmoral perception, altruistic sentiments alone cannot produce a general agreement
as to the moral value of an object. Another method of agreeing what good and bad
objects are will be necessary. That method is what the Humean moral sentiments
18 1 nSocial contract theories based on the agreement of people are a reverse way of discovering
morality; moral perception brings agreement, therefore, what people agreement represent
morality. But as morality lies in perceptions, agreement as a mere result does not guarantee
morality (see Chapter 7).
19
Contrary to its appearance, to make an egoistic sentiment eligible as a moral sentiment is by no
means a bizarre idea. In fact, Hobbes, for example, tries to set it as the basis of his moral theory,
which is one ofHume's main targets of criticism.
20
It is obvious that Hume has Hobbes and Mandeville as targets of criticism. Hobbes develops a
different story taking egoistic sentiment as a common standard (see Chapter 6).
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purport to present, which can be applicable regardless of the moral quality of the
1
human constitution itself.
(c) Justice as an Artificial Virtue
Immediately after having established the theory ofmoral distinction, Hume proceeds
to discuss justice. There is no doubt that Hume has a clear intention of revising the
natural law theories ofjustice by transferring them onto the foundation of human
nature. He introduces the discussion by asking whether justice is a natural or an
artificial virtue. In asking this, he again points to the causal aspect of the morality of
justice. He argues that justice cannot be a natural virtue because there is no cause in
nature that produces justice. Hume then explains the process by which justice comes
to be established as virtue from the natural and psychological condition of human
beings. Justice is reduced to the manner in which human beings cope with each other
with limited but sufficient resources to sustain themselves: here is the reason why
Humean justice signifies an unintended explanation of distributive justice. Though
justice is artificial, Hume claims that it is by no means arbitrary. He derives the rules
ofjustice from the psychological tendency of human beings to feel attachment to
their possessions. Thus, Hume proposes that the convention of adhering to one's own
possessions and not violating others' possessions is the basis of the first law of
justice of ordering the stability of possessions. In this way, he depicts justice as a
feasible rule not inherent in a natural principle.
Hume then provides the rules of deciding property. He declines both the
Hobbesian theory of the order by the sovereign and the Lockean labour theory. He
indicates as the first rule "present occupation". This shows that he recognises
property fundamentally as a matter of custom. As the second law ofjustice, Hume
maintains the law of transference of properties by consent. Hume conceives the
concept of consent as the derivative means for adjusting the property relationship,
preparing his criticism of social contract theories. In this way, he explains the system
that derives from the development of human interaction centring on property.
21
Later chapters will show that this signifies a criticism of the image of human beings as the
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Based on the first two laws, he proposes the last law ofjustice, the
implementation of promise. Hume explains the third law ofjustice with similarly
detailed argument as he employs in arguing the law ofproperty. He argues that there
is no natural motive in implementing promise. Hume considers that promise becomes
necessary when the transference of properties is conducted on a larger scale. Because
of physical limitations, there are cases where people cannot physically observe the
changes ofproperty ownership. Then, promise serves as a convenient vehicle for
conducting such commerce. More generally, promise enables the non-simultaneous
exchange of labour which is the basic form ofmutual cooperation. Thus promise is
established from convention. It turns out that promise is the most comprehensive of
all moral systems that enables all kinds of social arrangements. With the system of
promise, the potential social system expands drastically. It is no wonder that social
contract theories regard promise as the most fundamental basis ofmorality.
After establishing the three laws ofjustice, Hume discusses the origin of
government. Hume finds the origin of government in the weakness of human mind;
though people acknowledge the observance of the rules ofjustice, when their self-
interest is at stake, they tend to become blind to them, and are quite easily induced to
break them. Therefore, they agree to establish a political authority whose task is to
force people to observe justice. Government, once established, can command
cooperative tasks that are beyond the personal capacity of any individual. In this way
large scale projects ofpublic enterprises are carried out through government
initiative. Hume shares the idea of basic functions of government with Locke.
However, unlike Locke, Hume clearly states that the foundation of government is not
promise. For one thing, there is no factual credibility that government is established
by promise, and for the other, Hume understands that the most fundamental
condition for the functioning of government is the allegiance of the people, rather
than their consent.
Hume calls government "composition" or even "the finest and most subtle
invention" (T 3.2.7.8; SBN 539). He discusses government in a like manner as he
discusses property. In both cases, the principle that supports the system is custom
creature ofGod, whether sinful or moral.
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whose essence is the sense of attachment. Just as he discussed the rules of deciding
property, Hume discusses the rules that confer authority on government. He
maintains as the first principle—long occupation. This is clear evidence that he
conceives the theory of government in the same line of argument as the system of
property. However, he is no advocate of passive obedience. Hume supports the
Glorious Revolution, and asserts the right to resist to protect the liberty of the public
for public interest, even though he deems it absurd to establish exact rules that
stipulate when revolutions are desirable.
(d) Natural Virtue
After establishing artificial virtue, Hume discusses natural virtues, with which he
intends to complete the moral system of the Treatise. Hume explains the natural
virtues in terms of their tendency that makes us approve individually. They have the
direct tendency to increase the good of society. The difference between artificial and
natural virtues consists in the fact that natural virtue produces the good on the basis
of individual action, and artificial virtue produces good only when mankind concurs
in a general scheme. After the scheme of law and justice is established, it is
accompanied by "a strong sentiment ofmorals" which proceed from "our sympathy
with the interests of society" (T 3.3.1.12; SBN 580).
Hume considers a possible objection to his theory that if sympathy is the
origin of approval, it would be hard to explain the variableness of sympathy in a
manner compatible with the requirement ofmorality as the stability ofmoral
approval. In order to answer this challenge, he claims that we place our selves in
"some steady and general points of view" (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581-582) to prevent
contradiction and to reach the stable judgment of things. It is noteworthy that Hume
uses the concept of the general point of view for the first time at this late stage. He
compares this process to a correction that we make in terms of sensory judgements.
At the same time, Hume suggests that sympathy with someone who has commerce
with the people we judge is the most convenient means to set the stable standard.
Hume indicates four sources of character traits that produce moral pleasure or pain:
qualities that are useful or pleasant either to others or to the person that possesses
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them. He excludes from the sources ofmoral approval the interest of the observers,
apparently reflecting his criticism of the egoistic moral theory. He asserts that unless
people choose a general point of view from which to view things, people's feeling
and judgement cannot agree with each other. According to Hume, moral interest and
pleasure are constant and universal, and only produce particular feelings or pleasures.
Hume discusses the application of the four general principles to concrete
cases of virtues and vices. He first explains the mechanism by which pride is
regarded as vice, and humility is regarded as virtue through the principles of
sympathy and comparison. Then he discusses goodness and benevolence, and asserts
that a general and stable standard leads all people to the same moral evaluation of the
good quality. He says that when a person has no undesirable relations with people
around him, and with himself, then his character can be considered perfect.
As the final main point of natural virtues, Hume discusses "natural abilities".
He remarkably claims that there is no real distinction between the natural ability and
the moral virtues, because both are equally mental qualities, and are no different in
producing pleasures. In other words, both are in the same standing in terms of causes
and effects, thus it is not even possible to distinguish them strictly. Hume explicitly
criticises moral theories that ascribe moral value to those people who have the best
intentions without accompanying good effects. This can be understood as evidence
ofHume's consistent project in the Treatise of liberating morality from a narrow
confinement to cover the whole range of human activities. Though he makes a
famous remark that virtue in rug is still a virtue, this makes sense only as derivative;
if the virtue in good cloth has no good effects, then it would not be a virtue. He also
asserts that the distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" does not make a
difference to moral evaluation. By this assertion, Hume criticises the view that
ascribes responsibility to free will. The implication ofHume's thesis that moral
distinction derives from the pleasant or painful sentiment we perceive from the
general contemplation of the quality or character. It is not essential whether the
quality is produced voluntarily or not. This is also a result ofHume's position
regarding the problem of liberty and necessity. Even if there is no room for free will
in human behaviour, its does not mean moral responsibility is impossible. In this way,
Hume excludes a theological or non-natural origin ofmorality, and elucidates
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morality as a thoroughly human matter that covers the entire range of human
activities, including especially the economic. At the same time, Hume's moral theory
implicitly and explicitly criticises many rival theories such as egoist theory,
rationalist theory, and theological theory.
2. The "General Point of View" in the Treatise
In order to discuss the significance of the general point of view, it is first necessary,
to identify the idea of the general point ofview, as well as its equivalent phrases, by
showing the exact context in which Hume expresses it.
After clarifying that moral sentiments are a particular pleasure, Hume
qualifies the sentiments as follows.
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from
characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or
condemn. The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may
still command our esteem and respect. 'Tis only when a character is
considered in general, without reference to our particular interest,
that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally
good or evil. 'Tis true, those sentiments, from interest and morals, are
apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one another. It seldom
happens, that we do not think an enemy vicious, and can distinguish
betwixt his opposition to our interest and real villainy or baseness. But
this hinders not, but that the sentiments are, in themselves, distinct; and
a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these
illusions. (T 3.1.2.4; SBN 472, italics Hume, bold letters mine)
Hume emphasises that moral sentiments must be given from the general view
that is of an empirical nature.
Thus we are still brought back to our first position, that virtue is
distinguish'd by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action,
sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation.
This decision is very commodious; because it reduces us to this simple
question, Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey,
gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness?, in order to show the origin
of its moral rectitude or depravity, without looking for any
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incomprehensible relations and qualities, which never did exist in
nature, nor even in our imagination, by any clear and distinct
conception. I flatter myself I have executed a great part of my present
design by a state of the question, which appears to me so free from
ambiguity and obscurity (T 3.1.2.11; SBN 475-476, italics Hume).
Evidence that Hume is conscious of the general point of view is that he
recognises the opposite concept as the source of immorality as seen below.
'Twas, therefore, with a view to this inconvenience, that men have
established those principles, and have agreed to restrain themselves by
general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by
particular views of private or public interest. These rules, then, are
artificially invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to the
common principles of human nature, which accommodate themselves
to circumstances, and have no stated invariable method of operation. (T
3.2.6.9; SBN 532-533, bold letters mine)
Hume very commonly describes sentiments as resulting from "view", and
moral sentiments as "general". Then, Hume considers a doubt to his theory that
moral esteem does not proceed from sympathy, because sympathy varies without a
variation in our esteem. In his answer to this question, he relies heavily on the
concept of the general point of view.
To this I answer: The approbation of moral qualities most certainly is
not deriv'd from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds
entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or
disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular
qualities or characters. Now 'tis evident, that those sentiments,
whence-ever they are deriv'd, must vary according to the distance or
contiguity of the objects; nor can I feel the same lively pleasure from
the virtues of a person, who liv'd in Greece two thousand years ago,
that I feel from the virtues of a familiar friend and acquaintance. Yet I
do not say, that I esteem the one more than the other: And therefore, if
the variation of the sentiment, without a variation of the esteem, be an
objection, it must have equal force against every other system, as
against that of sympathy. But to consider the matter a-right, it has no
force at all; and 'tis the easiest matter in the world to account for it. Our
situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual
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fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little
time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man
has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible
we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were
each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear
from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent
those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable
judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of
view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them,
whatever may be our present situation. In like manner, external
beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and 'tis evident, a beautiful
countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance
of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer us. We say not, however,
that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will
have in such a position, and by that reflection we correct its momentary
appearance.
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable,
according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the
person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the present disposition of
our mind. But these variations we regard not in our general
decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or
dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in one point of view.
Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or
at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable.... Such corrections are common with regard
to all the senses; and indeed 'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use
of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not
correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present
situation. (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582, italics Hume, bold letters mine)
Hume emphasises that the general point of view is the standard ofmoral
judgment for correcting our particular and momentary sentiment.
The seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind: And the emotions
they excite are of a like species with those, which proceed from the
real consequences of objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these
emotions are so different in their feeling, that they may often be
contrary, without destroying each other; as when the fortifications of a
city belonging to an enemy are esteem'd beautiful upon account of their
strength, tho' we cou'd wish that they were entirely destroy'd. The
imagination adheres to the general views of things, and
distinguishes betwixt the feelings they produce, and those which
arise from our particular and momentary situation. (T 3.3.1.23,
SBN 586-587, italics Hume, bold letters mine)
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In a review of the section "Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices", he
reiterates that a common point of view enables people with different interests to
agree in the evaluation of characters.
But we shall easily satisfy ourselves on this head, when we
consider, that every particular person's pleasure and interest being
different, 'tis impossible men cou'd ever agree in their sentiments
and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view,
from which they might survey their object, and which might cause
it to appear the same to all of them. Now in judging of characters, the
only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is
that of the person himself, whose character is examin'd; or that of
persons, who have a connexion with him. And tho' such interests and
pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant
and universal, they counter-balance the latter even in practice, and are
alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality.
They alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment, on which
moral distinctions depend. (T 3.3.1.30; SBN 591, bold letters mine)
In the section "Of goodness and benevolence", Hume explains more
concretely what the general point of view is: a point of view of the close circle of the
person under evaluation.
We are quickly oblig'd to forget our own interest in our
judgments of this kind [a judgment of moral character], by reason of
the perpetual contradictions, we meet with in society and conversation,
from persons that are not plac'd in the same situation, and have not the
same interest with ourselves. The only point of view, in which our
sentiments concur with those of others, is, when we consider the
tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those, who
have any immediate connexion or intercourse with the person
possess'd of it. And tho' this advantage or harm be often very remote
from ourselves, yet sometimes 'tis very near us, and interests us
strongly by sympathy. This concern we readily extend to other cases,
that are resembling; and when these are very remote, our sympathy is
proportionably weaker, and our praise or blame fainter and more
doubtful. The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning
external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance: But tho'
the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard, by
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which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually diminish
by the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflection, arrive at a
more constant and established judgment concerning them. In like
manner, tho' sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves,
and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that
with persons near and contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences
in our calm judgments concerning the characters ofmen. Besides, that
we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every
day meet with persons, who are in a different situation from
ourselves, and who cou'd never converse with us on any reasonable
terms, were we to remain constantly in that situation and point of
view, which is peculiar to us. The intercourse of sentiments,
therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general
inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of
characters and manners. And tho' the heart does not always take part
with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet
are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company,
in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602-
603, bold letters mine)
In the section "Some farther reflexions concerning the natural virtues", he
once again clarifies that moral sentiments originate from the general view.
It has been observ'd, in treating of the passions, that pride and humility,
love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the
mind, body, orfortune; and that these advantages or disadvantages have
that effect by producing a separate impression of pain or pleasure. The
pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of
any action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and
gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a
fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred. We have assign'd
four different sources of this pain and pleasure; and in order to justify
more fully that hypothesis, it may here be proper to observe, that the
advantages or disadvantages of the body and offortune, produce a pain
or pleasure from the very same principles. The tendency of any object
to be useful to the person possess'd of it, or to others; to convey
pleasure to him or to others; all these circumstances convey an
immediate pleasure to the person, who considers the object, and
command his love and approbation. (T 3.3.5.1; SBN 614, bold letters
mine)
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As these quotations show, Hume apparently refers to the concept of "the
general point of view" with a substantially consistent meaning, even if he was not
strict about the exact phrasing of the idea. It is possible to consider that Hume has a
concrete idea of the concept. Therefore, it is important to consider the relation
between the concept and his theory of perception that is systematically developed in
Book 1. Put the other way around, unless the solid epistemological ground is
confirmed, Hume's theory ofmoral perception comes down to a very banal
admonition that says, "Think generally!"
3. Interpretations of the General Point of View
Let us survey the interpretations of the general point of view by Hume commentators.
I take up four representative interpretations which narrowly focus on the elucidation
• 22of the concept of general point of view. Before making my comments on them, I try
to convey the outline of their interpretation.
(a) Geoffrey Sayre-MeCord
Sayre-McCord's paper "On Why Hume's "General Point ofView" Isn't Ideal-and
Shouldn't Be" is a groundbreaking work on Hume's concept of the general point of
view (Sayre-McCord, 1994). For the first time in the major stage ofHume literature,
he brought the problem of the concept to light, and thematically considered Hume's
general point of view, especially clarifying the difference between Hume's general
point of view and Smith's ideal spectator, which was generally regarded as a
development of the general point of view and treated as a nearly equivalent
7^
concept. He clarifies that an important focus of the problem is whether the general
point of view is real or ideal/hypothetical.
22
There are more important articles thematically arguing the general point of view. I restrict
myself to dealing with only four because of space. However, I will refer to other essays as
necessary.
23
For example, John Rawls says, "a society is right when an ideal spectator endorses it" (Rawls,
1999a: 161). In my Master's Thesis, I argued that Hume's general point ofview should not be
identified with the Smithean ideal spectator (see Yajima, 1991).
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Sayre-McCord presents a clear interpretation of the general point of view that
it is not an ideal spectator's point of view. Admittedly, there seem to be clear
advantages of taking the general point of view as ideal observer theory; the general
point of view can clearly indicate a normative standard for moral judgement. But
Sayre-McCord objects to the understanding on the ground that "Hume's standard is a
both more human in scope and more accessible in practice that any set by an Ideal
Observer" (Sayre-McCord, 1994: 203). Though accessibility is important in Hume,
and there are apparently no means for ordinary human beings to become omniscient
or angelic sympathies. Hume's task is to explain our moral practice and justify it.
Thus, Sayre-McCord proposes that the general point of view accomplishes this
without resorting to the advantages of the Ideal Observer.
Our sympathetic responses vary in ways that are not reflected in our moral
judgement. Sympathy remains parochial and variable in ways moral judgements are
not, and is sensitive to actual effects. This is the weakness of the sentimentalist
reading. Therefore, our moral judgement is not simply a reflection of sympathy. It is
necessary to find ways ofexplaining how we can regulate sentiments' influence.
According to Sayre-McCord, Hume holds that our moral judgements are
appropriately guided not by how we individually feel at any given time, but instead
by how we all would feel were we to take up a general point of view. He interprets
the taking of the general point of view as what we would feel from a certain mutually
accessible point of view, emphasising that the general point of view must be
mutually accessible. Sayre-McCord points out that the situation is perfectly
analogous to all the others where we judge of things discovered by sense. In those
cases, our standard of correctness is found in how things would appear to a normal
observer in normal conditions, which is represented by the general point of view.
As to the reason why we should adopt the general point of view, Sayre-
McCord holds that it is to resolve conflict. Were we to remain in the situation
peculiar to ourselves, we will never be able to communicate. But intelligibility is not
the only reason for adopting the general point of view. Sayre-McCord understands
that adopting the general point of view is the basis ofmoral thinking, which is
absolutely crucial to a harmonious social life. Where our sentiments of approval and
disapproval are stable, we can have stable plans and projects. In order to embrace a
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standard that controls for sympathy's variation without losing sympathy's appeal, the
only way is to introduce a mutually accessible and stable perspective from which we
can all evaluate the world, which is the general point of view. According to Sayre-
McCord, the Ideal Spectator's point of view cannot serve this purpose, because it is
not sufficiently "accessible". He says,
Our estimates of the Ideal Observer's view of the effects of someone's
character will differ in exactly the way our judgements of the actual
effects differ. As a result, an Ideal Observer sets an inappropriate
standard, not simply because we cannot take up her position ourselves
(though we cannot), but because we cannot begin to anticipate what her
reactions might be. Ignorant as we all inevitably are of the actual,
subtle, and long-term effects of each person's character on everyone
who might be affected, even earnest attempts by all to determine how
an Ideal Observer would respond would leave us without a common
standard around which to coordinate our actions and evaluations. No
longer each speaking from her own peculiar point of view, each could
still be speaking from her own peculiar take on a point of view she
would not possibly occupy. And this means an Ideal Observer cannot
play the role that needs to be filled. (Sayre-McCord, 1994: 218)
In other words, the ideal observer's point of view would not resolve the conflict. On
the other hand, the general point of view which represents the usual effects of a
character is accessible, stable, and sufficiently univocal, thus serves as the standard
to resolve conflicts. Thus, Sayre-McCord asserts that the advantage of the general
point of view over other standards is that it is accessible to all of us. Because of the
accessibility, he concludes, we can join "the party of human kind against vice or
disorder, its common enemy" (EPM 9.9; SBN 275).
(b) Rachel Cohon
Rachel Cohon calls Hume's concept of the general point of view "the common point
of view" (Cohon, 1997a). In her "The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics",
she first indicates that there are two problems regarding the interpretation of the
common (general) point of view, which she summarises as follows.
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First, moral evaluations become inductive, empirical beliefs about what
we would feel if we really occupied the imagined common point of
view, and hence are the deliverances of causal reason; this contradicts
Hume's claim that the making of a moral evaluation is not an activity of
reason but of sentiment. Secondly, given Hume's thesis that the
passions do not represent anything else, he cannot say that our moral
evaluations will better represent the object being judged if they are
made from the common point of view. This leaves no clear reason to
adopt it, rather than making judgments from our real position. Hume
says that left to our particular point of view, we will encounter
contradictions and be unable to communicate, but it is hard to see why.
(Cohon, 1997a: 827)
Cohon finds the reason Hume introduces the common point of view in his
replies to two criticisms: one is that the sentiments of sympathy are variable in
accordance with the distance from the object, though moral judgement should be
stable; the other is that we do not disregard virtue even if the virtue is in rags, and
does not have any real effect. According to Cohon, it is in order to reply to those two
objections that Hume introduces the stipulation that we make moral evaluations from
the common point of view. Taking the common point of view, as Cohon understands,
is to treat moral judgements as cognitions, especially, beliefs (frequently
counterfactual ones) about what someone or anyone would feel if she occupied a
point of view close to the person being evaluated. This would make moral
evaluations inductive, empirical beliefs, presumably based on past experience of the
effects ofpeople's character traits on themselves and their closest associates.
However, Cohon holds that the moral beliefs obtained from the general
point of view can be taken as the deliverances of causal reason. Then, she claims that
it contradicts Hume's explicit claims that to make a moral evaluation is not to infer
or conclude but to feel in a certain way, and that making a moral evaluation is not an
activity of causal reason but of sentiment. This is a problem because this can
undermine Hume's antirationalism and his sentimentalist position. To this problem
of the compatibility of taking the general point of view with his sentimentalism,
Cohon answers that:
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we feel certain passions from our particular vantage point, and
whenever we contemplate the same character from the common point
of view we feel another, weaker sentiment. That is, we feel two
sentiments toward that same character trait. (Cohon, 1997a: 836)
Therefore, the general point of view, which produces inferential sentiments, does not
exclude the sentimentalist reading. Cohon maintains that the two sentiments
correspond to calm and violent sentiments. Thus, the common point of view provides
calm and steady sentiments. When the two sentiments differ, violent sentiment, with
all its fluctuations, is corrected. But Cohon claims that
The situated sentiment is the general principle of our praise or blame in
the sense that it is the general origin or source of what later becomes
our praise or blame.... So it [the situated sentiment] is the moral
sentiment, properly so-called, although under the best conditions, in
which the steady sentiment converts the situated one, there really is no
issue of which is the moral sentiment properly so-called. (Cohon,
1997a: 839)
In this way, as Cohon argues the moral sentiments are not confined to the
ones that is obtained from the general point of view, she faces the problem of why it
is that we need to take the general point of view when situated sentiments are already
moral sentiments. Therefore, her second question results from her answer to the first
question. She says that since Hume asserts that passions do not represent anything,
there is no guarantee that taking the common point of view produces a better moral
evaluation than otherwise.
In order to answer this problem, Cohon points out that our moral judgments
need to be uniform, mostly "because our moral evaluations always carry with them
certain other judgments that are objective" (Cohon, 1997a: 840). Cohon holds that
because of this extra-moral judgment, moral judgment should be uniform. She
apparently agrees with Sayre-McCord that the general point of view gives us not a
panorama, but an intimate glimpse. It is a viewpoint of those who have a connexion
with the person considered. Cohon recognizes an important function ofmoral
judgment to convey important information. Just as we need a stable point of view to
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inform others about objects, we need the common point of view in moral information.
This is why the ultimate test ofmoral quality is the information of those who are
nearest to the person. Thus, she holds that the common point of view with those is
"an intimate glimpse of the person herself and her nearest associate" (Cohon 1997a,
p. 845). She says,
The common point of view is a privileged position from which to make
moral evaluations because it is a privileged position from which to
make causal judgments about pride, humility, love and hatred, and
moral evaluations are inseparable from these. (Cohon 1997a, p. 846)
In Cohon's understanding, "Hume is not giving an account of what it is for
moral judgments to be warranted... he is only explaining the uniformity he observes
in them" (ibid.). Thus, according to Cohon, taking the common point of view is not
necessary for making moral judgment. She says,
On my interpretation, then, Hume does not say that we should make
moral evaluations from the common point of view because only such
judgments are well-grounded. If someone makes her moral judgments
not from the perspective of her own interest (this would be wrong kind
of sentiment altogether), but from the situated sentiments she feels
when she contemplates character traits in general from her peculiar
point of view, rather than from common point of view, her resulting
judgment is not false and not lacking needed support. (Cohon, 1997a:
847)
In short, Cohon understands the common point of view not as a specifically
moral point of view nor as a point of view for justification; she takes "the common
point of view as a mere fine-tuning ofHume's moral theory, not an overhaul" (ibid.).
(c) Christine Korsgaard
Korsgaard's paper, "The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in
Hume's Ethics" is an interesting twist to interpretations of the general point of view
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(Korsgaard, 1999). As she acknowledges, she does not attempt to be loyal to Hume,
but to extend the possibility in Hume in a direction that might realise interesting
theory, especially about the complex relation between loving someone and thinking
him good or virtuous. Her leading questions in the argument are to explore "why we
take up the general point of view", and "why we are inclined to think that the
judgments we make from it are normative" (Korsgaard, 1999: 4).
First of all, we cannot appeal to moral ideas in order to explain why we take
up the general point of view in the first place. Korsgaard understands that virtue and
vice are intimately related to love and hatred in Hume. She modifies the problem into
different terms ofwhy there should be a normative standard for love. Then,
Korsgaard indicates that the idea of a cause of love can be subject to a normative
standard (Korsgaard, 1999: 9). She finds here the key to explaining why we take up
the general point of view.
According to Hume, love can be caused by many things, such as nonmoral
psychological attributes, physical attributes, external goods and virtue (Korsgaard,
1999:10). However, virtue is not just one of the many causes of love, but — at least
"with regard to our mental qualities", the cause of love. Hume seems to maintain that
moral approval is a calm species of love, because it is founded on a distant view or
reflection. Korsgaard explains the relation between love and moral approval as
follows.
When we view a person from the general point of view, we feel a
particular calm species of love or hate, which is moral approval or
disapproval. The qualities that arouse these calm passions are the ones
we call "virtue" or "vices." But these are not merely particular forms of
love and hate, on a footing with our more personal and unregulated
passions. Moral approval and disapproval are corrective of, and
normative for, our more violent personal loves and hates. (Korsgaard,
1999: 12)
In this way, Korsgaard translates the question why we take up the general
point of view into why should there be a normative standard for love and why the
Chapter 1 45
Hume's General Point of View
general point of view should provide the standard. Korsgaard summarises Hume's
own answer to these questions as follows.
So Hume cites, as the reason we need to take up the general point of
view, the need to avoid the contradictory judgments of unregulated
sympathy, the need to stabilize all sensory judgments, and the need to
converse on some agreed terms. (Korsgaard, 1999: 14)
It is important and necessary, therefore, that there be some shared point of view other
than that one we use. But Korsgaard still questions why a shared standard has to exist,
if it is necessary for our conversation or for avoiding contradictions. She says, "the
answer cannot be that our judgements about virtue are contradictory until we take up
the general point of view, since we make no moral judgements at all until after we
take up the general point of view" (Korsgaard, 1999: 16-7). We might be indifferent
to whether or not we concur with others in our loves and hates.
Thus, Korsgaard asserts that there is no answer in Hume's text as to the
question why we take up the general point of view, and why we take the judgements
we make from the general point of view to be normative. She argues that the answer
lies in the reason we need to come to some sort of agreement about what makes a
character lovable. No one is recognised as lovable or responsible to some action
unless she is not a cause of an action. Therefore, Korsgaard claims that "to think
someone as a person, we must think of her as having a character" (Korsgaard, 1999:
29).
In order for people to be recognised as having a character, people must be
placed among the members of their narrow circle. Their character exists only in the
eyes of their narrow circle. Therefore, according to Korsgaard, "to see you as having
a character is essentially to take up the point of view of your narrow circle towards
you". She points out the factual link of treating people as a person and having the
general point of view. She sums it up as follows.
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We can now see why the general point of view is essential. To
view someone through the eyes of love or hate is to respond to him as a
person. To respond to him as a person is to view him as having a
character. To view him as having a character is to view him as a cause,
that is, a regular source, of happiness and misery to himself and others.
And to view him as such a cause is to view him through the eyes of his
narrow circle, that is, from the general point of view. A person's
character, his personhood, is constructed from the general point of view.
Thus the pressure to take up the general point of view is built into the
original connection between love and its object, a person. (Korsgaard,
1999:32)
Korsgaard explains why moral approval is normative for love in general. As
Hume separates cause and object in the case of love of people, it is impossible to
love people for themselves. But if moral love is the love of character, and character is
the person himself, then, Korsgaard insists, we can love the person for himself, by
loving his character. Moral approval should be grounded in appreciation of character.
She holds "external beauty, rank, or money" cannot rightly be regarded as the
inherent standard for loving a person. Just as baking a cake implies making it taste
good, or the notion of knife implies sharpness, "love by its very nature aspires to be
the love of character, to find its ground in the person himself' (Korsgaard, 1999: 34).
In this way, Korsgaard answers to the question why we take up the general point of
view when we think about and respond to people. She sums up her answer as follows.
We take up the general point of view because that is the point
of view from which others appear to us as persons. If love and
sympathy did not impel us to view the world from the general point of
view, our fellow human beings would just be so many useful or
dangerous objects to us. According to Hume, it is only when we view
the world from the general point of view that the moral world ... the
world composed of people who have characters and perform actions ...
comes into focus. (Korsgaard, 1999: 35)
In this way, Korsgaard connects the general point of view with the respect of person.
It is possible to see that, as a hard-line Kantian, she attempts to present a Kantian
interpretation ofHume's theory.
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(d) Kathleen Wallace
Kathleen Wallace in her "Hume on Regulation Belief and Moral Sentiment"
interprets the general point of view as a focusing activity, employing a photographic
analogy (Wallace, 2002: 83-111). According to her interpretation, the general point
of view is a device for "strengthening of sentiments for those remote and weakening
of sentiments for those near" (Wallace, 2002: 83). Wallace claims that her
interpretation does not undermine Hume's sentimentalist thesis, but explains how
sentiments are properly aroused and directed. She thinks that proper moral
sentiments can be understood in a similar manner as the regulation of belief. Proper
moral sentiments are like regulated beliefs. Wallace says, "regulating consists in the
mitigation, not the wholesale elimination, of the influence of uncorrected beliefs and
passions. (Wallace, 2002: 89)" She allies with Sayre-McCord and Elizabeth
Radcliffe in thinking there are incorrect moral sentiments prior to the general point of
view to be corrected by the general point of view.24 Wallace says,
A general point of view eases inter or intra-individual conflict
(inconstancy and variation) as well as the tendency toward partiality in
one's sympathy by focusing attention on relevant character traits and
their typical effects so that the appropriate moral sentiments can be
aroused via the mechanism of sympathy. (Wallace, 2002: 93)
Therefore, the general point of view can attain "steady and impartial evaluation".
Wallace claims that the broader one's intercourse with others, the more one comes to
realise the need for a common point of view (Wallace, 2002: 94). She thinks that the
mind creates the general point of view by the "imaginative act of focusing" (ibid.),
which she explains by using the analogy of a photographer selecting and focusing
and in so doing creating a subject matter. In this way, she claims, the natural
sympathetic responses of human beings become "impartial". Wallace takes the
24
Elizabeth Radcliffe questions whether, for Hume, moral judgments are based on actual human
feeling, or on the hypothetical feelings of an ideal spectator. She argues that it is based on the
actual human sentiments (Radcliff, 1994: 37-58).
Chapter 1 48
Hume's General Point of View
general point of view as "something invented" by imagination. In her analogy, she
alleges three characteristics in the general point of view, a) a general point of view
can make sympathy more extensive, b) a general point of view allows one to produce
the appropriate vividness in the idea of the effects of a person's character traits, c) a
general point of view facilitates the process of causal reasoning about the matters of
fact in question (Wallace, 2002: 95). She notices that Hume tends to emphasize more
the defects in our judgement on those distant from us due to the weakness of their
impact on us, rather than the vivacity of self-interest and partiality in assessing those
who are close to us. But she understands that we correct defective judgements of
overestimation by taking the general point of view.
Another important point in Wallace's interpretation is that she tries to
understand taking the general point of view as an analogous process to that of
correcting beliefs. She understands that the regulation ofmoral sentiments involves a
contrariety just as the regulation of belief involves a mitigating or weakening of an
incorrect belief through contrariety. She summarises the process of the spectator
making moral evaluation in the following ways.
1. to attend to those to whom s/he might otherwise be indifferent (and thus
underestimate their character),
2. to be more judicious in assessing those to whom s/he might be partial
(and thus overestimate their character),
3. to make more accurate discernment of the causal relations involved as
attention settles on the character traits or qualities and their tendencies
rather than the particular persons,
4. to have the moral sentiments ofpraise and blame aroused by the steady
contemplation of the character traits and their usual tendencies,
5. (with reasonable discourse) to generate more general principles by which
to assess character traits, that is, by which to apportion praise and blame.
(Wallace, 2002: 96-97)
Wallace thinks that moral judgment is a result of these processes. It does not matter
for her whether these are done through conscious efforts or through unconscious
habit. As to the problem between the "conscious efforts" interpretation and the
"unconscious habit" interpretation that William Davie formulated, Wallace thinks
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that it can be both.25 She applies the analogy ofHume's "wise men" (T 1.3.13.12;
SBN 150) who apportion to evidence as a matter of habit. On the other hand, "the
vulgar" habitually make unsound inferences; for them adoption of the general point
of view comes from conscious effort. Wallace holds that regulation is the crucial
factor to have moral belief, and that there would be no common morals at all, without
the general point of view (Wallace, 2002: 100). She holds that the difference between
the regulation with regard to belief and with regard to morals is that in the case of
belief, the conflict is just within one's own mental activity, but in the case ofmorals,
it is social. She formulates the differences as follows.
In Hume's characterization regulation in morals requires in some
respects an opposite move from that required in causal reasoning. In
the latter, the tendency of the mind is to overextend itself by not
distinguishing carefully between accidental and essential connections.
... In morals, the case is more complicated in that one has to both
employ the regulative rules of causal reasoning that involves narrowing,
and from a general point of view that requires a broadening of one's
point of view, and intensifying of focus so that the relevant object(s),
that is, persons, can appropriately affects one's sympathy. (Wallace,
2002:100)
Wallace thinks that to have impartial moral beliefs it is necessary to broaden one's
view and have broad sympathy. She emphasises that the regulation ofmorals consists
not in the wholesale replacement of incorrect belief, but in the production of
impartial judgement (Wallace, 2002: 102). Hume's reasonable person, or the
"judicious spectator", would focus on the relevant facts and put oneself in the point
of view that would allow moral sentiments of appropriation and disapprobation to be
appropriately aroused and enlivened.
4, Meaning and Significance of "The General Point of View"
25
William Davie, "Hume's General Point of View", Davie compares two interpretations of the
general point of view, whether it requires conscious efforts or it is an unconscious habit. He
concludes in favour of the unconscious habit interpretation (Davie, 1998: 275-94).
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Now let me clarify the understanding of the concept of the general point of view
through examining the interpretations of above commentators. These four
commentators and their diverse interpretations indicate a fairly accurate picture of
the present interpretative situation of the general point of view.
First, Sayre-McCord's contribution is to have clarified that the general point
of view is not a moral ideal. He successfully clarifies that to take the general point of
view as an ideal spectator's point of view is to confuse Hume's theory with the
idealist theory. He considers inaccessibility to be the reason why the ideal spectator's
point of view cannot be a moral point of view. If the ideal spectator's point of view
should be the moral point of view, every person must decide individually which is
the ideal spectator's point of view. Thus there will be no concurrence in moral
communication. However, it does not seem that Sayre-McCord solved all the
problems regarding the general point of view.
First of all, he does not clarify the exact definition of the concept. Though
Sayre-McCord seems to take the point of view of one's close circle as the general
point of view, mere accessibility is a weak condition for deciding the general point of
view. For example, his understanding does not exclude the delight of the closed
circle of a successful thief from moral approval. He holds that the general point of
view tells us how things would appear to a normal observer in normal conditions.
But, who this normal observer is, and what normal conditions are, cannot be
determined without problems. The general point of view is what shows this
normality. Sayre-McCord's understanding of the point of view of one's close circle
as the general point of view does not explain how the general point of view becomes
normative. In the discussion ofjustice, Hume clearly rejects the point of view of
one's close circle as the cause of injustice. If, as Sayre-McCord and others maintain,
the point of view of one's close circle is the general point of view, then the general
point of view does not apply to Hume's theory ofjustice. Also, though Sayre-
McCord claims that the reason we take the general point of view is to avoid conflict,
he does not show how this is possible: it is far from obvious why we can avoid
conflict by taking the general point of view. Unless he shows the grounds, it would
mean that Hume arbitrarily demands that we agree with the opinion of the close
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circle of the person we consider for avoiding conflicts. Though Sayre-McCord
argues that the general point of view is not an ideal point of view, he does not show
how it still is a moral point of view. As he denies the ideal spectator's point of view
on the grounds that it does not have a prospect of realizing morality, he is obliged to
show how the general point of view realizes morality.
If Sayre-McCord's initial point can be understood to mean that morality
emerges from experience, then, my claim that custom provides the general point of
view seems to fit nicely with Sayre-McCord's view. On the other hand, if he asserts
that the condition for morality is empirical validity, he needs to show that the general
point of view functions as a principle also in promoting morality on a social scale.
He does not indicate any connection of the concept with Hume's theory ofjustice.
But as I will discuss in later chapters, the general point of view can be shown to be
the principle ofjustice. Unless Hume's epistemology and the theory ofjustice can be
explicated consistently by the same concept, it cannot be said that Hume's moral
theory is empirical. The general point of view should be such a principle, if it is the
moral point of view. It is regrettable that Sayre-McCord's argument falls short of
making this point explicit.
Cohon's central claim is that the general point of view is not the moral point
of view, but is helpful to tune the moral sentiments. Though she does not deepen our
understanding of the concept of the general point of view, she may represent a
common view among many Hume readers. First of all, she chooses to use the term
"the common point of view" to refer to the general point of view, though she does
not show at all why she prefers this term. Hume clearly implies a particular
significance in that concept of generality. Hume deploys the concept of custom in the
explanation of general ideas. Because the general point of view is imbedded in the
concept of custom, it has to do with generality. To say the least, it needs to be made
clear that Hume's moral perception signifies the generality of a particular view in the
sense he discusses in his criticism of Lockean abstract ideas. "Point of view" is
related to Hume's moral standard because Hume's theory in the Treatise is a theory
of perceptions which emerge from a point of view. A point of view presents a
Chapter 1 52
Hume's General Point of View
particular view, and the general point of view does not mean any substantive position
in itself, but rather a manner ofperception that connects the particular to a generality.
Despite Cohon's concern about taking "the common point of view" as an
inferential process, Hume never argues that taking the general point ofview is
inferential, or the working of reason. If this is clear, Cohon's challenge undermines
itself. She challenges the view of assuming the essential role of the general point of
view in making moral judgments. However, she does not show a strong ground for
this. Her grounds are simply negative; because passion is an original quality, there is
no guarantee that the general point of view represents morality. It should be clear that
Hume does not say moral sentiments are arbitrary by the claim that passions are an
original quality. Cohon mistakenly understands that the general point of view
signifies an inferential process, because she does not see any connection between the
general point of view and Hume's epistemology. Cohon claims that the reason we
take the general point of view is because moral judgments are accompanied by non-
moral objective facts. But this is not Hume's view. Hume's general point of view
explains morality, and not, as Cohon interprets, accompanying features ofmorality.
Cohon's interpretation, which might be common, reveals the importance of
understanding Hume's moral theory in connection to his epistemology. Besides,
Hume's concept of objectivity should not simply be presupposed without close
examination.
Unlike Cohon, Hume defines the general point of view as the moral point of
view. Ifmoral sentiments carry no feature of normativity in their creation, Hume's
moral theory is no more than a psychological or sociological description of
something unknown, but vaguely understood "morality". In fact, Hume's
fundamental intention is to show how it is that morality, without relying on the
rational faculty of reason, can still be non-arbitrary and cause order and stability
among people. Hume's general point of view will not properly be understood unless
its origin is elucidated. By failing to notice the peculiar moral significance of the
general point of view, Cohon loses sight of the connection between Hume's theory of
morality and objective fact, and closes the possibility of understanding the role and
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significance of the general point of view in the formation of social stability and
political order.
Korsgaard's Kantian interpretation inadvertently reveals some characteristics
of the general point of view. First of all, her first assumption of identifying moral
sentiments with love and hatred, on which her entire thesis depends, is already
questionable. As Don Garrett indicates, it is wrong to reduce Hume's moral
sentiments to love and hatred, even though moral sentiments can produce love and
hatred as the case may be (Garrett, 2001: 214). They are "particular" sentiments.
Hume's moral sentiments are not love and hatred because the moral sentiments are
more widely concerned with all kinds ofmental activities beyond passions.
Korsgaard is mistaken to think that one should not morally evaluate others for
"external beauty, rank, or money". This is a typically Kantian prejudice. Hume
positively includes those as causes ofmoral approbation.
However, her major claim lies in her exposition ofwhy we take the general
point of view in making moral judgment. Simply put, she asserts that it is in order to
recognize others as a person. Again, as Korsgaard herself says, this is not Hume's
view. Hume does not consider respecting a person as the final objective in the claim
ofmorality, neither does he think that unless we recognize other peoples' characters,
we in fact treat others merely as so many useful or dangerous objects to us. Even if
we do not know other peoples' characters, we will avoid injuring them on the
working of sympathy. The person is not a central concept in Hume's ethics, because
Hume is more focused on moral situations, and on the creation ofmoral institutions,
which are not composed of persons, but produce the recognition of them. In this
respect, Hume's moral theory is oriented toward the system ofmorality rather than
individuals.
Moreover, Korsgaard wrongly identifies the general point of view with the
point of view of a close circle. As mere physical closeness does not guarantee the
moral point of view, it is necessary for her to clarify why Hume claims that a close
circle tends to present the moral standard. The general point of view has its ground in
Hume's epistemology. There is no concept of the general point of view in Kant's
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system. And the Humean person does not mean the end ofmorality in Hume's
system. Korsgaard has no means to connect the two. She thus fails to recognize the
comprehensive significance that bridges Hume's epistemology and his moral theory.
The concept of the general point of view makes no sense when taken out of the
context ofHume's whole theory.
Korsgaard asserts that there is "no answer" in Hume's text as to why we
take up the general point of view. But it is too early to agree with her. This is a very
unsympathetic way of reading philosophical theory. What is the evidence for her to
assert that there is no answer in Hume's text? Is it because Hume does not say,
"Look! Here is my answer why we should take up the general point of view"? There
is something fundamentally wrong about how she is looking for of the understanding
ofmorality in Hume. Even though Korsgaard is not totally unconscious of it, her
paper shows the danger of forcefully reading another philosophy into Hume.
Wallace has made a unique point by maintaining the analogy between taking
the general point of view and making corrections to beliefs. Though her argument
still remains in a rudimentary stage, it is an assertion of showing the connection
between Hume's epistemology and moral theory. Basically, she understands the
general point of view as a device for correcting moral sentiments. She also interprets
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Hume's moral sentiments as love and hatred. She seems to agree with Korsgaard
and some other commentators in recognizing the existence ofmoral sentiments
before taking the general point of view.27 But why it is possible to name sentiments
moral prior to taking the general point of view is not explained. She applies the
analogy of focusing from photography to the general point of view. While Wallace
claims that taking the general point of view is like narrowing or widening the focus
of the object of sympathy, it is hard to see more significance in her explanation than
mere metaphor. In her analogy, deciding the appropriate range of the focus is what it
means to take the general point of view. In that she does not explain how it is
26 This preconception is widespread because of the influence of Pall Ardal's Passion and Value
in Hume's Treatise (Ardal, 1966: passim). For my criticism ofArdal, see concluding chapter.
27
Charlotte Brown discusses this problem (Brown, 2001: 197-203).
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possible to decide the appropriate focus, her explanation is a tautology. Wallace
assumes that the focus is changed by widening the sympathy to the people concerned.
But Hume reveals his central point, that we cannot freely extend the objects of
sympathy, when he insists that there is no such a thing as the love ofmankind. In fact,
we do not know what to do to have sympathy with more people. My understanding
of the general point of view as the principle of custom seems to be able to overcome
Wallace's failure. Unlike Wallace's interpretation, the general point of view is not
concerned with a spatial analogy, but indicates an experiential connection with past
events.
Wallace explains what happens when a spectator makes a moral evaluation,
taking the general point of view as a five step process. She understands Hume's
theory ofmoral evaluation as a description of the process ofmoral judgment.
Obviously, she takes the general point of view as a technical device for adjusting
moral judgment, though for Hume it defines morality itself. Regarding the opposition
between the "unconscious habit" and "conscious efforts" interpretations, she claims
that the "wise man" takes the general point out of view unconscious habit, and the
"vulgar" needs conscious efforts. This is plainly wrong, as she does not show how to
distinguish the wise man from the vulgar. It needs to be stressed that Hume does not
offer a procedure for making a moral judgment. Rather, he explicates the correct
moral perception as consisting in the general point of view.
There is other evidence that Wallace misunderstands Hume's morality: she
treats beliefs and morality differently while insisting that the manner of corrections
are analogous. But this is wrong because morality in Hume is presented through the
theory of belief. To have wrong belief does not mean that the conflict is just within
my own mental activity. Hume's original claim is that there is no clear boundary
between my belief and public opinion; if someone has a wrong belief, it causes
confusion in society. Therefore, to have an appropriate belief is morally important.
Hume's general point of view is a standard for true moral belief. Ifmorality is
conceived as a special kind of causation, it cannot be fully elucidated without
exploring the argument of causation in Book 1. And if the general point of view
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represents the essence ofmorality, it should also be an underlying concept in
causation.
Common among the four commentators, and as far as I know all other
commentators who argue thematically about the concept of the general point of view,
is a neglect to consider the general point of view much beyond the narrow discussion
ofHume's theory ofmoral judgment. Also, they do not show the further connection
of the concept with the establishment of social institution such as justice or
allegiance to government. They do not define the general point of view exactly in
relation to the theory Hume develops in his epistemology. The general point of view
must be understood in reference to his epistemology, especially as composing the
core structure of custom. The general point of view, along with custom and
convention, is the central concept that penetrates and fundamentally characterizes the
whole Treatise. This dissertation attempts to show the whole significance of the
concept of the general point of view. And this new reading will decisively present the
whole Treatise fundamentally as a consistent moral theory.
5. Hume's Concept of "General Rules"
Beside "the general point of view", Hume's Treatise features another important
concept involved with generality, which is the concept of "general rules".28 It is
useful to explore the concept of general rules to clarify the particular significance of
the general point of view. Thomas Hearn's "General Rules in Hume's Treatise"
(Heam, 1970: 405-22) is regarded as a classic argument of this concept (cf. Martin,
1993: 245), by which Hearn attempts to explore Hume's constructive, nonsceptical
point of view. He first classifies two types of general rules:29 one type of general rule
is "a propensity of the imagination to extend the scope ofjudgements formed in one
28
The concept of "general rule(s)" appears 22 times in Book 1,12 time's in Book 2, and 21 times
in Book 3 and the Appendix.
29
Jack C. Lyons denies the distinction Heam proposes (Lyons, 2001: 274-5, endnote 20). He
claims that there are only good and bad general rules. He indicates that there is no clear definition
of the general rules in Hume (Lyons, 2001: 253).
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set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances", while the
other type "functions to correct certain natural propensities which result in erroneous
belief or action ifpermitted to operate unchecked" (Hearn, 1970: 405-6). Hearn
understands that adhering to these reflective rules renders an appropriate verdict.
Hume's general rules appear in the place where he deals with the subject of
unphilosophical probability. Hume's famous example of general rules is the prejudice
that "An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity" (T
1.3.13.7; SBN 146). Hume explains the general rules as follows,
Shou'd it be demanded why men form general rules, and allow
them to influence their judgement, even contrary to present observation
and experience, I shou'd reply, that in my opinion it proceeds from
those very principles, on which all judgements concerning causes and
effects depends. Our judgements concerning cause and effect are
deriv'd from habit and experience; and when we have been accustom'd
to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the
first to the second by a natural transition, which precedes reflection,
and which cannot be prevented by it. Now 'tis the nature of custom not
only to operate with its full force, when objects are presented, that are
exactly the same with those to which we have been accustom'd; but
also to operate in an inferior degree, when we discover such as are
similar; and tho' the habit loses somewhat of its force by every
difference, yet 'tis seldom entirely destroy'd, where any considerable
circumstances remain the same. (T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147)
Therefore, Hearn understands that the general rules share the same origin as habit or
custom. Influence of general rules explains the conflict ofjudgement and
imagination; because imagination has a generalising propensity, it tends to oppose
the unique judgement of reason. By making reference to the rules formed on
understanding, "we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the
efficacious causes" (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149). The conflict of imagination and
judgement can be seen as a conflict of the two types of general rules; between the
one that works on the imagination and the one that is formed on our understanding.
The first tends to lead to error and the other serves as a good guide of our judgement.
Hume notes that "[t]he vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise man by the
second" (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 150).
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Hearn shows that general rules are applicable not only in belief and passions,
but also in the area of human actions. Of the two kinds of virtues Hume discusses in
30 • • • . .Book 3, Hearn insists that artificial virtues, more concretely the three rules of
justice, constitute another instance of reflective general rules (Hearn, 1970: 416).
Above all, Hearn asserts that "the rule concerning the stability of possessions is a
reflective general rule" (Heam, 1970: 417). He holds that the rules ofjustice are
reflective on the human situation, and corrective to redirect acquisitive impulse, and
directive to enable man to enjoy the benefits of society. Thus, Hearn maintains that
"Hume intends us to understand this discussion from the perspective of his treatment
of general rules in Books 1 and 2", and that "artificial virtues are regarded by Hume
as reflective general rules" (Heam, 1970: 419). In this way, Heam thinks that he
shows the consistency between the 3 Books of the Treatise centring on the concept
of general rules.
Heam indicates that the correction ofmoral sentiments by reflective principle
has to do with general rules. It is supposed to be the key for our having stable,
common judgement despite the fact of our variation of intensity of sentiments
through sympathy. Heam understands that the correction of sentiments to meet the
requirements ofmorals take place by the use of general rales. The use ofmoral terms
is made possible by "the propensity of the imagination to generalise from one set of
circumstances in which certain qualities have produced good consequences to
resembling ones in which the qualities are seemingly present but the consequences
presented" (Heam, 1970: 422). Heam takes general rales as representing this
propensity. In this way, Heam concludes that "a genuine moral judgment for Hume
is the outcome of certain moral feelings corrected or evaluated by general rales"
(ibid.).
Heam is not the only commentator who ascribes normative standards of
rational judgement to general rales (Martin, 1993: 245-57). Nicholas Capaldi claims
that the capacity to be influenced by standard conditions or what Hume calls the
general view is the result of the presence of general rales (Capaldi, 1989: 121). Also,
30
I shall discuss Hume's theory ofjustice in connection to the general point of view in Chapters 6
and 7.
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David Norton regards Hume's appeal to general rules as evidence of his reliance on
reason. Norton says, "Reason formulates general rules that serve not only to correct
our sentiments, but also enable us to distinguish between sentiments which may seem
alike," thereby saving us from "moral illusion" (Norton, 1982: 130). Marie Martin, in
her "The General Warrant for Hume's General Rules", criticises those interpretations.
Martin explains how general rules derive their normative authority, thus she seeks for
the rational warrant for regulating judgments according to general rules. Her answer
to the question of the normative authority of general rules is as follows.
Continual adherence to general rules ensures the consistent
application of the fundamental and unavoidable principles inherent in
our reasoning. These principles are the foundation of our thoughts and
actions and it is only by following these principles that we achieve a
consistent system of orderly, coherent, and stable judgements. We
cannot justify guiding our judgement by general rules in the
traditional manner — by showing that following them will result in
true judgements. But, if the "love of order" is indeed inherent in
human nature, then we must concede that employing a method of
judgment formation that can provide a system of orderly and stable
beliefs is rationally preferable to one that cannot. (Martin, 1993: 256)
Thus, Martin considers the constant adherence to general rules enhances the
rationality ofjudgment. On the other hand, Jack Lyons maintains that "it is the
influence of (the good) general rules, and only this, that allows us to correct our
judgement." He proposes two standards by which to distinguish the good general
rules from the bad, that ought to influence our belief. They are:
(1) The extensiveness Constraint: The good general rules are only those that
are held on the basis of a large number of experiences.
(2) The constancy Constraint: The good general rules are only those for
which experience has provided few or no apparent exceptions. (Lyons,
2001:259)
Lyons further claims that:
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many of the general rules of which Hume disapproves can be
interpreted as involving either the influence of general rules that fail to
meet the Extensiveness and Constancy Constraints or the failure to take
account of relevant extensive and constant general rules. (Lyons, 2001:
264-5)
Thus, Hume's example of Irish men being witless is mistaken because it is
based on too narrow an example. In addition, Lyons asserts that reliance on extensive
and constant general rules is what makes a beliefjustified; utility is what makes
having justified beliefs desirable (Lyons, 2001: 268-9). More fundamentally, Lyons
holds that the purpose of philosophy is to satisfy the curiosity regarding abstruse or
philosophical questions, as well as to meet other, daily, pragmatic ends. According to
him, this is the reason we should formulate beliefs in accordance with the
philosophical method. Extensiveness and constancy provide the mark by which we
can tell whether we are reasoning like the wise or like the vulgar. Lyons asserts that a
source ofnormativity consists in these beliefs (Lyons, 2001: 271).
6. "General Rules" and the "General Point of View"
Now let us consider the relation between general rules and the general point of view.
The most significant point of those interpretations is to see Hume's theory as non-
sceptical argument. It is certainly an important propensity of human nature to
generalise experiences that seem to form regularities. Most commentators on general
rules assume them to be the standard ofjudgment and behaviour. However, there
seem to be some problems about their interpretations. First of all, though Hearn and
others imply that correct moral judgment is an application of general rules, Hume
does not say so. Hume's theory of making moral judgment is to take the general
point of view. Even if they are right, general rules do not unconditionally serve as a
moral standard for two reasons. First, rules depend on their application. Rules are
neither good nor bad in themselves: good general rules do not make sense when they
are applied to wrong cases, and even bad rules such as "An Irishman cannot have
wit" might do no harm when they are not applied at all. Second, the ground for
deciding good or bad general rules does not lie in general rules themselves. Hume's
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general point of view is conceived as a standard to distinguish the good moral
judgment from the bad one. Therefore, general rules are not the last ground for
making judgements. It is possible to think that good general rules are those that are in
accordance with the general point of view and bad ones are those that are not.
Hearn indicates that artificial virtues of justice are general rules to
demonstrate the consistency of 3 Books of the Treatise. However, Hume's artificial
virtues ofjustice cannot adequately be characterised as reflective general rules. It is a
mistake to think of artificial virtues ofjustice as general rules, because, though
general rules represent probability, justice is a law that does not permit probability.
What produces the three laws ofjustice is not inherently reflective principles; it has
more to do with the natural and psychological circumstances of human beings.
Humean theory is founded on a more fundamental principle than general rules.
Therefore, the consistency of 3 Books of the Treatise should be demonstrated
through more inherent principle than general rules.
Martin does not show convincing evidence in her assertion that by adhering
to general rules, we can achieve a consistent system of orderly judgement. It is
conceivable that blind adherence to general rules results in a disorderly judgement.
Hume surely recognises the human necessity to stick to general rules in ordinary life,
but his more fundamental objective is to show the true principle for distinguishing
good from bad general rules. Lyons's argument can be understood to answer this
problem. However, though he proposes the two constraints as the justification of
general rules and assumes utility to be what makes general rules desirable, this is not
Hume's view. Rules themselves do not produce utility. It sounds like a tautology to
say that good general rules are good because they are successfully applicable
extensively and constantly. This does not teach us a lot about the principle of general
rules. It is necessary to clarify exactly what makes general rule extensive and
constant.
Regrettably, this definition of general rules diverges from the original
concept that Hume observes in human nature. General rules are only statements of
the general propensities of accumulated experience, and do not serve as a criterion
for justification of beliefs. Hume regards general rules as a human propensity of
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relying on the influence of custom. Unlike the general point of view, there is no
synthesis of the particular and the general in general rules. He does not use them for
justifying human beliefs, either. On the contrary, his point in the argument is that
however extensive or constant the past experiences have been, it does not justify the
belief. On the other hand, the general point of view is a criterion for appropriate
beliefs. In short, there is no creativity in general rules. Rather than general rules, the
general point ofview should be examined as the central concept ofmoral judgment
and as the fundamental principle that provides justification to our beliefs.
7. Concluding Remarks
So far, we have discussed the arguments regarding the general point of view and
general rules. If, as I have claimed, commentators' arguments are not adequate, it is
because they consider the concept independently ofHume's more comprehensive
arguments of epistemology. This is concerned with their understanding ofmorality. I
have explained Hume's moral sentiment that is represented by the general point of
view as a manner-formalism. As Hume attempts to elucidate morality as a human
matter, it is necessary to consider morality as concerned with the whole range of
human life from the most basic mechanism ofperception to the formation ofpolitical
authority.31
Whether we call it the common point of view or the general point ofview, it
is more important to understand the function and the significance of the concept. To
say the least, the general point of view plays a central role in Hume's theory ofmoral
judgment. If Hume's moral theory has to do with his epistemology, this means that
the general point of view is involved in yielding the perceptions of general ideas,
causation, and objects as the natural composition of the human world. Even ifwe do
not use the concept of the general point of view, it is undeniable that we understand
morality, and behave morally based on those perceptions. As far as we adhere to
naturalistic and empiricist presuppositions, which Hume implies by the experimental
method, we can only understand morality in connection to the provisions of the
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human world. Put the other way round, unless morality is clarified by a persistent
principle, from Hume's epistemology through to his concept of political society,
Hume's theory of human nature cannot be considered as a comprehensive moral
theory that covers all the activities of human beings. In the following chapters, we
will develop the theory that the general point of view can serve as such principle.
11
For evidence of the striking similarity between Hume's anatomist method and Spinoza's
naturalism, see the "Dictum" on page iii.
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Chapter Two:
Custom, Resemblance, and the General Point of View
Introduction
In the Treatise 1.1.7, "On Abstract Ideas", Hume develops a significant criticism of
the Lockean concept of "abstract ideas". This chapter contains three central claims.
The first claim is that the argument is to be read as providing a definition of the
Hume's concept of "custom". The second claim is that "resemblances" among things
are not detected on the basis of any particular feature that is found by reason.
Resemblances tend to create associations ofperceptions, and custom is based on
these associations. And the third and the main claim is that the "general point of
view" that Hume employs in discussion ofmoral assessments should be understood
as the principle of custom. This chapter is an attempt to find in the concept of custom
significant relationship between the Humean epistemology and his moral theory. In
section 1,1 examine Berkeley's attack on Locke's abstract ideas. In section 2,1
explain that the Hume's concept of custom serves to classify particular impressions,
thus it replaces Locke's concept of abstract ideas. In section 3,1 criticise the standard
interpretation that takes Hume's theory of "distinction of reason" as Hume's own
theory for classification of ideas. In section 4,1 argue that custom is a conceptual
variant of the general point of view. This chapter will clarify that the concept of the
general point of view occupies a central place in Hume's entire theory by being the
principle that supports the concept of custom.
1. Locke and Berkeley on Abstract Ideas
Hume declares perceptions to be the only material of the human mind. Perception
comprises impressions and ideas; impressions are all our sensations, passions and
emotions as they first appear in the mind, and ideas are only their weaker form. This
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already suggests the line of argument he is ready to develop. It is to show how our
understanding of the world, both physical and moral, is constructed from those
primitive materials. At the same time, Hume's discussion of perception is so
composed that, being placed at the beginning of the Book, it sets the stage for the
whole argument.
It is a matter of fact that we can experience the world as something
harmonious, or, to say the least, as something more than just a chaotic gathering of
perceptions. The world usually appears to us as a meaningful object rather than just a
congregation of isolated and individual sets of impressions and ideas. This means
that there is a gap between the perceptions that are given from initial experiences,
and the beliefof the world that is alleged to be composed from no other materials
than these perceptions. Hume's task is to fill this gap. If successful, whatever he fills
the gap with will provide the whole etiological explanation for the final construction.
As the empiricist usually denies the existence of anything above and beyond
the particular experiences, empiricist philosophers have difficulty accounting for
universal concepts.32 As an English philosopher after Francis Bacon, Locke's
conceptualism is an answer for overcoming the difficulty of nominalism (Woolhouse,
1971: Chs. 5, 6). Lockean abstract ideas, while rejecting "nativism", play much the
same role of classifying knowledge. The problem is to meet two contradictory
requirements. On the one hand, our ideas have to have an origin in either sense or
reflective experiences, and on the other hand the particular has to be explained as an
instance of the more general kind under which it is classified. In order to do this,
there has to be an idea of the more general kind which is compatible with the fact
that we perceive only particular ideas.
Locke assumed a special function of human understanding that produces
abstract ideas. According to Locke, human beings have an ability to abstract from
concrete ideas an attribution, to form an abstract idea that has a universal function.
Commentators agree that Locke provides two different explanations for producing
abstract ideas (cf. Bennett, 2001b: sec. 161). The first explanation in Book 2 of the
Essay is usually referred to as a selective attention account (Mackie, 1976: 110; Jolly,
32 For a general explanation of the problems of universals, see e.g. Armstrong, 1989.
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1999: 50), according to which abstract ideas are made by taking note of one
component of complex ideas that is commonly seen among them.33 He explains as
follows:
the Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects,
to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in
the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and the
circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other
concomitant Ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby, ideas
taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of
the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever
exists in the Mind, without considering, how, whence, or with what
others they came there, the Understanding lays up (with names
commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to rank real Existences
into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns, and to denominate them
accordingly. Thus the same Colour being observed to day in Chalk or
Snow, which the Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that
Appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and
having given it the name of Whiteness, it by that sound signifies the
same quality wheresoever to be imagin'd or met with; and thus
Universals, whether Ideas or Terms, are made. (Essay 2.11.9)34
The second interpretation is referred to as an "elimination account".35 This
reading seems to be closer to be the original meaning of ab-stract than the selective
attention interpretation. Locke shows how the actual "way of abstraction" is
conducted, as follows:
the Ideas of the Persons Children converse with ... are like the Persons
themselves, only particular ... Afterwards, when time and a larger
Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other
Things in the World, that in some common agreements of Shape, and
several other Qualities, resemble their Father and Mother, and those
33 J. L. Mackie considers selective attention account as the only explanation Locke offers
(Mackie, 1976: Ch. 4).
34 In other place, Locke describes abstraction again as the act of separating ideas "from all other
Ideas that accompany them in their real existence" (Essay 2.12.1).
35
Jolley points that even a selective account will involve a kind of elimination; it will involve the
rejection of certain features of the experience as objects of attention. But unlike the elimination
account, there the alleged abstract ideas are not the product of human understanding (Jolley,
1999: 50).
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Persons they have been used to, they frame an Idea, which they find
those many Particulars do partake in; and to find they give, with others,
the name Man, for Example. And thus they come to have a general
Name, and a general Idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only
leave out of the complex Idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and
Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to
them all. (Essay 3.3.7)
Abstract ideas are supposed to be a simple idea of a sensible quality. An
obvious difficulty with the selective attention interpretation is that in order to
recognise the common component, one has to be able to identify in advance which
component to select. For example, take snow, sugar, salt and white marble; one can
classify these as things white only because one already possesses the abstract idea of
whiteness. Without such an idea, it would be impossible to choose appropriate ideas
to be classified as belonging to a same group. But this would then be circular: one
classifies white things as white on account of their being white. This does not explain
how one comes to possess abstract ideas in the first place. There is another difficulty
in the selective attention reading; it is difficult to explain why abstract ideas can
serve to represent complex ideas. For example, one cannot identify milk by referring
to its colour only, nor by its being liquid, nor by its being nourishing. In fact, no
complex ideas can be represented by any one particular component. More decisively,
Locke says that abstract ideas are "Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind" (Essay
4.7.9). This is incompatible with the selective attention account.36
On the elimination account, Locke seems to think that what is left after
subtracting all the particular attributions will be the abstract idea. Flowever, Locke's
assumption that something will remain alter the procedure is not well-founded. Even
if one could separate every accidental feature from the complex idea, there is no
guarantee that what is left will be a property that can be shared by all particulars
classified under a single general subclass. For example, there is no obvious reason
why the particular idea of "Socrates" and the particular idea of "Plato" should be
reduced to the same abstract idea. Why is it that after the elimination they should
36 The selective attention interpretation can be an afterthought that is influenced by Hume's
theory of the distinction of reason, as we shall see below.
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retain, for instance, the abstract idea "man" in common, rather than "skeleton", or
perhaps "sin"? Thus, the elimination account has a similar circularity to the selective
attention interpretation: one has to know in advance which component to eliminate
and which to retain before obtaining the abstract idea that is general. From an
empiricist point of view, Hume would say, one cannot obtain the idea of "man" only
by observing Socrates, nor can one obtain it only by observing Plato. There is no
impression exclusively corresponding to "man". In order to classify either Socrates
or Plato as a "man", one has to possess the idea of "man". In other words, the
abstract idea that is to be produced has to be clear beforehand. The most significant
opponent of Locke's account of abstract ideas is George Berkeley. Berkeley notes
the following passage of Locke's Essay.
Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general Idea of a
Triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and
difficult) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither
Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once.
In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an Idea wherein
some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together.
(Essay 4.7.9)
What annoys Berkeley is the suggestion that the general idea of a triangle is
"all and none of these at once". He complains that there can be no idea that is
contradictory, and that what cannot be conceived cannot exist. The elimination
account is inconsistent with a theory of ideas as images. The basic difficulty comes
from the fact that Lockean abstract ideas are not compatible with the Berkeley's
premise that ideas must be particular to be perceived. Berkeley criticises that it is
impossible to perceive any idea that is at once concrete and not-particular, although
Locke apparently implies both in his notion of abstract ideas;37 Lockean abstract
ideas are a mere creation of human mind and confined only to intellectual operations,
and thus lose the connection with reality.38
37 Regarding Berkeley's possible misunderstanding of Locke, see e. g., Stewart, 1994: 123-147;
Waxman, 1994: 88.
38 This goes back to Cartesian position (cf. Stewart, 1994: 123-147).
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However, Berkeley does not correctly understand Locke. Locke's central
assertions are that "general and universal belong not to the real existence of things;
but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding" and that "the sorting of
them [Things] under Names, is the Workmanship ofthe Understanding"39 {Essay
3.3.13). By regarding the abstract ideas as produced by understanding, Locke thinks
that he makes it compatible with the empiricist position and can explain why we can
have recognition beyond our experience.40 As Locke tries to explain generality in
terms of a universal feature among the recognitions of any object of a kind, he has to
assume that human understanding has the ability to deal with abstract ideas.
Difficulties lie in explaining how the new creation of the understanding correctly
represents the empirical particulars. On the other hand, Locke's explanation of the
function of abstract ideas is quite clear; abstract ideas serve as the basis of universal
knowledge that enables people to classify particulars, and thus makes communication
possible (cf. Essay 2.11.9,10). Abstract ideas are required to exist for the human
mind to understand the world. Hence, if one can construct a theory that does not need
abstract ideas to make communicative understanding possible, it would achieve
Locke's objective without the ambiguities he poses for the abstract ideas.
Berkeley thinks that his theory of idealism hinges on the thorough denial of
Lockean theory of abstract ideas (Pappas, 1995: 131-43). If there could be any
abstract idea that is not directly founded on perception, the role of perceiver, and thus
ultimately the role of an all-perceiving God becomes redundant: a conclusion that is
wholly destructive to Berkeley's philosophy (cf. Bennett, 1989: 44). Hume agrees
with Berkeley's criticism of Locke's theory of abstract ideas. Hume says,
A very material question has been started concerning abstract
or general ideas, Whether they be general or particular in the mind's
39 J. L. Mackie, in his defence of Locke's account of abstract ideas, encourages us to be
"charitable", and proposes to construe it as something indeterminate, something that corresponds
to 'kind' of the particulars. Mackie proposes that Lockean abstract ideas do not combine
inconsistent ideas but it is indeterminate (Mackie, 1999: 123; cf. Jolley, 1999: 52).
40 It does not matter for our purpose that Locke's explanation of the abstract idea seems 'less
than clear'. The point is that he admits that we somehow possess the abstract idea that function as
something universal (cf. Jolley, 1999: 50; Mackie, 1976: 110).
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conception of them? A great philosopher has disputed the receiv'd
opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are
nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives
them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon
occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon
this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has
been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour
to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all
doubt and controversy. (T 1.1.7.1; SBN 17)
However, Hume does not share Berkeley's fundamental aim.41 Hume shares
only a negative view of Lockean abstract ideas with Berkeley. Berkeley does not
deny the existence of all general ideas but only the existence of abstract general ideas.
According to Berkeley, general ideas function as a sign that represents many other
particular ideas (Berkeley, 1998: "Introduction", sect. 12).42 Berkeley sticks to the
basic framework of an epistemology that presupposes the independent existence of
the perceiver. It was most important for him to deny the abstraction from perception,
or the idea that ideas can exist without being perceived. If there is no universal
feature on the side of objects, the function for universality is sought in the faculty of
the perceiver who is capable of entertaining "indifferently a great number of
particular ideas". This both requires and justifies God as the ultimate perceiver: a
conclusion that is most incompatible with Hume.
2. Abstract Ideas and Custom
As Hume emphasises the importance of the denial of the Lockean theory of abstract
ideas, there is good reason to assume that he lets this denial guide his entire argument
throughout the Treatise. Hume argues that proponents of Locke must suppose that
the abstract idea of "a man" represents either "all possible sizes and all possible
qualities, or no particular one at all" (T 1.1.7.2; SBN 18). Hume gives two reasons
for this. First, "that 'tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality,
41 M. A. Stewart argues that Hume misrecognises Berkley's and Locke's theories. See Stewart,
1994: 123-147, esp. 130; Bracken, 1984: 90-109.
42 For general argument among commentators, see e.g., Beardsley, 1991: 123-33; Bennett, 1989:
37f.
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without forming a precise notion of its degree (ibid.)." And second, "tho' the
capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of all possible
degrees of quantity and quality in such a manner at least, as, however imperfect, may
serve all the purposes of reflexion and conversation (ibid.)." Let us note that Hume
maintains these claims by appealing to the common observation of ordinary life. As a
fact of our ordinary life, the world is so made that we never encounter a perception
that leaves no hint at all about its classification. This is not because we have an
ability to perceive the essence of new perceptions, but because we have no other
means but to connect them with the classes we are already acquainted with in some
way. Nonetheless, this seems to be enough from a practical perspective because what
matters for us is to be able to attain a common reaction to the object, rather than a
correct understanding of the object.
In criticising Lockean abstract ideas, Hume holds that "'tis impossible to
form an idea of an object, that is possest of quantity and quality, and yet is possest of
no precise degree of either" (T 1.1.7.6; SBN 20); we should not assume abstract
ideas as long as we retain the empiricist position. Hume does not accept the notion of
abstract ideas because they contradict his definition of an idea as the copy of the
impression.43 Thus he denies once and for all the possibility of Lockean abstract
ideas.44 Hume's negative argument, however, is followed by a positive argument.
Shortly after giving the above argument Hume begins to explain what abstract ideas
really are.45 He denies the function of reason that Locke assumes, and then fills the
gap by referring to the fact of human nature. Hume takes the same pattern in his
discussion of causation, and also in his discussion ofmoral distinction. Hume thinks
that the impossibility of abstract ideas leaves possible only one explanation that
"Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become
general in their representation" (T 1.1.7.6; SBN 20). Therefore, Hume, while denying
43 It is necessary to remember that Hume converts the concept of "idea" in Locke to "impression",
For a thorough discussion on the copy principle, see Garrett, 1997, Ch. 2.
44
Hume's reason for rejecting Lockean abstract ideas anticipates his rejection of Lockean natural
law theory where reason finds moral law by abstraction. In both cases, Hume finds unacceptable
he idea that human reason is capable of producing universal agreement.
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the existence of specifically abstract ideas, tries to find their function in particular
ideas as employed in reflection and conversation.46 It is possible to assume that any
particular idea can function generally, as we have no particular idea that is used
completely independent of any association.47 This is because generality is what
makes ideas meaningful; association with other resembling particulars explains the
meaning of particular perceptions. Unlike the Lockean explanation that admits the
particular prior to abstract ideas, particularity comes only with generality in Hume.48
Understanding of an idea is first possible when it is associated with other
resembling and familiar particulars; if there are only as many different meanings as
our empirical perceptions, there is no explaining any particular perception, and there
is no understanding of the perceptions of other people. Thus, the most important
function of abstract ideas is not universal recognition, which is not necessary for
communication, but only that it "may serve all purposes of our reflexion and
conversation" (T 1.1.7.2; SBN 18). What we actually do in our consideration of new
experiences is to regard them as another case of resembling experience that we
already have, and to deal with them as such. It is possible that this does not work
very well in some cases, which is typically represented in a failure of communication.
But what is more important is that it is the only means for us to communicate
particular perceptions.
Hume says that "[t]he image in the mind is only that of a particular object
tho' the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal" (T
1.1.7.6; SBN 20).49 Here Hume clearly takes note of the function of the abstract idea;
45 Hume may be a little bit careless to continue to use the term "abstract idea" after he has denied
it. It is apparent that Hume's explanation of the general idea is modelled on Spinoza's
"knowledge of the first kind" {Ethics, 2nd part, props. 18 and 40).
46 Hume is confident as to his reasoning because, as elsewhere, his argument obtains support
from our natural custom (T 1.1.7.16; SBN 24).
47 Thomas Hobbes distinguishes "Proper" and "Common" Names {Leviathan 26). Hume breaks
the tradition ofHobbes and Locke who make a sharp distinction between the general and the
particular (see Chapter 6).
48 As we will see later, this is analogical to the relation between individual and society. In Locke,
there are individuals before society, but Hume does not support this idea.
49 Kemp Smith summarises that "there is no abstract ideas of any kind, but only this and that
particular images, and that in addition to images there is nothing save the act ofmind whereby
through custom and custom these particular images suggest others no less determinate" (Kemp
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it proves to be enough for his purpose if he can explain its function, if not its real
essence. Hume says, "To explain the ultimate causes of our mental action is
impossible. 'Tis sufficient, ifwe can give any satisfactory account of them from
experience and analogy" (T 1.1.7.11; SBN 22). This is another instance where Hume
replaces the truth-value of empirical facts with their functional validity. He explains
the mechanism as follows.
When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often
occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever
differences we may observe in the degree of their quantity and quality,
and whatever other differences may appear among them. After we have
acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revives the
idea of one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive it
with all its particular circumstances and proportions. (T 1.1.7.7; SBN
20)
It is in this crucial place that the concept of "custom" that Hume calls "a kind
ofmagical faculty in the soul (T 1.1.7.15; SBN 24)" is significantly used for the first
time in the Treatise. And the point is that what makes ideas general does not consist
in any of their intrinsic features, but the custom with which they are linked via a
general name. Some important characteristics ofHumean custom are made clear here.
First of all, custom does not make sense unless a certain number ofperceptions have
been accumulated through experiences. It does not mean of course that any group of
particulars can crystallise itself into a custom. The key for producing custom out of
numerous particulars is their "resemblance", especially with respect to their effects
on the senses, owing to which newly obtained particular perceptions appear familiar.
Custom is produced as a result of the natural internalisation of particular
patterns of impressions. This does not require any positive working of understanding.
Therefore, it is natural. This naturalness lends itself to certainty with respect to the
Smith, 1941: 262). This is followed by a harsh criticism. I shall discuss Kemp Smith's criticism
later.
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meaning of the particular idea.50 As custom is a mechanism of referring a particular
to its kind, custom in effect confers generality on the particular. Therefore, generality
consists in the association of ideas through custom rather than in any content or type
of ideas. In this way, the locus of the generality has shifted from ideas in the
Berkeleyan theory, to the perceptive reactions of human beings. If, as in Berkeley,
general ideas in themselves represent particular ideas, how each new particular idea
is related to the general ideas has further to be questioned. By contrast, Humean
general ideas do not represent other ideas, on the contrary, their significance is
determined only by other associated particulars. Reason does not determine which
series of impressions make which custom. The role of reason is to recognise the
particular in their final classification, rather than to produce their classification.
There is no universal feature in objects to be discovered by reason, not because our
reason is too weak to discover one, but because it is none of the business of reason.
Unlike Locke or Berkeley, Hume's central concern is not to explain the
acquisition of language.51 To have a custom is a precondition for having a name for
certain type of experiences. The mind's recognition of resemblance naturally leads to
forming a certain custom of associating them.52 Resemblance already means to place
at least two or more objects in association. Therefore, resemblance as a natural and
philosophical relation prepares the way for custom to obtain. Resemblance also
represents the cognitive aspect of custom, and the custom in turn reinforces the
association of resemblances to confer on them a natural and solid appearance.
Generality of ideas means not that a particular idea changes into something that is no
longer particular, but that a particular idea is associated with other particulars. In
other words, to have a general idea means to place a particular idea in association
with those similar to it so that it can be treated in the same manner. In the Humean
theory of the natural mechanism of custom, we have an explanation why all of us can
50 This is parallel with the mechanism of causation where the psychological sense of necessity
composes the causal necessity (see Chapter 3).
51 Stewart characterises Berkeley's and Hume's theory as "association-as-signification" versus
"signification-as-association" (Stewart, 1994: 130). I agree with Stewart that Hume's theory of
custom is not predominantly semantic.
52 R. I. Aaron seems to take this way at least in the dealing with the resemblance among the
complex ideas (Aaron, 1942). My understanding is that Hume does not distinguish the essence of
resemblance between the two cases.
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have an understanding of ever new experiences.53 There can of course be "mistakes"
in classification, but it is the only way that we react to new situations by the
perception of resemblance—correcting mistake simply means to connect it to other
resembling perception. In the Lockean theory, we can make no sense of new
situations without abstracting particular perceptions.
3. "Distinction of reason"
In the last two paragraphs of section seven, Hume develops in an inadvertent manner
a theory called "the distinction of reason". The theory seems to trigger confusion for
the whole argument of the section. Some commentaries take it as Hume's own theory,
and criticise Hume for his sudden change of opinions.54 Kemp Smith for instances
claims regarding the "distinction of reason" that:
The verbal inconsistency in his admission of distinctions other than
those between simple ideas (i.e. of distinctions apprehended by
'reason'), is connected ... with his failure to discuss the nature of the
abstract itself, i.e. of the resemblance that makes possible general terms
and the custom that attaches to them; and it is because his terminology
is devised to suit the problems to which he has alone given real
attention, that it has betrayed him into assertions which he does not
intend. (Kemp Smith, 1941: 270)
Kemp Smith correctly recognises the inconsistency between Hume's
explanation of general ideas and the doctrine of distinction of reason.55 However, he
in fact does not have to criticise Hume, because the distinction of reason is not
Hume's own theory but his exegesis of a theory that "is so much talk'd of, and so
53 Most fundamentally, moral perception of good and bad is also a classification that is related to
human reaction.
54 Commentators accepting it as Hume's own view include (Butler, 1976; Kemp Smith, 1941;
MacNabb, 1966; Bracken, 1984; Waxman, 1994; Garrett, 1997; Broughton, 2000). But
Broughton disagrees with Garrett and Waxman regarding Hume's contention (Broughton, 2000:
287, note 13). Bradshaw argues against taking the distinction of reason as a part ofHume's
explanation of abstraction (Bradshaw, 1988).
55 Waxman criticises Kemp Smith that he "failed to realise that resemblances have no intrinsic
generality" (Waxman, 1994: 92-93).
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little understood, in the schools".56 Decisive evidence for this interpretation is that
the theory propounds a different kind of separation than that found in Hume's
separability principle "that all ideas, which are different, are separable."57
In the Treatise 1.4.4., "Of modern philosophy", Hume stresses the
impossibility of separating "movement" from "body". There he attempts to criticise
the Lockean distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities. Therefore,
the distinction of reason which explains "the distinction betwixt figure and the body
figur'd; motion and the body mov'd" cannot be Hume's view. Hume only explains
how we come to distinguish between the things that are in fact inseparables.
According to Hume,
when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the
impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, nor are we able
to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing
afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing
them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, in
what formerly seem'd, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little
more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the
colour by a distinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure and
colour together, since they are in effect the same and indistinguishable;
but still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances,
ofwhich they are susceptible. (T 1.1.7.18; SBN 25)
This is the secret to how the inseparable are "thought" to be separable.
According to Hume, distinction by reason does not indicate a separate idea, but just
seeing things from different perspectives.58 The above passage lends deeper
56 For Descartes's discussion of the distinction of reason, see Descartes, 1985: Principles of
Philosophy, part 1, sects. 60-2.
57 Stewart clarifies that separability principle is Hume's challenge to the Port-royal Logic, which
alleges that which is considered apart in thought does not exist separately in reality. See Stewart,
1994: 124. Garrett argued for the compatibility of the Separability Principle and the discussion of
distinction of reason (Garrett, 1997: 62-64).
58 Janet Broughton claims that the distinction of reason is "Hume's account of our general
capacity to recognise the features of things". I agree with Broughton together with the claim that
Hume does not explain "how we can recognise the feature of things and the respect in which they
resemble one another". Though, I have a different point to emphasise from Broughton; it is
Hume's positive claim that he does not have to do so, because resemblance is not based on
feature.
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significance to Hume's notion of custom and resemblance. It is important to consider
whether or not the recognition of resemblance is based on the distinction of reason.
The theory of distinction of reason is incompatible with Hume's intention to replace
the Lockean abstract ideas with the working of custom. Because Hume replaces the
universal or the Lockean abstraction with this concept of resemblance, Hume cannot
think that resemblance is based on the distinction of reason.59 Therefore,
resemblance must not be understood as based on any objective feature or an attribute
of an object. Recognition of particular features does not serve to classify objects,
because no particular feature constitutes the essence of a class of things. If so, the
reason why that particular feature is picked up as representing the object is further to
be questioned. It is a mistake, for example to think that we can classify things only
by their colour because colour itself does not compose the essential feature of any
object. Any one objective feature is not enough to identify a class of things, for
without that feature it is still possible to regard one thing as belonging to the same
class. Therefore, the distinction of reason has nothing to do with the Humean general
ideas.
The perception of objects is created as the result of repetitive experiences.
This is not a working of the intellect, but of the natural relation of resemblance.
Every individual impression and idea represents a point of view from which they are
perceived. But no object is recognisable merely by a single perception. This means
that no one particular point of view is enough to recognise an object. Hume holds
that the association of impressions and ideas does not depend on any particular
feature that is perceived. For this reason, simple ideas as well as complex ideas can
have different relations with other impressions and ideas. Hume says,
'Tis evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or
resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or
circumstance of resemblance shou'd be distinct or separable from that
in which they differ. ... 'Tis the same case with particular sounds, and
tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblance upon the general
appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance
59 Hume reiterates this critical remark in T 1.4.5.26; SBN 245.
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the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract
terms simple idea. They comprehend all simple ideas under them.
These resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very
nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance, in which
they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest. 'Tis
the same case with all the degree in any quality. They are all
resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from
the degree. (T 1.1.7.7; SBN 637)
Hume puts this paragraph in the second appendix of his Treatise obviously in
response to possible objections. Hume argues for the "infinite resemblance" between
simple ideas in order to refute the universalist interpretation. If simple ideas can
resemble other ideas, it is evident that resemblance does not depend on any feature.
Hume thinks that there is no objective feature recognizable as an inherent
characteristic of things. Things are classified only by resemblance. Let us remember
that Hume denigrates the role of reason in moral distinctions. Thus, the distinction of
"reason" could not have meant anything positive, but only means something not real.
Unlike the theory of distinction of reason, resemblance obtains only between distinct
impressions and ideas, and is not based on any feature that allows external
description. Resemblance is more fundamental than mere objective perception of
sights, sounds, touches, smells or tastes, for resemblance can be perceived even
despite the differences of those senses, e.g., we can make sense in saying "warm
colour". No two separate objects are exactly the same in nature. Were it not for
resemblance, we would have no means to think of even the identity of things. It is
such a fundamental principle that other things cannot explain resemblance, but only
can be explained by it. Hume refers to the concept of resemblance in every important
discussion such as those about causation, the external bodies and personal identity.
In order to confirm that Hume does not think that resemblance is to be found
by any objective feature or by distinction of reason, let us consider the decisive
examples that he uses to explain custom. The central point that Hume emphasises is
that "custom" can work properly even when we do not possess an adequate idea, or
when we forget the relevant ideas, or we do not annex distinct and complete ideas to
the term.
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I believe every one, who examines the situation of his mind in
reasoning, will agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and
complete ideas to every term we make use of, and that in talking of
government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in
our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are
compos'd. 'Tis however observable, that notwithstanding this
imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects, and
may perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a
full comprehension of them. Thus if instead of saying, that in war the
weaker have always recourse to negotiation, we shou'd say, that they
always recourse to conquest, the custom, which we have acquir'd of
attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes
us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition; in the same
manner as one particular idea may serve us in reasoning concerning
other ideas, however different from it in several circumstances. (T
1.1.7.14; SBN 23)
This should be a surprising example for those who try to think that
resemblance consists in some universal feature in things.60 In fact, Hume reveals
here the concrete target of his theory. It is clear that Hume does not assume that
resemblance is based on any single component. That is why he had to emphasise that
resemblance obtains between simple ideas. Hume does not think that there is a
universal feature that causes resemblance, and produces the association. He thinks
that it is not even necessary to have distinct and complete ideas to form the custom.61
This leads us to a consideration of the rule of custom in moral matters. It is decisive
for Hume to maintain that things are not classified by their objective features, but by
the most fundamental recognition of resemblance, because in human action, there
can never be exactly the same perceptions on which the distinction ofmorality is
based. Therefore, moral understanding cannot be elucidated by any universal feature,
which is handled by reason. Hume assumes that the discussion of general ideas can
be applied also to the impression of reflection. "Virtue" is one of the most significant
60 Kemp Smith, rightly from his position, criticises that Hume "naively presupposes abstract
ideas" in these examples (Kemp Smith, 1941: 263). Spinoza argues in a similar manner as Hume
(Spinoza, 1985: Ethic, 2nd part, prop. 18, schol.).
61 By this theory, Hume is preparing to elucidate the moral understanding that is even more
unlikely to be based on any universal feature in the Humean system.
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examples of abstract ideas.62 Virtuous action can take any form or any external
description so there is no recognition of virtue by its universal feature.
4. Custom and the General Point of View
The principle of resemblance is founded on the association of different particular
perceptions. The Lockean abstraction is replaced in Hume's system with a customary
association, which explains how a particular idea can represent other particular ideas.
Custom is not founded on any "objective" feature of objects which is detectable by
reason, but on the association of perceptions that are naturally arranged via
resemblance. It seems curious that "custom", such an important concept in his
epistemology, seems to be downplayed in his moral theory even though Hume says
the principles he is employing are the same as in Books 1 and 2.63 On the other hand,
it seems strange that the Humean general point of view, central and significant as it is
in Hume's moral philosophy, receives very small treatment as to its definition and
function.
There is a clear ground for assuming a theoretical connection between custom
and the general point of view. First, custom refers to the generality of actions rather
than their universality or particularity. Thus, the primary function of custom involves
making a "general" recognition as distinct from a universal or particular recognition.
Perception necessarily implies a point of view; a particular perception corresponds to
a particular point of view. Therefore, to view a particular as representing other
resembling particulars signifies what it means to take a general point of view. The
general point of view determines how the perceived objects are to be classified. As
the principle of association represents generality, Hume replaces the Lockean
intellectual process of abstraction with the generality that underlies custom.
Throughout his theory, the primary function ofHumean perception is to produce a
62 Garrett points out a comprehensive significance of abstract ideas in various crucial discussions
in the Treatise (Garrett, 1997: passim).
63 John Wright points this out to me. As I discuss in later chapters, "convention" plays the most
significant role in the theory of justice. I take convention to be based on the concept of custom in
Hume's epistemology.
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moral and pragmatic, rather than a right or correct recognition. Hume tries to show
that "tho' the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of
all possible degree of quantity and quality in such a manner at least, as, however
imperfect, may serve all the purposes ofreflexion and conversation (T 1.1.7.2; SBN
18, italics mine)." Let us consider the following quotation.
The word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom; and
that custom produces any other individual one, for which we may have
occasion. But as the production of all the ideas, to which the name may
be apply'd, is in most cases impossible, we abridge that work by a
more partial consideration, and find but few inconveniences to arise in
our reasoning from that abridgement. (T 1.1.7.7; SBN 20-21, italic
mine)
Hume apparently considers abstract ideas in terms of their pragmatic or
practical aspect. It is also remarkable that Hume bears in mind the serviceability of
custom in making possible the communication among people that is the foundation
ofmorality. Therefore, Humean custom is conceived to be serviceable as the basis of
inference and communication. Communication produces a shared perception which
is the basis of moral recognition.64 Hume is convinced that moral perceptions should
be the basis ofmoral behaviour. Unlike the prescriptive moral theory that is
concerned with right action, morality in the Humean system concerns the whole
spectrum ofmorality; morality is not something that ought to dominate the human
behaviour, but something that is actually serving to drive human realities. Utility and
agreeableness are the central characteristics that Hume ascribes to morality, but
disutility and disagreeableness must also be communicated because, most of all, the
moral understanding has to create and incarnate an agreement among people. This is
where the general point of view plays an important role. Hume famously introduces
the concept in explaining the fundamental function ofmoral terms.
64 Hume develops the theory of communication in the Treatise, Book 2 (see Chapter 5).
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Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in
continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in
a little time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular
man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible
we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable term, were each of
us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his
peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual
contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix
on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts,
place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T
3.3.1.15; SBN 581, italic Hume)
It is possible to indicate a parallelism between Hume's explanation of general
ideas and our adopting a general point of view. Hume clearly thinks that moral
perception consists in an agreement among people. He refers to the general point of
view in order to show that moral perception does not directly represent the inherent
characteristics of virtuous action; unless an action incurs association with other
similar action that are already recognised as moral, the action cannot be conferred
any moral evaluation. This is the function of taking the general point of view. The
general point of view enables people to view a particular object in a similar manner
as other similar objects, focusing on the resembling perceptions independently of the
particular personal relation. There is no moral action recognisable that is so
completely unique that it incurs no resemblance with another case. Therefore,
Humean general ideas and moral perception have in common the characteristic that
they are based on association, and serve to create common understanding among
people. In order for moral evaluation to function properly, people have to reach an
agreement regarding the meaning of an action. Hume's theory of abstract ideas and
moral judgement have a theoretical connection, because "virtue", "vice" and other
moral terms are abstract ideas that consist in seeing particular human action as a
particular instance of a definite moral value. It is impossible to enumerate the
features that compose benevolence, tolerance, kindness, courageousness, and so on.
Moral evaluation is most appropriately modelled on Hume's general ideas, because
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both concern the communicability of opinions.65 Therefore, it is understandable that
Hume deals with the two concepts, custom and the general point of view, with the
same line of argument.
5. Concluding Remarks
Broughton, after asserting that Hume's account of general terms is not "a fully
successful one" indicates the problem as follows. According to her,
It is not clear whether Hume thinks our associative powers are
activated simply by repetition of resembling impression-contents, or
whether he thinks that recognizing the resemblance of repeated features
is required as well. (Broughton, 2000: 287)
My argument above has clarified that resemblance does not depend on any
feature of objects. Hume holds that the function of recognising resemblance is
fundamental to human nature. If resemblance is based on any feature that is
recognised by reason, then the relation between the feature and the object has further
to be questioned. The Lockean difficulty as to the first ground for identifying the
feature that signified an object turns Hume into his criticism. Hume by consciously
recognising resemblance as the primitive relation puts a period to the quandary.
However, he by no means holds that resemblance has no cognitive ground.
Resemblance activates our associative power that forms custom. That one thing
resembles other things means we associate them in a practical manner. In this sense,
resemblance is not a matter ofwhat the features of objects are like, but what
association is created in the human mind.
David MacNabb once held that "Hume's views on abstract ideas do not play
such a fundamental part in his system as Berkeley's rather similar views do in his.
(MacNabb, 1966: 33)" Far from it, "OfAbstract Ideas" contains the most
fundamental principle in the Treatise. It is a theory for explaining how perceptions
65 Incidentally, the basic function of sympathy is to enable people to share the same feelings with
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come to be internalised and humanised to give human meaning to external
perceptions. This serves as a foundation to create a human world. As I have argued,
it defines the Humean concept of custom. All the important further development in
the Treatise relies on custom implying an association of ideas. For example, it is
noticeable that Hume's theory of causation is an extension of the concept of custom
as an associative principle, in which resemblances between constant conjunctions of
objects make us take one as the cause of the other.
I have argued that taking the general point of view can be understood in the
same manner that custom makes a particular idea into a general idea. Taking a
general point of view is implied in the formation of custom as a natural process,
because this is the manner in which we understand the meaning of particular
impressions. This also applies to our moral perception. The remarkable parallelism
between Hume's explanation of general ideas and his explanation of the general point
of view can be taken as evidence that Hume's epistemology gives a foundation to his
moral theory.
each other regardless of their personal situation (see Chapter 5).
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Chapter Three:
The Humean Theory of Belief and Causation: A Moral Reading
Introduction
Both belief and causation are incontrovertibly central concepts in the history of
philosophy. Causation is no doubt the most frequently discussed among many topics
contained in the Treatise, and sits at the centre of his whole system. Usually the
Humean theory of causation is discussed with exclusively epistemological concerns.
Little effort has been made to connect it with the rest ofHume's philosophy.66
However, since Hume's overall objective lies in establishing a moral theory, treating
Hume's concept of causation exclusively from the contemporary interest in
epistemology is gravely misleading in that it ignores the context into which Hume
brings the argument. The objective of this chapter is to show the direct significance
of Hume's theory of causation as a fundamental part of his moral theory.
One preconception keeps Hume commentators from understanding the
significance of his theory of causation; it is the preconception that Hume's theory of
causation is all about the relation between two events. In this chapter, I attempt to
prove that it is a theory about the quality of an object. I explain that Hume's theory of
causation is a theory ofbelief, and that Hume deals with causation exclusively as a
matter of human belief rather than as a quality of objects themselves. My view is that
Hume's theory of causation as belief explains his fundamental concept of
normativity. I argue that the concept of general point of view functions as the key
principle in causation and in producing our beliefs.
66
K. B. Price concludes that "Although Hume's theory of knowledge does not imply his ethical
theory, it does imply the negation or meaninglessness of others" (Price, 1995: 11). In recent
Hume literature, the focus of the debate is whether or not Hume is a causal realist (cf. Read and
Kenneth (eds.), 2000).
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In section 1,1 propose that Hume's theory of causation should particularly
be understood as a theory of belief. I explain that Hume's concept of belief can be
construed as a pragmatic concept, and that causation is viewed as a means to obtain
beliefs. In section 2,1 reconsider Hume's definition of belief, and argue that Hume's
concept of belief is analogous to the concept ofmoral sentiment, which consists in
the general point of view. In section 3,1 argue that Hume's theory of causation
replaces the Lockean concept ofpower. In section 4,1 examine the relation between
the natural definition and the philosophical definition of cause, and explain Hume's
view why they signify different views of the same situation. In section 5,1 criticise
the view which takes Hume as a causal realist, in order to indicate the moral
significance ofHume's theory of causation.
1. The Importance of Belief
Arguably, there is a link between Hume's "the general point of view" and his
concept of custom. As we have seen in the last chapter, Locke's concept of abstract
ideas is substituted by custom in Hume's explanation of generality. Generality is a
persistent theme in Humean theory; it is at once a principle of human understanding
and a ground for moral justification; particular impressions and ideas obtain meaning
when they are placed in a general association with each other.67
Although we receive only particular impressions from experience, it is
obvious that our understanding of the world is not exclusively composed of
particulars. Our mental capacity cannot retain an infinite number of particulars as
they are in themselves. We cannot assign a "term" to a particular idea unless we
place it in general association with other ideas which it resembles. In accordance
with his project of transforming the Lockean substance-centred system into his
relation-centred system, Hume takes full advantage of the generality that is produced
67
Furthermore the relation between the particular and the general presents a model for
understanding the relationship between the individual and the society. I will argue this problem in
Chapter 6.
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out of particulars. Imagination associates ideas through resemblances, contiguity
and causation. It is important to understand Hume regards causation as involved in
the creation of generality.
According to Hume, the relation of cause and effect is at once among the
three natural relations, and among the seven philosophical relations. Moreover,
Hume stresses that causation is "the most extensive (T 1.1.4.4; SBN 12)", and the
unique relation "that can be trac'd beyond our senses, and informs us of existences
and objects, which we do not see or feel" (T 1.3.2.3; SBN 74). Let us clarify more
specifically the significance Hume finds in causation. This question is crucial for
understanding the centrality of causation in Hume's Treatise. What is the
significance ofHume's argument about causation in his moral theory? A key to this
question seems to lie in the noteworthy fact that Hume discusses causation as
probability together with his theory of belief which is another of his crucial concepts.
In the main stream ofwestern philosophy since Plato, belief (doxa) has been
allocated an importance second to knowledge (episteme).69 Also in the context of
British philosophy, Locke tries to define belief as a supplement to knowledge
(Passmore, 1980: 185-208; Wolterstorff, 1996: passim); he tries to indicate a way ofmaking
belief closer to a state of knowledge. Hume's innovation in moral philosophy lies in
his rediscovery of the particular significance of belief as distinct from knowledge.
Causation is important as a mechanism for achieving beliefs; as causation shows the
efficacy of an object called cause, we can obtain a belief in the quality of objects by
causation. Furthermore, Hume regards opinion as a kind of belief, (cf. T 1.3.7.5;
SBN 96).70
68
Don Garrett claims that Hume's causation takes "events" rather than "substances" as the most
fundamental relata. However, in my opinion, Hume's central task is to elucidate the structure of
causal events which he analyses in terms of the perceiver and the object. As I clarify in the
following, causation is a product of custom that is a series of events, thus relational in its nature.
Therefore, it seems legitimate to call the Humean causation the relation-centred system (Garret,
1997: Ch. 6).
69
Peter Jones indicates that Cicero emphasises that probability should be the guide to life (Jones,
1985:34).
70
As Locke identifies beliefwith assent, this signifies that Hume's theory of belief implies a
criticism of the social contract theory because, as a critic of the social contract theory. Hume
criticises Locke's theory of belief as the basis of the formation of political society by presenting
his own theory.
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Let us highlight the significance of belief in moral philosophy by
considering the cases ofHobbes and Locke. Very concisely put, Hobbes thinks that
man can live long and with industry only where there is peace prevailing in society.
Only the sovereign can guarantee the peace. Therefore, according to Hobbes, man
must obey the order of the sovereign, which is the rationalised form of desire for life.
For Hobbes, the most important thing for human survival is to follow the order of the
sovereign as a rational desire. On the other hand, Locke thinks that man can live a
good life where there is rule by natural law. Therefore, according to Locke, man
must find and obey the natural law that is given as certain knowledge through reason.
For Locke, the most important thing for human life is to follow the morality based on
reason. In contrast to these and other philosophers, Hume thinks that men can lead a
good life by coping well with their natural and human circumstances. And the
necessary way of doing so is to obtain beliefs about them, as Hume observes beliefs
are the means by which people lead their daily life. Therefore, for Hume the most
important thing for human life is to have appropriate beliefs. In this case, people do
not obey their beliefs for any moral reason nor is it their direct moral duty to obey
them. In fact, human beings naturally follow their beliefs because they have no other
means to interact with their circumstance. Their belief determines how they behave
toward their environment, physical, human, and social.
For Hume, a social order is not attained by the conscious agreement of
people; social order is attainable where people have appropriate beliefs regarding
their social circumstances. On the other hand, it is impossible to attain peace and
order where people have inappropriate principles, which bring them into conflict
with each other. Hume thinks that what is usually called immoral action is in fact a
natural outcome of a false belief; beliefs that tend to cause immoral action are
produced from a perspective that lacks generality. Therefore, the moral perspective
has to assume a generality to be valid. And that is why the general point of view
serves as a moral point of view (cf. Cohon, 1997; Blackburn, 1998a: Ch. 7).
We need to attain a social order because man apparently cannot live happily
in social disorder. Order is the objective of nature. Social order must be protected.
This is the ideal Hobbes and Locke directly aim to attain. In this case, their theories
do not exclude the possibility of attaining peace through non-peaceful means. In the
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case ofHobbes, absolute obedience to the dictates of the sovereign may cause this
kind of undesirable situation. In Locke, the right to resist may permit men to resort to
a violent means to pursue justice, which is again a necessary evil that can only be
justified by its final objective. In the Humean perspective, however, these are
regarded as serious defects that occur as a result of their separation of the final cause
71
from the efficient cause for attaining it. Hume sees that natural beliefs serve to
show the way to avoid harmful consequences. The presence of smooth interaction
with the environment already foretells the presence of a moral order. Even the most
rational prescription for attaining a perfect order cannot be implemented without
being adopted as a general basis for human behaviour.
Hume recognises that the manner in which people deal with their moral
circumstances cannot be different from how we cope with our physical surroundings,
because in both cases human beings cannot but act except with the same natural
faculties. This is why Hume says,
I shall only observe before I proceed any farther, that tho' the
ideas of cause and effect be deriv'd from the impressions of reflection
as well as from those of sensation, yet for brevity's sake, I commonly
mention only the latter as the origin of these ideas; tho' I desire that
whatever I say of them may also extend to the former. Passions are
connected with their objects and with one one another; no less than
external bodies are connected together. The same relation, then, of
cause and effect, which belongs to one, must be common to all of them.
(T 1.3.2.16; SBN 78)
Moral understanding cannot be totally different from our understanding of
the physical world ifwe use the same human capacities in both matters. Hume's
strategy is to use the former as the model for the latter, for we are more unlikely to
make mistakes in our perception of the physical world because there nature guides us
with a stronger force.
71 This appears to be Hume's constant perspective, for he applies the same perspective in his
criticism of natural religion in DNR.
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Hume thinks that belief is serviceable for producing human behaviour. For
thousands of years before civilisation, human beings have had no means but beliefs
that are accumulated in the form of convention and custom as our guides for
behaviour; otherwise we could not have been able to survive thus far. Hume
understands that the situation remains essentially the same. It is vital for us to have
understanding beyond simple present perceptions. It would certainly be beyond our
imagination how much we owe to the natural process that nature has equipped us
with. Beliefprovides us with a chart of the world. Suppose we were never sure
whether fire produces heat or coolness, each time we perceived fire, or whether that
particular wall is penetrable or not. Ifwe had to examine every object in every
situation without any preconception, we would not be able to take even one step
forward without great troubles. Hume always attempts to begin theorising from the
fundamental requirements of the human world, and his theory of perception has a
practical implication as the foundation for human behaviour.
In epistemic terms, human beings are placed in a quandary; we always face
new circumstances, and the only impressions available are those present. In other
words, human beings only have past ideas and present impressions to confront the
new and future needs. But how is it possible for us to cope well with new
circumstances? It is obvious that we must infer from our present impression to its
future course. This is what the relation of cause and effect gives us. It cannot be
certain knowledge, for it might be wrong. With the help of beliefwe can think of the
manner with which to deal with new objects and new circumstances. In this way,
belief is a means to having an adequate relationship with our circumstances. Hence
Hume defines belief as a lively idea related to an impression.72
Belief is different both from present impressions and from mere memories.
The characteristic of belief is that it is beyond particular perception. Therefore, there
must be a special mechanism that provides us with belief. Moreover, there must be a
standard to distinguish true belief from false. Ifno belief is exact, what is the
standard of true belief? Hume thinks that true belief serves as a basis of our
behaviour, in order to produce a better situation, while false belief is a mere fiction.
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This is the problem of causal belief. The function of causal belief is to inform us
about the probability concerning future events. Hume's theory of causation explains
why we can behave with a sense of assurance in belief. Hume treats causal belief as
the model ofmoral belief, because both represent the quality of an object/person
TX > •
under observation. This indicates that there is a principle that is common to belief,
causation and morality.74
2. The Humean Belief and the General Point of View
Hume's theory of belief appears as a puzzle to some commentators (e.g. Hodge and
Lachs, 1995; Pflaum, 1995; Costa, 1995; Gorman, 1993). There seems to be two
points to be clarified in order to attain a fuller understanding of the Humean concept
of belief. The first point is concerned with the definition of belief; Hume seems to
provide different definitions from time to time, and even says that belief is
indefinable. And the second point is concerned with the justification of belief; what
distinguishes justified belief from false belief? These two problems are interrelated
and a careful consideration of the first will serve to clarify the second.
Let us consider the problem of definition first. Hume has been accused of
giving an inconsistent definition to belief. For example, Hodge and Lachs assert
regarding the definition of belief that "the plain and apparently unnoticed fact is that
Hume contradicts himself."75 According to them, Hume is contradicting himself
because he gives a definition ofbelief and then denies the possibility of defining it.
One definition is what Gorman names "feeling theory" that "An opinion, therefore,
72
Hume's definition of belief will be examined below.
73
As Jane Mclntyre points out, there is a parallelism between Hume's theories of character and
causation (Mclntyre, 1990).
74
Hume has obviously chosen to discuss causation also for examining Christian theory with all
its moral and political implications. His discussion regarding the difference between thinking
about and believing in God means more than just an example (T 1.3.7.2; SBN 94). Hume's
innovation is to use the argument that was used for the demonstration of the existence of God for
the opposite purpose; Hume used it for explaining how human beings (rather than God) can exist
(cf. Livingston, 1995: 482-95).
75
According to them, the reason is that Hume gives a clear definition in the Treatise and denies
the possibility of definition in the Enquiry.
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or beliefmay be most accurately defin'd A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR
ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION" (T 1.3.7.5; SBN 96).
In his discussion of belief, Hume first asks a leading question; "Wherein
consists the difference betwixt incredulity and belief?" (T 1.3.7.3; SBN 95). It is
possible to say that throughout the Treatise, Hume persistently catechises this
question, and places his answer to it as the cornerstone of his edifice. This is of
course a question that Locke also attempts to address when he distinguishes sound
belief from enthusiasm. There is a parallelism between Hume's definitions of
causation, belief, and moral sentiment; they all consist in the particular feeling. In
his theory ofmorals, Hume tries to find the distinction between moral sentiments and
non-moral sentiments in a particular feeling that though indefinable by words, can
clearly be felt. In a similar sense, Hume thinks that belief is defined by a particular
feeling that is characterised by the "manner" an idea is entertained. Let me quote at
some length.
This operation of mind, which forms the belief of any matter
of facts, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of
philosophy; tho' no one has so much as suspected, that there was any
difficulty in explaining it. For my part I must own, that I find a
considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I
understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for a term to express my
meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident,
that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a
fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of
its being conceiv'd. But when I wou'd explain this manner, I scarce
find any word that fully answers the case, but am oblig'd to have
recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of
this operation of the mind. An idea assented to feels different from a
fictitious idea, that the fancy alone present to us: and this different
feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity,
76 This theme is repeated in his theory ofmorality. Let us remember the passage from his
discussion ofmorals, "An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because
its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the
pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue is
nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The
very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we enquire into the
cause of the satisfaction" (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471). In his theory of morals, this particular feeling is
supposed to be obtained in taking a general point of view.
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or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may
seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the
mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes
them to weigh more in thought, and gives them a superior influence on
the passion and imagination. (T 1.3.7.7; SBN 629)
Hodge and Lachs take this passage as Hume's denial of the definition.
However, this definition should be considered to supplement his first definition that
belief is a lively and vivid idea accompanied by the present impression. The
important point to note is that belief is characterised by its manner rather than by its
content; he stresses that belief is different from mere fiction by the manner in which
it is being conceived; any idea can become belief by the manner it is entertained.
This is the Humean formalism of perceptions.77 It is a matter of contingency what
kind of belief one entertains, but it is inevitable that one entertains some kind of
belief to lead his behaviour so far as he engages in conscious activities. Although
Hume does not seem to specify the manner of conceiving belief, I would argue that
he has in mind his definition ofmoral sentiments as a particular feeling taken from
the general point of view. The common denominator between beliefs and moral
sentiments is among other things "solidity", "firmness", and "steadiness".78
Hume emphasises that the concept of belief cannot completely be expressed
by theoretical terms; belief is not defined by its contents but only by the manner of
feeling in which it is expressed. This implies a criticism of the Lockean theory that
has reason guide one's belief. Hume abandons the idea of evaluating beliefs by
reason as Locke did in trying to render beliefmore reasonable. For Locke the
criterion for finding a right belief is whether it is reasonable or not. He asserts that by
using reason properly, we can and should obtain a reasonable belief (Essay 4.15-6).
Therefore, Hume's negative remarks about reason can be interpreted as a
constructive proposal; belief is distinguished from mere fiction by its causal
implications, and both its origin and its working are involved in causation. Because
77
This is understood as a counter idea of the Kantian formalism which regards morality as
consisting in the "form" of universality of a maxim, rather than in its "material".
78
At the same time, it is also obvious that Hume had this definition in mind when he used the
concept of general point of view in Book 3 of the Treatise.
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causality is not an idea, belief is not a mere idea, either. It requires a commitment of
human beings for its existence. Ideas and beliefs are semantically the same, but
beliefs refer to the human commitment that is causal, and signifies something other
than semantic description.
Hume's theory of belief fundamentally intends to explain human behaviour.
No moral theory is valid, according to the Humean idea, if the theory does not
signify a natural principle that enables human beings to partake in its process. To
acquire beliefmeans to obtain a stable manner of behaviour in respect to the same
type of objects. This is why human beings can fare well in ever changing
circumstances, and therefore, this is the secret of the adaptation of human lives to
their surroundings. Hume says,
I find, that an impression, from which, on its first appearance,
I can draw no conclusion, may afterwards become the foundation of
belief, when I have had experience of its usual consequences. ... Now
as we call everything CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition,
without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a
certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present
impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin. (T 1.3.8.9-10; SBN 102)
Hume clarifies the essential connection between belief and custom. An
object is regarded as a cause when it is placed in a relationship that is determined by
a repetition of experiences. The same object is not regarded as a cause of another
object if it is not related to it by custom. For example, fire can be regarded as a cause
of heat, but it is not usually regarded as a cause of coolness, although it can be a
cause of coolness when, for example, it is used to fuel an air conditioner in some way.
Furthermore, in order to understand fire as a cause of heat, one has to repeatedly
place oneself in a certain perspective (as opposed to doing logical reasoning), expose
oneself to the view given by it, and trace the association of ideas that connect fire
with heat. This is what it means to take a general point of view. This process occurs
only customarily in most cases where simple physical responses are concerned. This
is the secret ofwhy taking the general point of view is not mentioned in Hume's
theory of belief; it is, so to speak, hidden because it is assimilated as a natural
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process. When one regards fire as the cause of heat, one is, without any act of
reasoning, taking a general point of view. This sense of naturalness is the condition
of the "particular feeling" which convinces us that the connection is real. This
conviction is to be distinguished from the sense that the idea is "true". Thus the
general point of view serves as the Humean alternative to the Cartesian criterion of
the "clear and distinct". Hume intends to replace the truth of reason with causal
validity as the criterion of human behaviour for showing the priority of good over
right.
If belief is known only by reason, the beliefmay not be based on reality.
And a merely consistent idea can lead to a conflict with other merely consistent ideas
without any arbitrator other than the sense of personal convictions. Therefore, it is
possible to indicate a plausible reason why Hume had to modify his initial definition
of belief, that it is known by a vivid feeling: if belief is defined only as a vivid
feeling, it can include a strong but false conviction such as superstition or
enthusiasm.79 This contradicts his intention of showing the standard to distinguish
genuine belief from false belief. The central point of his initial definition is that
reality and fiction are distinguished not by any content, but by the feeling that is
peculiar only to the former. Therefore, unlike the allegation of Hodge and Lachs,
Hume's denial of the definability of belief should be understood as a positive
assertion that belief is different from reason. It is logically possible to have unnatural
or inconvenient beliefs such as fire is the cause of coolness. Hume only warns us that
it will cost us. Hume tells us; "Ifwe believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis
only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise" (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). In
this way, Hume's theory of causation aims to make us aware of this significant fact
ofhuman nature.
Impressions always actuate the soul, and that in the highest
degree; but 'tis not every idea which has the same effect. Nature has
79
John Passmore argues that Hume "does want to destroy superstition; if philosophy is often
ridiculous, so he tells us, superstition is both ridiculous and dangerous. That is precisely what
leads him to write as if it is both possible and desirable to stand back from our vivid ideas, to
decide, in certain circumstances, not to count them amongst our beliefs" (Passmore, 1980: 175).
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proceeded with caution in this case, and seems to have carefully
avoided the inconveniences of two extremes. Did impression alone
influence the will, we should every moment of our lives be subject to
the greatest calamities; because, tho' we foresaw their approach, we
should not be provided by nature with any principle of action, which
might impel us to avoid them. On the other hand, did every idea
influence our actions, our condition would not be much mended. For
such is the unsteadiness and activity of thought, that the images of
every thing, especially of goods and evils, are always wandering in the
mind; and were it mov'd by every idle conception of this kind, it would
never enjoy a moment's peace and tranquillity.
Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither
bestow'd on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will,
nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. (T 1.3.10.2-3;
SBN 118-119)
This is a penetrating view not only about the nature of belief but also about
its significance. Hume points out that beliefs enable us to take distance from direct
course of nature, while fixing us to reality, and thus are a means for "peace and
tranquillity". Beliefs are the medium between impressions and ideas, adopting the
advantages of both, and tempering both of their disadvantages. Beliefs have an
influencing force of impression, and at the same time they have the generality of
ideas. It is noticeable that this explanation is parallel to Hume's "general ideas" as a
combination ofparticularity and generality. That both abstract ideas and beliefs are
mediated by custom is additional evidence for considering that belief is a particular
impression seen from the general point of view. The vivid and lively feeling
accompanying beliefs is derived from the sense of reality that composes its central
part. Because causation is the determination of the mind as a result of repetitive
experiences of resembling objects, a point of view that unifies those individual
experiences must exist, which is the general point of view.
Now let us turn to the question how Hume thinks it is possible to distinguish
true beliefs from false ones. In Locke, true belief is equivalent to a rational
judgement that is well-supported by clear evidence. But Locke is frustrated because
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he cannot show how much evidence is required by "rationality".80 Hume follows a
different line of thought from Locke. Hume's objective is to distinguish genuine
belief from mere fiction. It sounds good, as Locke advises, to make our beliefmore
reasonable. However, Hume understands this as just a metaphor, because belief is
different in its origin from reason, and cannot literally be made "reasonable". For
Hume, false belief, so called, is mere fiction or credulity. Any situation must support
some belief when it is seen from the general point of view. All beliefs are, so long as
they are in accordance with the definition, valid not because they are true but because
they constitute reality, and reality is not a matter of true or false.
Then, a problem seems to arise: how can the conflict between beliefs be
resolved, which we experience in our social and political life? Hume's answer would
be that the general point of view will produce a new belief that is less contradicting
than either of the original two. The resolution should arise from the point of view
that comprehends the most general qualities of the situation. Genuine beliefs are
products of our experiences of reality, and cannot be products of independent
judgement. If beliefs appear contradictory, it is because they are simultaneously seen
from different points of view. The general point of view solves the problem of
contradicting beliefs by being a perspective for producing a more comprehensive
belief about the object. This is nothing extraordinary, but simply a Humean
description of the reality ofmoral perception of ordinary good persons. The general
point of view will not instantly solve all moral conflicts, however, as our reality
shows us. This is because the existence of such different views and opinions among
many individuals is the original fact of our life, and the function ofmorality is to
reduce the conflict. We always have more experiences and impressions from which
to create the general point of view. This dialectical process is the progress of
81
sentiments. Those moral problems should ultimately be settled through the
procedures that are established in society, which again represents the general point of
view. The important thing is to stick to the real nature of our belief, and to refrain
80
Passmore claims that this is the background that makes Locke turn to tolerance (Passmore,
1980: 204).
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from indulging in mere fiction. By elucidating the nature of genuine belief, Hume
shows the criterion of real belief, and rejects other pseudo moral formula such as
religious enthusiasm, political ideologies, or hedonistic calculation, etc..
3. Causation and the General Point of View
It should be clear by now that Hume's theory of causation is a theory for clarifying
the nature of causal belief. It is true that one of the fundamental projects ofmodern
philosophy is to examine the legitimacy of scientific knowledge. But Hume's
intention is not to ground an absoluteness of scientific knowledge, certainly not one
that obtains only as a hypothesis in an idealised condition. Nor does Hume mean that
necessity understood as a psychological phenomenon denies a scientific theory of
causation. He denies the idea that causal power exists in the object of cause; if causal
power exists in the object, it cannot explain the fact that one object exerts different
82 • • • • • •effects. Hume's aim is to establish the concept of causation itself for human beings
and clarify its bearings on human life. For example, it is certain that no one will "put
his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed" (EHU 8.20; SBN 91). This
does not deny the fact that someone in some situation may do so, for doing this does
not entail logical contradiction. Hume's point is that there exists a point of view for
believing that putting one's hand in a fire until it is consumed is abnormal. If not for
the human fact that we need a strong sense of reliability upon which to base
behaviour, an understanding of causal relations would not be necessary. Because
Hume's belief originates from experiences, belief can belong in reality. Appropriate
belief accompanies the sense of fitness to reality, which evokes the notion of design
or providence.
However, even an extremely thorough investigation of an object is not
enough to discover how it relates to other entities. Experience is the only guide in
human behaviour. An object's relation to other objects is unknown until it is actually
81
This line of thought can lead to a Hegelian theory. Although Hegel's connection with the
Scottish Enlightenment is usually traced to Adam Smith, the similarity between Hegel and Hume
seems to be more conspicuous (cf. Berry, 1982; Pompa, 1990).
82
This is the same argument he uses in his theory of "pride" and "humility" (see Chapter 5, part
1).
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placed into interaction. After having been placed in a relation with another object, an
object produces a different appearance in addition to the original one. For example, a
flame may first be perceived just as a reddish flicker of light, but after experiencing
its proximity to skin, a flame is recognised as having heat. This means that our
perception of the flame has obtained a richer content by virtue of experience. Thus,
the role of causation is to inform us of the quality of an object, especially regarding
how it reacts to other objects when placed in relation to them. In fact, the recognition
of the qualities of an object is nothing but the recognition of its relation to other
• XT
objects. In this sense, Humean theory represents a relation-centred system.
Thus, causation is the major source of our belief not only of the relation
between two separate impressions, but also of the quality we perceive in objects. The
84
concept of power comes to the centre of Locke's theory. Therefore, it is possible to
say that Hume's major intention is to criticise Locke's concept of quality and power.
Although Locke's distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities is
notoriously obscure, Locke understands power as a cause inherent in object that
produces qualities. In 'Of the idea of necessary connexion', Hume reiterates his
criticism of the Lockean notion ofpower. For example, he says,
I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency,
power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are
all nearly synonymous; and therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of
them in defining the rest. By this observation we reject at once all the
vulgar definitions, which philosophers have given of power and
efficacy; and instead of searching for the idea in these definitions, must
look for it in the impressions, from which it is originally deriv'd. (T
1.3.14.4; SBN 157)
Therefore, Hume's theory of necessary connection purports to explain the
concepts of efficacy, power, and agency among others. It is important to note that
these concepts represent the active principle of an object, which at the same time
83
It has to do with Hume's almost gestalt-psychological method of seeing an object in contrast to
its background, or in its entire context.
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presupposes the independent existence of the object. Thus, Hume's theory of
oc
causation prepares us for the theory of external body. Usually vulgar people assume
that qualities of an object are inherent to the object. But Hume challenges this
assumption because there is no knowing the quality of an object apart from the
perception of its relation. Hume's point is that the quality of an object is not inherent
in the object itself, but custom attributes the quality to it through the perception of its
customary relation. This is not a negative argument; Hume tries to clarify the human
dimension of an object. The Lockean "power" is the counterpart of the Humean
"cause". It is possible to consider that they represent two perspectives of an object.
Locke's concept ofpower represents the perspective of an agent, and Hume's
concept of cause represents the perspective of an observer. This underlies Hume's
constructivist turn. As he begins the discussion of causation, Hume declares his
methodology of philosophy. He says,
To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of causation,
and see from what origin it is deriv'd. 'Tis impossible to reason justly,
without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we reason;
and 'tis impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without tracing it
up to its origin, and examining that primary impression, from which it
arises. The examination of the impression bestows clearness on the
idea; and the examination of the idea bestows a like clearness on all our
reasoning. (T 1.3.2.4; SBN 75)
Tracing the origin of an idea is Hume's typical method of clarifying its
essence, thus being true to his empiricist premises. Hume thinks that the origin of
ideas is in the impression of the object that lies in the mind of the perceiver, while
Locke thinks that the idea originates in the object. As we have an idea of causation,
there must be some impression that originates it. The search continues until he finds
an impression that produces the concept. Hume looks for the impression that
84
It is clearly the Locke's plan to establish the free will of the person as a natural right, which is
also Hume's target of critique.
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Kenneth Winkler denies taking causal realism as an inevitable belief, unlike external bodies
(Winkler, 1991: 562). I agree with Winkler in denying the realism interpretation of causation. But
as I argue in next chapter, the belief in external bodies is as inevitable as the belief in causation.
86
I discuss the problem of perspective in Hobbes, Locke and Hume in Chapter 6.
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produces the idea of cause, and characteristically indicates a problem: that is, that he
cannot discover the very impression that is supposed to produce the idea of causation.
He says,
Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, which we
call cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in order to find that
impression, which produces an idea of such prodigious consequence.
At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for it in any of the
particular qualities of the objects; since, which-ever of these qualities I
pitch on, I find some object, that is not possest of it, and yet falls under
the denomination of cause and effect. And indeed there is nothing
existent, either externally or internally, which is not to be consider'd
either as a cause or an effect: tho' 'tis plain there is no one quality,
which universally belongs to all beings, and gives them a title to that
denomination. (T 1.3.2.5; SBN 75)
In this way, Hume confirms the fact that there is no impression
corresponding to cause because any object can become a cause of something without
contradiction. Therefore, we do not receive the impression of cause from any
• 87 •
object. In other words, any object can logically cause any effect. By denying the
impression that corresponds to cause, Hume concludes that the idea "of causation
must be deriv'd from some relation among objects" (T 1.3.2.6; SBN 75).88 He
examines the relation of two objects that are regarded as cause and effect. He finds
that the objects are "contiguous" {ibid.), and that "PRIORITY of time in the cause
before the effect" (T 1.3.2.7; SBN 76) is essential, because if there is any
intervention between the occurrence of two objects, the first one is not the solo cause
of the second, and if the concomitance of the cause and effect is asserted, its
consequence would be "the utter annihilation of time" {ibid.). Only these two
phenomena are observable in the instance of causal relation. However, this is not
enough to make sense of causation. Hume pretends to be at a loss, and says,
87
Arguably, there seems to be an inherent connection between the working of causation and that
of sympathy; sympathy can take any feeling as its object (see Chapter 5).
88
This will lead to the "philosophical relation".
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Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of
contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation?
By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another,
without being consider'd as its cause. There is a NECESSARY
CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of
much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd.
(T 1.3.2.11; SBN 77)
Here, Hume indicates the essence of causation is a "necessary connexion" in
addition to the two phenomena above mentioned. It is interesting to examine how
Hume comes to regard necessary connection as the core element of causation. Hume
resorts to his characteristic pattern of reasoning; he takes a detour by asking two
further questions, rather than giving a direct answer to this question. Hume
formulates them as follows.
First, For what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every
thing whose existence has a beginning, shou'd also have a cause?
Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must
necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that
inference we draw from the one to the other, and of the belief we
repose in it? (T 1.3.2.14-15; SBN 78)
In answering these questions, Hume develops an interesting argument to
refute the theories of other philosophers. He says,
To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a
cause: 'Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to
exist, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for
granted in all reasoning, without any proof given or demanded. 'Tis
suppos'd to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims,
which tho' they may be deny'd with the lips, 'tis impossible for men in
their hearts really to doubt of. But if we examine this maxim by the
idea of knowledge above-explain'd, we shall discover in it no mark of
any such intuitive certainty; but on the contrary shall find, that 'tis of a
nature quite foreign to that species of conviction. (T 1.3.3.1; SBN 78-
79)
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So, it is not Hume himself but other philosophers and the people in general
• RQ
who claim the necessity of cause. Causation is not proven but just presupposed.
Hume's task is to question where in the first place the presupposition comes from.90
It is not correct to hold that Hume denies causation and idiosyncratically ascribes it
to the psychological quality of necessity. Hume does not deny causality but
acknowledges it as the undeniable form of human belief. Human beings are naturally
compelled to see the quality of an object in the form of cause and effect because this
is the framework of their understanding the world. Belief and causation are two sides
of a coin. Causation is undeniable to the extent that human beings have to rely upon
belief in their natural behaviour.
Then, how do we come to acquire the idea? Or "/h]ow experience gives rise
to such aprinciple!"(J 1.3.3.9; SBN 82) Hume makes a remarkable reformulation of
the question that "Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily
have such particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to another?" (T
1.3.3.9; SBN 82) Causation concerns inference, and "right" inferences regarding
facts must be accompanied by the "sense" of necessity paradoxically because the
inference regarding facts is not in fact necessary. This is a crucial step that Hume
locates the origin of our causal reasoning in experience. Hume says,
We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence
of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of
another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed
in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. ...
Without any further ceremony, we call the one cause and the other
effect, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other.
Thus in advancing we have insensibly discover'd a new
relation betwixt cause and effect, when we least expected it, and were
entirely employ'd upon another subject. This relation is their
CONSTANT CONJUNCTION. Contiguity and succession are not
sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect,
unless we perceive, that these two relations are preserv'd in several
89
Typically, philosophers resort to this theory in the cosmological argument for the existence of
God.
90
As we shall see, this attitude is also found in his discussion of the existence of external bodies
(see Chapter 4).
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instances. We may see the advantage of quitting the direct survey of
this relation, in order to discover the nature of that necessary connexion,
which makes so essential apart of it. (T 1.3.6.2,3; SBN 87)
In this way, Hume specifies the relations that produce causation to be
contiguity, succession and most of all "constant conjunction". Repeated experiences
influence the tendency of our mind that transits from one object to another with the
working of imagination. The natural transition ofmind from one object to another is
possible because of the working of custom. Forming a custom is inseparable from
taking a general point of view, because seeing two events as causation implies a
point of view. In this way, Hume explicates the manner in which we acquire the idea
of causation without resorting to the impression which corresponds to it. This is his
strategy precisely because there cannot be an impression that corresponds to cause.91
Hume clarifies that there is no impression of cause but that causation consists in the
manner of seeing an object in association with its usual attendant. This is an original
creation ofmind which functions as the basis of the idea of causation. Both causation
and custom are equally products of accumulated experiences, and therefore consist in
their association that is represented by the general point of view. In this way, Hume's
theory of causation consists in the formation of the general point of view.
4. Relation of the Two Definitions of Causes
As is well known, Hume supplies two definitions of cause. He had to wait to give the
definitions of cause until his argument had elucidated the nature of inference on
which the relation of causation depends. One is called the philosophical definition
and the other is called the natural definition. The relation and difference between
them are much discussed among commentators (e.g., Robinson, 1985: Richards,
1985; Gotterbarn, 1985; Baier, 1991: 90-3; Craig, 2002; Winkler, 1991). It is
possible further to clarify the moral implication ofHume's theory of causation by
considering them. Let us first survey Hume's definition as follows.
91
Some commentators see Hume as inconsistent (e.g., Craig, 2002: 221; Stroud, 1977: 80-81;
Stringfleet, 2002: 119-20).
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There may two definitions be given of this relation, which are
only different, by their presenting a different view of the same object,
and making us consider it either as a philosophical or as a natural
relation; either as a comparison of two ideas, or as an association
betwixt them. We may define a CAUSE to be 'An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former
are plac'd in like relations of precedence and contiguity to those
objects, that resemble the latter.' If this definition be esteem'd
defective, because drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may
substitute this other definition in its place, viz. 'A CAUSE is an object
precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea
of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other'. (T
1.3.14.31; SBN 170)
Hume considers this as "an exact definition of the relation of cause and
effect" (T 1.3.14.30; SBN 169). It is most important that the two definitions represent
one concept of causation, as Hume asserts that the two definitions are "a different
view of the same object". A sign that Hume takes the two definitions as representing
the same concept is that in the Enquiries, he blends the two as follows.
But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances,
been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of
foretelling one upon the appearance of the other ... We then call the
one object, Causey and other, Effect. (EHU 7.27; SBN 74-75)
The natural definition clarifies that causation is not a relation external to the
working of human mind. The philosophical definition, on the other hand, describes
causation as external perception, disregarding the involvement of the perceiver. It is
to be noted, however, both definitions are conceived within the framework of the
theory of perceptions. If two objects are not perceived, then the precedence and
contiguity cannot even be recognised. They are vocabularies peculiar to perceptions.
Thus, in the philosophical definition, two objects must be "recognised" as
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regularity. Moreover, it is significant that the relation between unknown causes and
perceivable effects cannot be recognised as causation, because this introduces a
dualism of appearance and reality. In other words, Hume's cause is not something
that causes perception of the constant conjunction of two objects. Hume's project is
to criticise this dualism in order to establish morality as a thoroughly human matter.
Q9
J. A. Robinson claims that the two definitions differ extensionally. He
claims that there are some cases where a causal event that meets the first definition
does not meet the second definition (cf. Craig, 2002: 224). According to Robinson's
interpretation, the regularity of two events, A and B, causes the mind to form the
tendency to associate the object like A with the object like B. He says that this
tendency is "a purely contingent feature (Robinson, 1985: 365)" because it is
possible that relation defined by the philosophical definition does not possess this
feature. Robinson says, "it is clearly an error on Hume's part to have offered it as a
definition, and admittedly an extremely misleading error, leading to
misinterpretations and confusions as to what he was trying to say about causation"
(Robinson, 1985: 366). However, this interpretation is disputable.94
The problem is that Robinson assumes that the capacity which recognises
the regularity of events A and B is different from the mind that forms the sense of
necessity. This is unacceptable because it will not explain why the regularity between
A and B is recognised as an instance of causation in the philosophical definition.95 It
is certain that there exist more cases of causation than we have already recognised,
and they are simply not yet recognised as causation. This is a tricky point. Hume's
92 This is the difference from the Newtonian concept of cause as the underlying force (cf.
Clatterbaugh, 1999: Ch. 7). Marina Frasca-Spada maintains that the Newtonian philosophy
"teaches how to talk about such subjects as moving and resting bodies, while the 'science of
human nature' talks about the ways people are - about human ideas, errors, beliefs, delusions,
passions" (Frasca-Spada, 1998; 189).3
Don Garrett summarises the famous interpretative difficulty as follows, "unobserved
regulatiries seem to prevent the set of causes defined by CI [philosophical definition] from being
even a subset of those defined by C2 [natural definition], while observed but unrepresentative
samples seem to prevent the set of causes defined by C2 from being even a subset of those
defined by CI" (Garrett, 1997: 98-9). Garrett fails to notice that Hume conceives the definition
strictly as a theory of perceptions. There can be no unobserved "regularities", and an
unrepresentative sample cannot cause psychological necessity. I will make this clear below.
94 Edward Craig provides us with a solution to this problem (Craig, 2002: 225).
95
This poses the same problem about the essential role of moral sentiments in moral perception.
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definition is of the concept of cause, and not a concrete standard to apply to judge
concrete cases of causal relationship. It is completely compatible with Hume's theory
that there are many causal relations that are not yet recognized as such. Hume's point
is that there is no way of recognising causation other than the two definitions. To
identify the concrete case is a merely technical problem.
It is illegitimate to suppose that there is something more than we perceive in
the concept of causation. Ifwe find this hard to accept, Hume would say, it is only
because we firmly believe in the objectivity of causation, which is not a conclusion
of reason nor senses but imagination. Not only the vulgar people but philosophers
cannot be exempted from entertaining this belief. Yet of the whole variety of
phenomena that occur in the universe, only a small portion of them are counted as
causation. The difference between causation and other perceptions consists
exclusively in the sense ofnecessity that the two like events will constantly follow.
By being recognised as a causal relation, the relation acquires a human significance.
It matters not at all if the recognition is corrigible, the point is that the understanding
is incorporated into a moral world and influences human behavior. It should be
thoroughly confirmed that Hume asserts this human significance of the concept of
causation.
On the other hand, Edward Craig asserts that the "two definitions" passage
is best understood as presenting two descriptions of the circumstances
under which belief in a causal connexion arise, one concentrating on
the outward situation, the other on the state of the believer's mind that
those outward facts induce. (Craig, 2002: 227)
Craig means that the phenomena of causes are independent of the formation of the
beliefs. However, it is not clear how Craig can distinguish the circumstances of the
formation of belief in a causal connection from the definition of causation.
Presumably, it has to do with his causal realist understanding ofHume.96 However,
Hume himself calls the two descriptions the definition of causation. He does not
specifically mean the "circumstance" of causal belief. The problem ofCraig's
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interpretation is that it leaves something in the concept of causation other than the
recognition of two events constantly conjoined, and the psychological sense of
necessity. There is nothing in causation other than the belief signified by the two
definitions, because causation is a thoroughly human concept. Some might say
causation is not composed of beliefs alone, there are other elements in causation
other than beliefs, such as two physical objects, coalition, movement, break,
explosion, etc.. These are in themselves nothing to do with the concept of causation.
To consider the belief in causation differently from causation itself is to suppose the
independent existence of causation, which leads to other problematic theories such as
dualism or realism. Hume's motif is to dispel the notion that there is something
behind the object. This idea leads to the creation of a new science, which we call
social science. To allow existence beyond perception is, on Hume's view, simply
"mysticism" (DNR 134). Hume intends to establish the science ofman excluding
07
those understandings.
Thus, the positive implication ofHume's sceptical argument consists in
demolishing the notion that there is something behind the perception, which is
typically articulated as a dualism of phenomena and essence. Hume transforms this
type of dualism into his theory of perception based on custom; what produces the
causation does not exist in objects, but rather the accumulated experiences of the past
forms the point of view of seeing a new perception in relation of another. He shows
that the relationship between two objects cannot be determined by them alone. It is
determined by the perspective of custom. Hume thus transforms the ontology of
dualism into the epistemological synthesis of the particular and custom.
It is necessary to understand that the two definitions imply each other.98 The
constant conjunction described in the philosophical definition naturally produces the
96
Craig later modifies his realist position in his article "Projectivist and Realist?" (Craig, 2000).
97
In the context of the Scottish Enlightenment, "realism" has a strong association with
Catholicism, which is the major target of Hume's criticism.
98
Annette Baier says, "the two views of cause are each non-eliminable alternatives. To
understand either is to see that it brings the other "along with" it. We can get at cause from either
view, since each leads us by causal inference to its attendant view. As both constant conjunction
and the inference of the mind are essential to necessity, and necessity is essential to causation, so
both ofHume's two views of cause must be grasped, and the double or mutual causal dependency
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psychological necessity, and the philosophical causation is first confirmable as a
causal relation when the natural definition is established. It is only by the natural
definition that the philosophical definition is known to obtain, and even in the
philosophical definition, there is a point of view presupposed that recognised the two
objects constantly conjoined. Without the psychological sense of necessity, there is
no causation for us." Thus the priority lies in the natural definition.100 As Hume says,
Thus tho' causation be a philosophical relation, as implying
contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as
it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we
are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it. (T 1.3.6.16;
SBN 94)
Although "cause and effect" is at once a natural and a philosophical relation,
it is first discovered only through experience. That is why Hume downplays the
working of reason in causal understanding. Human reason is the feeblest of all in this
matter. This is the fundamental characteristic ofHumean naturalism. Hume says,
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their
ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human
reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty,
whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the
creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being.
Nor is such a question any way material to our present purpose. We
may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether
they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere
illusions of the senses. (T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84)
between their foreign objects properly appreciated, before we see what precisely his definition
says and shows" (Baier, 1991: 92).
99
In a similar sense, if there is no moral sentiment, there is no belief in morality. There, Hume's
central concern is how to show the necessity of moral sentiment. In this sense the priority
between the two definitions becomes a central question.
100
Kenneth Clatterbaugh mistakenly thinks that the two definitions are not coextensive, and takes
the first definition as Hume's authentic definition (Glatterbaugh, 1999: 195-206). Hume names it
philosophical, presumably because it deals only with the relation of perceptions.
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Here is obviously an influence of the Lockean distinction between the real
essence and the nominal essence. Hume expels the discussion of the real essence
from his theory of perceptions. We have only to deal with our perceptions of the
world as they appear to us in causal inferences, because their non-perceptive reality,
whatever that may be, does not influence our belief or our behaviour.101 Hume
regards the sense of necessity as the essence of causation because causation functions
as a belief only when it appears necessary to us. The sense of necessity is first
produced when individual experiences acquire regularity, which is the hallmark of
custom (cf. Loeb, 1995a: 101-32, 1995b: 301-27, 2001: 145-64). Custom consists in
seeing each particular as an instance of a generality. Seeing the particular as an
instance of generality implies the formation of a general point of view on the side of
perceiver because no change is brought into the objects themselves.
There is another significant ground that Hume's theory of causation depends
on the general point of view. It is useful to think who, in the first definition,
recognises the regularity of two similar objects, and in the second definition, whose
mind is determined to form a more lively idea of the other by the one. It is clear that
Hume's definition does not describe the psychology of any particular individuals.
The standard to distinguish true causation from false is whether it is represents the
perception from the general point of view. In this sense, the general point of view
indicates the normativity of causation. This can be understood as part ofHume's
innovation of the Berkeleyan identification of existence with perceptions. Hume
considers that the understanding of objects is created with the formation of generality.
Causation composes a central element of the understanding of the world. Thus,
Hume's constructivism overcomes the problem ofhow the human mind recognises
the objective law that exists outside ofmind.
There seem to be many cases when our beliefs are betrayed by reality,
which is typically the case where the events that meet the natural definition do not
meet some cases of philosophical definition. More generally, experience shows that
in many cases our belief is wrong. But, this does not mean that Hume's theory is
101
I agree with Ken Levy who asserts that "Hume is not concerned with whether or not there are
causal connections in the objects" (Levy, 2000: 58).
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defective. The important fact is that it is another belief that determines whether or not
one belief is betrayed. Hume's definition does not maintain that causation so defined
is precise, and not because it is inadequate, but because a precise "uniformity in
every particular, is found in no part of nature" (EHU 8.10; SBN 85).102 Human
nature is so arranged that we abide only by beliefs in all of our behaviours. If an
event which has hitherto been considered as a cause fails to produce the expected
effect, we revise our belief, and search for a new belief. This is the creation of the
general point of view. We cannot possibly go beyond our belief concerning the
existence and nature of causation. This means that there is no point in talking about
the unknown law in reference to the concept of necessity. Hume says,
I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several qualities both in
material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly
unacquainted; and ifwe please to call these power or efficacy, 'twill be
of little consequence to the world. But when, instead of meaning these
unknown qualities, we make the terms of power and efficacy signify
something, of which we have a clear idea, and which is incompatible
with those objects, to which we apply it, obscurity and error begin then
to take place, and we are led astray by a false philosophy. This is the
case, when we transfer the determination of the thought to external
objects, and suppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them; that
being a quality, which can only belong to the mind that considers them.
(T 1.3.14.27; SBN 168)
"True philosophy" has to show that causation and thus beliefs are
specifically human matters, whose function lies in creating the human world. The
task of true philosophy is to explore the human significance of this tendency. False
philosophy surreptitiously borrows the concept of necessity from custom, and
publicly declares it as the feature of external objects. Hume's two definitions of cause
show that the concept of causation cannot be a matter other than of human
perceptions. In this way, Hume completes the Copernican turn ofwhat is considered
external events into human construction.
102
It is a preconception since Aristotle that physical cause is more exact than moral cause. Hume
is clear that the comparison is groundless.
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5. Debate regarding Hume's Causal Realism
A new tendency ofmind that is created through repeated experiences creates the
recognition of the world which, in turn, becomes the framework of our behaviour.
And the world as perceived is the realm of human nature, as it does not exist prior to
or independent of human experiences. Hume's theory of causation is an attempt to
identify a principle that constitutes the human world, including especially what are
generally considered external events. However, Hume is aware of the fact that this
idea may sound unacceptable to many people.
But tho' this be the only reasonable account we can give of necessity,
the contrary notion is so riveted in the mind from the principles above-
mention'd, that I doubt not but my sentiments will be treated by many
as extravagant and ridiculous. What! The efficacy of causes lie in the
determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate entirely
independent of the mind, and wou'd not continue their operation, even
tho' there was no mind existent to contemplate them, or reason
concerning them. Thought may well depend on causes for its operation,
but not causes on thought. This is to reverse the order of nature, and
make that secondary, which is really primary. (T 1.3.14.26; SBN 167)
Here, Hume reveals his Copernican project of rendering internal to human
nature what are usually understood as external events. However, as though to
endorse Hume's worry, there have emerges commentators who claim Hume to be a
realist. Those commentators, named "New Humeans" assert that Hume is in fact a
realist regarding causal power (Read and Richman eds., 2000). They maintain that
Hume believes that we can know that causal powers and objects exist in the world,
although we are unable to know any more about them than that they exist. I disagree
with the realist reading ofHume, fundamentally because, firstly, I take Hume as a
constructivist. Realism about causation does not make sense unless there are
independent objects between which causation obtains. But Hume does not
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presuppose the existence of independent objects.103 Secondly, I understand Hume's
theory of causation as the foundation ofmorality, but the realist interpretation does
not serve as such a foundation (see Chapters 7 and 8).
John Wright, a representative new Humean, understands Hume as a
sceptical realist concerning causation. On the other hand, Kenneth Winkler opposes
Wright's interpretation and asserts that Hume denies the causal power that lies
behind the observation of regular sequence of two objects (cf. Bell, 1997). In a
counter response to Winkler, Wright criticises Winkler's view as follows.
Hume defines power as 'the unknown circumstances of an object, by
which the degree of quantity of its effect is fixed and determined'. In
other words, it is the unknown circumstance in the cause which
necessarily connects it with the effect. It is true that Hume stresses that
this circumstance can only be identified through the effect; that is, as
that which is constantly conjoined with it. We have no independent
identification of it. Thus we have 'additional evidence', as Hume
claims in his first 1759 note, to show that we are totally ignorant of any
power, such as the vis inertiae. But if, as Winkler thinks, the power
were nothing more than regular succession, 'these explications and
definitions' would afford no such evidence. Hume's aim is to show that
the power is unknown to us. (Wright, 2000: 92)
Wright's quotation ofHume's definition of power is rather arbitrary.104
Hume denies the independent existence of "power" even though he talks about what
is usually regarded as such.105 Wright's "the power is unknown" is a meaningless
103
New Humeans assert the reality of causation, while they are indecisive about the existence of
external bodies. But this is clearly odd. It is hard to understand why they think external law is
more certain in terms of reality than the external body (see Chapter 4).
104
Hume says, "we have no idea of a being endow'd with any power, much less of one endow'd
with infinite power. But ifwe will change expressions, we can only define power by connexion;
and then in saying, that the idea, of an infinitely powerful being is connected with that of every
effect, which he wills, we really do no -more than assert, that a being, whose volition is
connected with every effect, is connected with every effect: which is an identical proposition, and
gives us no insight into the nature of this power or connexion" (T 1.4.5.31; SBN 248).
05
Hume says, "I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several qualities both in material
and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please to call these
power or efficacy, 'twill be of little consequence to the world. But when, instead of meaning these
unknown qualities, we make the terms of power and efficacy signify something, ofwhich we
have a clear idea, and which is incompatible with those objects, to which we apply it, obscurity
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phrase for Hume, because there is no known power, either. New Humeans hold that
though the human mind cannot conceive the "force" that makes one event cause or
necessitate another, it is possible to suppose there to be something, ofwhich we have
no distinct idea, which is responsible for the regularities in question (Read, 2000:
Introduction; Strainstreet, 2002: 133). Thus, Wright asserts that as Hume says power
is unknown, power must exist as something other than what we observe as the
psychological necessity. This is Wright's sceptical realist Hume (cf. Strainstreet,
2002: 128-132). Winkler, on the other hand, criticises the realist interpretation by
pointing out that it is illegitimate to infer that "there are unknown powers in bodies"
from Hume's remark that "it is possible that there are unknown qualities in bodies"
(Winkler, 1991: 550). As Winkler's criticism implies, one ofHume's kernel
assertions is that it is impossible to know that the unknown qualities are what we
understand as "power".106 This is different from Wright's understanding that Hume's
point is to show that the power is unknown to us. Wright makes an illicit leap when
he asserts that "the unknown circumstances" are "in the cause", because it is
impossible to decide where the unknown circumstance exists.
Hume's task is to clarify what we usually understand by power in terms of
the theory of perceptions. As in cases of other important concepts he deals with in
the Treatise, He intends to humanise the concept ofpower. Thus, as Hume defines
power as a thoroughly human matter, he cannot mean that there is unknown "real"
power. Hume purports to modify our common understanding that assumes power is
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inherent in objects. Thus, Hume dashes the understanding that there is an
independent power that works between two events. This implies that the relationship
and error begin then to take place, and we are led astray by a false philosophy" (T 1.3.14.27;
SBN 168).
106 Kenneth Winkler makes another important point that "the hidden powers of observable things
rest not on unobservable (and unanalyzable) real powers, but on unobservable mechanisms or
structures" (Winkler, 1991: 549).
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Another realist-interpretation commentator, Galen Strawson dismisses the Treatise in favour
of the Enquiry to defend his position (Strawson, 2003: 8). He confuses Hume's explanation of
what is ordinary taken to be causation as Hume's genuine definition. In fact, the definition Wright
takes as Hume's own is explained in a footnote (EHU 7. footnote 17; SBN 77) as an
understanding of ordinary people ("we"), or "all philosophers" whose theories Hume intends to
criticise (cf. Craig, 2000: 117).
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between two objects is not determined exclusively between themselves. Every
object is causally related to all kinds of things, so there is no law that corresponds
exclusively to a particular relation.
It is important to understand that the perception of resemblance is involved
in the concept of cause. Without resemblance, there is no concept of causation. No
two exactly the same events happen twice in the universe, and if all events happen
only once, it does not make sense to call the relation causal law. Law implies
universality; there is no law that can apply only in one instance. Therefore, in fact,
there is no causal law in the universe, because everything in the universe is particular.
This understanding is supported by Hume's nominalism. Hume holds that though
there are no abstract ideas discoverable by reason or senses, imagination regards
particular ideas as a representation of other resembling particulars by custom.
Similarly, though there is no law that causes two events, custom takes one particular
causal relation as an instance of causal law in other resembling events, because law is
abstraction.109
It might be possible to understand that what Hume calls the unknown
circumstance should be understood as the whole universe, or the whole existence,
because even the tiniest event we observe requires the whole universe to happen. Just
as there is no unnecessary moment in our life, and as every drop ofwater serves a
role to constitute a great ocean, everything has a role in making every other event to
happen.110 This theory should apply to society to help us understand that everyone is
necessary for the whole society. What do we learn from the fact that the real "cause"
is the whole universe? It is empty to call the whole universe the causal power,
because it only means that every event has the same cause. The search of the cause
does not end here. It is necessary to enquire into the cause of the whole universe and
the whole existence. This inference typically has a termination; to suppose the God
108 •
This is the same as in the case ofmorality, appropriate moral relationship between two
persons is not determined only between the two persons. In later chapters, I argue that Hume
elucidates the political power based on his theory of causation.
109
Simon Blackburn notices the connection between Hume's arguments of "general idea" and
causation (Blackburn, 1990: 245).
110 This represents the situation that every citizen contributes to compose the society by paying
tax and even by just living.
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as the real cause.111 This is the doctrine of occasionalism. Occasionalism has rightly
revealed that any proceeding object cannot be the exclusive cause of the following
object. However, occasionalism cannot solve the core question because it does not
clarify the human meaning of the causation (cf. Clatterbaugh, 1990: 246). And the
result is the denegation of scientific understanding, which Hume purports to establish.
Craig asserts that Hume's intention is to show there is something-we-know-
not-what in order to destroy any pretension to finding what we might antecedently
have hoped to understand about nature. However, even if this is right, this argument
is headed in a wrong direction. Hume tries to establish the realm of human belief
from which we can establish a reliable system of belief. In this sense, Hume's project
signifies the foundation of social sciences, not simply sceptical limits (cf. Blackburn,
1990:246).
Hume understands this as a necessary consequence from a false assumption
that "every thing must have a cause" to exist (T 1.3.4.7; SBN 81). This is a useful
and necessary framework for understanding the human world and human events.
However, ifwe apply this to other fields beyond the process of acquiring human
beliefs, it can only invite an absurd conclusion. This is the purport ofHume's project
of applying the experimental method; ifwe expand our understanding of causal
relations beyond perceivable impressions, it becomes impossible to decide what is
legitimately or illegitimately understood as cause. Hence emerges the demon who
might deceive Descartes or the God who is the real cause of occasionalism in
Malebranche; anything goes, once the Deus ex machina is permitted. Hume's
proposal of the science ofman is stop relying on it.
It is important to remember that Hume declares it impossible to consider the
cause of sensations (T 1.1.2.1, SBN 8). With this assertion, we return to the starting
supposition ofHume's epistemology. Hume clearly recognises that this question is
outside of his queries. This is a positive assertion of confining the realm of his
science ofman. As is well known, Kant supposes the unknown real cause thing-in-
itself (Ding an sich) which lies behind our perceptions, but unlike Kant, Hume
111
Incidentally, Buddist philosophy asserts that the ultimate cause of existence is the "emptiness".
Chapter 3 117
Hume's General Point of View
refuses to incorporate such a concept into his explanation of the recognition of the
119 •
world. Because, what he tries to explain is the very fact how human beings
naturally come to obtain their manner of understanding the world. Therefore, if
someone tries to admit the unknown causal power in Hume, he breaks the basic
framework ofHume's epistemology, and introduces a different element into his
science ofman. The assumption of the unknown cause makes Hume a quasi-dualist.
It is true, as Craig points out, Hume sometimes seems to make sincere
remarks as though he supports the causal reality (Craig, 2000: 117). Now let us
consider why Hume positively talks of the causal power as if it exists in objects,
despite his sceptical argument. In short, it is because his theory is about the human
• 1 1T • • •
significance of the belief in causation. Belief in causation works not because
causes are real, but because we believe it is so. Owing to the human fact that we
believe causation is real, our belief in causation serves to compose the human world.
Fictions function as genuine only when we believe them as genuine and behave
relying on them. This is the secret of creating the human world which does not exist
originally in nature. By believing the causation, human beings obtain a pattern of
behaviour that follows their beliefs.114 In the theory of causation, Hume sets the
standard to tell when and how factious belief is useful and reliable, and how to
distinguish false or merely fictions belief from genuine or reliable belief; a reliable
fictitious belief is one that is involved in causal inference. Because of the sense of
necessity we are forced to believe that our beliefs represent the reality as such, rather
than that we feel causation necessary because it is objective. Causation seems to be
reliable precisely because of the sense of necessity. He takes note of causation
because of its relevance to human behaviour. In this sense, Hume's theory of
112 As we will see in Chapter 4, the notion that an object has an inherent principle is an
imaginative projection from the fact that we cannot perceive the same object simultaneously from
the front and from behind. Thus the notion of power or substance is derived not from rational
argumentation but from a natural act of the imagination based on our experience of the world.
11
1 agree with Winkler who maintains that Hume is a causal realist in a non-philosophical sense
(Winkler, 1991:544-8).
'14
This is the same reason why human beings believe in the existence of external body (see
Chapter 4). As we will see, Hume argues justice and government as fiction in a similar manner.
As we will see, behind this lies a Hobbesian idea that the power of authority becomes genuine
when people actually fear it seriously. Hume's theory of causation is based on the similar line of
thought.
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causation and thus reality is strategically oriented toward moral theory. There is
essentially no distinction in Hume between moral and non-moral perception, because
both are equally a matter of human nature.
As Hume recognises, there is a difficulty in understanding his theory,
because it requires anatomising beliefs that people, including philosophers, have
already accepted as objective. This difficulty accompanies all the important
conceptual analysis in Hume. It seems that the realist interpretation is trapped in this
difficulty.
6. Concluding Remarks
Hume's close cousin, Henry Home, later Lord Karnes is reported to have been
"crucified" by reading the chapter on "Power" in Locke's Essay concerning Human
Understanding.115 It is now clear that the most significant implication ofHume's
theory of causation is to replace the understanding that objects have inherent
qualities or power, or the notion that there is something in or behind the object.
Hume needs to explain the quality of an object in terms of two events, i.e. as a theory
of causation because the independent quality is a fiction, and the quality of an object
enters into human perception only in relation to other objects. Realism means a
position to suppose something inherent in the object, but the Humean constructivism
clarifies that the something is the epistemological history of the perceptions.
Don Garret asserts that Hume's two definitions of cause are "extremely
general and open ended" (Garret, 1997: 115).116 If this kind of understanding is still
common among Hume readers, it is a regrettable indicatory that Hume's aim is not
understood on the most crucial point. Hume's definitions are exhaustive in exploring
the human significance of the human concept of causation. There is nothing in the
human mind about causation other than the perception of two similar events
constantly following, and the mind's natural tendency to be induced by one event to
115
It was recorded in a correspondence of 1723. Hume's friendship with Henry Home, fifteen
years his senior, is believed to have started early in his life. Mossner suggests that Henry Home
was one ofHume's mentors in philosophy in his college days (Mossner, 1980: 58).
116
Don Garret is not the only commentator to take this view. Clatterbaugh likewise insists that
"Hume's definitions cast too wide a net" (Clatterbaugh, 1999: 205).
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infer the other. If there is any other feature, Hume would be very curious to know
what it is. However, it is possible to say that owning to the generality and the open-
endedness ofHume's concept, all events can count as causation and thus be
incorporated into our understanding of the world."7 The perception of causation is
like the perception ofmoral sentiment. The sentiment that identifies causation is
nothing but the particular sentiment of necessity. In this respect, perceptions of
causation and morality are the same. The fundamental purport ofHume's theory of
causation is not to explore the essence of nature as an external object, but to establish
the theory ofmorality as a case of special causation. By conceptualising causation as
a human matter, he found the natural basis on which to base the moral order. There is
no wonder that Hume's theories of causation and moral judgment are similar.
John Passmore described Hume's ethical theory as the "ethics ofbelief'
(Passmore, 1980: appendix). As I have argued, Hume takes special note of belief as
the guide for human behaviour. To acquire appropriate beliefs is the fundamental
task of human beings in order to balance reality and ideas. Human beings obtain
belief typically through the experiences of causation. Belief serves as a guide in
coping with the natural environment. Beliefs are the understanding of qualities of
objects; by having beliefs human beings incorporate external objects into the
condition of their behaviour. Human beings obtain beliefs through causal observation.
As Hume emphasises by his sceptical argument, there is no necessity apart from
human reactions. As far as our observation of natural events is concerned, no event
can occur in accordance with a strict law. Causation is a human concept which is
applicable to the relation between human perceptions only. By his theory of
causation, Hume criticises the essentialist idea of power. He reveals that the concept
ofpower is a fiction, signifying only the psychological requirements of human
beings. The significant point to note is that the theory ofbelief provides the model
for his theory of moral sentiments. Both are founded on the manner in which they are
conceived. As I have argued, they are founded on the general point of view. Belief in
the causal connection between two objects presupposes the belief in their
117
Similar characteristic is applicable to the allocation of property, and the selection of political
authority (see Chapters 7 and 8).
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independent existence. As we will see in the next chapter, the belief in causation will
develop in the Treatise into the belief in the external bodies.
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Chapter Four:
Moral Implications of the Existence of the External Object
Introduction
The existence of the external object ranks alongside causation and personal identity
as one of the three major topics ofHume's theoretical philosophy. Hume's deep
commitment to the topic is shown by the fact that he returns to it in several places in
the Treatise. The main discussion, though, is placed in two sections, one at T 1.2.6.,
entitled "Of the idea of existence and of external existence"; the more substantial
discussion, however, is at T 1.4.2., entitled "Of skepticism with regard to the senses".
There can be little wonder, then, that the topic is usually discussed in relation to
Hume's skepticism; however, Hume's theory of the existence of the external objects
is not restricted to a mere skeptical argument. As I will seek to show, the topic not
only occupies a central place in his epistemology, but plays just as central a role in
Hume's whole system ofmoral philosophy. This chapter explores the moral
significance ofHume's theory of the existence of the external object. Above all, this
chapter attempts to present a new reading ofHume's theory of the external object as
a theory of the perception of human beings."8
Hume first discusses the problem of demonstrating the existence of the
external objects in the context of the development of his own system. It is, therefore,
important to place the argument in the context of the whole development of the
Treatise. Hume strategically develops his theory starting from the most primitive
perceptions and then shows how they are associated with each other. Independent
impressions and ideas are the most basic units which, through the three natural
118
Before Hume, others such as Epicurus, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke discussed the
human body as an external object, the Latin corpus signifying both object and human body. In
particular, Spinoza explicitly argues that the human body is an external object from a moral
perspective.
Chapter 4 122
Hume's General Point of View
relations and the seven philosophical relations, come to form general ideas. In his
explanation of general ideas, Hume introduces another of his crucial concepts,
custom (see Chapter 2). The notions of the general idea and custom are then used to
explain another central concept: causation (see Chapter 3).
Before dealing with the problem of external objects, then, Hume has clarified
the concepts of impressions and ideas, general ideas, beliefs, and causation. These
are all essential for our understanding of our natural circumstances. The external
object is the next concept that appears in the development ofHume's theory of
human nature. We would be extremely confused ifwe had only to rely on our present
perceptions, and were not sure of the whole situation beyond them. The belief in
causation arises simultaneously with the supposition of the existence of the external
object which contains independent objects that have causal powers. Without any
belief in objects, the discussion of causation is not really complete in itself.
A fundamental characteristic ofHume's theory is a holism whereby
everything is related to everything else; each discussion prepares the next stage,
while the meaning of the preceding discussion is shaped by what follows. The final
stage of the theory crystallises all the previous discussions such that they all stand or
fall together. In the Treatise, the final stage is the theory of civil society with
government. Before discussing the moral construction of civil society, it is necessary
to explain the physical world which is the stage on which human interactions take
place. If the final stage of the argument is concerned with morality, all the preceding
stages should be concerned with this as well.
In section 1,1 clarify Hume's concept of existence in comparison with
Berkeleyan idealism. I argue that Hume's task is to explain the origins of the concept
of externality. In section 2,1 discuss how Hume attempts to compensate for the limits
of reason by appealing to the workings of nature in producing our beliefs regarding
the notion of externality. In section 3,1 explain how Hume's denial of the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities aims to undermine the claim that
objectivity arises out of the workings of reason. I argue that Hume's idea of existence
can be used to refute the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary
qualities. In section 4,1 argue that Hume's theory of continued existence is a theory
of reliable belief. Hume's theory of the creation of the belief in external existence is
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explained in relation to the general point of view that recognises various perceptions
as composing one object. In section 5,1 explain how imagination induces the notion
of distinct existence from the notion of continued existence. In section 6,1 argue that
belief in external existence depends on the general point of view, and that it is this
that provides us with the concept of objectivity. The moral implication of the idea of
objectivity is then clarified to present a strong case against Lockean liberalism,
which I claim is based on an implausible account of objectivity. Further, because the
general point of view is the principle which produces the most solid belief in
objectivity, it can be regarded as a reliable basis for moral evaluation. Most of all, I
argue that Hume's theory of external objects implies the perception of human beings
which is solid not by virtue of their physical quality, but by virtue ofmorality. In this
way, I argue that Hume's moral theory is grounded in his epistemology.
1. Hume's Concept of "Existence"
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the notion of existence. Ontology is a
central theme in the philosophical tradition up to the medievals, and Hume's direct
philosophical rivals all treat of this concept in some way or another. Descartes'
dualism consists in recognising two types of existence, Locke's empirical philosophy
appeals to an unknown substratum to support primary and secondary qualities, and
Berkeley's central tenet is "esse ispercipi". It is little to be wondered that Hume too
has a unique theory about this concept. He begins his discussion of existence with his
trademark question, asking whether or not we have an impression corresponding to
existence.
There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have
any consciousness or memory, that is not conceiv'd as existent; and 'tis
evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and
assurance of being is deriv'd. From hence we may form a dilemma, the
most clear and conclusive that can be imagin'd, viz. that since we never
remember any idea of impression without attributing existence to it, the
idea of existence must either be deriv'd from a distinct impressions,
conjoin'd with every perception or object of our thought, or must be
the very same with the idea of the perception or object (T 1.2.6.2; SBN
66).
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Hume is confident in his answer that "So far from there being any distinct
impression, attending every impression and every idea, that I do not think there are
any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoin'd" (T 1.2.6.3; SBN 66).
There is no impression that exclusively corresponds to "existence", because there are
no two objects that are exactly the same except with respect to their existence. Hume
asserts that, "every object, that is presented, must necessarily be existent" (T 1.2.6.6;
SBN 67).119
This appears to be a Humean rephrasing of the Berkeleyan thesis that to be
is to be perceived. At first sight, Hume too appears to identify perceptions with
existence. But there is a crucial difference between Berkeley and Hume. For
Berkeley, the slogan "esse is percipi" is intended as an ontological claim: the
existence of something follows from its being perceived. Berkeley's idealism stems
from this claim. Hume, however, is making not an ontological but an epistemic
claim: our perception of existence is no different from other perceptions. Hume
provides an explanation of the perception of existence; perceived things should be
taken as existing. There is no other means for us to reach existence other than via
perceptions. Hume says,
Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us
chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the
universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can
conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have
appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of imagination,
nor have we any idea but what is there produc'd. (T 1.2.6.8; SBN 67-
68)
This paragraph immediately reminds us of Locke's remark that,
119
The same idea appears again in his discussion in "Of the immateriality of the soul" (T
1.4.5.10; SBN 235-6).
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All those sublime Thoughts, which tower above the Clouds, and reach
as high as Heaven it self, take their Rise and Footing here: In all that
great Extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote Speculations,
it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those Ideas,
which Sense or Reflection, have offered for its Contemplation. (Essay
2:1:24)
One crucial difference, however, is that Locke holds that ideas "are the
impressions that are made on our Senses by outward Objects, that are extrinsical to
the Mind" {ibid.), while Hume holds that impressions of sensations arise "in the soul
originally, from unknown causes" (T 1.1.2.1; SBN 7). Berkeley's idealism asserts
that all that exists are ideas which are modifications ofmind. Hume does not
subscribe to idealism, however, because it presupposes the existence ofmind as
distinguished from perceptions. For Hume, the existence of the mind is another
problem to be explained in terms of existence.
Locke, having criticized the Cartesian innateness of ideas, is left with the task
of explaining the origin of our ideas. According to Locke, "existence is a simple idea
suggested to the understanding, by every object without, and every idea within"
{Essay, 2; 7; 7). At the same time, Locke asserts the existence of a corporeal
substance or substratum which carries primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley
criticises Locke's solution on the grounds that this idea requires something that
produces the ideas, but which is distinct from them (see Chapter 2). Berkeley takes it
to be impossible to maintain a distinction between the supporting substance and the
qualities, because this amounts to claiming the existence ofmaterial substance.
Berkeley thinks he has overcome materialism, but, to put it bluntly, having
claimed to have expelled "materials", he then calls the same things "ideas". Hume
approves of Berkeley's demolition of the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, but is not satisfied with Berkeley's solution because it does not explain our
common distinction between existence and non-existence. Hume attempts to
overcome this difficulty by identifying existence with perceptions. He transfers the
problem from "what is out there" to "how perceptions create what is out there". For
Hume, perception is a fundamental given. Hume's is not a causal theory, nor is it a
representative theory which supposes the objects of perception to exist independently
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of perceptions. At the same time, Hume intends to answer the Berkeleyan challenge:
neither sense nor reason can establish that there are external bodies, and they cannot
even be posited as a hypothesis to account for our perceiving the ideas that we do.
What matters for us in our moral life is not the ontological constitution of existence,
but the perception of existing things. Hume tries to explain what it is that we believe
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to exist. While for Berkeley "esse ispercipi" is virtually the final word, for Hume
the story begins right there.
Usually, ordinary people - the Humean "vulgar" - think that things exist
outside of our minds. Perception is naturally taken to be about something external.
However, from the Humean perspective, perceptions lie in our mind. There is no
perceivable connection between perceptions and external things as the alleged causes
of the perception. Hume begins from a philosophical premise and proceeds to show
how the final construction is produced, the latter being something which is already at
our hand. Hume's task is to explain, from the given facts, the real nature of our
concept of existence; how it is that we come to entertain the concept of existence as
we do, though we in fact have only perceptions. First Hume needs to indicate the
nature of the problem itself. He says,
The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when
suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a
relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related
objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically
different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and
durations. (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68)
First of all, it is important to affirm that, contrary to our common
understanding, "externality" does not mean spatial distance, but denotes a class of
objects qualitatively different in kind from perceptions (cf. Bennett, 2001b: 285). It is
absurd to interpret spatial distance as externality, because spatial distance does not
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We will see that in the "universe of imagination", the interaction of existent things presents a
spectacular development that culminates in the creation of civil government and human life
backed by virtue, and Hume's Treatise is the story of that drama. We require external bodies as
the characters and as the background scenery of this story.
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make sense unless there is a fixed point from which to measure distance. But it is
impossible to decide the point at which the perception is located, just as it is
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impossible to fix the point where the self is located. More specifically, by external
existence as a non-perceived object, Hume means something that exists according to
its own principle.
The above remark shows that his goal is not to argue for or against the
existence of the external objects, but to explain how our idea of the existence of the
external objects is composed out of impressions and ideas. This means that there is
nothing that produces the understanding of existence other than perceptions. Here,
Hume apparently has Locke's theory as his target. The Lockean causal theory of
perception is wrong, on Hume's view, because it allows empirically unconstrained
existence, and because it is based on an indefensible account of the nature of
perceiver and object. Hume sees that Locke presupposes what should be explained.
Hume attempts to provide an explanation of our common understanding of existence
which is firmly based on perceptions.
2. Scepticism and Nature
Hume's theory of the external object is mainly developed in the section titled "Of
scepticism with regard to the senses". This section is preceded by its twin argument
titled "Of scepticism with regard to reason". It is important to understand the second
argument on the basis of the first. In "Of scepticism with regard to reason", Hume
examines the system of philosophy that relies on reason. Clearly, he aims to criticise
Cartesian philosophy, among others, according to which reason is the foundation of
all certain knowledge. Hume does not deny the certainty of "the rules" of reason, and
therefore he is not a methodological sceptic who doubts everything. Hume is
concerned with our application of the rules to real situations in which real human
activities are directed towards dealing with truth. It would be true that no rule can
play its role in our life without our applying it to reality. Hume claims that in the
accumulation of an unlimited number of trials, there emerges a possibility of error.
121 This is easily seen when we reduce our picture of the world to the atomic level. There is no
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He argues that all human knowledge is empirical, and is subject to probability. Hume
argues that in any reasoning there is a possibility of error, and therefore "all
knowledge is denigrated into probability", which leads to "continual diminution, and
at last a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 1.4.1.6; SBN 183). He takes the
example of mathematics and maintains, "there scarce is any proposition concerning
numbers, of which we can have a fuller security." According to Hume, mathematics
• . . . i
is also a matter ofprobability in so far as any human commitment is involved.
This is a challenge to the Cartesian principle of "clear and distinct" perception as a
foundation for knowledge.
Once we are trapped in scepticism, the conflict between the "sceptical and
dogmatical reasons" (T 1.4.1.12; SBN 187) continues until "both vanish away into
nothing" (ibid.). This argument reveals Hume's true intention in this topic, which lies
in answering the question "how it happens" "that these arguments above-explain'd
produce not a total suspense ofjudgement, and after what manner the mind ever
retains a degree of assurance in any subject?" (T 1.4.1.9; SBN 184). Hume ascribes
the secret to nature. According to Hume,
Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us
to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear
viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of
their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can
hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the
surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sun¬
shine (T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183).
It is remarkable that at the height of his sceptical argument Hume turns to
the workings of nature. Nature "breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time,
and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding" (T
1.4.1.12; SBN 187). This idea parallels Hume's account of causation where he
ascribes what is usually taken to be the working of reason to the "sensitive" (T
1.4.1.8; SBN 183) part of our nature. In fact, all of his arguments in the Treatise aim
line that demarcates between the "inside" and the "outside" of our body.
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Later we will see that the notion of number is our empirical construction.
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to explore how the principle of nature solves the otherwise insoluble problems of
reason in human matters. This basic conviction is persistent also in his dealings with
the existence of the external object. Although reason cannot defend the principle
concerning the existence of body, the sceptic is not allowed to doubt it, because
Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an
affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings
and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe
in the existence ofbody? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body
or not? This is a point, which we must take for granted in all our
reasonings (T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187).
It is interesting to understand this against the background of his theory as
discussed in the last section. In T 1.2.6., Hume rejects the Berkeleyan identification
of ideas with being, because simply identifying materials with ideas does not explain
the fact that there seems to be an external object around us that is distinct from ideas.
When he first affirms the existence of the objects of perceptions, Hume does not
mean that perceptions exist independently. Claiming the existence of objects
commonly entails claiming that the object is distinct from the perception itself.
Accordingly, Hume goes on to explore how it is possible that objects of perception
exist "externally". He asks how it is that we come to believe that there is an object
that is different from perception. Hume says, "our present enquiry is concerning the
causes which induce us to believe in the existence ofbody" (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 187-88).
Now Hume has a premise and a conclusion: we only have impressions and
ideas, and we in fact believe in the existence of body. Hume's task is to bridge the
gap. Here, the gap lies between the foundation ofhis epistemology, perceptions, and
our compelling natural belief in body. Hume explores the full scope of this thesis
with regard to human nature. The key difficulty is that the external object seems to
possess some qualities that are different from our perception.
In order to explore the nature of the external object, Hume distinguishes two
sub-beliefs that we have regarding external objects, namely that they have a distinct
existence from us, and that they have a continued existence, and asks:
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why we attribute a CONTINU'D existence to objects, even when they
are not present to the senses; and why we suppose them to have an
existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception? Under this last
head I comprehend their situation as well as relations, their external
position as well as the independence of their existence and operation.
These two questions concerning the continu'd and distinct existence of
body are intimately connected together. For if the objects of our senses
continue to exist, even when they are not perceiv'd, their existence is
of course independent of and distinct from the perception; and vice
versa, if their existence be independent of the perception and distinct
from it, they must continue to exist, even tho' they be not perceiv'd. (T
1.4.2.2; SBN 188)
In other words, the belief in the existence of the external object is elucidated as
continued and independent existence. Hume strategically retains this distinction, and
• • • • 123 • •tries to show that continued existence is entailed by distinct existence. It is crucial
to understand the implication of this distinction; the merely continued existence
signifies the inert object, and independent existence signifies the lively object.
He questions which faculty of the human mind produces this belief in the
continued existence of objects: the senses, reason, or the imagination. To take the
conclusion first, Hume shows that the belief is not the product of senses, nor of
reason, but of imagination. First, the senses cannot produce the belief in the
continued existence of their objects, because they deal with perceptions only in so far
as they appear to the senses. In fact, sense cannot even underpin the belief in distinct
existence, for it is evident that "our senses offer not their impressions as the images
of something distinct, or independent, and external, because they convey to us
nothing but a single perception" (T 1.4.2.4; SBN 189). In order to have an
impression of an independent object, we have to sense every aspect of the object at
once; the independency of our perceptions from ourselves can never be an object of
perception. Therefore, Hume asserts that "[a] single perception can never produce the
idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination"
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We will see the reason Hume makes this dichotomy of externality below. To take the
conclusion first, the independent existence applies to material, and independent existence applies
particularly to living organs.
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(ibid.). Moreover, Hume claims that if the senses were to produce the belief in the
independent existence of objects, they must show at the same time the "relation and
situation" (ibid.) between the objects and our impressions. It is significant that Hume
questions not the perception of external things, but turns his fundamental scepticism
to the relation of externality itself. Therefore, what is established as an external
object in the end is not the perceptions of external things, but more fundamentally the
relation of the externality of our perceptions.
Specifying the exact meaning of "externality" poses a problem: Hume asks
with respect to what an object must be positioned in order to be external. "External"
does not mean spatially distant from our "body", because our body is also an external
existence.124 Hume's argues for an existence exterior to perceptions as a criticism of
Berkeley. What is perceived as external existence is the same object of perceptions
that exists in the absence of the perception. This does not mean that something that is
different from perception exists, however: Hume's theory is not the kind of realism
that allows for the independent existence of the cause of perceptions. The emergence
of externality in fact means there must be established a point of view that regards an
object as external. It is crucial to understand what this point of view is.
3. Hume's Challenge to the Primary and Secondary Distinction
Following the examination of the senses, reason is examined as the cause of the
belief in external existence. The argument is developed in the section "Of the modern
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In fact this is a tricky point that often eludes exact reasoning. For example, Immanuel Kant
says, "Idealism consists in the claim that there are none other than thinking beings; the other
things, to which in fact no object outside the later corresponds. I say on the contrary: things are
given to us as objects of our senses situated outside us, but of what they may be in themselves we
know nothing; we only know their appearances, i.e. the representations that they effect in us
when they affect our senses. Consequently I do indeed admit that there are bodies outside us, i.e.
things which, although wholly unknown to us as to what they may be in themselves, we know
through the representations which their influence on our sensibility provides for us, and to which
we give the name of bodies. This word therefore merely means the appearance of that for us
unknown but none the less real object. Can this be called idealism? It is the very opposite of it.
(Kant, Prolegomena, Academy edition, vol. 4: 288)" The point is to determine what exactly the
"unknown" is external to. Kant seems to assert externality to "us". Then where are we? Kant
skips this point. But Hume's general point of view refers precisely to the perspective of "us".
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philosophy" in which Locke is a central figure. Behind this discussion lies the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Let us consider Hume's
argument regarding this distinction. Hume observes that there are three different
kinds of impressions.
The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of
bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and
cold. The third are the pains and pleasures, that arise from the
application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with
steel, and such like. Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first
of these to have a distinct continu'd existence. The vulgar only regard
the second as on the same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar,
again, esteem the third to be merely perceptions; and consequently
interrupted and dependent beings. (T 1.4.2.12; SBN 192)
As is well known, the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary
qualities corresponds to the distinction between the first and the second plus the third
group. Locke defines "quality" as power to produce in the perceiver an idea of the
object. According to Locke, the primary qualities are those that allow of rational
• *19 f\
treatment in physics. They are alleged to resemble the object. Solidity, extension,
figure, motion, rest, bulk, texture, etc. are examples of primary qualities. They are
"inseparable", "unchanging", "constantly found", and "found in any part" of the
object. On the other hand, secondary qualities are not in the objects themselves, but
are powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. Colours,
sounds, tastes, smells are examples. The crucial point in relation to the present
discussion is that Locke ascribes to reason the discovery of the distinction. As is
often claimed, Locke's distinction is not entirely robust, although it is still possible to
understand what he intends by it (cf. Alexander, 1977: 70).127 In his criticism of
Locke, Berkeley denies the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. As
125 • t—
It is clear that Locke is the main figure in Hume's "modem philosophy" because he is referred
to most: whether Hume is true to Locke's theory is a different question. Other than Locke, Hume
apparently has in mind Descartes, Boyle and Malebranche in this connection.
1 6 Locke apparently inherits this idea from Boyle (cf. Palmer, 1976: 181-9).
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Locke himself seems to notice the limitations of this distinction (Essay 4.6.11). For a
defending interpretation, see e. g., Bennett, 2001b, Ch. 25.
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we have already seen, his reasoning derives from his basic thesis that esse is percipi.
Hume develops Berkeley's argument and rejects the perceivability of the specifically
primary qualities without the secondary qualities.
Hume first recognises that the modern philosophy is exempt from the defect
of the ancient philosophy that centred on the "fictions of substance and accident" (T
1.4.4.2; SBN 226), or "substantial forms and occult qualities" (ibid.) that "are like
the spectres in the dark" (ibid.). They are defective because they "are neither
universal nor unavoidable in human nature" (ibid.). Hume maintains that "the
fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds,
tastes, smells, heat and cold; which is asserted to be nothing but impressions of
mind" (T 1.4.4.3; SBN 226). However, the modern philosophy "asserts to be nothing
but the impressions in the mind, derived from the operation of external objects, and
without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects" (ibid.). A problem arises
from this. Hume says,
'Tis certain, that when different impressions of the same sense
arise from any object, every one of these impressions has not a
resembling quality existent in the object. For as the same object cannot,
at the same time, be endow'd with different qualities of the same sense,
and as the same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different;
it evidently follows, that many of our impressions have no external
model or archetype. Now from like effects we presume like causes.
Many of the impressions of colour, sound, etc. are confest to be
nothing but internal existences, and to arise from causes, which no way
resemble them. These impressions are in appearance nothing different
from the other impressions of colour, sound, etc. We conclude,
therefore, that they are, all of them, deriv'd from a like origin. (T
1.4.4.4; SBN 227)
Once this principle is admitted, it is followed by an "easy consequence" (T
1.4.4.5; SBN 227) that all those sensible qualities should be removed from the rank
of continued independent existence, and
we are reduc'd merely to what are call'd primary qualities, as the only
real ones, of which we have any adequate notion. These primary
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qualities are extension and solidity, with their different mixtures and
modifications; figure, motion, gravity, and cohesion. The generation,
encrease, decay, and corruption of animals and vegetables, are nothing
but changes of figure and motion; as also the operations of all the
bodies on each other; of fire, of light, water, air, earth, and of all the
elements and powers of nature. One figure and motion produces
another figure and motion; nor does there remain in the material
universe any other principle, either active or passive, of which we can
form the most distant idea. (T 1.4.4.5; SBN 227)
The point is that primary qualities are essential for the scientific
understanding of the world that is based, above all, on mathematics. In order to
understand the core implication of this argument, it is necessary to consider Hume's
concern about its possible implication for moral philosophy. Prior to Hume, Berkeley
had recognized the danger this theory posed for his religious belief; if the primary
qualities are possible without the secondary qualities, the role of perceivers, and thus
ultimately the rule of God as the ultimate perceiver, may become redundant
regarding the primary qualities.128 Hume, not sharing Berkeley's religious views,
perceives a different kind of dangerous consequence from this theory. Hume's
concern lies with the crucial role played by reason in the argument, and with the lack
of any role for human nature, which Hume sees as destructive of an account of
morality based on moral sentiments. If there is objectivity apart from perception, the
workings of perceptions and ultimately the workings of human nature become
similarly redundant as to the primary qualities. This is the crucial reason for which
Hume has to attack the primary and secondary distinction, and the independence of
the primary qualities from the secondary ones. Hume's task is, as in the discussion of
causation, to clarify the human commitment in the perception of the physical world -
—a commitment that modern science tends to take for granted— in order to show that
even the perception of the natural world belongs to human nature. The scientific
understanding of the physical world typically expels human commitment. Hume
opposes this mechanical picture of the physical world. He examines the putative
128 His very strong personal reactions are amply shown in his A Treatise concerning the
Principles ofHuman Knowledge (Berkeley, 1998: sects. 57, 66, 93, 102, 107).
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reason why secondary qualities are alleged not real, and are thus discarded to obtain
rational knowledge.
Upon examination, I find only one of the reasons commonly produc'd
for this opinion [that is, the subjectivity of the secondary qualities] to
be satisfactory, viz. that deriv'd from the variations of those
impressions, even while the external objects, to all appearance,
continues the same. These variations depend upon several
circumstances. Upon the different situations of our health: A man in a
malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats, which before pleas'd him
the most. Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men:
That seems bitter to one, which is sweet to another. Upon the
difference of their external situation and position: Colours reflected
from the clouds change according to the distance of the clouds, and
according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous body. Fire
also communicates the sensation of pleasure at one distance, and that
of pain at another. Instances of this kind are very numerous and
frequent. (T 1.4.4.3; SBN 226)
This paragraph reminds us of the argument in which Hume introduces the
concept of the general point of view (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581-2). The similarity of this
discussion to his discussion ofmoral perception is too obvious to be ignored. The
focus of the present discussion is whether or not we can trust these direct sensations.
Hume's basic assertion is that personal perceptions should be adjusted rather than
discarded. It is safe to say that this problem is fundamental to Hume's perspective on
the reliability of perceptions. It is connected with the problem of objectivity: how to
attain a common standard among personal perceptions. Hume discusses whether the
idea ofprimary qualities is sustainable, and lodges a decisive objection to the
distinction.
I assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by
its [i.e. the modern philosophy] means, we utterly annihilate all these
objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant
skepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be
merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a real,
continu'd, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and
solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on (T 1.4.4.6;
SBN 227-28).
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Hume's argument here is paradigmatic. He begins with motion. Motion
cannot be conceived ofwithout presupposing a "body moving" (T 1.4.4.7; SBN 228),
and a moving body "resolves itself into the idea of extension or of solidity" (ibid.).
Consequently, the reality ofmotion depends upon that of extension or solidity. Then,
Hume examines the notion of extension. Extension must be conceived as either
coloured or solid. But colour is by definition no real quality. Therefore, extension
must be linked with solidity. However, according to Hume,
The idea of solidity is that of two objects, which being
impell'd by the utmost force, cannot penetrate each other; but still
maintain a separate and distinct existence. Solidity, therefore, is
perfectly incomprehensible alone, and without the conception of some
bodies, which are solid, and maintain this separate and distinct
existence. Now what idea have we of these bodies? The idea of colours,
sound, and other secondary qualities are excluded. The idea of motion
depends on that of extension, and the idea of extension on that of
solidity. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that the idea of solidity can depend
on either of them. For that wou'd be to run in a circle, and make one
idea depend on another, while at the same time the latter depends on
the former. (T 1.4.4.9; SBN 228-29)
Hume concludes that "after the exclusion of colours, sounds, heat, and cold
from the rank of external existences, there remains nothing, which can afford us a
just and consistent idea of body" (T 1.4.4.10; SBN 229).129 The fundamental idea
here is that body requires a relationship with other similar objects to be perceived as
such. This is a denial of the idea of a substance that can exist by itself, without
relating with other bodies.
Now, let us return to the starting classification of impressions. Through the
rejection of the primary-secondary distinction, Hume distanced himself from the
opinion of philosophers who refused to take "colours, sounds, heat and cold", in so
far as they appear to the senses, to be as real as motion and solidity. On the other
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hand, Hume modifies the mistake of the vulgar who think that pleasure and pain are
different from "colours, sounds, heat, and cold". Hume maintains that all of those are
of the same kind as perceptions. He also makes no distinction between our mental
activities: "Every impression, external, and internal, passion, affection, sensations,
pains and pleasures, are originally on the same footing" (T 1.4.2.7; SBN 190). This is
clear evidence that Hume asserts the uniformity of perceptions. This discussion has a
serious implication for his moral theory because moral sentiments are "a particular
kind of pleasure or pain". Therefore, through the denial of the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities, Hume demonstrates that the perceptions ofpleasure
and pain are no more subjective than other perceptions.
It is clear that the belief in the external objects is not based on reason either.
Hume says that "'tis obvious ... that children, peasants, and the greatest part of
mankind are indue'd to attribute objects to some impressions, and deny them to
others" (T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193), and not by the arguments ofphilosophers. As we
have seen above, reason is a source of scepticism. It tends to deny the continuing
existence of body, without ever achieving its goal in our life. Therefore, only one
candidate is left. Hume concludes that "that opinion must be entirely owing to the
imagination" {ibid.). And this conclusion introduces the next task of exploring how,
then, the imagination produces the idea of the existence of the external object.
4. Constance, Coherence, and Identity
Since not all impressions generate the notion of their distinct and continued existence,
it is necessary to explain which kinds of impressions do cooperate with the
imagination to produce this notion. Clearly, it is not those characterised by
"involuntariness", "superior force", and "violence" (T 1.4.2.16; SBN 194). For, says
Hume, "'tis evident our pains and pleasures, our passions and affections, which we
never suppose to have any existence beyond our perception, operate with greater
violence, and are equally involuntary, as the impressions of figure and extension,
129
Owing to the "big bang theory", it is our common knowledge that the universe had no
extension in its very beginning. From this point of view, Descartes definition of body as
extension and Locke's definition of "primary qualities" {Essay, 2.8.9) is invalid.
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colour and sound, which we supposed to be permanent beings" (T 1.4.2.16; SBN
194). Another hypothesis is therefore required. It is noticeable that this is a basic idea
in Hume's theory of belief. Merely involuntary, strong, and violent beliefs are not in
themselves a reliable guide for understanding the world and our behaviour.130 This, I
shall argue, opens up the possibility that Hume's search for the "manner" in which
some perceptions constitute our belief in the external object also clarifies the notion
of a valid belief in morals.
Hume observes that "all those objects, to which we attribute a continu'd
existence, have a peculiar constancy" (T 1.4.2.18; SBN 194). By "constancy", Hume
means appearance "in the same order", or presence "in the same uniform manner". It
is to be remembered that causation depends on a similar notion of "constant
conjunction". Most significantly, continued existence is founded on the relation of
resemblance. But there is a problem in thinking of constancy as the essential
characteristic of things possessing continued existence, because constancy "is not so
perfect as not to admit of very considerable exceptions. Bodies often change their
position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly
knowable" (T 1.4.2.19; SBN 195). Hume observes that coherence within the changes
has a better chance of being the defining characteristic of external objects.
The coherence of appearance cannot be obtained from reasoning concerning
causes and effects, for there is no causal regularity in the impression of the external
object, "since the tuning about of our head, or the shutting of our eyes is able to
break it" (T 1.4.2.21; SBN 198). Coherence of appearance appeals primarily to the
understanding, and only indirectly to custom, because custom cannot be obtained
from what was never present to mind. "There is scarce a moment in my life", Hume
confesses, where "I have not occasion to suppose the continu'd existence of objects"
(T 1.4.2.20; SBN 197). Therefore, it is doubtful that it is the product of an inference
of the understanding. The supposition of the external object should be a more natural
product than the result of inference. We certainly suppose the continued existence of
objects, which is not the direct and natural effect of constant repetition and
connection, but "must arise from the co-operation of some other principle" (T
130
This is why Hume criticizes enthusiasm and fanatics (see Chapter 3).
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1.4.2.21; SBN 198). Coherence needs the hypothesis of the continuing existence of
objects, but coherence is "too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of
the continu'd existence of all external bodies" (T 1.4.2.23; SBN 198-99). Hume
thinks "we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to
give a satisfactory account of that opinion." However, constancy of our perceptions
"gives rise to the opinion of the continu 'd existence of body, which is prior to that of
its distinct existence, and produces that latter principle" (T 1.4.2.23; SBN 199).
Hume provides us with "a short sketch" of his theory as follows.
When we have been accustom'd to observe a constancy in
certain impressions, and have found, that the perception of the sun or
ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an absence or annihilation
with like parts and in a like order, as at its first appearance, we are not
apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, (which they
really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the same,
upon account of their resemblance. But as this interruption of their
existence is contrary to their perfect identity, and makes us regard the
first impression as annihilated, and the second as newly created, we
find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv'd in a kind of
contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty, we
disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove it
entirely, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected
by a real existence, of which we are insensible. This supposition, or
idea of continu'd existence, acquires a force and vivacity from the
memory of these broken impressions, and from that propensity, which
they give us, to suppose them the same; and according to the precedent
reasoning, the very essence of belief consists in the force and vivacity
of the conception. (T 1.4.2.24; SBN 199, italics mine)
The significant point is that we, by the natural tendency of imagination, tend
to regard interrupted, but resembling, perceptions as connected in order to save us the
trouble of treating them as different. Custom is indifferent to the truth-value of
reason. We may be uncertain about the essence of each perception, but it is
impossible to keep questioning all of them, all of the time. The most notable point is
that the underlying principle of the belief in the external object is fundamentally the
same as that of treating a particular impression as belonging to a wider class of
perceptions. It is also closely related to the principle of taking the general point of
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view in moral judgement, which consists in avoiding contradiction and arriving at a
stable judgement (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581-2). Hume tries to justify this system by
showing the following four things. First, "to explain the principium individuation, or
the principle of identity" (T 1.4.2.25; SBN 199-200), second, to "give a reason, why
the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an
identity to them"; third, to "account for that propensity, which this illusion gives, to
unite these broken appearances by a continu'd existence"; and fourth, to "explain that
force and vivacity of conception, which arises from the propensity".
Let us consider Hume's four discussions one by one. First, the principle of
identity is one of the seven philosophical relations (cf. T 1.1.5.4; SBN 14), and is
• 1 T 1
employed in Hume's previous discussion on causation. Hume gives an exact
definition here. According to Hume, no one perception is sufficient to convey the
idea of identity, for one "single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity"
(T 1.4.2.26; SBN 200). "On the other hand, a multiplicity of objects can never
convey this idea, however resembling they may be suppos'd" (T 1.4.2.27; SBN 200).
They are regarded as different objects. And since "both number and unity are
incompatible with the relation of identity, it must lie in something that is neither of
them" (T 1.4.2.28; SBN 200). Here lies the key to the concept of identity. It is
important to understand that the notion of equality is based on the notion of identity.
Equality means two different items are identical in a particular respect.132
In elucidating the concept of identity, Hume tries to "remove this difficulty"
by having "recourse to the idea of time or duration" (T 1.4.2.29; SBN 200). In a strict
sense, time implies succession, for there cannot be time where there is no change. So,
when we apply the idea of time to any unchangeable object, "'tis only by a fiction of
the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is supposed to participate in the
changes of the co-existent objects, and in particular of that of our perception {ibid.;
SBN 200-201)". That is, when we think we observe for any time an unchangeable
object, the fact is that we create it by a fiction of imagination. "This fiction of the
imagination almost universally takes place; and 'tis by means of it, that a single
131
The principle of identity is also important in the discussion of the nature of personal identity.
132
The concept of equality bears immense political implications (see Chapter 7).
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object, plac'd before us, and survey'd for any time without our discovering in it any
interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity" (ibid).
The unchangeable object is a fiction of imagination created by a pure
1 •
concept of time. By our tendency to understand time as conceptually independent
from the notion of change, we create a fiction of the possibility of unchangeable
objects with changing qualities. This fiction gives rise to the notion of identity. The
notion of identity is the key to making "number" and "unity" compatible; "when we
consider any two points of this time, we may place them in different lights: We may
either survey them at the very same instant" (T 1.4.2.29; SBN 201). Then, they must
be multiple in order to be conceived of at once and as existent in these two different
points of time. We can obtain the idea of unity when we trace the succession of time
by a like succession of ideas, and conceive first of one moment, along with the object
then existent, and imagine afterwards a change in time without any variation or
interruption in the object; in this manner we arrive at the idea of unity. Identity is
thus a "medium betwixt unity and number; or either of them, according to the view
in which we take it" (ibid.). We cannot say "that an object is the same with itself,
unless we mean, that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at
another" (ibid.). "Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the
invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, thro' a suppos'd variation of
time" (T 1.4.2.30; SBN 201).
Next, Hume tries to establish "why the constancy of our perceptions makes us
ascribe to them a perfect numerical identity, tho' there be very long intervals betwixt
their appearance, and they have only one of the essential qualities of identity, viz.
invariableness" (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202-3). The previous argument established the
mechanism through which our successive perceptions create the identity of objects.
Hume now needs to explain how it is that interrupted perceptions can create the
notion of numerical identity. In dealing with this, Hume has in mind "the opinion and
belief of the vulgar" who "can never assent to the opinion of a double existence and
representation" (ibid.). Hume reminds us, regarding the relation of resemblance, that:
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Typically, for Kant time is one of the forms of intuition.
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Nothing is more apt to make us mistake one idea for another, than any
relation betwixt them, which associates them together in the
imagination, and makes it pass with facility from one to the other. Of
all relations, that of resemblance is in this respect the most efficacious;
and that because it not only causes an association of ideas, but also of
dispositions, and makes us conceive the one idea by an act or operation
of the mind, similar to that by which we conceive the other (T 1.4.2.32;
SBN 202-3).
Here resemblance is declared to be the central principle. In order for there to
be a relation of resemblance, there needs to be more than two perceptions on more
than two occasions. According to Hume, if some objects are capable of placing the
mind in the same disposition, they are very naturally confounded with identical ones;
we regard the action as continuous, as an effect of viewing one single object, and we
attribute sameness to every succession of related objects. "The thought slides along
the succession with equal facility, as if it consider'd only one object; and therefore
confounds the succession with the identity" (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 204). "An easy
transition or passage of the imagination, along the idea of these different and
interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition ofmind with that in which we
consider one constant and uninterrupted perception" (T 1.4.2.35; SBN 204). This is
why we "mistake" the one for the other. Clearly, this idea can be regarded as a
development ofHume's notion of the general idea in which resembling ideas are
classified as falling within a single group.
In this way, Hume has explained the notion of identity and the reason why
the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute
numerical identity to them. However, the identity between two resembling objects
still does not mean that they have a continued existence. Therefore, his third task is
to explain that propensity, which the illusion of the identity between different
perceptions produces, to unite these broken appearances in a continued existence.
Now, the idea of identity between separate perceptions inevitably produces a
contradiction. It is inevitable because "the interruption of the appearance seems to be
the contrary to the identity, and naturally leads us to regard these resembling
perceptions as different from each other" (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205). Hume's solution is
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that "the perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a propension to unite
these broken appearances by the fiction of a continu'd existence" (ibid.). Here, the
principle of nature that seeks stability emerges. According to Hume, "Nothing is
more certain from experience, than that any contradiction either to the sentiments or
passions gives a sensible uneasiness" (T 1.4.2.37; SBN 205), while "whatever strikes
in with the natural propensities, and either externally forwards their satisfaction, or
internally concurs with their movements, is sure to give a sensible pleasure" (T
1.4.2.37; SBN 205-6). Now, the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions and
the interruption of their appearance stand in tension with each other. Then the mind
feels uneasiness, from which it will naturally seek relief... this desire for relief being
the expression of the natural search for stability. It is apparent that this is also
applicable to our taking of the general point of view, which is a means to avoid
contradiction. Stability of the object of perception requires the postulation of its
continued existence, and stability is desired because of the uneasiness associated
with apparent contradiction.134 This is not a conclusion of logic, but a principle of
nature.
Interruptions of appearances and perceptions are so long and frequent, that it
is impossible to overlook them; nevertheless, we do not cease to believe in the
continued existence of the objects that so appear to us. How can this be possible?
Hume appeals to the "bundle theory" ofpersonal identity to provide a reason; as
mind is nothing but a "bundle" ofperceptions, absence of any particular perception
involves no contradiction. Hume says, "[a]n interrupted appearance to the senses
implies not necessarily an interruption in the existence. The supposition of the
continu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contradiction" (T
1.4.2.40; SBN 207-8). This means that as the mind is composed of a perpetually
changing group of perceptions, a change in perceptions, even an interruption of them,
appears natural to it.
In a nutshell: "When the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes us
ascribe to them an identity, we may remove the seeming interruption byfeigning a
134 There are strong political implications in this choice of vocabulary. The notion of uneasiness
or stability is carried through to his moral theory.
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continu'd being, which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire
identity to our perception" (T 1.4.2.40; SBN 208, italic mine). Feigning the
continued existence of the objects of perception is, therefore, the means whereby the
mind attains stability. It is a fiction but does no harm to the mind because it "involves
no contradiction" (ibid.). Once the fiction of the independent object is established, it
is supposed to possess different qualities, and thus it is easy to believe that it exerts
different causal effects.
However, it is not enough just to feign continued existence. We must also in
fact believe the fiction to be real. So Hume proceeds to answer the fourth question;
"from whence arises such a belief (T 1.4.2.41; SBN 208), that we "not onlyfeign
but believe this continu'd existence" (ibid.). The difference between an idea and
belief lies in its vivacity. "The relation causes a smooth passage from the impression
to the idea, and even gives a propensity to that passage" (ibid.). Hume explains:
Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of
perceptions perfectly resembling each other, that return at different
distances of time, and after considerable interruptions. This
resemblance gives a propension to consider these interrupted
perceptions as the same; and also a propension to connect them by a
continu'd existence, in order to justify this identity, and avoid the
contradiction, in which the interrupted appearance of these
perceptions seems necessarily to involve us. Here then we have a
propensity to feign the continu'd existence of all sensible objects; and
as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory,
it bestows a vivacity on that fiction; or in other words, makes us
believe the continu'd existence of body. (T 1.4.2.42; SBN 208-9)
As in the theory of causation, and also in the theory of sympathy, the
perception of resemblance confers vivacity to the idea. The idea of continued
existence obtains vivacity through the memory of accumulated experiences. The
general point of view is involved here in recognising the resemblance, and it
becomes clear that the belief in continued existence is a means to "avoid the
contradiction", just as in morals. Hume also explains why we believe in the
continued existence of new objects.
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If sometimes we ascribe a continu'd existence to objects, which are
perfectly new to us, and of whose constancy and coherence we have
no experience, 'tis because the manner, in which they present
themselves to our senses, resembles that of constant and coherent
objects; and this resemblance is a source of reasoning and analogy,
and leads us to attribute the same qualities to the similar objects. (T
1.4.2.42; SBN 209)
It is because of neither the content, nor the violence, but the "manner, in
which they present themselves to our senses" that we ascribe a continued existence to
objects. It is impossible to overemphasise the importance of "manner", not "content",
as the standard that distinguishes reliable belief from mere fiction in Hume. It is the
manner in which we treat new perceptions or objects as representing the same thing.
The general point of view represents this manner in moral belief. Thus, as in the case
of the classification of ideas, in which a new idea is classified as the same as already
experienced resembling ideas, new objects are believed to have continued existence
in so far as they resemble other objects that are supposed to have continued existence.
Human beings base their behaviour on this convenient fiction, one which is not a
conclusion of reason but a product of imagination. We come to believe this fiction
and behave as if it is real. In this way, human beings live in a world of fiction which
is their own product.
5. The Connection between Continued and Distinct Existence
Thus far, Hume has established how we come to produce and believe the fiction of
the continued existence of objects. He goes on to explain the mechanism that
transfers our belief in continued existence over to the distinct or independent
existence of objects. This argument proves to be crucial in that it reveals that Hume's
real target is the theory of double existence of perception and object. Hume first
reminds us of the fact that our perceptions do not have any independent existence.
This is easily seen when "we press one eye with a finger," and see that all the objects
have a different quality.
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[W]e clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our
organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This
opinion is confirm'd by seeming encrease and diminution of objects,
according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure;
by the changes in their colour and other qualities from our sickness
and distempers; and by an infinite number of other experiments of the
same kind; from all which we learn, that our sensible perceptions are
not possest of any distinct or independent existence. (T 1.4.2.45; SBN
211)
According to Hume, "the natural consequence of this reasoning shou'd be,
that our perceptions have no more a continu'd than an independent existence" (T
1.4.2.46; SBN 211). It is noticeable again that these examples show a strong
similarity with Hume's account of the general point of view. The belief in distinct
existence, however, contains more difficulties than that ofmere continued existence.
Theoretically, the claim that perceived objects have independent existence is false in
so far as the existence is based on perceptions. This is so clear, according to Hume,
that philosophers simply cannot ignore it.
Therefore, "philosophers have so far run into this opinion, that they change
their system, and distinguish betwixt perceptions and objects, ofwhich the former
are suppos'd to be interrupted, and perishing, and different at every different return;
the latter to be uninterrupted, and to preserve a continu'd existence and identity"
(ibid.). This is the background of the theory of the double existence of perceptions
and objects. Hume maintains that this theory cannot be arrived at "but by passing
thro' the common hypothesis of the identity and continuance of our interrupted
perceptions" (ibid.). In other words, philosophers do not propose the theory of the
double existence on the basis of any pure reasoning. "Were we not first perswaded,
that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they do not
appear to our senses, we shou'd never be led to think, that our perceptions and
objects are different, and that our objects alone preserve a continu'd existence"
(ibid.). Hume asserts that the theory of the double existence of perceptions and
objects obtains its plausibility from the previous hypothesis of continued existence.
In order to prove this, Hume shows that it is neither a conclusion of reason, nor of
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imagination. It is not derived from reason, for we cannot infer the existence of one
thing from the presence of the other by means of the relation of cause and effect.
But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it
follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and
effect betwixt different perceptions, but can never observe it betwixt
perceptions and object. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the
existence or any of the qualities of the former, we can ever form any
conclusion concerning the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our
reason in this particular. (T 1.4.2.47; SBN 212)
Hume then argues that imagination also does not produce the belief in the
theory of double existence. It is not clear that the imagination "proceeds to the belief
of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu'd,
and uninterrupted, and identical" (T 1.4.2.48; SBN 213). Hume's strongest ground
against this claim is that it is an improper subject for fancy to work upon. Hume
relies upon common facts about our imagination to understand the common opinion
concerning the continued and distinct existence of body. Vulgar people believe that
our perceptions are of independent objects, which continue to exist even when they
are not perceived.
Hume reveals the trick within this philosophical system. Vulgar people
believe in the continued existence of external objects, and though their belief is
plainly false, there is a natural cause that induces people, including philosophers, to
accept it. Belief in continued existence leads naturally to belief in distinct or
independent existence. The claim that objects possess distinct existence cannot be
directly imagined nor deduced from reason, for it too is false. After a little reflection,
the philosopher notices this. However, the belief in continued existence is so strong
that the philosopher, not knowing the real cause of the belief, tries to reconcile the
contradiction. Where there is a conflict between the product of philosophical
reflection and natural opinion, the latter always prevails in the end. But philosophers
cannot ignore reason, either. This is the quandary. Therefore, according to Hume,
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In order to set ourselves at ease in this particular, we contrive a new
hypothesis, which seems to comprehend both these principles of
reason and imagination. This hypothesis is the philosophical one of
the double existence of perceptions and objects; which pleases our
reason, in allowing, that our dependent perceptions are interrupted and
different; and at the same time is agreeable to the imagination, in
attributing a continu'd existence to something else, which we call
objects. This philosophical system, therefore, is the monstrous
offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which
are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually
to destroy each other. ... The contradiction betwixt these opinions we
elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both
of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to
different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the
continuance to objects. (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215)
Hume's criticism is comprehensively applicable to dualism theories. Hume
asserts that the theory of double existence represents our ambiguous positioning
between imagination and reason. Ifwe were fully convinced by imagination of the
continued existence of objects, the opinion of double existence would never occur to
us. On the other hand, ifwe are fully convinced by reason, we would not even
embrace the notion of continued existence. Therefore, the theory of double existence
comes from "the intermediate situation of the mind" (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 216), such that
we are not directly ruled either by nature or by reason. And this is why our belief can
be both reasonable and creative. Both beliefs are false, strictly speaking, but between
them, reason can do no better than imagination, and imagination will finally prevail.
This is why Hume sarcastically calls it "another advantage that the philosophical
system resembles the vulgar one." By virtue of this, the philosopher too can have a
double existence: coming and going between his closet and his common life!
There is still other point to be noted with respect to this philosophical
system. First, as we can conceive nothing but perceptions, "[w]e suppose external
objects to resemble internal perceptions" (T 1.4.2.54; SBN 216). "Secondly, As we
suppose our objects in general to resemble our perceptions, so we take it for granted,
that every particular object resembles that perception, which it causes" (T 1.4.2.55;
SBN 217). Because of this very fundamental assumption regarding resemblances, we
have neither doubt nor uneasiness about recognising the external object. But the fact
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is that we escape this doubt only because reason makes use of the product of
imagination without acknowledging its debt to it.
Hume asserts that it is "a gross illusion" (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217) to suppose
that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same. It "is this illusion, which
leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still
existent, even when they are not present to the senses" (ibid). For no good reason, the
philosophical system has introduced a double confusion. Hume attacks this
philosophical illusion, saying "What then can we look for from this confusion of
groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood?" (ibid). However,
scepticism is not his final word. Hume acknowledges the irresistible power of nature
and imagination, which can afford us remedy, and upon which we can entirely rely.
• ITS
This is fundamental to the creation of the human world.
6. Moral Significance of the Belief in External Body
In this section, let us consider the underlying moral implications ofHume's theory of
136the external body. In the first place, as in other major topics, Hume's argument
concerning the existence of the external object is a theory of belief. To have a belief
in the external object is to believe in the continued and distinct existence of objects.
Hume maintains that this idea is a fiction, and this is a conclusion which tends
towards scepticism. But this epistemic scepticism does not have any destructive
power in moral matters. No matter what reason asserts, the common belief in the
existence of the external object is ineradicable. In this way, Hume establishes the
priority of the working of human nature over reason. Most of all, belief in the
existence of the external object generates a stable view of the world. Beliefs in
continued and distinct objects represent stability in its perfection, which means the
most reliable beliefs. Reliable beliefs provide one with the circumstance in which to
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It must be admitted that Hume's argument is complicated and seems sometimes not as
coherent as my interpretation may suggest. But for my purpose it is sufficient if the present
interpretation represents at least one plausible way of interpreting Hume.
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It is to be noted that unlike Descartes no entry for "external world" is found in the Treatise.
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engage in one's more particular activities. No regular activities are possible
without the belief in the stability of external objects.
It is significant that the basic concept of "objectivity" derives from the
nature of belief in external bodies. It is impossible to overemphasise the importance
of this concept. Objectivity signifies our common picture of the world which is
composed of independent objects. The concept also produces our common notion
that each object has its own structure and qualities. Objectivity is constituted by the
general ideas that represent existences, and on which is based our absolutely
fundamental reliance on the world. By obtaining the notion of objectivity, the world
of subjectivity also emerges, for objectivity and subjectivity mutually imply each
other. "Subjectivity" can be defined as perceptions that do not form beliefs in
independently existing object. Insofar as they are perceptions, they are no different
from the "objective" perceptions: they only lack the manner of appearing needed to
• 1 38 •
produce the fiction of independent existence. Objectivity and subjectivity
correspond to our understanding of the public and the private (Livingston, 1984: 14).
Apart from the manner in which they appear, pleasure and pain are no different from
colour or other perceptual qualities. Thus Hume prepares us for the concept ofmoral
sentiment, as a particular pleasure or pain, as the standard ofmoral judgement. The
principle that underlies, and partially constitutes, the idea of the external object is
again proven to be the general point of view, which assures that things are perceived
in the particular manner inherent to the objective.
The relation of resemblance has an equally significant role to play here as it
does in the case of abstract ideas (see Chapter 2). Resemblance consists in the point
of view of seeing one particular in association with the other particulars. Thus, belief
in the external object consists in the point ofview which treats different perceptions
as signifying the same object, rather than in the concrete contents themselves, which
it is in fact impossible to identify because what appears to us is always changing and
137
As we will see in Chapters 8, Hume's concern in the theory of promise is how to create the
same kind of reliable belief in moral world.
138
Hume's innovation is apparent when one thinks of the totally different usage of the "objective
reality" in Descartes, which means the "representational content" of an idea. See the entry of
"objective reality" (Cottingham, 1993: 136-7).
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never remains the same. Only because of the general point of view, external things
are perceived as stable, which is the whole mark of nature.139 This stable belief,
further, is what is usually signified as objectivity. In this way, Hume replaces the
rational principle of objectivity with a natural principle.
Dualism or what Hume calls the double existence theory has been Hume's
constant target. Behind the Lockean theory of the double existence lies a principle
that concerns morality; it is to establish the authority of reason as a way of reaching
truth. Hume, on the other hand, intends to clarify the intimate relationship between
the notion of objectivity and human nature. The notion of objectivity is essential for
us to have stable relationships with our circumstances, and it is inevitable because it
is a product of the genetic process of human nature.140
Locke thought that for there to be objective moral truth, this truth must be
discoverable through reason alone.141 Hume proves this wrong by showing that the
alleged objectivity is a fiction of imagination. Even if the notion of objectivity is a
scientific hypothesis, the problem is how and from where we obtain the hypothesis in
the first place. The consequences of Locke's theory are the neglect of convention,
sentiments, and human nature. This is why Hume persistently criticises reason as a
principle in moral matters. In this way, his epistemology can be regarded as
preparing the ground for his moral theory.
Vulgar people arrive at a mistaken belief in objectivity by tracing a natural
course from the notion of a continued object to the notion of a distinctly existing
object. But the objectivity alleged by this "false philosophy" inevitably results in
falsehood, because it has no other means but to smuggle its truth surreptitiously from
sentiments whose credibility it officially despises.142 The corollary of the
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Hume obtained this conviction from the Stoics.
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This can be seen as a radical execution of the Locke's "Historical, plain Method" (Essay
1.1.2). Livingston calls Hume's empiricism "historicaF (Livingston, 1984: 94).
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In this belief, Locke shows his debt to the Natural Law tradition.
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Recall Hume's excellent explanation of the conflict between reason and skeptical reason (T
1.4.1.12, SBN 186-87). Livingston discusses Hume's adherence to the distinction between the
true philosophy and the false philosophy (Livingston, 1998: Ch. 2). Bennett interprets Hume's
theory as a criticism of Lockean materialism (Bennett, 2003: 305-6).
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impossibility ofprimary qualities without secondary ones is that reason is empty
without perceptions.
Although continued existence and distinct existence imply each other, distinct
existence has a deeper significance. Because external existences are distinct and
independent, it is a natural inference to make us believe that their activity must be
derived from themselves; they are considered to have their own principles which
sustain and move them. This is the genesis of the idea of power, and eventually
autonomy. As an extension of this idea, other people, as external bodies, are
recognised as free agents capable of spontaneous activities. This is the naturalistic
basis for ascribing to other people the right to freedom. In this sense, the physical
perception of others occurs prior to moral recognition, and the idea of free agency is
founded on the natural stability of the former. Hence, the notions ofpower and
spontaneity are by-products of the imaginative creation of external object. We regard
the object as the source of different qualities. By supposing this origin of variable
perceptions, perceptions are first completed and become available for stable belief. In
this sense, the creation of external object is the terminal of the process of physical
perception. The most significant of all the external bodies are human beings. It is
possible to understand the theory of human existence is the underlying objective of
Hume's exposition. Thus Hume presents the theory that others are supposed to be
independent, have their own qualities which comprise character, and their own
principle ofmovement which is freedom. This means that when we recognise others,
we should treat them as such in order to have stable relationship with them.
There is a moral reason to regard external objects and human beings on a
par. The quality of the external object is treated as it is because it is believed to be
distinct. Distinctiveness is the most appropriate concept for perceiving human beings
because morality requires us to respect and treat human beings as having their own
inherent qualities. To regard others as they are is the natural significance of the idea
of recognition which leads to a clearer notion ofmorality, such as freedom or moral
right. Hume's sceptical argument shows that nothing is solid and impenetrable by its
own power. What confers solidity and impenetrability is our imagination that
perceives the object. Human beings are solid and impenetrable only by virtue of
moral perceptions that consist in the general point of view.
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It is also clear that the real intention behind Hume's criticism of the primary
and secondary distinction is to critique Locke's reason-based moral theory and its
corollary, the social contract theory. Lockean liberalism is based on the idea of
independent individuals equipped with the power to rule themselves. Hume's theory
of the external object as a creation of imagination shows that independent existence
is in fact a creation of custom and imagination. Locke presupposes freedom and
regards persons as moral beings, while Hume's morality lies in the perception of
other beings, and treating them accordingly, and for Hume freedom is the very thing
to be explained in terms of human nature.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have tried to interpret Hume's theory of external existence as constructivism.
Hume criticises Locke, refusing to regard the external object as an unknown cause of
our perceptions (cf. Essay 1.1.2). This idea is mistaken because it relies on the
unwarranted supposition of a causal relationship between a perception and its cause.
In his theory of causation, Hume argues that this picture is illegitimate. To Hume's
sceptical mind, it is illegitimate to suppose that our perceptions have objects that are
independent of the perceptions themselves, which he sets as the premise of the
discussion. Therefore, Hume's fundamental intentions are to explain how we
naturally come to entertain the picture of the world as composed of distinct objects,
and to explain how the notion of external existence so firmly enters into our mind.
According to Humean constructivism, the idea of external existence is a creation of
human perception; it is a fictional unification of various perceptions. It must be a
fiction because different kinds of senses cannot refer to same object: but the fiction is
necessary for us to have a stable picture of the world.
As the Treatise aims to explain the whole of human nature, the theory of
external object has strong moral implications. Hume's theory of the external body
must be considered in reference to his moral theory. His target is to criticise a reason-
based understanding of the world and morality. By examining the theory that
distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities of objects, Hume reveals the
false authority of reason. It is crucial to recognise that the external object obtains
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only from a view that sees variable resembling perceptions as belonging to a single
object. This means that the general point of view plays a very central role in his
epistemology. In this sense, the understanding of his theory of the external object
supplies the foundation for his moral theory.
Hume's theory of the external object completes the development of the theory
of belief in physical objects. His theory of causation is not fully meaningful where
there is no external object established. Belief in stability and reliance is absolutely
necessary for a stable life. Hume provides a foundation to stable belief by putting the
belief in external existence at its core. The same manner that constitutes the belief in
external bodies significantly includes the perception of human beings. Thus Hume
established a totally different notion of human beings from the Cartesian cogito. It is
easy to see that Hume's explanation of a person as an external object leads to the
denial of personal identity as posited in the Cartesian cogito. Here is the continuity of
his theory of external body and that of personal identity.
Humean human beings are the construction of the general point of view;
because the general point of view perceives human beings, it is the moral point of
view. Here is the true foundation of the morality of human existence. It is possible to
think that by explaining human beings as independent beings who are capable of
spontaneous action, Hume provides the naturalistic explanation to the notion of
human right which is formulated in overly moral terms such as Lockean liberty, or
Kantian "freedom" as "autonomy". Hume's Copernican turn corresponds to the
conversion of the relationship between "is" and "ought", or the natural perception
and the moral perception. We must respect other people not because we ought to be
moral in the first place, but rather because as other people are recognised as objective
beings, it is natural to treat them accordingly. In this way, Hume's theory of external
objects provides a naturalistic foundation to the notion of human right, which will be
fully developed in his theory ofjustice.
Through his theory of the external bodies, Hume has prepared the stage on
which moral activities can take place. By the end of Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume's
theory has developed from the basic unit of perceptions to this creation of the
physical world as human world. Upon this ground, in Books 2 and 3, he bases his
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theory of the interaction of sentiments among people, and the creation ofpolitical
society, to which we will now turn.
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Chapter Five:
Sympathy and the General Point of View
Part 1: Sympathy and Communication
Introduction
This chapter attempts to read Hume's theory of sympathy as a consistent
development of the theory of perception in Hume's Treatise. Hume's theory of
perceptions enters into a new stage with his discussion of the passions in Book 2.
This development signifies something crucial much beyond a mere change in topic.
Prior to this there were no full fledged human beings in Hume's epistemology; no
human beings with emotion, feeling and passion. Abstract ideas, custom, causation,
and external bodies were all explained only through the association of perceptions.
After discussing the topics that deal with the setting in which human activities are
conducted, a theory that explains the "blood and tears" of human beings naturally
follows. Thus, the central theme of Book 2 of the Treatise is passion. In this chapter,
I argue that Hume's theory of sympathy explains the perception of human sentiments
which enables communication and moral relationships.
Among the many philosophical issues in the Treatise, Book 2 is the least
discussed among Hume commentators. I attempt to clarify its significance to Hume's
entire theory. My view is that Hume's theory of passion explains sociability. In Book
1, Hume deals with the physical perceptionper se, but in Book 2, he deals with the
social perception ofphysical objects. Hume deals with the external object in relation
to our "social", as opposed to physical, behaviour that is based on the pleasant or
painful impression of things. This at the same time means that human relationships in
general are composed in relation to the recognition of the social value of things,
which leads to the foundation of the system of property. Therefore, Hume's theory of
passion prepares the way for the idea ofjustice. The primary function of sympathy is
nothing other than "perception". Hume's idea of sympathy explains the perception of
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other people's sentiments in like manner to how we perceive the social value of
objects. It creates a direct human relationship in the form of "communication" that
consists in sharing the same sentiments. Communication enables human beings to
engage in co-operative action. Hume's theory of passion, therefore, has a close link
to his epistemology and moral theory. I clarify that Hume's theory ofmorality based
on sympathy signifies a consistent criticism of realist understandings ofmorality.143
In section 1,1 clarify that Hume regards passions as a vehicle of social
recognition, and that Hume states in his theory of pride and humility the mechanism
by which one's possessions and behaviours produce the evaluation of the self. In
section 2,1 examine Hume's definition of pride and show that sympathy is based on
the fact of perception, and explains rather than justifies human relations. In section 3,
I discuss the connection between sympathy and the general point of view.
1. The significance of Pride and Humility
Hume regards passions as "reflective impressions" (T 2.1.1.1; SBN 275). Like other
perceptions in general, passions are not an innate quality, and are produced through a
process that is freed from immediate reaction. Because of this openness to the world,
passions can represent an individual's situation, and serve as the basis of a human
relationship which is the central theme ofHume's discussion in Book 2 of the
Treatise. Hume focuses on passion in order to deal with the human interactions that
are obviously beyond physical contacts. In his dealings with passion, he denies the
assumption that human beings are independent of each other. Hume sees that the
perception of the self is created out of interactions of passions, in other words, the
self is a product of human relationships (cf. Rorty, 1990). This is clearly a criticism
of the Hobbesian method of introspection based on methodological individualism
(see Chapter 6). Hobbes believes that only when one reflects upon his own mind can
one know what others think. It is true that human beings have relationship with each
other also in Hobbes; they have the sentiments ofpity, or benevolence. But all of
143
Hume's concept of sympathy has much in common with Spinoza's concept of imitatio
affectuum (Spinoza, 1985: Ethics, part 3, prop. 27, shol.).
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those sentiments originate in a unilateral relationship toward others, and can be
reduced to the desire for self-preservation (cf. Herdt, 1997: Ch. 1). Hobbes writes,
Grief, for the Calamity of another, is pity; and ariseth from
the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and
therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present
time a fellow-feeling. (Leviathan 43)
Hobbesian theory implies a hedonistic picture of human motivation,
according to which all human actions are motivated by self-interest. This is because
Hobbes's theory ofmotivation is based on a mechanical theory according to which
motion is determined solely by the cause that immediately precedes it.144 Hume
criticises this understanding because it is based on an unwarranted assumption that
human perceptions are determined directly by the immediately preceding
145
sensations.
Hume finds an initial clue for refuting Hobbesian individualism in the
common phenomena of human nature that we in fact feel "pride and humility". Pride
and humility are self-directed sentiments whose counterparts, when directed to others,
are love and hatred. He indicates that there is an enigma about feeling pride and
humility.146 Pride and humility, though they are opposite sentiments, have the same
object, the self. However, the self cannot be their sole cause because the object and
the cause of pride and humility are different. This is a peculiar point that is not seen
in the perceptions of external things; external things are at once the object and the
cause ofperceptions. The cause of pride must be something that causes good effects,
and that of humility must be something that causes bad effects. In addition, the cause
of pride and humility must be something that is close to the object of pride, because
unless the object is closely related to the self, it cannot cause these passions. Hume
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In fact, this is why Hobbes' explanation of society is not described as a historical process but
as a sudden creation by covenant.
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Locke emphasises the importance for human beings to suspend immediate desires. For Locke
human freedom enables us to suspend our direct desire (Essay 2.21.53).
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As pride and humility represent a cardinal vice and a cardinal virtue in Christian ethics, this
can be regarded as Hume's challenge to Christian ethics.
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maintains, therefore, that there must be "double relations" of impressions and ideas:
between the impression of the cause and the self, and between the idea of the cause
and the self. Hume explains the double relations as follows.
That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object,
which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the
cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of passion: From
this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd.
The one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one
impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it: With how
much greater facility must this transition be made, where these
movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double
impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas (T
2.1.5.5; SBN 286-287).
It is noteworthy that the transition of impressions is the central principle in
Hume's theory of causation. Hume mentions that the hypothesis of the double
relation can be compared to the theory of causation (Cf. T 2.1.5.11;SBN 289). In
Hume's example, someone's good house causes a pleasant impression to others. The
vivacity of the pleasant impression is discharged through the relation of ideas
between the object and the self, to the idea of the self, and thus produces an
impression ofpride. In this way, one feels pride in oneself. In pride and humility, the
impressions of pleasant objects that initially belong to others are transferred into the
self of the possessor as the subjective impression of pride. The impression of pride,
in turn, gives rise to the idea of the self as the object ofpride. Regarding the
relationship between the object and the subject, impressions of objects are easily
transferred to the impressions of the self. Here is seen an interchangeability of the
loci of sentiments. Phenomena ofpride and humility evidence that perception occurs
prior to the idea of the self.
Feeling pride is to perceive other people's impressions as one's own. To be
proud of something is to feel a pleasant impression about oneself because of some
object that is related to oneself. Unless other people find pleasant impressions in the
object, one cannot feel proud about it. In this sense, pride is a social sentiment. In the
process, mere physical objects are transformed into social values. The social nature
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of pride and humility creates a pattern of social behaviour regarding the possession
of external things; people naturally prefer to possess those things that cause pride,
and to avoid those that cause humility. Therefore, this eventually leads to the
foundation of a system of property (cf. T 2.1.10). The mechanism that causes pride
or humility can be applied to human behaviours that cause pleasant or painful
impressions to other people. Those behaviours that cause pleasant effects produce
pride, and those that cause painful effects produce humility. Therefore, human
behaviours can be socially evaluated in accordance with their effects on other people
(cf. 2.1.7). In this way, moral evaluation is made in the similar manner that the
possession of external objects is perceived by human beings.
2. Explanation and Justification of Sympathy
After discussing pride and humility, Hume deals with "the love of fame" (T 2.1.11).
This topic is a variation on the time-honoured topic of "reputation" in Locke (Essay,
2.28.10-2). The concept of sympathy appears for the first time in the section which
can be rightly regarded as an application of the principle of pride and humility. Some
commentators think that Hume does not give a definition of sympathy despite the
fact that he attaches great importance to the concept (Mercer, 1995: 437). However,
it seems to be Hume's strategy to explore sympathy through the general functions of
passions. In other words, for Hume, it is necessary to think of sympathy in reference
to human experiences of the transference of sentiments.
The basic function ofHumean sympathy is to convert ideas into impressions
(Cf. T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354). This function cannot be ignored because Hume does not
think that sentiments leap from mind to mind. However, in order to have a more
comprehensive understanding of sympathy, it is necessary to clarify the conditions
that produce sympathy as well as its practical implications. Hume thinks that the
function of sympathy is to receive the sentiments of others.
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself
and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize
with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and
sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own. (T
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It is crucial to understand that passions and sentiments are a peculiar object
ofperception in that they can have completely different qualities, according to the
perspective of the observer. The same sentiment has a different quality for the person
who causes it and one who merely observes it. Nevertheless, we seem to be capable
of attaining a common perception of a sentiment. For example when we witness the
misfortune of other people, we are capable of having painful moral sentiments,
despite having no direct experience of the cause. There must be some mechanism
that makes this possible. Hume's concept of sympathy should first of all be regarded
as an attempt to identify this mechanism; for an individual to understand the
sentiments of others, that person must somehow have the capacity to feel other's
sentiments as his own. However, it must be further clarified what it means to have
the same sentiments as others. Sentiments themselves are not an entity that can be
identified in terms of strength or quality. It is well known that Hume makes no
difference between impressions and ideas except in terms of their force or liveliness.
Hume says,
The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and
conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object,
to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a
real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great
measure the same, and differing only in their degree of force and
vivacity. (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354)
It is important to note that the equivalence of ideas and impressions means
that there is no difference in terms of their cognitive content (Ardal, 1966: 43). The
difference that sympathy brings to ideas is not mere increase of strength; it is the
change of attachment of the ideas. Before the working of sympathy, the sentiments of
others are known only as ideas that belong to other people. But after the working of
sympathy, the same ideas become impressions that belong to the self because one's
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present sentiments are always impressions. Therefore, sympathy is a means to share
with others a similar attitude toward their situation.147 What actually takes place in
sympathy is not so much a mere increase of vivacities as a change of vectors of the
sentiments. Therefore, as Stroud maintains, it is possible to regard sympathy as a
mechanism that makes people adopt the perceptions of others without taking into
148
account the difference between the self and the other (see Stroud, 1977: 198).
Hume is conscious that he has no fewer rivals in his theory of sympathy
than in other topics.149 There is ample evidence in the Treatise that Hume is very
aware of the criticism that his theory of sympathy contradicts some of our common
experiences. In the first place, it is necessary to remember that Hume focuses on
pride and humility because they are common phenomena. He takes it for granted that
sympathy "is not only conspicuous in children ... but also in men of the greatest
judgement and understanding" (T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316). He even insists that opinions
as well as sentiments are shared among people by sympathy.
Hume supplies a very elaborate explanation for why the fact that we do not
always feel as other people do does not contradict his basic theory. Most briefly,
Hume ascribes the dysfunction of sympathy to the insufficiency of the double
relation of impressions and ideas (Cf. T 2.1.6). If the insufficient double relation
causes the dysfunction, it proves that the double relation is the necessary condition of
sympathy. Hume also maintains that there is a force that exerts contrary effects to
sympathy, called the principle of "comparison" (T 2.2.8; SBN 372fi). A comparison
with others prevents the working of sympathy and causes "malice and envy" which
represent our tendency to enjoy the misery, and to hate the happiness of others. By
this principle, Hume provides an alternative account to the Hobbesian thesis that
147 Stroud asserts that the feeling of sympathy is "the same general affective quality" (Stroud,
1977: 198).
148
Lipkin criticises this view. However, Lipkin's argument is defective as he deliberately ignores
the difference of the concept between the Treatise and the Enquiry (Lipkin, 1987: 18-32).
149 Other than Francis Hutcheson, other opponents include, Hobbes, Mandeville, Schaftesbury
and, Joseph Butler before him. Moreover, Hume's theory of sympathy is harshly criticised by
later generations, most of all by Jeremy Bentham who owes the basic idea of utilitarianism to
Hume. Bentham criticises the principle of sympathy and antipathy as "caprice", "sentimentatism",
or "ipsedixitism" (Bentham, 1955: 4-9). Post humously commentators ascribe utilitarianism to
Hume mostly when they criticise him. Thus, Hume is blamed from both sides.
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human beings are naturally selfish. Hume thinks that malice and envy are not
evidence ofman's inherent selfishness, because they are social sentiments
themselves. At the same time, they are compatible with the working of sympathy; in
order to envy other people's happiness, we need to feel the pleasure of others through
sympathy to find that our own situation is less gratifying.
Hobbes asserts that sympathy is reduced to the sentiment of self-love. He
claims that sympathy occurs from imagining that the same thing happens to
ourselves; there is no sympathy that shares another person's happiness without
reference to self-interest. He sees sympathy as in fact a form of love; deriving
pleasure from the happiness of others, which is originally the Epicurean view.150 This
opposition reveals an important point that unless one acts with no regard for one's
exclusive interest, it cannot be properly regarded as the working of sympathy. In
other words, the working of sympathy is equivalent to the denial of egoistic-
individualism. This also leads to a fundamental problem whether the good is pleasant
and naturally done on its own, apart from self-interests. Hume criticises the egoist-
interpretation of sympathy in the Enquiries as follows.
Now as these advantages are enjoyed by the person possessed
of the character, it can never be self-love which renders the prospect
of them agreeable to us, the spectators, and prompts our esteem and
approbation. No force of imagination can convert us into another
person, and make us fancy, that we, being that person, reap benefit
from those valuable qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no
celerity of imagination could immediately transport us back, into
ourselves, and make us love and esteem the person, as different from
us. (EPM 6.3; SBN 234)
In short, Hume denies the possibility of basing sympathy on egoistic-
individualism because it is incompatible with the nature of imagination to reduce
other love to self-love. Furthermore, this hypothesis cannot explain the sympathy of
painful sentiments; based on the egoistic picture of human beings, it cannot happen
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allies with Hume in refusing to ascribe self-love to the sentiments of sympathy,
says,
Sympathy, however, cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a
selfish principle... this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to
me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with
whom I sympathize... I consider what I should suffer if I were you,
and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons
and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and
not in the least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish. A
man may sympathize with a woman in child-bed; though it is
impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in
his own proper person and character. (TMS 317)
Obviously, it is absurd to reduce the pleasure and pain of other people to
self-interest.151 However, the theoretical framework of self-interest theory is by no
means absurd. The Hobbesian explanation is not illogical but only a due consequence
of a strict individualist framework. In order to refute the individualist explanation, it
is necessary to provide a theory that allows individuals to obtain non-individual
sentiments. Hobbes's mechanical atomistic position prevents him from giving a non-
individualistic perspective (see Chapter 6). This is exactly what Hume tries to
provide by his theory of indirect passions. Hume's theory of perception, that comes
prior to his concept of individuals, is capable of identifying the foundation that is
common among different individuals. Hence, with the theory of sympathy, Hume
• •••• m ^ i
breaks the Hobbesian individualist conception of society.
There is another objection to the Humean concept of sympathy. According
to this objection, even if sympathy does exist, it is not of any contagious nature as
Hume maintains, but stems from the rational judgement of the individuals. This is a
Smithian criticism to Hume. More fundamentally, this criticism is concerned with the
relationship between sentiments and reason. To take the conclusion first, Hume
150
Herdt points out that this is why Hutcheson opposes Hume (Herdt, 1997: 52).
151
Herdt says, "If it is absurd to say that we approve of someone in order to feel pleasure, it is yet
more absurd to say that we disapprove of someone in order to feel pain" (Herdt, 1997: 58).
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considers this a confusion of the explanation and justification of sympathy. Hume
presents sympathy as a perception, and not a result of rational judgement. Perception
is fundamentally imposed on human beings: we do not have control over our
perceptions. If, for example, a person perceives merely some percussion of sounds,
when hearing some other person "crying" out of distress, it mean that the person does
not perceive the sentiments of the other person properly. It is possible we judge that
the crying is not a proper reaction to the situation. Thus, the judgement, although
impossible without the perception, is different from the perception of the situation.
Hume's sympathy is concerned with original perception as material for judgement.
The Humean "general point of view" can be understood as involved in the
mechanism of sympathy. To have sympathy means to perceive someone else's
sentiments as they appear to other people in general. In this sense, sympathy is a
mechanism of the synthesis of the particularity and the generality of one's sentiment.
Without sympathy based on the general point of view, we have only our individual
view, and cannot behave "humanly".153 Just as someone who did not feel heat from
fire would fall afoul of fire, those who cannot understand another person's
sentiments via sympathy can never really communicate with others. Thus Hume
indicates the perception of sentiments is on a par with the perception of nautral
objects. To achieve proper perception of sentiments is to experience a common kind
of reaction. We will not be able to deal with fire properly unless we feel its heat. In
the same manner, ifwe do not feel sad by seeing people's distress, we do not deal
with the situation morally.154 In this way, Hume conceives morality based on
sympathy in a similar manner as causal reactions (see Chapter 3).
As a pleasant, agreeable or useful object causes in us a feeling of pleasure,
so we feel pleasure by perceiving a happy face, and feel pain, by perceiving a sad
face. This idea is expanded to Hume's basic tenet in his moral theory that "utility
152 f
Hume's theory of sympathy prepares the way for his criticism of social contract theory (see
Chapter 7).
153
It is arguable that Hume uses "humanity" in the Enquiry in this sense.
154
This relates to the problem of the sensible knave who deliberately takes advantage ofmorality.
Hume's theory of sympathy implies that such a knave cannot be happy for his criminal success
based on miseries of other people (see Chapter 7).
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pleases".155 To approve something means that we try to promote it, and to disapprove
something means that we try to avoid it. In this way, sympathy is closely connected
to other-regarding behaviour. In other words, to have sympathy means to act in the
place of the person with whom we are sympathizing. Therefore, moral behaviour
involves taking the sentiments of other people through sympathy as the motivation of
one's own behaviour. For example, the job of a doctor is not to make money, nor to
cure himself but other people. Were it not for the original tendency of acting for
others, there could be no sociability nor any development of the division of labour. In
this sense, the working of sympathy is decidedly fundamental for social cooperation
and the development of social institutions.156
There seems to be another problem in accepting Hume's theory. It is certain
that there are cases in which we should not feel sympathy. For example, we should
not sympathize with a gratified thief. Because we understand that not all of our
sympathy may be appropriate, we seek for a standard ofjustification of our
sentiments. Hume's theory of sympathy implies the denial of human rationality
• . . 1S7
because the mechanism of sympathy is common with animals. This is why Hume
elaborates at length, explaining the exceptions to his theory. However, there is no
worry about the fact that we are influenced by wrong or inappropriate sentiments. It
is not because such sentiments are not infectious, nor because we can rationally
avoid being infected by them, but because other sentiments are infectious as well.
The wrongness or Tightness of a sentiment is not determined, when it is considered
singularly. It is realised only by understanding the fact that if some sentiments are
inappropriate, other sentiments will emerge with counter effects. This is possible
because sympathy is not restricted to the present or the immediate sentiments of a
155 Section 5 ofAn Enquiry ofthe Principle ofMorals reads "Why Utility Pleases". Obviously,
the answer consists in the same principle as sympathy. This is further evidence that Hume retains
sympathy in Enquiries, even if the direct reference disappears. This also means that sympathy is
a part of the system of the theory of perception rather than a practical morality.
15
What about the activities of the philosopher? Plato in his Republic, Book 7 (520 b-c) asserts
that the fundamental activity of the philosopher must not be to gratify his own desire for
knowledge. He must return to the "cave" in order to teach the "prisoners" even at the cost of, in
the case of Socrates, his life. This is related to the Kantian notion of the "priority of practical
reason", and implies the idea of education and enlightenment.
157
Hume discusses the pride and humility of animals in the same way as humans (cf. T 2.1.12:
"Of the pride and humility of animals").
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closed circle. Though there is no universal sympathy, we can in principle share in the
sentiments of all those concerned in the end.
"Wrong sentiments" can be understood as lacking generality determined by
the general point of view. Wrong sentiments are disapproved by most members of
the society because of the painful causal effects they are typically involved in, and
are corrected by massive opposing influences, which also presuppose the working of
sympathy. For example, sympathy with the self-gratification of a successful thief is
more than nullified by sympathy with the injured sentiments of his victims, and by
sympathy with ordinary people who accept the functioning moral norm that prohibits
stealing. Thus, the norm is derived from the sentiments of the general populace.
Hume denies any other standard against which the moral value of a sentiment is
determined.158 In this way, sympathy can bring sentiments of the overall effects of
the situation to a "judicious observer". Hume says,
In order to cause a transition of passions, there is requir'd a
double relation of impressions and ideas, nor is one relation sufficient
to produce this effect. But that we may understand the full force of
this double relation, we must consider, that 'tis not the present
sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the
character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the
beginning to the end. (T 2.2.9.2; SBN 381)
There is always a tension between explanation and justification in Hume.
The relationship between explanation and justification is a variation of the "is-ought"
problem. Hume's theory of belief is a theory for explaining beliefs rather than a
theory for showing which among competing beliefs is justifiable (cf. Chapter 3).
Hume focuses on the elucidation of human beliefs because even the justified belief
must nonetheless be a belief in the Humean sense I have already defined. In regard to
sympathy, it is more important to explore the natural mechanism of the perception of
sentiments, which by its implication can serve as a standard ofjustification.
158
This makes a sharp contrast to Adam Smith's assertion that the judgement of our conscience
can go against the opinion of all mankind. I will discuss this point in Part 2 of this Chapter.
Chapter 5 168
Hume's General Point of View
3. Sympathy and Communication
Pride and humility are produced through the transition of impressions between object
and subject; the impression that is entertained regarding the object, is transferred into
an impression regarding the self. In other words, "objective" sentiments become
"subjective" through sympathy. Impressions themselves belong neither to the subject
nor to the object. In this way, sympathy provides a point of view that comprehends
particular perspectives. Hume says,
in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is
there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves; as in the present
case, where we are suppos'd to be actuated with pride or humility.
Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in
reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external
objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as
lie continguous to us, or resemble us. (T 2.2.2.17; SBN 340-341)
As I have argued in Chapter 4, Hume's "external objects" that "lie continguous to us,
or resemble us" include other people. Hume thinks that the perception of ourselves
crucially depends on our relations with those around us.159 He says that the change of
ideas into impressions "proceeds from certain views and reflections" (T 2.1.11.3;
SBN 317). Hume insists that the following maxim must be established,
That 'tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or
pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the
general bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. (T
2.2.9.11; SBN 384-385)
Therefore, sympathy is a development of the sentiments of people in general.
This means that one's sentiment and situation are seen not from a single perspective,
but are seen and considered from a general point of view. In this sense, sympathy is
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not limited to present sentiments and situations, and can extend even to the people
who are not present.
'Tis certain, that sympathy is not always limited to the present
moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and
pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only
anticipate by the force of imagination (T 2.2.9.13; SBN 385).
This expansion of the idea of sympathy suggests the expansion of human
relationships. Sympathy introduces a social dimension to a human relationship by
liberating human sentiments from the direct and merely personal reaction to the
situation. In this way, particular impressions obtain general recognition. Therefore,
sympathy consists in the creation of a general point of view that takes the form of the
circulation of custom and shared opinion in a society.
Hume confirms the relation-centred character of passions. The sentiments of
other people are transmitted through the relations in which they are situated.
Sympathy is not only produced through relations; it has a corollary effect of
strengthening relationships. Sympathy is the basis of human relationships, enabling
"communication", which is one of the central concepts in Hume's Treatise. It is to be
remembered that the primary function of general ideas is to make communication
possible (cf. chapter 2). On the basis of communication, human relations and society
are established. Communication is more fundamental than agreement and consent as
they only signify its final appearances.160 Because of physical limitations, individual
human beings can have direct sentiments only of themselves. Without sympathy,
other people appear to be no different from mere bodies with arbitrary movement.
Communication that is based on sympathy, a form of trans-subjectivity, enables us to
attain mutual understanding. What is communicated through sympathy is not
restricted to mere sentiments; on the basis of sentiments, agreement among people's
opinions can be attained.
159 There is a striking similarity between this passage and Smith's theory of sympathy. See
footnote 244.
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This leads to Hume's criticism of social contract theory (see Chapter 8).
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Sympathy also serves as a foundation of our beliefs. This is true of our all
beliefs including natural sciences. Science cannot be established without taking into
account the sentiments of other people. History is first possible because we naturally
receive the sentiments of other people in their original form. Natural sciences
typically develop in the context of the society at large. Similarly, in all human
endeavours, one's intellectual appreciation is founded upon the sentiment of
sympathy. As opposed to reason, sympathy typically represents the working of
human nature. To deny the Humean notion of sympathy is to deny a fundamental
condition for science. Therefore, Hume is critical of the theories that allege reason to
be their source, because they pretend that they can do without sympathy, though they
derive their opinion furtively through sympathy.161
The other fundamental function of the Humean sympathy is to cause
partiality, not impartiality, of sentiments in individuals. Partiality means to take care
of a particular need. Hume's morality is based on partiality as there is no impression
that corresponds to impartiality. Everything owes its existence to some partiality, and
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every sentiment is partial including the moral sentiments. Where there is a
partiality or an imbalance of sentiments, nature tends to work to put them right. As
long as human life continues, there will always be some imbalance that requires
adjustment.
Hume thinks that human behaviour is motivated by that imbalance, rather
than by an impartial ideal that has no root in reality. The most human beings can do
for themselves is to try to meet this requirement. Parents attend to their children, and
workers listen to their colleagues, etc.. Requests are issued bilaterally and, thus,
reciprocally. All we do is to address the particular cause issued by sentiments of our
friends, family, neighbours, and others, with the provision ofjustice in civil
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society. Hume recognises nothing special other than this in our virtuous behaviour.
It is impossible to act for those particular distant people whom we do not have
161
The situation is the same with regard to the idea of objectivity.
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Adam Smith, on the other hand, asserts that impartiality is the fundamental moral quality.
163
In "Of Parties in General", Hume remarks that one of the many dangers of a divided society is
that members of such a society have difficulty in maintaining a stable sympathetic understanding
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sympathy for. Also, people are only justified in taking charge of their proximate
relations, because "distant" people have their own neighbours. In this principle, all
are placed under the mutual care of each other.164 The "distance" here is not
measured by the spatial relationship only. Neighbourhood is defined as any situation
that enters into one's perception as perceptions are the only material to compose
one's moral world. Thus Hume's sympathy-based morality can be understood as an
integral part of his criticism of realist moral theories. This is why Hume elucidates
morality as a matter of perception, and this is why moral sentiment squares with the
condition of causation.
Therefore, it is a mistake to think that the motivation for human activities
consists in utility, or in any dogmatic ideal, religious or ideological. It is also
groundless to suppose that some unseen providence will automatically work to
produce the best result out of the imbalance. On the basis of the adjustment, the
redistribution ofproperty can take place. The real authority of opinion consists in this
function as well; opinions do not indicate the moral law or the standard ofmorality,
but represent people's sentiments to be sympathised.16"^ In all of these, Humean
sympathy signifies a vehicle that lets the excess or deficit of passions make their way
to equilibrium.
Ultimately, there is no other ground but sympathy with others for engaging
in social activities. Precisely because of this, to deceive others by pretending false
emotions or opinions out of self-interest is a vice. In the fundamental manner, trust is
the fundamental principle of human relationships. People are not responsible to
believe the false emotions or opinions of others and to act on them, because the
working of human nature binds everyone. We cannot decide whether or not to
sympathise with another's opinion in the first instance; sympathy occurs prior to
judgement.166 With the assumption of sympathy as a natural human phenomenon,
communication of opinions can take place, which leads to the system of consent and
of the needs and interests of those around them: when interests are divided, it becomes difficult to
reconcile self-interest and public interest (cf. Rorty, 1990: 267).
164
As I will discuss in Chapter 7 this is the necessary condition for establishing property.
165 This is Hume's basic criticism of Locke's social contract theory.
166 This is a crucial criticism ofAdam Smith. I will discuss this problem in Part 2 of this Chapter.
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promise. Thus, Hume's theory of sympathy is very fundamental to his theory of
morals; without the working of sympathy, the system of human interaction can
hardly be started.167
4. Concluding Remarks
We have explained Hume's theory of sympathy as a development of his theory of
perception with the consistent theme of criticising the realist theory ofmorality. The
central significance of Hume's theory of passion is to construct the social recognition
of physical objects and human actions. We have seen that because of the transference
of passions, physical objects come to assume a social significance. Human
relationships are organised pivoting on the property relationship. As can be seen in
Hume's theory ofjustice, human beings are given social recognition as a property
owners. Therefore, human relationships are reflected in property relationships.
Hume's theory of passions is first of all a theory for explaining this mechanism.
Hume understands people's character in the same manner as property.
Sympathy, as the transference of passions, has the sentiments of other people as their
original objects. The most significant function of sympathy is the recognition of the
sentiments of other people. The character of a person is determined by the effects of
his own action. In terms ofperceptions, both property and action are qualities that
produce some pleasant or painful sentiments in others. In accordance with the effects
of one's actions, one receives moral recognition from other people. Therefore,
sympathy enables us to recognise the moral quality of other people.
Evaluation of actions and possessions are incorporated into the human world
through sympathy. Sympathy provides necessary perceptions that produce a variety
of human communication on the basis ofwhich moral norms and institutions are
created. It has become clear that sympathy indicates the direction of human
sentiments that create stability among human relationships. In this sense the theory of
passions in Book 2 is theoretically related to the moral theory in Book 3.
167
Hume's theory of sympathy is very fundamental to his theory of promise, without the working
of sympathy, the system of promise cannot be explained. Hobbes stipulated the system of
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Part 2: The General Point of View" and Smith's "Impartial Spectator
Introduction
Adam Smith, best friend ofHume and renowned father ofmodern economics, is the
best philosopher to consider by contrast the distinctiveness ofHume's theory of
1 68
sympathy. In this part, I deal with Smith's theory of sympathy to elucidate the
uniqueness ofHume's sympathy for understanding morality and human sociability.
Smith develops a theory of sympathy derived from Hume and places it in the centre
ofhis own theory ofmorality. Smith's unique development of the concept of
sympathy serves to highlight the peculiarity of the Humean theory of sympathy (cf.
Blackburn, 1998a: Ch.7). Smith's sympathy enables moral judgement, while Hume's
enables moral perception. It is also argued that they have a different underlying idea
of the concept, especially in regard to providence, and that the general point of view
and impartial spectator identify their distinctive theories. My aim is to show the
disjuncture between Hume and Smith, and I confine the discussion of Smith to the
theory ofmoral judgment.169
In section 1,1 explain the basic theory of Smith's sympathy, and point out a
problem which can be found in it; Smith's sympathy consists in the agreement of
sentiments between the moral agent and observer, but it is not clear how to assure the
agreement. In section 2,1 argue that the above problem provides a motivation for
Smith to revise The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, in the direction of seeking for a
justification of sympathy. I clarify the reason Smith's sympathy has to deal with the
sentiments of an impartial spectator. In section 3,1 examine the difference between
Hume and Smith. And in section 4,1 argue that Hume's general point of view and
Smith's impartial spectator respectively represent their core characteristics of their
promise as an artificial arrangement, precisely because there is no sympathy in his system.
168 As a student, Smith read Hume's Treatise, and their friendship started from around 1748 and
lasted until Hume's death (Ross, 1995: xix).
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moral theories. I clarify that Hume's general point of view and Smith's impartial
spectator represent opposite understandings of normativity.
1. Adam Smith's Theory of Sympathy
As a great philosopher himself, Smith reconceived the notion ofHume's "sympathy".
Smith's theory, by virtue of the advantage ofbeing published later than Hume's, is a
development from Hume's. The fact that Smith adopts the concept of sympathy from
Hume as the core concept of his moral philosophy shows the importance of the
concept in Hume's theory. Moreover, Smith develops his concept of "the impartial
spectator" from Hume's concept of "a judicious spectator" (Raphael, 1975: 87). Also,
the centrality of the concepts of "praise" and "blame" in Smith reflects Hume's
argument regarding "pride" and "humility".
As we have seen, the basic function of sympathy in Hume is the perception
of the sentiments of others, and to convert the ideas of others into impressions. Hume
did not deny benevolence as virtue; it merely was not adopted as the basis of Hume's
moral system because Hume tries to cover the whole spectrum ofmoral perceptions.
Benevolence can be at most a part ofmoral perception. The principle of benevolence
is too narrow to cover all virtues, and if it were the only moral principle, it could not
explain vices. On the other hand, Hume's theory of sympathy, by focusing on
perceptions, enables us to explain the dynamic formation of a new society, or a
society whose central characteristic lies in a constant flow ofmoney, goods, and
people (cf. Phillipson, 1981: 19-40). Smith obviously allies with Hume in this
understanding, and focuses on the human relationship rather than a static moral
quality inherent in individual human beings independent of and prior to social
interactions.
As a critical departure from Hutcheson's theory that focuses on the
characteristics of a virtuous person, Smith begins his The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments by introducing the concept of sympathy. This also signifies a difference
from Hume who starts all Books of the Treatise from the most primitive framework
169 For a comprehensive discussion of Smith's moral theory (e.g. Griswold, 1999: passim).
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of perceptions. Unlike Locke or Hume, Smith does not discuss epistemology, and
presupposes human beings who are equipped with the capacity for sympathy.170
Sympathy is a means for adjusting changing human relationship. By focusing on
sympathy, Smith tries to grasp morality in terms of human relationships. Smith
confers a unique meaning to the concept of sympathy different also from Hume. The
most important function of sympathy in Smith is to enable people to approve or
disapprove of the moral attitude of a person.
Smith indicates in the 4th edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments a
subtitle, which reads "An Essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by which Men
naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of their Neighbours, and
afterwards of themselves". The subtitle is significant because it informs us of the two
important features of his theory. First, it is a theory of a moral "judgement". Second,
Smith presupposes both the person who makes a moral judgement and his
neighbours who are to be judged. And the morality of oneself is to be judged after
the manner that one judges his neighbours, i.e. by regarding himself as his neighbour.
Therefore, in Smith, sympathy is an important means for making a moral
judgement, rather than representing any normative sentiment like benevolence.
Smithean sympathy obtains where there is a concurrence of sentiments between the
person who observes the situation and the person who is affected by the action. One
imagines oneself to be in the situation of other people, and compares the sentiment of
other people with the one he would feel were he in the position of the person
observed. If the two sentiments are the same in degree, then sympathy obtains. An
occurrence of sympathy signifies approval, and an absence of sympathy signifies
disapproval.
Smith observes as a fact of human nature that sympathy is in itself a
pleasant sense of harmony between people, and the natural agreeableness of
experiencing the approval of other people urges one to seek for sympathy. Seeking
the approval of others is alleged to be the strongest inclination of human beings
170 i f
In contrast, Hume's theory is about the emergence of "human beings" as such.
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second only to self-preservation. This is the Smithean reason to be moral.
Generally, an observer, as a third person, tends to have weaker sentiments than the
person primarily concerned. Therefore, in order to attain sympathy most effectively,
the observer should try to raise the level of his sentiment, and the person primarily
concerned should try to lower the level of his sentiment so that even the third person
"can go along with" his sentiment toward the situation. In most cases, primary and
stronger efforts are required of the person affected rather than the observer.
Sympathy thus established signifies the stable human relationship between people,
and guarantees the stability of a society. It is to be remembered that the stability of a
society specifically relies on the stability of the sentiments of the ordinary people in
the society. The spirit of fair-play represents the moral standard. Smith famously
remarks:
In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as
hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to
outstrip all his competitors. But if he should jostle, or throw down any
of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at the end. It is a
violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. (TMS 83)
Smith's explanation sensitively captures a new kind of human relationship
in the expanding commercial society where the dominating human relationship is
that with an indefinite number of anonymous persons. In such a society, one has to
behave in a way that is approved by ordinary people with whom he has no contact
either beforehand or afterward. Only by the approval of the third person, moral
behaviours are justified.
However, some problems immediately seem to follow from Smith's theory.
First, as Knud Haakonssen once pointed out, Smith does not explain how it is
possible for a spectator to recognize a sentiment or a motive of a person apart from
the action itself performed by that person (Haakonssen, 1981: 48). The motivation of
other people is hidden behind the veil of privacy, as the motivation of an action is not
171
Hume seems to think the desire for society is stronger than any other. He says, "A perfect
solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer" (T 2.2.5.15; SBN 363).
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a direct object of observation. In order for a comparison to be possible, one has to be
able to recognize the intention of the other person with a reasonable degree of
accuracy. Besides, the spectator must have known how he would feel were he in the
condition of the actor, though it is unlikely he would have experienced the situation
himself (cf. Heath, 1998: 58).172 But it does not seem to work in any efficient manner,
if the other's mind is not in principle knowable. In sum, there is a serious difficulty
in understanding how the "imaginary exchange of places" can take place (cf. Raynor,
1984: 55).
Secondly, according to Smith, a moral observer primarily deals with the
sentiment of an actor, and sees whether he "can go along with" it, were he in the
place of that actor. But it is problematic to equate the morality of an action with
sentiments, where sentiments and action are different. The motivation of an action is
not usually sentiment, nor can the action be merely reduced to sentiment. For
example, we would not approve of the good will of a convicted thief, even if his
good will were genuine. So if the spectator tries to evaluate the propriety of the
motivation, he has to consider other criterion than mere sentiment to see if the
motivation is appropriate. But this would divert Smith's theory from a theory of
moral sentiment to a different kind of theory.
Furthermore, Smith provides us with a still more difficult problem.
According to Smith, in order for sympathy to obtain, bilateral efforts are required;
one is required on the part of an observer to strengthen his emotion, and the other is
required on the part of the person primarily concerned to weaken his emotion. These
two efforts, when combined, first realise the concurrence of two different emotions.
It is not, however, clear how it is possible for a third person to supervise these
bilateral processes, unless they engage in a face-to-face negotiation like in a market.
Smith assumes that sympathy among people's sentiments at the same time signifies
the harmony of the society, and of human relationships. But it is still an unwarranted
presupposition that a concurrence of sentiments in sympathy coincides with the
reality of social order.
172
Hume would have no difficulty in this respect, as he clearly says that the sympathy is based on
the perceivable present sentiments.
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2. Impartial Spectator and the Demigod
Smith thinks that, in a society that is composed of anonymous people; one's
behaviour can be regarded as moral when someone who has no prior personal
relationship with you approves of you. In this case, it would not be necessary to
make sure that no one has an objection about the verdict, because an anonymous
member is the objective criterion. If one representative spectator acknowledges some
behaviour, this means that the behaviour has obtained the recognition of the society
as a whole. When Smith first introduces the concept of an impartial spectator in the
first edition ofhis Theory ofMoral Sentiments, he means by the concept just such a
spectator.
And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for
ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent
affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone
produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in
which consists their whole grace and propriety. As to love our
neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is
the great precept of nature to love ourselves as we love our neighbour,
or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving
us. (TMS 25)
It is important to notice that the principle of sympathy is in fact the combination of
two of the Smith's most important virtues: humanity that consists in sharing the
sentiments of other person, and self-command that consists in containing one's own
sentiments. These two virtues represent the two most important sources of Smith's
moral philosophy, Christianity and Stoic philosophy, respectively. The virtue of
humanity is required of the spectator (or the person who regards himself as a
spectator). On the other hand, the virtue of self-command is required of the person
primarily concerned. Of the two virtues, self-command is more important, because
an observer cannot in principle share the violent sentiments of the person primarily
concerned, and unrestricted sentiments cause the observer an aversion and thus
disapproval. Without self-command, one cannot take a position of an observer, and
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self-command means to love oneself with the humanity which is available even to
other person. Therefore the two virtues are in fact the two sides of the same coin.
To behave morally means to behave in such a manner that an impartial third
person would approve of it. When the moral behaviour of other people is approved
by a third person, the behaviour is supposed to be approved unanimously by all the
• • *173
members of the society. This represents a minimum morality. And this third
person is what Smith means by the impartial spectator. Smith's impartial spectator
specifically means an ordinary person who has no personal interest in the situation.
Moral behaviour is impartial not because of any inherent characteristic but because
of its being approved by an impartial spectator.
One of the problems that was indicated in the last section finds the
possibility of solution with the notion of the impartial spectator. It would not be
necessary for both parties to make an effort to attain the concurrence of their
sentiments. All that is necessary to secure propriety is to adopt the sentiment of an
impartial spectator. People can make a right judgement about themselves only if they
can imagine themselves as a third person when considering their own morality. This
signifies the understanding ofmorality that regards "social validity" rather than any
particular normative position as the standard ofmorality. Therefore, the fundamental
characteristic of the impartial spectator is that he is considered as a representative of
ordinary citizens (cf. Phillipson, 1983: 226-46).
However, Smith's doctrine sees a crucial turn regarding the concept of the
impartial spectator. It is in a sense a development that was waiting to happen. Soon
after the publication of the first edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Gilbert
Elliot questioned how it is possible in Smith's theory that one's conscience can go
against popular opinion (Reader, 1997: 18-30). In response to this criticism, Smith
adds a major correction to the role of impartial spectator in the 2nd edition of the
173Smith even maintains that the beauty and ugliness of one's face is the product of the opinion of
other people. He says, "We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither
with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who
has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality between us" (TMS
135).
Chapter 5 180
Hume's General Point of View
Theory ofMoral Sentiment ,174 In a correspondence to Elliot, Smith hopes that upon
the reading of the 2nd edition, he
will observe that it is intended both to confirm my Doctrine that our
judgements concerning our own conduct have always a reference to the
sentiments of some other being, and to show that, notwithstanding this,
real magnanimity and conscious virtue can support itself under the
disapprobation of all mankind. (Reeder, 1997: 19)
This distinction between the judgement of our own conduct and the
disapproval of all mankind presupposes the difference between "actual praise" and
the "praise-worthiness", which is the most significant distinction in Smith's theory of
• • 175moral evaluation. In its essence, this is typically a question regarding vanity.
Vanity is defined as an attitude to love praise itself even if one is not at all
praiseworthy. It is to be noted that the distinction between actual praise and praise-
worthiness is exclusively concerned with a moral evaluation about oneself. In so far
as one acts as a disinterested spectator who judges the morality of other people, there
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can be no contradiction between the actual praise and praise-worthiness. Smith
asserts that the problem of conscience is peculiar to self-evaluation. "Conscience"
177 • •
orders without regard to, and often in defiance of, public opinions. This is
174 Smith witnesses the case in which the actual observers do not always make an appropriate
judgement both in person, as in the Calas case, and in general observation. It was Smith's
distinctive contribution that he designated the sympathy of "responsibly-minded men ofmiddling
rank" as the moral criterion in the emerging new society (Phillipson, 1983: 226-46).
175 The problem of "vanity" has been the central, if inconspicuous, problem in the history of
Western philosophy since Socrates. It occupies a central place because of the intellectual
challenge made by Hobbes and Mandeville, and because of the influence ofChristianity. Hume
develops his theory of sympathy centring on the concept of "pride and humility" apparently in
defiance of traditional Christian virtue, and converted it as the base of social unification.
176 That is derived from the time honoured problem of how to base the non-empirical concept,
self, within the framework of empirical explanation.
177
Raphael and Macfie write in the "introduction" to TMS that "the originality ofAdam Smith's
impartial spectator lies in his development of the idea so as to explain the source and nature of
consciousness, i.e. of a man's capacity to judge his own actions and especially of his sense of
duty. On this aspect of ethics the theories of Hutcheson and Hume were undoubtedly lame, as
was clear to their rationalist critics" (TMS 15). It is obvious that the terminology of "conscience"
signifies a "private" knowledge, rather than its medieval meaning "conscientia (joint
knowledge)" (OED, 2nd edn., vol. 3: 754), which means to know with others. In this sense,
Hume's concept of the general point of view as the moral point of view restores the original
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precisely the development that Smith announces in the subtitle of the Theory of
Moral Sentiment. Smith proceeds to analyse the principles by which men naturally
judge the conduct and character of themselves. In the 2nd and especially in the 6th
edition ofChapter 2, Part 3, Smith discusses in detail how the differences between
actual praise and praise-worthiness, or actual blame and blame-worthiness. The
underlying implication of his criticism of vanity is Smith's criticism ofMandeville. It
is in this process that he introduces the concept of "demigod" or "the man within the
breast" (TMS 131).178
Smith thinks that the love of praise-worthiness cannot be derived from the
love ofpraise itself. For, the love of praise is desirable only when the praise is given
to the action that is truly praiseworthy. The point is that, here, praise-worthiness has
the priority over the actual praise. Smith refuses to base the desirability of praise-
worthiness on the actual praise of the public. And the reason why praise-worthiness
has priority is that it is nothing but the verdict of the conscience. This is founded
upon Smith's natural law theory that prescribes the priority of the right over the good.
And the strict correspondence between the right and the good can be found nowhere
else other than in the presupposition that the sympathy of an impartial spectator
should always be correct. Smith ascribes the authority of conscience that can go
against the disapprobation of all mankind to the impartial spectator, leaving his initial
position of identifying the impartial spectator with the opinion of the general public.
sense of conscience from the Cartesian-Lockean modification. The same applies to the concept of
sympathy, which originally meant "joint sentiment".
178 In the 2nd edition, Smith still represents an ambivalent position between public opinion and
conscience. Raphael argues that "On the one hand Smith wanted to retain the traditional view
that the voice of conscience represents the voice of God and is superior to popular opinion. On
the other hand he believed that conscience is initially an effect of social approval and
disapproval; in the first instance, vox populi is vox DeF (Raphael, 1975: 91). Smith says, "The
Author of nature has made man the immediate judge ofmankind, and has in this respect, as in
many others, created him after his own image, of his brethren" (TMS 128). Although developed
conscience is a superior tribunal, "yet, ifwe enquire into the origin of its institution, its
jurisdiction, we shall find, is in a great measure derived from the authority of that very tribunal,
whose decisions it so often and so justly reverses" (TMS 129). In the 6th edition, the above
quotations are removed as Smith emphasises the priority of conscience. However, if the impartial
spectator reaches a different verdict from the opinion of the general public, it must be because the
impartial spectator possesses his own criterion of moral judgement. However, Smith does not
explain the reason, nor does he think it necessary to give one. It is based on a "self-evident
presupposition" (Kleer, 1995: 275-300). See also Hope, 1984: 157-67.
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In the later 6th edition, Smith emphasises the distinction between mere
sympathetic feeling and approval as the verdict of conscience (cf. Raphael and
Macfie, 1976: 17). Smith upgrades the authority of conscience from the impartial
spectator to "the demigod within the breast" and to "the all-seeing Judge of the
world" (TMS p. 131), from the first tribunal by the actual spectator, to the tribunal of
conscience and further to "the unerring rectitude" ofGod's "great tribunal" (ibid.).
This is precisely the reverse course that he undertook as he first introduced the
concept of sympathy as a critical departure from Hutcheson. The development of the
concept of Smith's moral observer is in a sense a necessary consequence of his
theory of sympathy. Therefore the justification of sympathy ultimately depends on
the morality of the observer. So long as sympathy is supposed to be the initial moral
criterion, there is no other means for deciding the priority among competing moral
opinions, other than by examining the qualification of persons who hold each opinion
rather than the content of the opinions themselves.179 However, this "all-seeing Judge
of the world" is anything but the ordinary people who constitute the society to which
1 80
Smith tries to give philosophical foundation.
3. Smith's Criticism of Hume
Hume and Smith express their difference in their well known correspondence. Hume
clearly recognises that their disagreement occurs regarding the connection between
sympathy and moral approval. He wrote to Smith that,
I wish you had more particularly and fully prove'd, that all
kinds of Sympathy are necessarily Agreeable. This is the Hinge of your
System, & yet you only mention the Matter cursorily in p. 20 [TMS
1.1.2.6, p. 15-16]. Now it would appear that there is a disagreeable
Sympathy, as well as an agreeable: And indeed, as the Sympathetic
179
In comparison to this, Hume sets the standard ofmorality in the causal effects of action.
180
According to Smith, our "happiness in this life is thus, upon many occasions, dependent upon
the humble hope and expectation of a life to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in
human nature; which can alone support its lofty idea of its dignity; can alone illuminate the
dreary prospect of its continually approaching mortality, and maintain its cheerfulness under all
the heaviest calamities to which, from the disorders of this life, it may sometimes be exposed"
(TMS 132).
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Passion is a reflex Image of the principal, it must partake of its
Qualities, & be painful where that is so ... if all Sympathy was
agreeable. A Hospital would be a more entertaining Place than a Ball.
... You say expressly, it is painful to go along with Grief& we always
enter into it with Reluctance. It will probably be requisite for you to
modify or explain this Sentiment, & reconcile it to your System. (Creig,
1932: l:312f.)
Smith replies to Hume's criticism in a footnote of the 2nd edition ofTMS (1761)
that,
It has been objected to me that as I found the sentiment of
approbation, which is always agreeable, upon sympathy, it is
inconsistent with my system to admit any disagreeable sympathy. I
answer, that in the sentiment of approbation there are two things to be
taken notice of; first the systematic passion of the spectator; and,
secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing the perfect
coincidence between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the
original passion in the person principally concerned. This last emotion,
in which the sentiment of approbation properly consists, is always
agreeable and delightful. The other may either be agreeable or
disagreeable, according to the nature of the original passion, whose
features it must always, in some measure, retain. (TMS 46)
This is Smith's answer to Hume's criticism, clarifying the difference
between his and Hume's concept of sympathy (Reeder, 1997: 13). In sum, Hume
does not accept Smith's identification of sympathy with moral judgment. In spite of
Hume's sarcastic tone, the difference is not ofminor significance. Smith tries to
replace not only Hume's theory of sympathy but his whole system (TMS 327). Smith
classifies and criticises Hume's theory as a doctrine that seeks the principle of
approval in utility. He thinks that the consideration of result can never be the ground
ofmoral value. Smith fears that ifmorality depends on utility, actual praise will have
priority over the praise-worthiness. He asserts that the idea ofmorality being based
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on utility is a mere "afterthought, and not what first recommends them to our
approbation" (TMS 20).181 Smith further criticises Hume.182
That system which places virtue in utility, coincides too with that which
makes it consist in propriety. According to this system, all those
qualities of the mind which are agreeable or advantageous, either to the
person himself or to others, are approved of as virtuous, and the
contrary disapproved of as vicious. But the agreeableness or utility of
any affection depends upon the degree which it is allowed to subsist in.
Every affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of
moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it exceeds the
proper bounds. According to this system therefore, virtue consists not in
any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the affections. The
only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring to
establish, is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the
correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original
measure of this proper degree. (TMS 306)
183 . ...
But Smith's understanding ofHume needs correction. Smith's criticism
would be correct only ifHume identified sympathy with moral sentiments. For Hume,
however, sympathy is a means to obtain those perceptions before the agent is ready
to make a moral judgement. But the real thrust of this disagreement concerns the
relationship between the good and the right. Hume's sympathy assumes the priority
of the good over the "right", which is contrary to the case in Smith. Ifmoral
judgement is, as Smith claims, only concerned with the propriety of sentiments, its
role is to tell if something is right or wrong.
Hume explains by his theory of sympathy how it is possible that people can
share the sentiments of other people even if they do not experience the same situation
181 This reveals a very significant characteristic of Smith's idea, as it relates to his notion of
providence. Smith thinks that utility is to be realised by right action.82
Raynor convincingly offers a very interesting story about how Smith tries to buy the favour of
the general readers by attacking Hume, and by appealing to his orthodox faith, while Hume tries
to procure Smith a good reputation by publishing the anonymous "Abstract" of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments in which he deliberately denigrates his own theory in Smith's favour (Raynor,
1984). Also, Raphael argues the reason Smith withdrew the paragraph endorsing the Christian
doctrine of atonement is because he felt some revulsion criticising Hume by using language of
those "who had been the bitterest detractors ofHume (Raphael, 1969: 225-48).
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in person. In this way, Hume's sympathy is a means of communication, and explains
the mechanism by which people share the perception ofmoral situations before
making moral judgements. The most important feature ofHume's sympathy is the
intervention of the third object, as either property or action, between the self and
others, as the direct object of perception. Smith's sympathy is also meant to be a
medium for communication, but Smith's communication, as it is a direct comparison
between two sentiments, obtains only in cases where people approve of others, which
is too narrow to cover the entire range of human communication. Smith does not
explain how it is possible for a spectator to recognise a moral situation in the first
place.184 Smith takes it for granted that the spectator and the agent can share the
recognition ofmoral object. This is because Smith' theory of sympathy is a
normative theory, unlike Hume's theory that is an epistemology for explaining
objective perception.
4. General Point of View and Impartial Spectator
In his pursuit ofjustification ofmoral judgement, Smith criticised utility as the
standard ofmorals, and seeks to the standard in the idealised judgement of impartial
spectator. The grave consequence is that Smith separated the ground ofjustification
ofmoral action from its effects in reality; moral actions are good regardless of its
causal effects in so far as an impartial spectator approves it. His separation of "the
efficient cause from final cause" (TMS 87), and the reliance on the latter correspond
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to this picture. At this point, Smith decisively resorts to providence to compensate
for the right determination; right action will cause good effect in the end by
providence (cf. TMS 128-30, 166). The notion ofprovidence resolves the problem of
183
Raynor argues that Smith's reply completely misses the point of Hume's criticism (Raynor,
1984: 57).
184 Smith distinguishes moral recognition from moral approval. But this in fact makes moral
sentiments redundant for moral recognition, because any objective recognition of a moral
situation should correspond to one moral judgement.
185
Kleer also criticises the view that theological concepts "may be excised without impairing the
cogency of Smith's analysis (Kleer, 1995: 275)", and shows that "the principle of a benevolent
divine author of nature must be considered as one of the cornerstones of Smith's system ofmoral
philosophy (Kleer, 1995: 279)". Smith uses "God" or "Gods" at lease sixty six times in TMS.
Many commentators, however, are opposed to this picture (e.g., Haakonssen, 1981: 77-9).
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the correspondence between sentiment and reality, or sympathy and social order.
Unlike Hume, Smith does not supply an explanation why the sympathy of the
impartial spectator represents the stable relationship among numerous people (Herdt,
1997: 50-60; Haakonssen, 1988: 97-110, 1996: Ch. 2).186 Smith's moral theory
focuses on the justification ofmoral determination whose consequences are not taken
into account. Smith confines the moral authority ultimately to the conscience of each
individual. However, this causes a problem; if conscience is the ultimate authority,
there will be no way to arbitrate opposing consciences between individuals.
On the other hand, Hume finds the origin ofjustice not in the conscience but
in the relationship among individuals which is represented by custom. Hume is able
to avoid the Smithean problematic of how the impartial spectator can know the mind
of a moral agent by setting the starting point in perceptions that belong both to self
and others. In Hume, moral order is fundamentally reduced to stabilising human
relationships. Hume attempts to explain the goodness ofmoral action as a good
effect. Sympathy is necessary to achieve shared perceptions ofmoral situations
rather than moral judgements.
It is necessary to recognise the difference between Hume's general point of
view and Smith's impartial spectator. A general point of view is distinct from the
impartial judgement of a spectator. Views can be held by anyone, but to have an
impartial spectator's judgement, one needs to become an impartial spectator. It is
noteworthy that Smith called the viewpoint of the impartial spectator, "a third place"
(Smith 1984, p. 135). Hume's general point of view, on the other hand, is not
occupied by specific persons, but represents the situation itself. It is general as
opposed to particular, and therefore enables people to reach agreement on the
meaning of a moral situation. Unlike Smith's notion of the impartial spectator who
sees "all", Hume's general point of view provides a view to see things in their
general quality. Sentiments of sympathy obtained from the general point of view
assume a generality in the sense that they are in principle accessible to people in
general. They do not primarily depend on a particular faculty of the observer.
186
Clark says that unlike Hume, Smith's adherence to natural law theory and his reliance on final
cause has prevented him from developing a theory based on efficient cause (Clark, 1994: 151-68).
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Because of this, Hume's theory explains the creation of society. Smith's moral theory
aims at producing moral persons, while Hume's target is to explain the nature of
morality itself.
The most significant difference between the Humean and the Smithean
concepts of sympathy is concerned with justice. While Hume separates the
emergence ofjustice from the natural working of sympathy, Smith identifies justice
with the sympathy of impartial spectator as fairness. For Hume justice purports to
create order by coordinating people's self-interests. Therefore, it comes to be
crystallised as a private law in the first instance. For Smith, justice is to preserve the
social order; therefore, it is centred on commutative justice (cf. Griswold, 1999: 252).
5. Concluding Remarks
It is clear that Smith's conscience is an internalisation of social convention. In fact,
Smith's impartial spectator is given the role as the representative of society, and
embodiment of the values of society. This is why the impartial spectator is compared
to a higher tribunal, where normativity is established, as Smith's sympathy is
founded on the private conviction. But Hume's general point of view is open to
external views, and more prepared to produce normativity in accordance with the
development of custom. Hume's general point of view is externalised in constructing
a moral world. In this way, Hume's general point of view and Smith's impartial
spectator represent opposite directions of understanding normativity.
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Chapter Six:
The Epistemological Foundation of Justice in Hobbes and Locke
Introduction
The formation of a political society is the central topic in the theories of Hobbes,
Locke, and Hume. They all share the fundamental view that society is sustained by
the system of justice, which prescribes a stable relationship among its members.
However, they have different objectives for presenting their theories ofjustice.
Hobbes tries to provide justification for the necessity of obeying the sovereign,
whereas Locke tries to protect the right of individuals from political oppression, and
Hume tries to provide an explanation compatible with an emerging industrial and
commercial civil society. Accordingly, they have different definitions ofjustice. For
Hobbes, justice is the will of the sovereign; for Locke, it is the eternal law of nature;
and for Hume, it is an established convention of society. My claim in this chapter is
that their respective theories ofjustice correspond to their epistemologies. Hobbes,
Locke and Hume all are commonly influenced by the Baconian nominalism that
denies the reality of the universal. In defining their theories ofjustice, the concept of
the universal is a key issue; society relates to the individual, as the universal relates
to the particular. Thus, they need to provide an explanation of the particulars which
function as quasi-universals to unite society. Hobbes's theory reflects his
materialistic nominalism, and Locke's theory reflects his conceptualism.
The differences in their epistemologies consist in the difference in "the point
of view" from which justice appears. Hobbes's concept ofjustice is founded on the
first person perspective of the sovereign. Locke's theory ofjustice can be construed
as based on the objective perspective which can be found in natural law that is God's
eternal law.
This transitional chapter examines the theories ofjustice found in Hobbes
and Locke, as a necessary background for explaining Hume's theory ofjustice in the
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next chapter. In section 1,1 indicate the connection between Hobbes's nominalism
and his theory of the absolute authority of sovereign, by showing how one's
recognition of the equality of perspective with others produces morality. In section 2,
I show how Locke's conceptualism relates to his theory of government by majority
rule. I argue that Locke's morality is founded on a rationalist perspective.
1. Hobbes's Morality of the First Person Perspective
Hobbes begins his argument by elucidating the human nature that is common to all
human beings regardless of the differences in their religious or moral viewpoints.
Under the influence ofGrotius, Hobbes remains thoroughly faithful to this principle
when he describes human nature and the state of nature that reflects it. As a
methodological individualist, he carefully leaves out all aspects of human beings that
have any bearing upon morality as a means for making a peaceful relationship with
other people. This methodology not only clarifies the obstacles to establishing a
society in which people can have industry and long life, but it also makes people
realise the absolute necessity of avoiding such obstacles. According to Hobbes, the
most serious obstacle and threat to civil society is man's unrestricted desire in his
pursuit of self-preservation and the power to assure it. Hobbes's objective is to define
the structure of a civil society that is the product of the converted wills of the people.
He theorizes that the prescriptions that stipulate the solution of this problem can be
called a natural law which is a means to escape from the state of nature. According to
Hobbes, natural law is publicly interpreted as the will of the sovereign who has
absolute authority in a civil society. In this way, Hobbes transforms natural law into
an empirical concept (cf. Herdt, 1997: Ch. 1).
Hobbes's theory is usually considered an interest-based moral theory.187
According to this interpretation, people make a bargain with each other in a manner
that promotes their common interests. Although this kind of egoistic-theory
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Thomas Nagel says that "I shall attempt to show that genuine moral obligation plays no part in
Leviathan at all, but that what Hobbes calls moral obligation is based exclusively on
considerations of rational self-interest ... One cannot miss the arguments in Leviathan based on
self-interest. An egoistic theory of motivation permeates the entire book" (Nagel, 1959: 69).
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interpretation ofHobbes may be interesting as an ethical theory, it is not a correct
reading ofHobbes and fails to appreciate the essence of his argument.
Indisputably, Hobbes's theory rests on methodological individualism. In the
introduction to his Leviathan, Hobbes acknowledges "Read thy self' (Leviathan 10)
as a cliche of his doctrine. Hobbes's individualism reflects his ontological position of
mechanical materialism, and his epistemological position of nominalism. From the
premise of individualism, Hobbes argues for the necessity for morality to prescribe a
compatibility of independent individuals. Morality is that which differentiates a
society from a mere gathering of atomic individuals. Therefore, morality is presented
as the fundamental condition of commonwealth. Hobbes describes the creation of the
commonwealth as the realisation ofmorality itself.
Let us briefly survey Hobbes's epistemological framework. According to
Hobbes, every idea is derived from sensations that are a result of "motions of the
matter" (Leviathan 14). Motion of volition, conatus or "Endeavour", is called
"Desire" when it promotes life, "Aversion" when it prevents life. Objects of desire or
of aversion are identified as "Good" or "Evill" (Leviathan 38). As our understanding
is a product of our sensation and imagination, our understanding of good and evil is
also individual. This idea is endorsed by his nominalism. Hobbes expresses his view
on the idea of the universal as follows:
Of names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as
Peter, John, This man, this Tree: and some are Common to many
things; as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is
nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all
which together, it is called a Universall; there being nothing in the
world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of
them Individuall and Singular.
One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their
similitude in some quality, or other accident: And wheras a Proper
Name bringeth to mind one thing only; Universals recall any one of
those many. (Leviathan 26)
Hobbes is clearly aware of his position as a nominalist. His treatment of the
"universal name" is noteworthy; a universal name does not refer to one universal
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thing, but to many things that are similar, and recalls any one of them. There is a
notable similarity between this and the Humean theory of general ideas. Unlike
Hume, however, Hobbes does not develop a theory about how the "similitude"
functions, and emphasises only that there is no universal concept, since his intention
is to provide a mechanical explanation of the role which "Speech" (Leviathan, Ch. 4)
plays in human behaviour. Most importantly, Hobbes's nominalism leads to the
denial of the existence of a universal moral law. As each individual has a particular
position, a good thing for one person does not mean the same for another. Thus,
188
literally there is no "common good" as the foundation of "Commonwealth".
He describes, by way of introspection, the natural working of human
psychology to seek self-preservation. Hobbes's state of nature is a hypothesis
obtained from thought experiments, which depicts a counter-reality that would
emerge were it not for the existence of political society. Where there is no law,
people must rely upon individual decisions to secure their self-preservation. In the
state of nature, where only natural rights dominate, one is responsible for one's own
life. All things are evaluated solely in terms of its particular relation to one's own
self-interest. In other words, everything is to be evaluated by its direct serviceability
to one's self-preservation. And as self-preservation is a unique interest peculiar to
individuals, the survival value of things is incompatible between different people; if
one person obtains something desirable, it works disadvantageously for others.
Therefore, the understanding of the good and the bad inevitably differs from person
to person.
Hobbes understands that "power" is most important for self-preservation.
He defines power as the "present means, to obtain some future apparent Good"
(Leviathan 62). With limited resources, other people, as one's equal competitors
seeking the same things, appear from any one individual's particular point of view as
obstacles to one's own survival. The only way to remove the menace of others is to
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In contrast to this, Locke's fundamental tenet in common with Grotius and Pufendorf is that
men live in a world that is a gift given "to Mankind in common" (Two Treaties 286). This is a
criticism of Filmer's divine right theory that God had given the earth to Adam and his heirs in
succession (e.g. Olivercorona, 1974: 220-34). Thus, Yolton maintains that Locke's problem is to
explain "how particularisation is possible" (Yolton, 1970: 187).
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show one's competitors one's superiority so as to obtain the best prospect of survival.
Therefore, people seek for "Honour", "Worth", and "Dignity" as a sign of their
supremacy (Leviathan, Ch. 10). Their common ultimate desire is to preserve their
own lives. For that purpose, they are allowed, by their natural rights, to do anything
to secure everything they may need in the future. Based on these assumptions, the
inevitable course that multitudes of such people follow is a "Warre of every one
against every one" {Leviathan 88). Here "Warre" refers not to any actual fight; but to
a state in which people cannot live in peace; people are destined to compete with all
other people, which is impossible because of their physical restraints as human
beings. It is obvious to every one, however, that war with everyone is the worst
situation as there can be no final winner. In this situation, people find a contradiction
between their initial intention and the final result; they only wish to secure their own
lives, but as a result, they are not merely frustrated in their desire, but inevitably
aquire a most miserable life which is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short"
{Leviathan 89).
It is important that people plunge into war not because they are naturally
brutal or morally wicked. If this would be true, there would be no possibility of
attaining peace, for it would be impossible to change human nature. War in the
Hobbesian state of nature is a matter of human rationality and not a moral problem.
People use rationality not for obtaining maximum utility, but for securing a minimum
level of self-preservation.189 It requires but a little reflection for anyone to see that
the fundamental cause ofwar is the fact that other people also have natural rights,
that is "the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the
preservation of his own Nature" {Leviathan 91). Although liberty is by definition
beyond the control of others, it is to be presumed that people are rational with respect
to fulfilling their own objectives. Therefore, to be more exact, the real problem is not
liberty itself, but the lack of a common rule for making the liberty of different people
compatible. In other words, there is no common means for people to achieve
peaceful relations with others while securing their individual interests. War derives
from the absence of this mutuality, which is a due consequence of the premise of
189
An Epicurean influence is easily traceable in Hobbes.
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methodological individualism. However, as people's concerted desire is to escape
from war, it is a matter of rationality, and not ofmorality, to desire peace and to
avoid war. In this way, the first law of nature reads as follows:
That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has
hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek,
and use, all helps, and advantages ofWarre. (.Leviathan 92)
Self-preservation is still the ultimate objective.190 But as its direct pursuit
proves to be ineffective, people must attain their objective through this indirect
means with the understanding that what secures their survival is not power but
peace.191 The next problem concerns the manner to attain peace. The key lies in
understanding the cause of peace. On the one hand, everyone desires the same goal,
peace, and everyone has the same obstacle: the liberty of others. On the other hand,
although the liberty of others is beyond control, they have control over their own
liberty as their natural right. Paradoxically, the wills of others are uncontrollable
because everyone has control over his own will. A crucial element to solving the
problem of peace and war lies in the fact that everyone fears others.192 Here, let us
confirm who the "others" are. "Others" do not signify concrete individuals; rather it
is a "Common Name", which is relational to the self. It is to be noted that in
Hobbes's individualist perspective, all people are only first-person individuals. In
fact, all individuals are "others" to each other. Therefore, all fear themselves as seen
from the viewpoint of others. In Hobbes, moral relationships with others are reduced
to the relationship with oneself.
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Therefore, unlike Spinoza's criticism, Hobbesian people do not in fact renounce all their
natural rights.
191 Locke also maintains the importance ofquitting the direct pursuit of desire. He proposes the
"suspension" of desire as the central characteristic of human freedom (cf. Essay, 2.21.47).
According to Locke, Human beings should suspend their direct desire in order for reason to make
a moral judgement. The problem is how one can tell whether or not one has suspended desire, or
whether the judgement is made by reason. This is the same problem that is found in his theory of
producing abstract ideas; in order to suspend the desire and attain the moral judgment, the right
judgement has to be clear beforehand. Locke's "voluntarism" matches his explanation, in which
reason can tell whether the judgement agrees or disagrees with the divine will.
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It is crucial for people to notice that the instrument for turning from war to
peace consists in the awareness that other people have the same fear of oneself that
one has of others. Though it is impossible to have others under control, it is possible
to attain the same effect by putting oneself in the place of others. This is the solution.
In order therefore to remove fear, people have only to cease to be a source of fear for
others. Hobbes for the first time clarifies that morality is concerned with a change in
point of view. This is the Hobbesian creation ofmutuality by rationality in the first
person perspective.193 Therefore the second law of nature runs as follows.
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as
for Peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay
down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty
against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.
(Leviathan 92)
Here emerges the prescription for peace based on mutuality: everyone
should renounce his freedom on the condition that others do the same. In other words,
only by seeing oneself as one sees other people can a person obtain peace in return.
The crucial step for being moral is to acquire the point of view of seeing oneself
from the point of view of others. This is feasible by seeing oneself as one sees others.
This is the Hobbesian exegesis of "Read thy self\ The Hobbesian way of
transcending the individual perspective is not precisely to exchange positions with
others, because that is prohibited by the premise ofmethodological individualism.194
It is done rather only through introspection. In this way, the mutuality that people do
not possess in the state of nature emerges. Mutuality in Hobbes does not mean to act
directly upon other people; it involves merely a change of one's own perspective.
Mutuality is to regard others as one's equal. By this means, others cease to be a mere
obstacle for attaining one's self-preservation. This signifies the transition from
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Richard Tuck proposes an interesting thesis that the fundamental purpose ofHobbes's theory
is to liberate men from unnecessary fear (Tuck, 1991).
193 This is to be contrasted with the Humean creation ofmutuality by sympathy.
194 Unlike Adam Smith's theory of sympathy, in which the exchange of positions is modelled on
the impartial spectator's approval, the Hobbesian exchange of positions is based on the
understanding of oneself.
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natural to moral recognition of others. At this stage, equality as a natural fact turns
into a moral norm.
After stating nineteen entities of the laws of nature, Hobbes indicates a rule
by which the laws of nature may easily be examined; "Do not that to another, which
thou wouldest not have done to thy self' {Leviathan 109). This is a modification of
the golden rule in the Gospel: "love your neighbour as yourself'.195 The modification
is necessary for applying the rule beyond the physical limitation of human beings,
and only through this unspecified relationship can people contract a relationship with
other people in general.196 Hobbes says that the laws of nature are "easie", because
"they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance,
fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just" {Leviathan 110). Hobbes
describes it as "easie", because the relationship with others is realised through a
relationship with oneself. Hobbesian morality is a rational activity, and it does not
rely upon custom. This is the Hobbesian ground for making a covenant. People need
a guarantee that this covenant is observed by others, for it is clear if this is left to the
good wishes of other people, the system will soon collapse. And the guarantee must
be a compulsory power. Thus, people make a covenant and enter under the rule of
their common sovereign.
Hobbes's moral philosophy is concerned with how to make the multiple
wills of individuals compatible. A covenant is the direct means for that purpose.
What distinguishes the civil state from the natural state is the fact that people submit
themselves, regardless of their personal judgement, to the order of the sovereign,
which then emerges as a law. The idea of the Hobbesian covenant demands once and
for all an alternative between liberty without life and life without liberty. As self-
preservation is the clear and ultimate goal of the covenant, the decision for life
without liberty always prevails. Also for this reason, there is no escape from
morality; denial of morality is tantamount to a denial of one's life. This can be
regarded as a justification of society in his covenant theory. In this way, the
Hobbesian hypothesis of the state of nature shows a theoretical necessity of entering
195
George Shelton indicates the relationship between Hobbesian morality and the golden rule (cf.
Shelton, 1992: Ch. 4).
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into a covenant. Fortunately, on accepting life within that order, people can enjoy
civil liberty. Admittedly, the absolute authority appears as an object of fear. But the
fear of the sovereign is different from the fear of others in the state of nature since
that is a guarantee of inevitable death. Furthermore, the more the sovereign is feared,
the more likely one's life is safe from breach of the law by others, since fear prevents
people from breaching law. Thus my fear of the sovereign is the source of security
from the perspective of others. Without this enforcement, civil society is no better
that the state of nature where people are isolated and act according to their individual
interests. On the other hand, whenever the law "silences", which in fact applies to
most human activities, people can enjoy their natural liberty.197 In this sense, the
enhancement of liberty is the final product of commonwealth without aiming at it.
There is another reason why political authority is necessary, apart from
being a moral constraint. The political authority finalises the disputes regarding the
interpretation of the natural law among its subjects. Law does not consist in abstract
words, but in its concrete application, because law without application is non-existent.
In the state of nature, the absence ofpolitical authority is the direct cause ofwar.
Hobbes maintains that judgement must be made by a single will. This is because a
single will does not contain contradiction. It is impossible from the perspective of the
individual to decide which of their competing convictions should prevail especially
when property ownership is at stake. This is not because individuals are avaricious,
but because their view is particular and not comprehensive enough. Therefore, the
only publicly recognisable decision derives from the sovereign.
A key implication of this idea is that property ownership must be decided
singly. A decision by the sovereign, by virtue of being a single and accessible order,
is bound to bring the most coherent settlings ofproperty ownership. This is the
reason Hobbes strongly adheres to the indivisibility of the sovereign. The whole task
of the subjects is to submit themselves to that particular order. When the will of the
sovereign is different from the natural will of the individuals, it is their duty as
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In this respect, Hume's sympathy still preserves the positive application of the golden rule.
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In fact, this is the realm of custom. Hobbes strategically stays away from this realm and deals
with the conscious or positive aspect of human activity.
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subjects to regard it as their real will. This is the Hobbesian explanation of the duty
of obedience to government.
2. Locke's Morality: a Rational Perspective
Lockean moral and political philosophy is characterised as "rights-based". The
purpose of Locke's political philosophy is to defend the rights of people from the
arbitrary power of government; government is established to protect the inalienable
rights of the people, especially their life, freedom, and property. Here is already a
remarkable difference from Hobbesian theory, where self-preservation is the ultimate
desire of human beings. In Hobbes, people cannot secure their life in the state of
nature, because they cannot become a property owner in the state of nature.
Ownership involves a moral relationship that is beyond merely physical control.
Unlike Hobbes, Locke's people own their property from the beginning. Therefore,
Locke's ultimate objective is to preserve not their life but their ownership of their
property that is entitled to every man already in the state of nature (cf. Two Treatises
272). The mere preservation of life is not enough, because without the ownership,
their life is not their own. The crucial difference that separates Hobbes from Locke
reflects the difference in their epistemology. As we saw in the previous section,
Hobbesian nominalism is a mechanical explanation. Knowledge is produced as a
reaction to an external object, and thus it is particular. Hobbes applies the same
mechanical explanation throughout his work to all kinds of knowledge, physical,
human, and political.
Locke can be regarded as a conceptualist whose position is typically
expressed in his theory of abstraction. Conceptualism depends on the faculty of
reason and understanding; though the materials of knowledge are external objects
that produce ideas in human minds, human beings have a unique capacity of
abstraction, and produce "abstract Ideas" that have a universal cognitive content.
Locke explains how general words come to be made as follows:
Words become general, by being made the signs of general
Ideas: and Ideas become general, by separating from them the
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circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may
determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of
abstraction they are made capable of representing more Individuals
than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract Idea,
is (as we call it) of that sort. (Essay 3.3.6)
Locke distinguishes between real essence and nominal essence. The real
essence is what is inherent in objects, and the nominal essence is the universality of
complex ideas that human understanding creates out of particular perceptions. In the
case of external objects, the two are not congruent. In the case ofmorality, however,
they are identical because morality is concerned with no external object, but consists
in relation of ideas, and the materials of moral considerations are complex ideas that
are themselves the product of reason {Essay 4.3.19). Complex ideas are comprised of
ideas of substance, mode, and relation. Locke considers that morality is a matter of
mixed modes {Essay 2.22.10,12) and relations, ofwhich cause and effect is an
example {Essay 2.26.2). Modes of human action and the causal relation of human
action can be understood by reason. Therefore, Locke thinks that "Morality is
capable ofDemonstration" {Essay 4.12.8). The laws of nature as the paradigm of
1 Q8
Lockean morality are considered to be discoverable by experiences and reason.
It is especially noteworthy that the Lockean theory is centred on reason and
freedom, which individuals are equipped with in the state of nature, and which are
necessary in order to deal with their properties. This explains the individual as
property possessor in his Two Treatises ofGovernment. Although the target of
Locke's criticism in his political theory is usually considered the divine right theory
(Laslett, 1986: introduction; Snyder, 1986: 723-50), he is clearly conscious of the
Hobbesian theory of the state of nature. Locke's definition of the state of nature
already shows a stark contrast with Hobbes's. Locke describes the state of nature as
follows:
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This is the background of Locke's understanding of the state of nature (cf. Yolton, 1970, Chs.
7, 8).
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a State ofperfect Freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of
the Law ofNature, without asking leave , or depending upon the Will
of any other Man.
A State also ofEquality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction
is reciprocal, no one leaving more than another: there being nothing
more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use
of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another
without Subordination or Subjection. (Two Treatises 269)
It is noteworthy that Locke describes the state of nature as "a State of
perfect Freedom" where Hobbes calls it a state ofwar. Which cognitive faculty can
describe freedom as "perfect"? It is impossible to call freedom perfect from the
individualist perspective, because freedom can never be secured in the Hobbesian
state of nature. Therefore, Locke sees the situation from a different perspective from
Hobbes; that is, the perspective which sees things rationally or objectively by the
faculty of reason. And this perspective is impossible for Hobbes because of his
nominalistic framework. As we have seen above, Lockean conceptualism underlies
this objective perspective, and is founded on the faculty of reason that produces
abstract ideas.
In the Lockean state of nature, people are free, equal and possessors of their
properties, including, in particular, their own body. Because human beings are free,
rational and capable of creating abstract ideas, they can be possessors of properties
already in the state of nature. Therefore, the Lockean man does not only have a duty
"to preserve himself', but also ought "as much as he can, to preserve the rest of
Mankind" (Two Treatises 271). Through the protection and respect of his life, the
Lockean man conceives the order that harmonises the property relationship among
people. Property is not a natural fact, but is protected by the binding force ofmorality.
Mutuality is realised by people's rational capacity of following the law of
nature. In the state of nature, Lockean individuals, as independent proprietors, are
reciprocal from the beginning. The law of nature, represented in the Gospel, orders
them to treat others as their equals. Based on their common moral capacity, a more
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positive form ofmutual relationship is artificially created by a social contract.
Society is established through the law of nature, that is, by submitting oneself to the
rule of the majority. Locke's rational morality does not rely upon mutuality, but only
guarantees it. Moral right, by its own right, is supposed to bring harmony into human
relationships.
Locke criticises the Hobbesian identification of the state of nature with war.
Locke thinks that war can happen even when man is in a social state. Human beings
have a natural right to live, because God could not have created human beings in
vain. Although Hobbes considers self-preservation a natural fact, for Locke, self-
preservation is a moral duty.199 And because human beings are created in God's
image and endowed with reason to judge right from wrong, they can live in peace
without external instruction and even without government.
Therefore, government is not absolutely necessary for Lockean theory
because there is the rule of natural law prior to any human institution. The
desirability of government in Locke comes from a different ground from Hobbes. For
Hobbes, government is necessary to produce property ownership which secures
people's lives. However, Locke thinks it possible to determine property ownership
without government. Locke asserts,
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work
of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he
hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own,
and thereby makes it his Property. (Two Treatises 287-288)
The natural law that determines property is called the labour theory of value;
everyone is the owner of his body, so any product that is created with his labour is
his property due to natural law (cf. Snyder, 1986: 723-50). Locke maintains that it is
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Unlike the negative rule in Hobbes, the Locke adopts the rule in the positive form, presumably
because the rational law of nature realises the order of the whole (cf. Harris, 2000: 49-85).
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a "Law of reason" (Two Treatises 289) that should be clear to any person who is
capable of reasoning. However, with the invention ofmoney as a conventional
means for storing property, instability begins to make the society more vulnerable to
a breach of the moral order. This is because of the imperfections of human beings.
There are three artifices to compensate the weakness of human beings: the legislative,
the executive, and the federative power. These compose a government. Locke asserts
that there is only one way for individuals to enter into a political society provided
they are "free, equal and independent (Two Treatises 330)". This way is via their
consent to follow the majority, rather than the sovereign.
When any number ofMen have so consented to make one Community
or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make
one Body Politics, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and
conclude the rest. (Two Treatises 331)
People establish a government by a bilateral contract; they consent to submit
to the rule of government, and the government gives protection to their life and
property in return. The power of government is "a delegated power from the People"
(Two Treatises 362) and therefore, based on "Trust" (Two Treatises 413). Locke
stipulates "the Right ofresisting" (Two Treatises 404) when "The Legislative acts
against the Trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the Property of the
Subject" (Two Treatises 412). Locke has little worry about the moral legitimacy of
the right to resist, because he expects it to have preventative effects. Locke trusts the
moral capacity of the people that they will not exert the right to resist without good
cause.
Locke's description of the state of nature and his idea of the natural right of
all human beings reflect his epistemological framework. As a conceptualist, he
admits the creation of universal understanding by reason. In Locke, fundamental
social order need not be created artificially. In other words, moral order is not any
creation ofmutual relationships. On the contrary, the rational moral law should
regulate mutual relationships between people. In this sense, Locke's moral theory
can be regarded as constructed from the rational point of view. Locke has no doubt
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about human beings' moral capacity as they are created in the image of God. This is
in contrast to Hobbes's picture of human beings as fallen sinners. In Locke, the
protection of freedom is important, because without freedom one's life is not his own
property. Locke considers that all human beings are equal by their moral capacity.
This is the moral idea of equality that is recognisable by human reason, and the
central task ofpeople is to implement it. A political authority is needed specifically
for that purpose.
Instead of the Hobbesian will of the sovereign, the Lockean criterion of
political authority is expressed by the "determination of the majority" (Two Treatises
331) that endorses the majority rule.200 This difference also stems from the moral
status of popular opinion in their theories. For Locke the consent of the majority is
first justified by presupposing the moral equality of each person; because they are
equal, the majority vote is justified as the only way to settle a dispute. In order for
the consent of the majority to be regarded as appropriate, the majority must always
make a proper determination. Hobbes would decline this idea, for every human being
has a particular interest, and no particular interest is compatible with other particular
interests. Though Hobbes is apparently aware of the idea of determination by the
majority, the consent of the majority is not the principal means for discovering
morality.202 Therefore, he is careful not to make it conspicuous as he indicates that
people "may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, upon one Assembly of
men" (Leviathan 120). Compared to this idea, Locke's reliance on people's opinion
leads to "The Law ofOpinion or Reputation" (cf. Essay 2.28.10). Popular opinion
can be reliable as moral criterion in so far as people exert their reason properly.
That Locke sets property as the cornerstone of his moral theory furnishes his
theory with a rational character, because property is thought to have an obvious
external existence, which literally means an object of rational recognition. Property is
considered a quality of a person. As his theory of external existence shows,
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Although the majority vote has a function for selecting the sovereign in Hobbes, it does not
have the same significance as in Locke.
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Therefore, as an individual, people retain a right to leave the society.
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In the similar line of thought, Hobbes declines the Aristotelian idea of "mean", as it has
nothing to do with the truth.
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recognition of property is analogous to the recognition of qualities. Objectivity is
the realm of reason. Locke's basic premise about qualities endorses the fixation of
property by a rational agency. Also in this sense, Locke's social contract theory is
based on the objective perspective of reason. But the problem still remains regarding
whether or not reason is capable of recognising property and moral order. This is the
point Hume explored closely in his critical examination of the Lockean theory.
Hence Hume's moral theory begins with the examination of perception and
knowledge.
3. Concluding Remarks
So far, we have considered the theory ofjustice in Hobbes, and Locke in reference to
their epistemology. It has been argued that their epistemology characterises the
theoretical framework of justice. Hobbes clarifies not only the necessary course of
the behaviour of atomic individuals in the state of nature, which leads to the war with
everyone, but also the necessity of having morality for creating stable relationships.
The crucial turn from the state of nature to a social state is produced by the
recognition of the equality between oneself and others, i.e. by obtaining the point of
view of seeing oneself as one sees others. Hobbesian mutuality is attained only
through a change of relationship with oneself, without property relationship. This is
why Hobbes emphasises the necessity of establishing political order itself.
Lockean mutuality is based on rationality. As a conceptualist, Locke
believes in a universal order recognisable by reason. He thinks that by rational
consideration one can maintain a peaceful relation with others regarding personal
properties. Locke's theory aims at securing the rights of citizens against government.
Lockean theory clarifies the political obligation of the government. Locke ascribes
the status ofmoral agency to people, thus he overturns Hobbesian priorities in terms
ofmorality between the state and the people. Locke's advancement from Hobbes
consists in recognising the significance of free economic activities, symbolised by
property, over and above mere political order.
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As with Hume, the Lockean theory of external objects anticipates his moral theory.
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It is significant to recognise that the two philosophical systems shed light on
morality from different "perspectives". Hobbesian theory shows that creating and
sustaining peaceful relationships with others is the supreme objective ofmorality and
we should almost always obey the moral order. His moral theory is characterised as
proceeding from an individual perspective. Lockean theory is oriented towards
individual rights: to freedom and property. His theory is characterised as a
perspective of reason.
In Chapter 7 we will consider Hume's theory ofjustice in relation to his
epistemology to see how Hume revised the Hobbesian and the Lockean theories of
justice through his epistemology based on custom that is characterised by the concept
of the general point of view.
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Chapter Seven:
Justice and the Stability of Property
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed the relationship between epistemology and
justice in Hobbes and Locke. It has been shown that their understanding of the
universal determines their theory ofpolitical authority. What is at issue is how to
explain the principle of the society that unites individuals. The principle is assumed
to function as a quasi-universal in that it is beyond the single will of individuals.
Hobbes regards the will of the sovereign as the only possible substitute of the
universal that binds individuals. Therefore, the will of the sovereign represents
justice. Locke denied the idea of Hobbesian justice and asserts that the will of the
people represents justice. Locke's theory reflects his conceptualism; the discovery of
reason represents the universal. This difference between Hobbes and Locke
corresponds to their different picture of human beings. Hobbes's picture of human
beings is fundamentally hedonistic, while Locke views human beings as rational.
However, Hobbes and Locke share the assumption of individualism.
Hume directs his fundamental criticism to their individualism. Hume attempts
to replace their theory by proposing custom as the template ofjustice. Custom has
been the constant theme throughout the whole of the Treatise. This is true also in the
theory ofjustice. Most important of all, making custom the basis ofjustice
illuminates Hume's unique way of realising mutuality. On the one hand, Hobbes's
idea ofmutuality is realised by the exchange ofpositions with others, i.e. by seeing
oneself as one sees others. It is important to note that this is different from the
Smithean exchange ofpositions that allows people to see themselves from the point
of view of others, which should be impossible in Hobbesian individualism. On the
other hand, Lockean mutuality is attained by obeying the prescriptions of the Natural
Law. Lockean mutuality is founded on a rational perspective. Hume rejects both
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theories as untrue to human nature, and founded mutuality on convention. Mutuality
enables the pursuit of self-interests in a cooperative manner. And with the
introductions ofjustice into society, the significance of self-interest changes. The
fundamental characteristic ofHumean justice lies in showing the unity of society,
interest, and morality. I attempt to argue that Hume's general point of view is the
unifying concept behind those three concepts.
In section 1,1 argue that justice appears as a cause that regulates human
behaviour. Justice is artificial because it is a product of convention and is not found
in nature. In section 2,1 argue that Hume founded the necessity ofjustice on the
natural circumstances, both material and psychological, of human beings. This
explains why Humean justice is an artificial "virtue" centring primarily on the
relationship of "property". In section 3,1 discuss why Humean justice realises
society without resorting to any quasi-universals as the Hobbesian or the Lockean
theories do. In section 4,1 argue that Humean justice consists in the general point of
view that realises human mutuality and cooperation. In section 5,1 argue that, unlike
the common allegation, the Humean theory ofjustice comprises a full-fledged theory
of rights, and I show that Hume's dealings with "rights" have a parallelism with his
dealings with the concept of "power". In section 6,1 show that the rule for
determining property is far from arbitrary, but is founded on his theory of human
psychology as the principle ofhuman nature. In section 7,1 clarify the Humean
ground for "why be just", or why we should abide by the rules ofjustice. This
chapter clarifies that Hume's theory shows how public interest and private interest
coincide injustice.
1. Justice as Artificial Virtue
The most striking characteristic ofHume's philosophy is that, whichever topic he
discusses, Hume always sets his eyes on "causation". So it is with his discussion of
the law of natural science, and so it is with his discussion ofmoral judgement. Those
kinds of actions that cause pleasant sentiments in observers signify a virtuous
character, and those that cause painful sentiments, a vicious one. Moral judgement
has as its object the motivation of the agent as the cause of virtuous or vicious action.
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Hume lays such emphasis on the motivation of an agent precisely because it causes
human action. When Hume considers justice, he regards it as a kind of virtue in the
sense that it is concerned with the evaluation of human behaviour.
Hume begins his discussion ofjustice by highlighting seemingly
incomprehensible phenomena. From the general observation of virtuous actions, he
observes that justice is characteristically performed without being directed at any
good effect other than morality; justice seems to be performed for no other reason
than that it is a duty. This is an enigma because all human behaviour is motivated by
some good effects. Hume thinks that the most fundamental tenet ofmorality is the
pleasant or painful effects of an action. Hume says,
It appears, therefore, that all virtuous actions derive their merit
only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those
motives. From this principle I conclude, that the first virtuous motive,
which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue
of that action, but must be some other natural motive or principle. ...
We blame a father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shews a
want of natural affection, which is the duty of every parent. Were not
natural affection a duty, the care of children cou'd not be a duty;
and 'twere impossible we cou'd have the duty in our eye in the
attention we give to our offspring. ...
In short, it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no
action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human
nature some motive to produce it, distinctfrom the sense of its morality
(T 3.2.1.4-7; SBN 478-9).
It is noteworthy that Hume clearly thinks that nature provides us with the
paradigm of virtue. In other words, nature shows the example ofmoral behaviour by
giving us motivation. Therefore, normativity accompanies natural motivation, which
is why human beings have survived so far. This is a very radical transformation of
the traditional theory of the natural law that resorts to reason for its prescription.
Here is seen Hume's thesis of the priority of passion over reason as a moral paradigm.
If virtuous action should have some natural motive, but not all types of
virtuous actions can be explained by natural motive, then it means there is a breach
of the rule of nature. Just actions are to be performed regardless of our natural
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tendencies and often in conflict with them. Therefore, the moral value ofjustice has
apparently nothing to do with the direct effects of the action. Artificial virtue means
that it does not originate directly from nature. It is significant to notice that Hume
titles the first section of the chapter on justice "Justice, whether a natural or artificial
virtue?" This in fact is an alternative between the Hobbesian and Lockean positions
regarding this matter. And Hume clearly stands with Hobbes.
Hume demonstrates the artificiality of the virtue ofjustice by examining its
three possible natural motivations: "private interest or reputation" (T 3.2.1.10; SBN
480), "the love ofmankind" (T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481), and "private benevolence, or a
regard to the interests ofthe party concern 'dF (T 3.2.1.13; SBN 482). The first and
the third of these are discarded for the similar reason that justice is often done in
opposition to, not on behalf of, them. The second possibility is denied because there
is no such thing as love ofmankind. This indicates the evidence that Hume thinks
about justice in reference to the psychological mechanism of human perception that
is naturally influenced by one's close circle. As clarified in his theory of sympathy,
human love as constituted of sentiments changes its strength in accordance with the
psychological distance from the agent.
The artificiality ofjustice does not mean that justice is arbitrary, but that, as
Hobbes argues, there is no such thing as justice in the state of nature. Obviously,
civil society is not a state of nature, and therefore what distinguishes civil society
from the state of nature has to be something artificial. An evolutionary explanation
clarifies the nature and the significance ofjustice. Justice is a central concept for
explaining the formation of society as a product of human development. This
historical character of society necessitates a new principle that is not witnessed in
natural relationships. As we have seen, sympathy is such a principle. But this does
not mean that the artificiality ofjustice has nothing to do with natural principles. On
the contrary, artificial virtue must be grafted on to the natural principle. Unlike
Hobbes, Hume's theory ofjustice is an attempt to show this continuity.
Therefore, Hume's theory ofjustice explains the development of civil
society as a product of human interaction. More specifically, it means that civil
society has been formulated from the given natural conditions surrounding human
Chapter 7 209
Hume's General Point of View
beings. The Humean state of nature comprises 1) individual human beings, 2)
families as the primitive union of both sexes driven by natural instinct which
subsequently results in reproduction, and 3) natural environments. Justice is the
driving force which transforms a natural human group into a civil society. In other
words, justice is the missing link between a natural human group and a civil society.
There is no doubt that people notice the advantages of human cooperation in
their experiences in a family group. Human beings, therefore, desire society.
However, there is a hindrance that prevents the family group from developing into a
society. Hume is unequivocal about the specific cause that hinders the development
of society from the family unit. It is, according to Hume, man's self interest which
tends to focus on the interests of himself or his family members. Therefore, justice
has to work as an opposing force to this natural interest. The artificiality ofjustice
explains why Hume regards the virtue ofjustice in connection with duty. The
apparent strictness ofjustice is reflected in the fact that justice is based on a different
principle from natural virtue. The indifference to natural reactions explains an
inflexible appearance to the artificial virtue ofjustice. In other words, Hume's virtue
ofjustice does not include rigorousness as its essential characteristic, nor does it
require absolute application.
On the other hand, the strict application ofjustice does not mean that justice
corrects the selfishness ofman.204 First of all, the natural tendency of human nature
cannot be corrected. And second, justice does not deny selfishness; instead, it
liberates and, in a crucial sense, develops it. Hume clearly sees that the natural
tendency of selfishness is not a vice, and there is no justice without "selfishness".
This is another sense in which justice is not a matter of right or wrong, and
selfishness is not wrong at all. It is important to remember that artificiality is only
possible where human behaviour is freed from causal determination, or from an
automatic response to the immediately preceding condition. In this respect, the
artificiality ofjustice presupposes the development of human perceptions. Because of
204 Charles Cottle maintains that the strict application ofjustice is to "correct the selfishness of
man as he finds himself confronted by the scarcity of external goods" (Cottle, 1991: 24).
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the formative nature of perceptions, selfish sentiments gained through experience can
manifest themselves differently in civil society.
There is a deceptive tendency in human nature that confuses the final
product with an independent entity, as we have seen in Hume's argument regarding
external objects. Justice is another example of this tendency. Some philosophers
insist that justice is absolute and has its authority in the eternity or absoluteness of
reason. In order to reveal the fallacy of this notion, it is necessary for Hume to clarify
the evolution ofjustice. Hume tries to naturalise the notion ofjustice by providing
the explanation of its formation.
2. Preceding Conditions for Justice
While Hobbes's theory ofjustice centres on life, and Locke on liberty, they aim to
present a theory for deciding and securing property. Hume's theory ofjustice shares
the common feature with Hobbes and Locke in that he focuses on property. The most
significant characteristic ofHume's theory ofjustice is that he deals with property
per se prior to dealing with life or liberty. It is necessary to understand why Hume
focuses on property directly. Some commentators criticise Hume for his "bias" on
property. Typically, Lawrence Scaff agrees with A. Woozley and says,
The error of identifying the whole of justice with the rules governing
property seems all too obvious: all those cases in which our considered
moral duties contravene formal legal requirements must be excluded by
Hume, as must those cases, far from uncommon nowadays, in which
our sense of justice can only be satisfied through the exercise of human
rights, Why, then, should Hume have thought that "perfect harmony" in
society could be achieved by securing property and property rights? No
doubt one should partly blame his classification of human 'goods' and
the consequent belief that of these only "such possessions as we have
acquir'd by our industry and good fortune" [T 3.2.2.7; SBN 487]
present any serious problems for political philosophy. I can only agree
that Hume's analysis here is woefully shortsighted and unconvincing.
(Scaff, 1978: 102)
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In fact, this criticism reflects a prevailing approach to understanding
Hume.205 Understanding the full scope of the discussion of property is the key to
understanding Hume's theory ofjustice. Like Hobbes and Locke, Hume begins his
discussion of the formation ofjustice by considering the natural conditions of human
beings. He maintains that there are two conditions that describe the natural
circumstances of human beings: "the selfishness and confin 'd generosity ofman,
along with the scantyprovision nature has madefor his wants'" (T 3.2.2.18; SBN
495). Justice is contingent on these natural conditions. This means that were these
conditions different, there would be no justice; with unlimited natural resources, or
with divinely inspired benevolence toward other people, there is no need for justice.
Also, if people's possessions cannot be transferred from one person to another,
justice is purposeless. Therefore, Humean justice is neither logical nor absolute.
These initial conditions prior to civil society already reveal the fundamental
function that justice should fulfil. The contents of justice are determined by the initial
conditions of the natural circumstances of mankind. First, the limited amount of
natural resources means that people cannot take as much as they wish. So, it will be
necessary to set a limit on their possessions, and this containment of desire is the
basis of the system of property as rules ofpossessions. Thus, by the first condition,
Hume's theory ofjustice comes to be concerned with the problem of distribution of
goods. Second, in order to cope with the limited benevolence ofpeople, justice has to
be considered in reference to people's moral dispositions. Thus, by the second
condition, Humean justice is to function as a virtue.
In this way, the basic nature ofHumean justice is broadly based on the
causal reaction of people as a whole to the natural conditions that precede society.
For Hobbes, justice has its roots in anti-reality in the sense that justice is a means to
prevent falling into a condition without justice; and for Locke, justice has its roots in
a trans-reality (an ideal) that ought ideally to be realised by people. For Hume,
205 Scaff even criticises Hume because his concept ofjustice "is severed from the idea of rights"
(Scaff, 1978: 103), forgetting Hume's central thesis is to repudiate once and for all the moral
theories based on reason, the supposed human faculty of telling "right from wrong". Hume's
criticism of reason is meant as an attack on the moral and political theories based on rights.
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justice is a means of coping with human circumstances which are a result of our
natural environment and human psychology.
Limited benevolence does not mean that human beings are totally self-
regarding, but that human benevolence can extend only as far as the force of
sympathy reaches. Hume thinks that "all the kind affections, taken together ... over¬
balance all the selfishness" (T 3.2.2.5; SBN 487). Because of this, people are capable
of abiding by the rules ofjustice spontaneously, not based on selfish motivation, in
other words, without being enforced by an external power. Though a spontaneous
rule of justice is unthinkable in Hobbes, Hume's theory of sympathy prepares the
9Ofi
psychological mechanism that enables it. As Hume says,
By this means [N.B. convention], every one knows what he may safely
possess; and the passions are restrain'd in their partial and
contradictory motions. Nor is such a restraint contrary to these
passions; for if so, it cou'd never be enter'd into, nor maintain'd; but it
is only contrary to their heedless and impetuous movement. (T 3.2.2.9;
SBN 489)
This moderate picture of human psychology is the necessary condition for
human beings to adapt themselves to the new order that places them in a compatible
relationship with other people in general. This contrasts sharply with the Hobbesian
people who cannot alter their fundamentally ego-centred psychology. Therefore,
Hume's theory ofjustice is linked to the psychological characteristic of human
beings, which enables men to form a society without external force acting upon them.
Practicability which is implied in convention is a key notion in the Humean theory of
justice. Because society is a product of causal interactions, society is rightly
construed as originating in human nature. Hume's basic understanding of society
ascribes the origin to convention in opposition to the idea of a product of design
907
either by people or by nature.
However, as we shall see further on, it is wrong to believe that Hume's theory has nothing to say
about rights.
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Hume's theory of sympathy signifies a preparation to maintain this (see Chapter 5).
207 Needless to say, the criticism of the design argument is Hume's consistent theme.
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Hume thinks that human beings must have fully experienced the
disadvantages of their natural conditions and the advantages of human cooperation
before they obtain the virtue ofjustice. In other words, it is impossible that human
beings come to notice the necessity ofjustice by abstract reasoning. In the case of
Hobbes, the absolute necessity ofjustice is appreciated by thought experiment. For
Hume, family life provides not only the fruit of co-operation but also the necessary
training for co-operating with other people. However, the family unit as the first and
most primitive form of society itself poses a problem as man tries to develop it into a
larger unit in order to enhance the advantages of human cooperation. Society requires
a different principle than the natural principle of family. At this point, Hume
recognises the occasion of the emergence ofjustice; justice is required in order to
develop society by breaking the natural tie of the family. This contains a
contradicting force to human psychology that tends to focus on one's proximate
relations. Justice consists in overcoming this contradiction between the natural
tendencies of human nature and society.
3. The Stability of Property
With the explanation of natural conditions, neither as an unrealistic hypothesis nor as
an ideal, Hume clarifies the concrete step needed for creating society. It is to
coordinate the property relationship among human beings. Justice as the principle of
society emerges as a process of adjusting the relationship between people and objects,
rather than between people as in Hobbes, or between government and people as in
Locke. The primary model of the connection between human beings and property is
already illustrated in his theory of sympathy. Possession ofmaterial goods
contributes to the creation of an evaluation of the self (cf. chapter 5). So people are
naturally inclined to possess external goods for the sake of improving their self-
image, via the evaluation of other people. Here, in a different manner from Hobbes
or Locke, is the beginning ofpeople's quest for external goods. Clearly, unrestricted
self-interests and avarice bring disorder to social relationships. Therefore, in order to
attain stability, it is necessary to redirect the sentiment of self-interest properly so
that it is not destructive to society.
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Hume classifies human goods into three categories: "the internal satisfaction
of our mind, the external advantages of our body, and the enjoyment of such
possessions as we have acqur'd by our industry and good fortune" (T 3.2.2.6; SBN
487). Hume concludes that the third kind of good is the only object with which
justice is concerned. First, inner peace ofmind cannot be an object ofjustice, for it is
not an object of possession, and thus it is safe from any robbery. Second, "the
external advantages of our body" is excluded, for as Hume says, they "may be
ravish'd for us, but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them" (T
3.2.2.7; SBN 487). This implies a criticism of the Lockean theory, which is based on
the fundamental property of one's body.208 Hume does not count the body as one of
one's possessions, because it is not an object of artificial arrangement, nor is it
transferable.209 If the body is recognised as one's property, it presents a problem of
the ontological status of the "self'. If the owner of the body must be different from
the body itself, then where is the owner ofmy body? The situation would be
complicated if, for example, parents claimed the body of their child as their
possession.210 Thus, in order to recognise body as a property, one has to return to the
metaphysical assumption of the Cartesian self or the Lockean mind as substance (Cf.
Essay 2.23.5).
However, unlike mind and body, the situation is completely different with
external goods in that they are at once very easily transferable, and vulnerable to the
violence of other people. External goods carry no mark of its possessor, and can
cause disputes among people regarding their ownership. Most of all, they are the
object of people's avarice and self interest. Not only do disputes regarding ownership
ignite the fiercest kind of struggle, they are totally destructive to society itself.
Therefore, the ownership must be recognised by people in general, and cannot be
made by self-appointment.
208 Locke shares this idea with Grotius, and Pufendorf (cf. e. g., Haakonssen, 1996: Ch. 1;
Schneewind, 1998: Ch. 8).
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Bodily harm is a matter of commutative justice. Hume thinks that it can be dealt with by the
natural virtues.
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Locke, consistent with this assumption, argues that parents should dominate their children
until they acquire reason (Two Treatises, sects. 54-6, 61). The Lockean criterion of the "Age to be
free" must be seen as too vague for Hume.
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The fundamental threat for the stability of a society is the general tendency
of people to violate the possessions of others, rather than a specific threat from
specific people, precisely because society itself consists in the generality, and cannot
cope with a general tendency to disorder. For example, if likely "burglars" can be
specified in advance, and the number is relatively small, justice will not be
necessary; people have only to remove those dangerous causes to resolve the
problem once and for all. On the other hand, if people in general are convincingly
determined to violate the possessions of others, i.e., when the whole society is
swarming with ruffians, or in a state of emergency, to protect people's possessions
from others would be too much a burden to carry, "the suspension of all laws of
justice" would be the result (EPM 3.16; SBN 190). In order for justice to obtain,
society should be more or less dominated by a general tendency to justice, though
possibly accompanied by some exceptions.
Therefore, it is not arbitrary that Hume's theory ofjustice centres on property.
Hume even emphasises that once the system ofproperty is introduced, "there
remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord"
(T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491). Hume understands that it is not correct that the main threat to
society comes from violence toward other people (cf. Baier, 1991: 221; Postema,
1986: 103-4). Even if violence destroys society, it is only a proximate cause, and
there is a further root cause for it.211 His theory of sympathy supplies the ground for
his position; human beings have no natural desire to injure other people. Human
beings are naturally disinclined to cause pain under normal circumstances because of
the mechanism of sympathy. In the case of sporadic breaches, people can cope with
it by natural principles. However, the situation is totally different in the case of
property. Human avarice toward external goods knows no satisfaction. And it is the
main cause of people inflicting violence on others. People conflict with each other,
often resorting to violence as a means to obtain external goods.
Ifpeople come to notice the benefit of society and recognise the cause that
tends to disturb it, it should be only natural for them to search for a way to escape
211 • *tBentham shares the same idea that the main cause of social disturbance lies in material
scarcity (cf. Postema, 1986: 104).
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from the trouble. Social disorder is nothing but the lack of stability. Therefore,
people look for stability. In Hume, the convention of not violating other's
possessions represents a moderate awareness of the preference for peace. This can be
seen as moderate version of the Hobbesian turn from war to "peace" in the
"Fundamental Law ofNature" {Leviathan, 1.14). Therefore, Humean people
naturally try to attain stability just as Hobbesian people seek peace to escape from
the fear of a war of all against all. Now the problem is how to attain the stability of
possessions. Hobbesian people hastily jump to the solution of the mutual covenant
and the establishment of a common and absolute authority by relinquishing one's
natural rights. Humean individuals, on the other hand, have no "rights" to renounce
prior to society. The Humean artificial virtue ofjustice has to be developed not
instantly but in a gradual process, so that Hume's explanation is not a hypothesis to
be justified but an explanation of reality.
In the place of the Hobbesian natural right, Hume observes that there is an
alternative mechanism equipped in human nature that serves to procure the stability
ofproperty, which is the psychological tendency of attachment to one's possessions.
This is a sense that Hume explains as the second definition of being "natural": "as
oppos'd to what is unusual" (T 3.1.2.10; SBN 474). Unlike the once and for all
determination of reason, custom can be formed only gradually, which makes abiding
by the rules ofjustice appear natural: the hallmark of the stability of a society. Hume
is obviously critical of the idea of people resorting to authorities to acquire peace,
• 212because this is too abstract and complicated an idea to be embraced naturally.
Human beings feel attached to the possessions with which they engage in their daily
activities. Habitual activities give them the occasion of improvement of skills, and
eventually lead to the increase of the material conditions of the society. All these are
impossible where there is no stability, since without stability people cannot
habitually repeat their daily activities; without practice, there is no improvement.
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Stephen Buckle argues that the Humean argument ofjustice can be understood as a theory of
natural law that is determining the dictates of reason (Buckle, 1991: 296). Buckle is relying on
Hume's passing statement that artificial virtue is not a matter of human morality, but it is a
problem of "the degree ofmen's sagacity or folly" (T 3.2.2.13 ; SBN 492). However, he does not
grasp the real thrust ofHume's idea. It is obvious for Hume that there is no such a thing as
natural law to be discovered by reason.
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Once stability is recognised as the sine qua non of the good life, the most
effective way to secure stability is found easily; concentrate on one's own while
letting others work in the same manner. It is noteworthy that these two represent the
same; by concentrating on one's own, one naturally leaves the possession of others to
themselves. And the latter is subordinate to the former. This is precisely in
accordance with the psychological mechanism; therefore it can prevail naturally
among ordinary people without resorting to "fear" or "reason". Furthermore, with the
formation of this convention, any breach of the convention appears literally unnatural,
and comes to be perceived as painful. There is only one more step before this
convention is proclaimed as a conventional law, which becomes the initial law of
justice. Because of convention, people are initiated into the practice of following the
rules of justice, which will expand as necessary. Also, this implies the initial idea of
rule by law.
This convention proves to be a significant solution to the problem of
forming society. It brings an unintended and very significant consequence with it.
Society is based on a crucially different principle from the family. One crucial
difference between family and society is that the latter is constituted by anonymous
people or people in general while the former is constituted by members all ofwhom
are known to each other. Therefore, to form a social union, there has to be a principle
that serves to unite people who are unknown to each other.
Convention meets this requirement because it is a principle of generality;
convention, like language or money, serves to no specific person or no specific
purpose. The scope that is determined by the same convention demarcates a society.
By resorting to convention, people can relate with each other beyond their natural
reach ofphysical and psychological contact. And the convention not to violate other
people's property can prevail because it is in accordance with human nature. It is
practicable for all the members of a society to participate in the formation ofjustice
without any prior arrangement, because everyone always has "what is the most
proximate to him".
Therefore, there is no gap in Hume between the creation of convention and
the stability of society. Without intending the overall effect, the convention of
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adhering to one's own possession naturally brings stability to the whole society. In
other words, there is no gap between the means and the end in attaining peace in
Hume. Because individual activity realises the unintended stability of society, there
is no wonder that this final appearance ofjustice gives birth to the notion of
providence in a nai've mind.
4. Mutuality and the General Point ofView
The formation of the concept ofjustice is the most significant aspect in Hume's
theory ofjustice. This is different from the explanation ofwhy we approve the act of
justice. This question is misleading because it presupposes the separation of the
• •• • • ?1"3
reason for our obeying the rules ofjustice from their formation and existence.
Hume's theory ofjustice as based on convention purports to avoid this dichotomy.
For Hume, justice exists only as a functioning norm of virtue that binds people.
Hume compares justice to the religious rite:
'tis one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that
can possibly be imagin'd, and may even be compar'd to
transubstantiation, or holy orders, where a certain form of words,
along with a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external
object, and even of a human creature. (T 3.2.5.14; SBN 524)
This means that there is no objective existence of any law ofjustice, but it is only a
product of convention.
Justice consists in its psychological sense of necessity for controlling
people's behaviour. In other words, justice exists as our convention of behaving on
the supposition of justice, similar to the case of causation. The concept ofjustice is
solid because it is deeply interwoven into our social conventions which come prior to
213
Jacqueline Taylor understands Hume's theory ofjustice as explaining why we approve the act
of justice (Jacqueline, 1998: 5-30). John Rawls maintains that the motivation to justice is "the
desire for a character" (Rawls, 2000: 68). This relates to our rational consideration ofjustice,
which applies only to a part ofHume's theory ofjustice. The gist ofHume's theory ofjustice in
the Treatise lies in its connection to perceptions in general. As we will see below, the normative
argument ofjustice can properly be understood only on the basis of the theory of custom.
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our personal consciousness. It is also mistaken to identify the explanation of the
concept ofjustice with the justification of the current system of property.214 Hume's
theory ofjustice is a story how the concept ofjustice emerges in an empirical manner.
Only the application ofjustice can be the subject ofjustification, but the justification
is first possible on the basis of the notion ofjustice itself. Thus, it is possible to ask
whether something is just, but it is impossible to justify the concept ofjustice itself.
It is to the latter that Hume supplies a naturalistic explanation.
Conventional stability of property does not simply mean the restriction of
the blind pursuit of self-interest. More significantly, convention introduces a new
dimension to the notion of self-interest; it is an interest not directly pursued, but
realised through mutuality. In the first place, Hume's theory of sympathy reveals that
the purely individual benefit that is cut off from the rest of the society is a deception,
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because human goods are evaluated socially. Even seemingly purely physical
desires appear and are fulfilled only in a socially formed manner. One cannot even
understand "thirsty" or "hungry" until one learns how to deal with them; that babies
feel "thirstier" or "hungrier" only as uncertain pains is evidence of this.
In a similar sense, individual interests without sound community are only
deceptions. For something to be valuable it has to be recognised by others. Most
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notably, money is only a piece ofpaper without social recognition. Therefore,
justice serves to create and coordinate interests in the social dimension of life. No
human being can work exclusively for himself, or even by himself. Human activities
have influence upon others in a manner that is beyond direct perceptions, and human
lives are supported by the works of others beyond identification. For example,
214
Hume is a conservative neither of his time nor of today. He was a most radical critic of the
convention of his time. It is a mistake to say that he insists on the fixation of the present property
system. His theory is to explain how the notion ofjustice and society is created based on property.
2 5 This relates to the thesis that "taste" is the fundamental concept for the Scottish Enlightenment.
In this regard, Hume's "Of the Standard ofTaste" in Essays is especially important (cf. Broadie,
2003: Ch. 14).
216 Hobbes regards money as a "measure" of all commodities, and compares it to the "Bloud
(sic.y of the commonwealth {Leviathan 174), while Locke considers money as a means for
preserving goods. Though Hume does not discuss money thematically in the Treatise, the idea of
"interest" as socially constructed is indicative of his idea ofmoney as an "instrument". Hume
asserts that industry and refinement of all kinds promote universal diffusion and circulation of
money, which strengthens the kingdom {Essay, "Ofmoney").
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clothes, food, and houses are a complex resulting from numerous activities. In this
sense, individuals reflect the whole society. Therefore, Humean justice is
fundamentally a principle of human mutuality. Hobbesian mutuality lies in the
recognition of the equality of others with oneself, which occurs prior to the
establishment of sovereign. Lockean individuals realise mutuality by the equal
application to others the prescription of the natural law. For Hume, however,
mutuality is realised through convention in which people seek self-interest in a
cooperative scheme with others. This is possible when one is expected to behave in
the same manner he expects others to behave toward him. Hume explains,
Taking any single act, my justice may be pernicious in every respect;
and 'tis only upon the supposition, that others are to imitate my
example, that I can be indue'd to embrace that virtue; since nothing but
this combination can render justice advantageous, or afford me any
motives to conform myself to its rules. (T 3.2.2.22; SBN 498)
This shows that justice implies mutuality of the self and others. Because
there already prevails the rule ofjustice, people can rely on it, even abandoning
seemingly immediate interests. It is first possible when people are freed from the
direct pursuit of self-interest. People depart from their immediate, self-centred
reactions by correcting initial perceptions. In this sense, justice is founded on the
generality of perceptions, rather than on principles such as impartiality, rationality, or
fairness.
For Hume, mutuality does not mean that people must engage in some
common enterprise. On the contrary, in Humean convention, each person has only to
do his duty, and to leave the rest to other people. Behind this lies a realisation that
self-interest can be realised most efficiently by taking care of one's own possessions,
while leaving the possessions of others to other people. This is a paradoxical way of
actualising self-interest, and can never be invented by any abstract reasoning. The
emergence of this convention can only originate from experience, but the final figure
appears like a product of design or providence because it is beyond individual
intention. This is best illustrated by commercial society based on the division of
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labour that Hume had anticipated both in theory and in his personal experience.
Hume illustrates the convention ofmutual expectation in the well-known example of
the people rowing a boat together.
I observe that it will be for my interest to leave another in the
possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with
regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his
conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd,
and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour.
... Two men, who pull the oar of a boat, do it by an agreement or
convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. (T
3.2.2.10; SBN 490)
Hume compares the British Isles to the boat. The boatmen do not pull the
oars independently, for each pulls the oar counting on the other doing the same thing.
Through convention, people begin to act counting on the action ofunknown people
in pursuit of their self-interest. People rely upon other people who behave likewise.
Thus, the Humean mutuality is neither moral, nor rational, but conventional. This
917
represents the most fundamental basis of interdependence among people. Hume
illustrates the difference between benevolence and justice in an example from
architecture.
The happiness and prosperity ofmankind, arising from the social
virtue of benevolence and its subdivisions, may be compared to a wall,
built by many hands, which still rises by each stone that is heaped upon
it, and receives increase proportional to the diligence and care of each
workman. The same happiness, raised by the social virtue ofjustice and
its subdivisions, may be compared to the building of a vault, where
each individual stone would, of itself, fall to the ground; nor is the
whole fabric supported but by the mutual assistance and combination
of its corresponding parts. (EPM Appendix 3.5; SBN 305)
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This form of interdependency anticipates Hume's theory of promise. Promise is based on
interdependence in a more and more explicit manner. In this sense Hume's theory of property
underlies his theory of promise.
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This clearly suggests that the essence ofjustice consists in mutual
dependency; people support each other by being placed in the situation of connecting
with and supporting each other. A vault would collapse, were the individual stones
that comprise it separated from each other. They are not arranged by any order that is
independent of them. Likewise justice creates the mutual relationship in which each
individual depends on others. Though each member directly connects only with his
neighbours, they contribute to, and obtain benefit from the whole construction of
society. Justice guarantees the point of view that sees one's interests from the
common perspective with other people in general. Thus, justice represents the
general point of view.218
The primary function ofjustice is to enable people to concentrate on their
own work, without worrying too much about the behaviour of others in the
understanding that others do the same. Thus Hume rewrites the Lockean concept of
labour. Humean individuals work with their possession, while Lockean individuals
are supposed to act on nature. In this sense, Hume's theory is more tuned to
describing industrialised society. Once justice is established, it changes the way of
realising personal interest. This is because justice requires abandoning the direct
pursuit ofparticular interests. As Hume says,
A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest, and
were it to stand alone, without being follow'd by other acts, may, in
itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a
beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a seditious
bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer.
... But however single acts ofjustice may be contrary, either to public
or private interest, 'tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly
conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society,
and the well-being of every individual. (T 3.2.2.22; SBN 497)
Hume emphasises that justice gives a different meaning to "a single act"
from its direct effect. The full meaning of a single action is not determined only by
218
In the Enquiry, Hume emphasises that the purpose ofjustice is "the general interest of
mankind" (EPM 3.28; SBN 195). This clearly suggests that justice consists in generality. It is
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its direct effect. In this way, Hume's theory is thoroughly associative. This is
clearly explained in his theory of abstract ideas; what confers meaning to a particular
is the general effect of its similar kind (see Chapter 2). In the same manner, a single
action does not have general meaning until it is evaluated as a particular of its
general kind, which is realised through the creation of a new convention. The
meaning of interest between the pre-social state and social state is totally different;
individual interest is possible only in the social state. In fact, Hume is no less
uncompromising about the necessity ofjustice than Hobbes. Hume says in a
Hobbesian tone:
And even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on
balancing the account; since, without justice, society must immediately
dissolve, and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition,
which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be
suppos'd in society. (T 3.2.22; SBN 497)
Justice is necessary for sustaining society, and without society Hume
understands human life is as bad as the Hobbesian description of the state of nature.
Fundamentally, justice has more to do with the framework in which the interest is
produced. The Humean sense ofjustice as personal interest does not make sense
without supposing a point of view that represents particular action in its generality.
Just like in custom particulars are regarded as instances of the generality; the
convention ofjustice enables people to see their behaviour in the general scheme of
justice.
5. Rights as Causation
very conspicuous that Hume explains justice referring to the notion of "generality" in Enquiry.
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This is different from the long-term effect of the single action as long as it is still seen as a
single action. Therefore, justice has nothing to do with the term of interest, long or short. John
Stewart asserts that "Hume's position is that human nature remaining constant and the economic
circumstances remaining about the same, both justice and obedience to a good government
always are in the long-term interest of a person as an individual" (Stewart, 1992: 177).
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While Locke certainly does not mean to surprise us by the concept ofproperty when
he refers to our body as the first thing we have as property, Hume induces us to be
surprised by the mysterious power of property, as he compares it to "superstitions"
(EMP 3.36; SBN 198). However, property is indeed quite mysterious ifwe view it
from a causal perspective. Hume says,
The same species of reasoning it may be thought, which so successfully
exposes superstition, is also applicable to justice; nor is it possible, in
the one case more than in the other, to point out, in the object, that
precise quality or circumstance, which is the foundation of the
sentiment.
But there is this material difference between superstition and
justice, that the former is frivolous, useless, and burdensome; the latter
is absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence of
society. (EPM 3.37-8; SBN 199)
Property consists in the mysterious power to prevent all people except the
owner from using it. Why is it that the same physical object can exert such different
causal influence on people's behaviour? There is no such thing as property in nature;
all we perceive in nature are particular objects. And none of them bears any sign that
presents itself as a property of a particular person. Still, property exerts a power to
regulate and control people's behaviour. Once justice is established, people will be
forced to respect the property of others by a morality that is endorsed by a political
authority. Therefore, property means nothing but this unnatural power which reaches
each and every member of the society with an equally binding force. No individual is
more strongly obliged to refrain from using another's property than any other
220
person.
It is clear that the power ofproperty does not derive from any inherent
quality of the object. Then, the power can only derive from a relation, which is
represented by the general point of view (see Chapter 3). Property consists in a
220
It is impossible for a sovereign to exert physical power to make people obey the law when a
significant number of people disobey the authority. On the other hand, it would be contradiction
to the empiricist tenet to assume the eternal "natural law" that binds all the people exists.
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causal power that in a sense parallels the psychological sense of necessity. There is
no essential difference between the power of a physical object and that of property in
that both compel a certain type of behaviour based on acquired beliefs. Through
convention, people feel compelled to refrain from violating the domain of others.
The power of property is in reality nothing but those collective negative
commitments of individuals. In this way, Hume explains the rule of justice without
resorting to any external force.
Unlike the allegation of some commentators, Hume's theory ofjustice
comprises a theory of rights. Hume's understanding of property as a socially
constructed power explains the crucial moral and political notion of rights. It is
Hume's conscious strategy to replace the Lockean understanding of rights as an
inherent quality of a person with his causal explanation. This indicates Hume's
different perspective; his Copernican turn from a substance-centred to a relation-
centred notion ofproperty. Hume explains the mechanism through which human
beings can be regarded as having rights, and why the rights command other people to
behave in a certain way. Therefore, he uses a similar strategy to explain rights as in
his discussion of causation. He clearly understands rights as the product of
convention,
After this convention, concerning abstinence from the possessions of
others, is enter'd into, and every one has acquir'd stability in his
possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice;
as also those ofproperty, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether
unintelligible without first understanding the former. Our property is
nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is establish'd by
the laws of society; that is, by the laws ofjustice. Those, therefore, who
make use of the words property, or right, or obligation, before they
have explain'd the origin of justice, or even make use of them in that
explication, are guilty of a very gross fallacy, and can never reason
upon any solid foundation. A man's property is some object related to
him. This relation is not natural, but moral, and founded on justice (T
3.2.2.11; SBN 491).
Once the concept of right is established in the instance of a property right, this
concept can be extended to cover other more abstract kinds of rights such as human
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rights, social rights, etc.. As property is nothing but the moral relationship of people
in reference to a certain object, rights are also the creation ofmoral relationships.
What are called rights are in the first instance someone's exclusive use of his
possession, which is empty unless people in general protect them. Thus the notion of
rights emerges with the system of property.
It is important to note that right does not mean that people in general are
obliged to take some positive action with regard to the right. For example, the right
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to life does not entail giving life to the person who asserts it. In general the most
people can do to respect the right to life of other people is to partake in the general
practice of not taking life, in the same manner that they do not violate the
possessions of others. One individual's rights are the obligation of others. Rights and
obligations are two sides of the same coin. To other people, the assertion of rights
appears only as prohibitions. In this way, people are associated with one another
through rights and obligations; others are the object of obligation and the self is a
subject of right. Thus justice consists more in a negative commitment, because this is
the only way the multitude ofpeople support a particular person.
Thus, Hume's theory of causation prepares the way for the theory ofjustice.
Just as causation is a product of imagination, so rights are products of imagination.
The concept of rights produces the concept of liberty as free access to one's property.
Therefore, the Humean theory ofjustice explains the realistic condition for the
emergence of liberty.
6. The Rules for Determining Property
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To be more exact, positive obligation is a derivative form of negative obligation. For example,
modem states are obliged to provide basic human needs. This is because not to do so can be
interpreted as robbing man of his basic human needs. This is based on the fundamental idea of
nature as the supplier of human necessity. This is the Humean rephrasing of Locke's dictum that
God had given the earth to mankind in common. The implication is that where people can no
longer survive without taking from others, justice can no longer obtain.
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Some commentators criticise Hume because he cares so much about the existence
and rigid observance of the rules of property, and yet cares so little about which rules
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in particular are adopted. Admittedly, Hume says,
the preference... is often founded more on taste and imagination than
on any solid argument. Public utility is the general object of all courts
of judicature; and this utility too requires a stable rule in all
controversies: but where several rules, nearly equal and indifferent,
present themselves, it is a very slight turn of thought which fixes the
decision in favour of either party. (EMP Appendix 3.10; SBN 308-9)
That there be a separation or distinction of possessions, and
that this separation be steady and constant; this is absolutely required
by interests of society, and hence the origin of justice and property.
What possessions are assigned to particular persons; that is, generally
speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often determined by frivolous views
and considerations. (EPM Appendix 3 footnote 65; SBN 309 footnote)
Therefore, John Plamenatz observes,
We are seriously invited to believe that, though it matters
enormously that there should be some rules ofproperty and that they
should not change, it does not much matter what they are ... that
argument is not illogical, but it is odd and unrealistic. I am less moved
to refute it than to wonder how it ever comes to be made. I feel about it
as I should do if someone were to say: "I am against divorce, because,
while it does not much matter whom we marry, it matters enormously
that we should marry and stay married". (Plamenatz, 1963: 309-10)
222 David Miller says, Hume "might argue that it was a matter of comparative indifference which
principles of acquisition, transfer, etc. were adopted, provided that these principles were
generally acknowledged by the population at large. It is, in other words, a mistake to look for a
justification of the principles which fill out the property theory; what can be justified is the
system of property as a whole, not its detailed rules. In this way questions about desert never
enter the picture; the Lockean principle of acquisition can be accepted, not as an ethically
justified principle, but as a convention whose value is that it assigns property rights somehow and
that it commands general recognition. ... Although these rules (five rules of acquisition plus a
rule of transfer) would naturally suggest themselves to anyone who had to decide on the
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The ghost of Locke is hard to get rid of. Hume is certainly indifferent about
who owns what, but he is not indifferent about the "rules" ofproperty. These two are
crucially different, because this is what the rule of law means. Hume opposes
Aristotle, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke, who imagine they decide ownership not by
"frivolous views and considerations", but by the unshakable reasoning of the
justificatory ground of approbation. This is because he is critical of the possibility
that by serious views and considerations property can be allocated to the most
appropriate person who really deserves it. Most of all, it is crucial to understand the
Humean ground for the five rules.
Hume stipulates the following five rules for determining property: "present
possession", "occupation", "prescription", "accession" and "succession". Here as
elsewhere, his argument is a challenge to the traditional theory ofjustice. First,
Hume's target is clearly the Aristotelian tradition, which considers justice as a
distribution in accordance with desert. Hume thinks that it is virtually impossible to
decide individually "who deserves what", because,
so great is the uncertainty ofmerit, both from its natural obscurity, and
from the self-conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of
conduct would ever result from it; and the total dissolution of society
must be the immediate consequence. (EPM 3.23; SBN 193)
No one is willing to admit that he deserves less than his fellows. It is
certainly impossible to find the most appropriate owner for each item that can be
regarded as property. Hume emphatically warns that "Fanatics may suppose, that
dominion is founded on grace, and that saints alone inherit the earth'''' (EPM 3.23;
SBN 193). On the other hand, the equal distribution of property is not effective either,
because it will soon result in an inequality given the difference of people's ability
and industry. Hume says,
allocation of property rights, they were neither capable of, nor stood in need of, justification in
the strict sense" (Miller, 1980a: 9).
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But historians, and even common sense, may inform us, that,
however specious these ideas of perfect equality may seem, they are
really, at bottom, impracticable; and were they not so would be
extremely pernicious to human society. (EPM 3.26; SBN 194)
As property is always particular, it is theoretically impossible to divide
property in equal proportion. Hume's argument about the rules deciding property
endorses his fundamental view ofjustice: justice should not be founded by any moral
concept, such as right, desert, equality, and fairness. These are first understood once
justice is established. To use these concepts for explaining justice not only
constitutes a vicious circle, but also is dangerously misleading, which is indicated in
Hume's criticism of rationalistic moral theory.223 Thus, Hume avoids the difficulty of
the rationalist theory ofjustice and develops his theory in a manner that is in accord
with human nature.224
Hume's five basic rules for deciding property allocation is not arbitrary at all.
On the contrary it is very consistent with his theory of convention and sympathy that
he has so elaborately argued so far. On the whole, Hume seems to adopt the basic
framework of the natural modes of acquisition in Roman law with a very significant
difference that he places "present possession (T 3.2.3.4; SBN 503-5)" as the first rule
(cf. Barry, 1962, 130-140). Hume's choice of the five rules is based on the
consideration that they should be acknowledged and accepted by "the population at
large". As convention produces the only viable system ofjustice, the rule to
determine property must be in congruence with the principles of human nature. It is
significant to note that the Humean criterion for all five rules consists in the
psychological attachment to the object by the possessor. The sense of attachment is
the only natural bond that connects humans and objects beyond direct physical grasp.
It is based on his associationist psychology according to which the sense of
attachment increases or decreases in accordance with the distance from the object. In
223
Hume denies equality as the primary requirement for justice. Most of all, there is no
impression corresponding to "equality". The notion of equality is first understood with the
establishment of the concept of "identity" (see Chapter 4).
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terms of human psychology, to possess something means to feel stronger attachment
to the thing than any other person does. This psychological reality should be
reflected in the legal relationship for the system of property to function among
people in general.
Hume says, "Men generally fix their affections more on what they are
possess'd of, than on what they never enjoy'd" (T 3.2.1.14; SBN 482). All of the five
rules can be derived from this principle that realises the stability of the system of
property because a psychological cohesive power is a principle of stability. This
should be seen as a strong justification for Hume's rules of determining property.
We may conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for
the regulation of property, we must be acquainted with the nature and
situation of man; must reject appearances, which may be false, though
specious; and must search for those rules, which are, on the whole,
most useful and beneficial. Vulgar sense and slight experience are
sufficient for this purpose; where men give not way to too selfish
avidity, or too extensive enthusiasm. (EPM 3.27; SBN 194-195)
Hume tries to remove the cause of disturbance by leaving the problem of
deciding property to natural principle. In this way, Hume gives a psychological
foundation to the Hobbesian law that "those things that cannot be enjoyed in
common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and in some cases
to the First-Born, as acquired by Lot" (Leviathan 108). Certainly in preparation for
this argument Hume explains the importance of the principle of imagination, of his
associationist psychology in Book 2 of the Treatise. This is another significance of
the consistency between each Book of the Treatise. Therefore, it is a mistake to
dismiss Hume's rules as arbitrary. The rules to decide property are as consistent with
the theory of human nature offered in Hume as these are in Hobbes and Locke. If
property does not derive from those rules, the system of property cannot prevail
spontaneously. Humean justice is necessitated for the overall objective of attaining
224
David Miller criticises Lockean labour theory that "it is then no longer possible to separate
questions about the original acquisition of property from questions about the distributive pattern
that later results from these acquisitions" (Miller, 1980a: 9).
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the stability of human relationships. Society is most stable when it is ruled by that
principle that constitutes stability itself.
The five Humean rules show that property ownership does not depend on
the inherent quality of the object at all. Property is determined exclusively by the
convention in society; objects have no claim on their possessors. Precisely because
this is a unilateral way of fixing property relations, property is transferable to anyone.
In this way, anyone can become an owner of property, and property is transferable in
society. Unlike Locke, Hume does not have in mind primarily "estate" as property.
Rather, Hume's properties signify movable property (industrial products and money).
Society is unified as an arena for the circulation of properties. All people can be
equally qualified as owners of property, which is the precondition for commercial
society. Free commerce presupposes and strengthens the equality of people qua
owners ofproperty, which in turn develops the condition for free and equal
commercial society.225 Based on this foundation of the basic law ofjustice as the
stability of property, Hume's second law ofjustice stipulates the transference of




7. The Problem of "the Sensible Knave"
So far, we have seen how the artificial virtue ofjustice comes to be established. Now
let us consider the meaning of the morality ofjustice as distinguished from
convention. It makes sense to ask why it is that Hume discusses the artificial virtue
ofjustice before natural virtue. It would certainly be natural to discuss natural virtue
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first and then artificial virtue. This problem is related to an interesting discussion
among Hume commentators regarding the rationality and morality of the Humean
justice. In the Enquiries, Hume controversially remarks:
225 This idea seems to lie behind Hume's optimism that commerce promotes art and morality in
society (Essays, "Of the Progress ofArt").
226 The second and the third laws ofjustice will be dealt with in Chapter 8.
227 Pall Ardal says, Hume's "order of exposition is unfortunate, and has given more plausibility to
a wrong interpretation of this particular statement" (Ardal, 1966: 183). We will see that Ardal's is
among the incorrect interpretations.
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though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no society could
subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are
conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an
act of inquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his
fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union
and confederacy. That honesty is the bestpolicy, may be a good general
rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be
thought, conducts himselfwith most wisdom, who observes the general
rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions. (EPM 9.22; SBN 282-
283)
The sensible knave reminds us of Hobbes's "Foole" who
has sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes
also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every man's conservation,
and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no
reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make ; keep, or not keep
Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.
{Leviathan 101)
As we have seen, Hume asserts that sensible knaves "are the real dupes, and
have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for
the acquisition ofworthless toys and gewgaws" (EPM 9.25; SBN 283). Gerald
Postema argues that Hume's answer to the sensible knave is crucial to his entire
theory ofjustice. He says:
Hume seeks the origins of justice (and the foundations of its
rationality) in the self-correction of the interested passions achieved
through the promptings of observation, reflection, and judgement. That
is, Hume's argument starts from a perspective shared with the knave. If
the knave's challenge cannot be answered, Hume's project fails on its
own criteria of success. (Postema, 1995: 110-1)
Therefore, according to Postema, Hume must show a satisfactory answer to
the problem of the sensible knave in order to prove the validity of his theory of
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justice. Postema himself asserts that Hume's reply is "ultimately unsuccessful"
(Postema, 1995: 1 ll).228 This problem is concerned with one of the most significant
problems ofmoral philosophy: "why be moral". Surely, the consideration of this
problem clarifies the fundamental points ofHume's theory ofjustice, and leads us
into a deeper understanding of Hume's theory. First of all, it is necessary to note that
Hume's theory ofjustice does not purport to satisfy an openly convinced "vicious"
individual to accept the morality ofjustice from the motivation of self-interest. Hume
admits that if someone has lost "a considerable motive to virtue", it is "a bit difficult
to find any" answer to persuade him (EPM 9.23; SBN 283). Hume sounds ironical
here; he might consider it the task of a political or a medical institution to deal with
such people. It is a mistake to take this, like John Rawls does, as meaning that Hume
is not "concerned in the least with rational egoists who want to be persuaded that
following virtue is to their advantage or for their good" (Rawls, 2000: 99). On the
contrary, we should understand Hume's argument as his answer to the question "why
should we be moral?"
Hume's argument can be divided into two parts; he deals with the problems
of feasibility, and ofpsychological stability. First, Hume observes that the sensible
knave will most likely fail to persecute his maxim of cunning, and then, even if it
succeeds, he is a loser of the requisite for happiness of "[ijnward peace ofmind,
consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct" (EPM 9.23;
SBN 283).
Hume observes that the maxim of the sensible knave stands on a mistaken
understanding about the "perfect crime". The sensible knave acknowledges the
importance ofjustice for the interest of society. He only makes use of every
exception while pretending to be observing every rule ofmorality. He will not breach
the justice if he will lose his reputation by his deeds. Now, is it realistically possible
to take advantage of the evasion of rules ofjustice?
228
Postema also says that Hume's argument "exaggerates the force of habit and the limitations of
individual judgement in much the same way as the vault analogy exaggerates the fragility of
social order" (Postema, 1995: 125). Postema is not the only commentator. David Gouthie
similarly sees Hume's reply as a failure (Gouthie, 1995: 129-54). M. Baron argues that Hume
Chapter 7 234
Hume's General Point of View
Hume denies the idea of the "uncertainty of causes" as a superficial view of
the "vulgar" (T 1.3.12.5; SBN 132). The idea of a perfect crime stands on an
assumption that there can be "uncertainty" in the cause; even though society and the
public suffer from someone's injustice, the cause may not be detected. Injustice is
very conspicuous not least because we never fail to note any loss to ourselves
suffered by the injustice of other people (cf. Rawls, 2000: 67). The assumption is that
if the sensible knave knows that he will be detected, he will not breach justice. Now,
every breach leaves the evidence of criminal action, and even the most sensible
knave cannot make his living from injustice without even pretending he is obeying
the law. If the gain from the secret action of injustice is bigger, it is more likely the
fact will reveal itself, easily betraying the cunning of the sensible knave. In terms of
cost-performance, the gain from undetectable injustice will presumably be much less
than the gain through just activities. The sensible knave will have to keep anxiously
running away from his past criminal action by "adjusting" unjust activities, while
pretending to be a just person. Here, a fundamental problem arises; what is the
standard of successful injustice? Simply, "being undetected" seems to be the most
important one. In order to attain this purpose, the sensible knave will not spare any
sacrifice. Here is seen a contradiction between the gain through unjust action and its
cost. He could have attained his ends by not committing any criminality.
Let us concede to admit a more vulgar supposition that in many cases
injustices are kept undetected behind the veil of anonymousness, as many cases
actually seem to be. Suppose he somehow manages to make both ends meet.
According to Hume, however, this is accompanied by the most disastrous thing: the
loss of peace ofmind. Hume asserts that the gain from injustice amounts to nothing
compared to this burden. Even if the knave obtained great sums ofmoney, he could
not buy peace ofmind with money.
Yet we must make another concession by obeying the vulgar psychology.
What if the sensible knave does not care about being able to peacefully reflect on his
conduct, and somehow he is convinced of not being detected (Blackburn, 1998a:
knows that the advancement of self-interests through justice is indefensible, but that it is his
noble lie for the sake of society (Baron, 1995: 155-70).
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208f.)? Postema asserts that Hume can at most resort to the theory of custom; the
force of custom is so powerful that we follow the rule ofjustice even though we
would gain by breaking it. On this argument, Postema concludes that Hume's answer
is unconvincing because Hume's argument "exaggerates the force of habit and the
limitations of individual judgement" (Postema, 1995: 125).
Postema's criticism might repudiate the Humean theory ofjustice; there is
no theory in Hume that shows the convincing ground for following the rules of
justice. At this point, the more fundamental question arises whether justice is only a
convention. If so, we might as well ignore it whenever we have a good chance of
getting away with our private interests. Let us not trivialise this question, and
consider a case where we have a good chance of obtaining our personal interests by
99Q •
sacrificing the public interest without being detected. It is not a problem about
how we should deal with the sensible knave out there, but how we deal with the
sensible knave in ourselves. In the former case, the question is already solved, and
there will only be a technical problem of detecting those "bad" people to be punished.
But precisely in order for us to do so, it must be theoretically clear that we have
reason to deny the sensible knave. Are we in fact dupes by following the rules of
justice, where the breach is in the benefit of our private interests? Or, is there a
genuine reason why we should follow the rules ofjustice?
This problem touches upon the Humean concept of self-interest. Hume's
answer can be found in his concept of the general point of view, which is a view
which sees self-interest as one particular among other similar interests. As Hobbes
observes, ifwe are all sensible knaves who only take advantage of the system of
justice, justice does not function at all without the power of a sovereign who forces
us into justice. However, Humean justice lies in the fact that people spontaneously
obey the rules ofjustice at the conscious expense of their immediate and direct
interest. As we have seen above, justice first emerges with the formation of a general
point of view. Then the problem can be stated as whether or not there really is a
general point of view that approves ofjustice.
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Thus, the credibility ofHume's argument depends on whether or not there is a
general point of view that sees self-interest differently from how the sensible knave
does. As discussed above, human nature leads us to leave direct perception, and to
rely on custom that reflects the general point of view. The same principle is
persistently applicable throughout the development ofperception in general, and thus
the human world. Therefore, it is impossible to deny the general point of view so
long as we behave as normal human beings. At the stage of our human development,
our communicating with others, or our behaving as normal human beings, we are
equipped, by virtue of custom, with the general point of view that clearly sees justice
as a priority over our direct private interest. By the same token, it is impossible for us
to become convinced sensible knaves, so long as we acknowledge the value of, and
have benefits from, having a society or enjoying the pleasure of human
communication, because all of this normal behaviour is supported by the general
point of view in multiple layers. This is the Humean ground for saying that
hypocrites and enthusiast, and also false philosophers, cannot be consistent with
themselves; they do not believe themselves what they say.
Hume believes that as people increase their communication, their morality
improves (cf. Essays: "Of Refinement in the Arts"). With the same psychological
force of necessity with which we acknowledge causation, the existence of the
external world, sentiments of other people, we are forced to acknowledge the
authority ofjustice. As evidence for this fact, it is difficult for us to deny justice in
public. This difficulty is parallel to the inevitability of taking up the general point of
view, owing to which we behave and communicate as normal persons. In fact, the
public represents the general point of view. Our daily moral disputes are concerned
only with the interpretation and application ofjustice, rather than the concept of
justice itself.
The fact that societies universally have some system ofmorality and legal
institutions, however variable, shows that the general point of view dominates over
229 If a breach of a rule ofjustice is purely based on the inefficiency of the rule in terms of the
public interest, we can change the rule to reflect rational public interest by a lawful manner. The
real crux of this problem is the relationship between public and personal interests.
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that of the private interests in the final balance. It is also important to note that
even the extremely "sensible" knave considers his behaviour from the general point
of view in order to persecute his personal project successfully, just or unjust.
Therefore, the most considerate sensible knave will rationally try to gain his interests
without breaching justice. This can be the Humean answer to the "private vice and
public virtue" controversy; the most sensitive, not rational, private vice leads to
justice. This is the Humean explanation why society naturally attains harmony and
prosperity through morality.231 In this way, Hume illustrates that "private" vice and
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public "virtue" ultimately coincide injustice.
That Hume explained justice based on the same principle of the general
point of view indicates his strategy of giving the firmest ground possible to the
system ofjustice. Postema clearly underestimates the deep-rooted authority Hume
ascribes to custom, because he like other commentators does not see the close
connection between Hume's epistemology and his moral theory. In fact, Hume's
theory ofjustice is the zenith of his project of the science of human nature, in which
Hume radically transforms the traditional theory of natural law.
Justice provides the absolutely necessary framework for all human activities.
On the basis ofjustice, liberty, right, leisure, industry, stability, and most of all, the
9
sense of security are first introduced. These are sine qua non for people to act as
citizens. From the general point of view, therefore, the value of a just action is very
obvious. The alleged interests that the sensible knave may pilfer from his injustice
9T4 •
are nothing compared to all the benefits of society. The sensible knave himself
relies on justice for his unjust conduct; the sensible knave needs justice in order to
235conduct his injustice, though his very conduct undermines that justice. Moreover,
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Only in extreme cases, where considering the final balance becomes impossible, does the
suspension ofjustice result.
231 This is also Hume's anticipation of Smithean social harmony through the unseen hand.
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In this sense, Hume replaced the Mandevillian problem between private activity and public
benefit with causal explanation (cf. Furuya, 2003).
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Let us remember that the sense of stability is what Hume establishes by the theory of the
external object.
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Of course there will be a point where society can no longer accommodate his waste and
collapses. Annette Baier presents a similar argument (Baier, 1991: 253).
235 This can be viewed as a version of Plato's saying that the unjust man conflicts with himself.
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he needs justice more than he needs the advantages of injustice, because injustice is
.. .. .. ..
parasitic on justice. The plain evidence for this is that the criminals rely on justice
in their trial. As justice is founded on the general point of view, any loss through just
action can be compensated by society if it is esteemed undue from the general point
of view.
Hume deals with artificial virtue first before dealing with the natural virtue
because natural virtue is impossible to understand prior to the artificial virtue of
justice in a double sense. First, individual human beings lack a social dimension
before the formation of society through the system ofjustice, and second, natural
virtue is most feasible within the framework ofjustice, because it is socially
constructed. Mere physical and psychological developments are not enough to
compose "people". Physical and psychological human beings become social
individuals only with rights conferred through the system ofjustice. There is no
abstract self existing in the world but only those that are physically, psychologically,
and socially constructed. Thus the final products of perception are moral beings. In
this sense, Hume's Treatise is at once the story of the formation of society and of
moral beings; they can only be the outcome of the natural development of human
perceptions. For Hume, therefore, morality is first possible as the development of
human nature. In this comprehensive sense, his theory is a moral philosophy, and
Hume is a moralist (cf. Phillipson, 1979).
As we have discussed in his theory of causation and external objects, the
belief in causation is constructed by the general point of view. Now it is clear that, in
the same manner, the belief injustice consists in the general point of view. Justice is
inseparably connected with the sense of solidity. This explains the tendency of
identifying the creator of both justice and the "heaven and earth". Thus, where
Immanuel Kant asserts that "fiat iustitia, pereat mundus (let justice reign even if all
• • • 1M
the rogues in the world perish because of it)", Hume would maintain that when the
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The Humean ground to abide by the rule ofjustice is different from the Kantian ground that to
observe justice is a requirement of universality, and therefore, injustice is contradictious, is
against the dictation of reason. However, the Humean ground is concerned with the real
conditions of human behaviour.
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Kant's own translation in German (Kant, 1996: 345).
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perception ofjustice cannot obtain, the world will also perish. This is now
understandable for us; when we suffer from either mental disorder or the extreme
conditions of social disorder, there is no justice constructed by the general point of
view. In those cases, heaven and earth will literally "perish".
How then does Hume explain the fact that there still seem to be a lot of
unrepentant "sensible knaves"? Though the discussion of the sensible knave overtly
appears only in the Enquiry, in the Treatise, Hume's "knave" receives different
9TR .... • •
treatment. Hume sees our tendency to injustice in the "infirmity of human nature"
(T 3.2.7.5; SBN 536). "When we consider any objects at a distance, ...we always
give the preference to whatever is in itself preferable" {ibid.). Justice is always
approved from the general point of view. We do not usually mistake moral judgment
in distant circumstances. "But on my nearer approach, those circumstances, which I
first over-look'd, begin to appear, and have an influence on my conduct and
affection" {ibid.). Because of the weakness of human nature, we yield ourselves to
the temptation to breach justice.
This natural infirmity I may very much regret, and I may endeavour, by
all possible means, to free myself from it. I may have recourse to study
and reflexion within myself; to the advice of friends; to frequent
meditation, and repeated resolution: And having experience'd how
ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other
expedient, by which I may impose a restraint upon myself, and guard
against this weakness. (T 3.2.7.5; SBN 536-537) 39
Therefore, Hume concludes:
Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that
narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote.
They cannot change their natures. All they can do is to change their
situation, and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of
238
In this respect, the Enquiry and the Treatise have a different objective; the former is an
explanation of virtue and the latter is an explanation of human nature. But they are compatible.
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This may reflect Hume's own attempt and failure as a young man to execute all the duties in
The Whole Duty ofMan (see Mossner, 1980: 34).
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some particular persons, and its violation their more remote. These
persons, then, are not only indue'd to observe those rules in their own
conduct, but also to constrain others to a like regularity, and inforce the
dictates of equity thro' the whole society. (T 3.2.7.6; SBN 537)
Hume shares with Locke the similar idea of government. Its raison d'etre is
to compensate the imperfection of human beings. But Hume gives a more consistent
empirical explanation for the authority of government than Locke; justice derives its
authority from the comprehensive interests of society, and the stable life which
society provides its people with.240
8. Concluding Remarks
We have seen the basic structure ofHume's theory ofjustice as the development of
his theory of perception. He criticises Hobbesian rational consideration and Lockean
abstraction as the ground for justice, and replaces it with his theory of convention.
Hume finds the only feasible way for individuals to relate in society is through a
negative commitment; by not violating others' property, people enter into a
relationship with society, from which a new type of human interaction develops in
accordance with the rule ofjustice. A morality ofproximate human relationships can
still be maintained by sympathy. Hobbesian covenants and Humean conventions
serve the same fundamental function: to control the wills of others by morality.
Based on human sentiments, Hume's theory ofjustice reveals a striking parallelism
with his theory of causation; Hume denies objectivity to both laws, and alleges them
to be products of human psychology. The normative minimal aim of the Humean
theory is to vouchsafe stability; custom is at once stability's driving force and its
realisation. His theory connects personal and public interest in the system ofjustice.
Hume shows how general interest and self-interest are naturally reinforced in the
development of society through justice.
Because of the constructive nature of human perceptions, they create the
stable objective world as the stage that enables human communication, on the bases
240
This leads to the topic of allegiance to the government, which will be discussed in Chapter 8.
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ofwhich, society is created, pivoting on property. Humean justice is founded on the
general point of view that sees oneself and others as particulars in the same
convention. In this way, the general point of view represents the comprehensive
principle ofHumean justice and morality.
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Chapter Eight:
Promise and the Allegiance to the Government
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed the first of the three laws ofHumean justice:
stability of possessions. The formation of the concept ofjustice is decisive for the
formation of society, because with the belief injustice human beings acquire a new
mode of behaviour that is unknown in nature. The concept ofjustice accompanies the
concept of rights, as well as the general practice of abiding by the rules ofjustice
from moral motivation. However, the stability ofproperty is only the first step of
Hume's system ofjustice. In this chapter, I will explore how the first law ofjustice is
followed by the second law, the transference ofproperty, then by the third law, the
performance of promise. These are derived by necessity from the first law ofjustice.
Among them, Hume's theory of promise is particularly significant. This is because
Hobbes and Locke, though in different ways, invoked promise as a means of
establishing and legitimising government. Hobbes and Locke resort to covenant or
contract for explaining the foundation of government, assuming them to be
fundamental laws. Hume's theory ofpromise inevitably implies a challenge to his
two predecessors, especially to Locke whose theory is typically recognised as a
social contract theory. This chapter, therefore, attempts to clarify the concept of
promise with its critical implication for social contract theory, in relation to the
epistemology ofHume that we have discussed so far.
I first outline Hume's overall opinion of the social contract in his "Of
Original Contract" to assess Hume's general position on the problems regarding
promise and government. Then, I explain the second law ofjustice, the transference
of property by consent as a preliminary step for Hume's theory of promise. I argue
that the performance of promise is as artificial virtue that binds people's behaviour.
This chapter clarifies that government is also a "composition" (T 3.2.8.8; SBN 539)
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of human nature in a similar sense as the external body, the belief in which is crucial
for stabilising our life. Government is sustained by the virtue of allegiance. I argue
that allegiance to government is founded on the same mechanism as our belief in the
existence of the external body, which signifies that government consists in the
general point of view.
1. "OfOriginal Contract"
Modern social contract theories played a significant role in justifying the
establishment of government and the obligation of the people to obey the
government. Ever since Jeremy Bentham referred to Hume to attack social contract
theory together with the natural law tradition as its background, Hume has been
known as a critic of social contract theories.241 There is no doubt that Hume regards
social contract theory as a major target of his criticism. Hume's position on the social
contract theory is clearly developed in his "Of the Original Contract". Though he is
critical of the social contract theory, he does not simply deny the social contract
theory. Hume shows an understanding of what the theory might offer a theory of
political society. He shares a motivation with the social contract thinkers to explain
the origin of government, and also the obligation to submit to the government. Upon
the evaluation of the significance of social contract theory, Hume attempts to replace
it with his own. Hume specifically has in mind the Lockean social contract theory.
Hume acknowledges that
When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their
bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till
cultivated by education; we must necessarily allow, that nothing but
their own consent could, at first, associate them together, and subject
them to any authority. The people, if we trace government to its first
origin in the woods and deserts, are the source of all power and
jurisdiction, and voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order,
abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and
241 Bentham says, "this chimaera (the Original Contract) had been effectively demolished by Mr.
Hume. I think we hear not so much of it now as formerly" (Bentham, 1988: 51). Standard
commentary assumes this understanding (cf. Plamenatz, 1963: 98, 332).
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companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to submit,
were either expressed, or were so clear and obvious, that it might well
be esteemed superfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the
original contract, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at first,
founded on a contract, and that the most ancient rude combinations of
mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. (Essay-OC, 467-68)
Hume agrees that given the natural equality of human capacities, consent is
the only means to create one authority at least in the initial establishment of any
government. No one person can rule many others by his physical power. But Hume
denies that consent is the only justification of the rule of government in the more
mature stage. If consent is the sole ground for submission, people are allowed to
abandon the authority by their will as well. Therefore, the social contract theory
justifies a right to resist when the sovereign fails to implement the contract. Hume
shows the absurdity of social contract theory by pointing out that such a practice is
not widely observed in the world (Cf. Essay-OC, 469-70). Many princes regard their
subjects as their property and their own sovereignty as independent of their subjects.
Most people do not care about the origin of their government. Common people
acknowledge the authority of their government only because of the fact that their
ancestors had obeyed the government for generations. Even if there was an original
contract, it does not bind the later generations. Considering past practices of
establishing a new government in history, it is obvious that the force to demolish the
old government gives birth to almost any government. In those cases people are
forced to obey the new government (Cf. Essay-OC, 474).
If consent is made by force, it is natural that the consent will lose its power
once the force is removed. Hume argues that mere formal consent is not enough
unless it is supported by some spontaneous principle. Therefore, what really matters
is not the consent itself, but that which makes the consent enduring. Hume's enquiry
is directed to the conditions under which meaningful consent is made. The Lockean
ground for making consent the only and sufficient condition for obedience to
government can be found in his individualism (cf. Grant, 1988). Because people are
naturally free, independent, and equal, only their consent can make them subject to
an authority other than themselves. And, if they consent freely, there is no other
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means for the government to control them. Hobbes thinks that a covenant by force or
under threat is valid. Locke answers that because human beings are free, they cannot
give consent by force.
However, the problem with Locke's theory is that it does not explain the
obligations of later generations who are not involved in the original contract. To this
possible criticism, Locke presents a "tacit consent" theory, which means that living
under the rule of the government is itself the evidence that the person gives a tacit
consent to that government. However, tacit consent is a contradictory concept
because consent lies in its explicitness. Hume thinks this compromised form of social
contract cannot be justified unless the choice is realistically practicable. It is well
known that Hume says,
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free
choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or
manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he
acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel,
freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on
board while asleep. And must leap into the ocean, and perish, the
moment he leaves her. (Essay-OC, 475)
Hume likens the British Isle to a ship which people got on board while
sleeping. Consent can be a ground for a legitimate government only if people can
disobey government whenever they do not like it. As most people do not have a
privilege to leave freely, simply living there does not mean they are willing to obey
the government. Hume also points out that people are placed under the governance of
their prince even if they leave their home country, as the Pilgrim fathers did, which
indicates that the foundation ofpolitical legitimacy lies outside of consent, explicit or
otherwise. Where, then, does the legitimacy come from? Hume makes it very clear
that both the obligation to allegiance and the obligation to fidelity owe to "the
general interests or necessities of society".
If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound
to pay to government, I readily answer, because society could not
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otherwise subsist: And this answer is clear and intelligent to all man
kind. Your answer is, because we should keep our word. But besides,
that no body, till trained in a philosophical system, can either
comprehend or relish this answer: Besides this, I say, you find yourself
embarrassed, when it is asked, why we are bound to keep our word?
Nor can you give any answer, but what would, immediately, without
any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance. (Essay-OC,
481)
In this passage Hume reveals the crucial connection between the obedience
to government and keeping a promise. Hume sees the defect of the social contract
theory not so much as consisting in a fiction of the original contract, but more as an
insufficient explanation of the nature ofpromise. Without understanding promise, we
cannot understand obedience. More importantly, Hume's theory is not directly
addressing the problems which arise when we should resist a despotic government.
These arguments cannot be made sensible unless the nature of government,
obedience and promise are clarified. Hume considers that the social contract theory
rests on an obscure foundation regarding these significant concepts. Social contract
theories regard these concepts as rational, but in fact they only take them for granted,
which is the cause of absurdity.
in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is
really no other standard, by which any controversy can ever be decided.
And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous,
than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, repugnant to the common
sentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations
and all stages. (Essay-OC, 486)
Thus, Hume recognises the importance of clarifying the moral concept and
the standard ofmorality. He distinguishes the moral fact that we should obey
government from the problem about which government is more desirable. The latter
decision does not annihilate the former fact. Moral norms in the final instance should
be clear and accessible to "all mankind". Hume's philosophy is permeated by this
attitude. The general interest of society is inseparably connected to the duty of
obedience, and produces both the duty of obedience, and promise keeping. Where
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there is no duty of obedience, there is no duty of promise. Therefore, it is in vain to
ascribe the former to the latter.
The general obligation, which binds us to government, is the interests
and necessities of society, and this obligation is very strong. The
determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of
government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Present
possession has considerable authority in these cases, and greater than in
private property; because of the disorders which attend all revolutions
and changes of government. (Essay-OC, 486)
Hume clearly finds the largest chance of social improvement in safe
"commerce". Hume finds it extraordinary to assert "that the supreme power in a
state cannot take from any man, by taxes and impositions, anypart ofhis property,
without his own consent or that ofhis representatives" {Essay-OC italics Hume, 487).
This is anything but the general opinion ofmankind. What matters for Hume is how
the consistent and moral explanation of social interest and necessity which produces
the justice of promise can be possible. In his discussion of promise, Hume clarifies
the mistake of the social contract theory together with the mistake of the theory of
individualism.
2. Relation to the Preceding Laws of Justice
We have seen above that Hobbes and Locke arrive at different destinations in
accordance with the difference of their initial premises. Hume presents a theory that
fosters the ongoing development of commercial society, free both from the
Hobbesian fear of anarchy and from the Lockean fear of despotism. Regarding the
concept of promise, Hume argues Hobbes and Locke do not explain the concept of
promise itself, and why promise has a moral power, without which covenant or
compact does not make sense. Hume says,
that a promise wou'd not be intelligible, before human conventions
had establish'd it; and that even if it were intelligible, it wou'd not be
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attended with any moral obligation. (T 3.2.5.1; SBN 516, italics
Hume)
Both Hobbes and Locke have a provisional answer to this question. But both
answers are insufficient for understanding the whole implications of the concept. The
Hobbesian covenant falls short of a promise that regulates the personal relationship
between individuals. Hobbes's covenant is a once and for all determination; people
surrender their natural rights to their common sovereign. The performance of
promise in Hobbes is controlled through the fear of authority. But this is not a
Humean promise that serves to create a cooperative behaviour ofpeople. Hobbes
does not regard promise as initiating from individual rationality because his
methodological individualism cannot explain the common framework based on
anything other than individual wills.
Locke understands that the binding force of a promise is morality which
derives from no particular cause in reality. He grounds the moral obligation to keep
promises in natural law; people must keep promises because it is a moral duty set
ultimately by the will of God. Locke resorts to the notion of contract in order to
establish a bilateral relationship between government and people. He considers
promise to be the requirement ofmoral beings.242 Locke's theory focuses on the
relationship between government and people; he does not explain the principle of
regulating private relationships among ordinary citizens. This is also reflected in the
individualistic picture of human beings who work alone on nature rather than in
cooperation with other people.
Hume's innovation is to explain promise from non-moral premises by his
evolutionary approach. He introduces promise as the third law ofjustice after the
first two rules ofjustice; the stabilisation of property, and the transfer ofproperty
through consent. Hume is very aware of the fact that nothing can exist independently
except in relation to its proceeding conditions. This also applies to promise. The
242
Locke excludes atheists and Catholics from tolerance on the ground that they would not keep
promise that should be made before God (Locke, 1983). For a more detailed explanation, see (e. g.
Riley, 1974; Tully, 1993: 47-62).
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system of promise does not exist independently but is created in reaction to the
situation that necessitates it.
Obviously, promise does not make sense without the situation in which it is
serviceable to human beings. Thus, Hume traces the origin ofpromise to the natural
state before justice to understand what situation requires the system ofpromise.
Historical and evolutionary considerations make it all too clear that human beings
cannot be independent. First, no one can be born to oneself, nor can one sustain one's
own life by oneself into adulthood. This is enough evidence to indicate that the
Hobbesian picture of the independent individual is impossible (though Hobbes
indeed demonstrates the impossibility). It is also evident that human beings are
neither free nor equal by nature other than in moral terms, as Locke asserts. For
Hume, however, the concepts of freedom or equality can be produced in a highly
sophisticated social stage only after human beings obtain the system ofjustice.
As we have seen in the last chapter, it is not arbitrary that the first law of
justice is the stability of possessions, because, in the primitive stage of human
development, the cause of conflicts can only be concrete objects. The artificial virtue
ofjustice unites society by a new kind of relationship, which is not based on
perceptible effects. Paradoxically, this is how human beings can become concerned
with the whole society despite their natural limitations, psychological as well as
physical. Justice creates a new type ofmutuality among people. Mutuality develops
necessarily because it is essential for sustaining a social life. This necessity is also
based on physical limitation. It is a simple fact that human beings cannot bring with
themselves everything they need for their survival, though Locke might say they are
given the whole earth. People seek for a solution to this difficulty, which leads to the
next development of the law ofjustice.
3. "Of the Transference of Property by Consent"
The second law of the transference ofproperty by consent links the first law of the
stability ofpossessions and the third law of promise keeping. Although Hume's
dealing with this second law is quite terse, a mere three pages, it contains, behind its
plain surface, the explanation of a crucial step for preparing the convention of
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promise. First, property is understood as a mysterious power in that the same object
exerts a totally different power depending on whether one is its owner or not. This
reflects Hume's understanding of morality as founded on causation. Justice is a
particularly human mode of causation. Let us take an example. I can do anything
with my watch as its possessor. But this same watch, left on a table, can devastate
your entire life ifonly you put it into your "pocket". A still more surprising mystery
can happen. The same act of your putting the same watch into your pocket will not
harm you at all, but only add to your property, only if you heard some moments
before the action, my voice saying "I give that watch to you". Let us share Hume's
surprise that this phenomenon is totally incomprehensible in terms of natural
causation. There is something needed to fill the gap.243
Hume constantly appeals to the principle that every phenomenon can be
explained as a causal reaction. The rule of the transfer of property by consent
emerges as a reaction to the rule of the stability of possessions. As we have seen in
the last chapter, Hume stipulates five rules for deciding property. The central
principle, a criticism of the Aristotelian principle, is that property should not be
decided based on any desert or merit of the person. Though this brings stability, it is
accompanied by an inconvenience that the resulting de facto distribution of goods is
too much dependent on chances, which must cause gross inconveniences. It is not
until man confronts this inconvenience that man finds some way ofmodifying the
initial allocation of property. It is wrong to suppose that people demand the proper
distribution of things before finding some inconveniences in their present possession
ofproperty. Properties cannot be kept fixed in any form; the needs ofproperty reflect
the ever-changing situation of human beings. A "Remedy" to this inconvenience is
sought after. Violence is the worst option. The next strategy, however, commends
itself. It reads:
possession and property shou'd always be stable, except when the
proprietor agrees to bestow them on some other person. This rule can
have no ill consequence, in occasioning wars and dissentions; since
243
Hume's "OfMiracles" (EHU 10; SBN 109f.) has proved this theoretical intention.
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the proprietor's consent, who alone is concern'd, is taken alone in the
alienation: And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting
property to persons. Different parts of earth produce different
commodities; and not only so, but different men both are by nature
fitted for different employments, and attain to greater perfection in
any one, when they confine themselves to it alone. All this requires a
mutual exchange and commerce; for which reason the translation of
property by consent is founded on a law of nature, as well as its
stability without such a consent. (T 3.2.4.1; SBN 514)
This is the second law ofjustice in Hume. In this way, the redistribution of
property at once explains the origin of commerce and the division of labour. Through
these, property can most effectively be redistributed in accordance with present
needs. Hume describes the natural emergence of the relevant concept regarding the
redistribution of property. Consent is established, suited to its size, as a means for
redistributing goods based on individual requirments. It serves as a cause for
people's property to circulate in society. Consent is the only way of changing a once
fixed property relationship and therefore, the most convenient way of redistribution.
Most significant of all, consent "can have no ill consequence" (T 3.2.4.1;
SBN 514), because consent guarantees the peaceful redistribution of property among
people. However, unlike Locke, Humean consent is not the primary ground of
justice; its function is confined to the distribution of property based on the needs and
desires of individuals. Moreover, Humean consent differs from Lockean consent
because it does not represent the natural right prescribed in natural law. In other
words, consent is valid not because of the absolute rights of individuals, but because
of convention. As with the rule for the stability of property, consent is based on
convention, which represents its validity and its binding force.
Hume clearly aims to replace the Lockean term of "consent" that is
considered to originate from the right of individuals.244 The consent of the
244 This is Hume's basic strategy. It is obviously his strategy to confer different meaning to the
same term. Remember he takes the same strategy in the discussion of sympathy; he transformed
the term of "pride" or "humility" into a totally different meaning. And the most significant
differentiation of the meaning occurs in his use of the word "natural (T 3.1.2.10; SBN 475)". He
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individuals is socially acknowledged as a means for adjusting property ownership,
and there is no Lockean inalienable right involved in consent. Consent is based on
the convention of society regarding the transference ofproperty. However, consent is
conferred with a strong moral power because of the absolute necessity for avoiding
conflict and sustaining individual life, when it is established as the law ofjustice.
This rule is absolute because the redistribution of goods is impossible without this
rule, and without redistribution, society would soon collapse.
There is another sense in which the second law ofjustice serves to produce
another significant concept for the formation of society, which is "mutuality". In the
first law of the stability of property, property emerges as the result of each person's
concentrating on his own possessions. At this stage, no mutuality as social
interaction has emerged. First in this second law ofjustice individuals enter into
mutuality through the exchange of their possessions, as distributors of their property.
This is the initial sense ofmutuality. Thus, individuals are involved in mutual
relationships with other people through exchanging their property, and strengthening
mutual dependency and social order. Consent is a vehicle for producing mutuality. In
this way, Hume has radically transformed the concept of consent from the Lockean
means for legitimatization to the means for developing human relation.245 This
further prepares the way for positing the last law ofjustice, promise-keeping.
4. Promise as the Completion of the Laws of Justice
The third law of justice, the performance of promise, is founded upon the second law,
transference by consent. In order to demonstrate its artificiality, Hume resorts to a
similar argument to that in his discussion of the stability of possessions. If promise is
shown to be based on convention, it no longer can be the ultimate justification of
government (cf. Miller, 1981: 81). Hume points out why keeping promises is an
artificial virtue. He asserts
changes the traditional meaning of the word of "natural" as eternal or unchangeable into a causal
concept, depending on which theory he has developed.
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that a promise is not intelligible naturally, nor antecedent to human
conventions; and that a man, unacquainted with society, could never
enter into any engagements with another, even tho' they could
perceive each other's thoughts by intuition (T 3.2.5.2; SBN 516).
Hume confirms the above passage by asserting that there is no "faculty of soul" that
produces promise. Though promise is issued by the agent to commit himself to a
future action, neither "resolution", nor "desire", nor "willing" assigns him any
obligation. This is the fundamental point of Hume's theory of promise. Underneath
this argument lies his theory of causation; no present perception guarantees a future
event. Likewise, no one can produce a moral relation as promise by himself. Thus it
is arguable that Hume's theory of promise is elucidated by the same argument that he
used to explain causation. The core argument ofHume's theory of promise is to
explain how it is that the present contract is causally connected with future action.
Hume recognizes the defect of the social contract theory in this respect. Thus it is
now clear that the real purport ofHume's theory of causation is a criticism of the
social contract theory. This is related to the basic tenet of his moral perception.
According to Hume,
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any
action, or quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we
say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it,
displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an
obligation to perform it. ... [We cannot] render any action agreeable or
disagreeable, moral or immoral; which, without that act, wou'd have
produced contrary impressions, or have been endow'd with different
qualities. (T 3.2.5.4; SBN 517)
Hume clarifies the mysterious character of promise. Promise is like a
magical formula that changes people's behaviour. Hume emphasises that as it cannot
possibly be created by any working of the mind of a single person, it must be derived
from something beyond the individual will. Shown in his explanation of the stability
of property, there must be a natural motivation for an action to become a moral
245 For a Lockean meaning of consent, see, e.g., Dunn, 1967: 153-82.
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obligation; in the case of natural virtues, moral norms are derived from pleasant or
useful tendencies of human action that are established as a custom. Hume takes the
examples of relieving the miserable, and of a father taking care of his children (Cf. T
3.2.1.5; SBN 478). For those moral obligations, there are corresponding natural
inclinations that urge us to take some action whose negligence means a deficit of
natural sentiments of humanity.246 Unlike these natural virtues that are accompanied
by a natural inclination, however,
there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of
their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that
promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions. (T 3.2.5.6; SBN
519)
This is the evidence for the artificiality of the third law ofjustice; "promises
are human inventions, founded on the necessities and interests of society" (T 3.2.5.7;
ibid.). As a promise cannot exist without other laws ofjustice, it cannot be the
original foundation of society. Independent individuals cannot resort to the system of
promise in order to form a society. In this way, Hume denies the function of promise
in establishing a political society. But this negative argument is followed by a
positive theory about promise. Hume fully acknowledges the essential function of
promise in society.
It is important to understand how promise follows the first two rules of
justice. By the first law ofjustice, Hume explained the stability of society and the
creation of property. This is a foundation for creating independent individuals who
work on their own with a favourable indifference to others. But this is not enough for
their survival, and they establish the second law of nature to transfer each other's
property by consent, which is the first step toward the mutual commitment of the
individuals. The transference of property, however, turns out not to be enough for
implementing mutual cooperation.
245
Apparently, Hume considers the paradigm of "natural virtue" to be found among animals. The
rivalry with Descartes thesis is obvious in his "Of the pride and humility of animals" (T 2.1.12;
SBN 324f.).
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The transference of property, which is the proper remedy for this
inconvenience, cannot remedy it entirely; because it can only take
place with regard to such objects as are present and individual, but not
to such as are absent or general (T 3.2.5.8; SBN 520).
Though transference of property by consent is known to be to mutual
advantage, it is not always easy to practice, mostly because ofphysical limitations.
Distant property, like "a particular house, twenty leagues distant", or a general thing,
like "ten bushels of corn", cannot be transferred. More serious cases, however, apply
to "services and actions, which we may exchange to our mutual interest and
advantage" (T 3.2.5.8; SBN 520). Hume describes the quandary in a superbly
succinct manner:
Now as it frequently happens, that these mutual performances cannot
be finish'd at the same instance, 'tis necessary, that one party be
contented to remain in uncertainty, and depend upon the gratitude of
the other for a return of kindness. But so much corruption is there
among men, that, generally speaking, this becomes but a slender
security; and as the benefactor is here suppos'd to bestow his favours
with a view to self-interest, this both takes off from the obligation, and
sets an example of selfishness, which is the true mother of ingratitude.
Were we, therefore, to follow the natural course of our passions and
inclinations, we shou'd perform but few actions for the advantage of
others, from disinterested views; because we are naturally very limited
in our kindness and affection: And we shou'd perform as few of that
kind, out of a regard to interest; because we cannot depend upon their
gratitude. Here then is the mutual commerce of good offices in a
manner lost among mankind, and every one reduc'd to his own skill
and industry for his well-being and subsistence (T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519-
520).
Hume is aware that people will not often consent to sacrifice their personal
interest for the sake of others or the public. It is easy to see that Hume has in mind
the Hobbesian quandary of being unable to rely on others' gratitude or voluntary
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kindness for mutual interest.247 As everyone loves themselves more than others,
kindness to others is naturally overwhelmed by self-interest. Thus, it is contradictory
to human nature to rely on the voluntary kindness of others to attain one's own self-
interest, though mutual cooperation is necessary for self-interest. The latter is desired
from the general point of view. The solution to the problem is to secure cooperation
by the sanction of self-interest: by using a certain form ofwords, a man "subjects
himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure" (T 3.2.5.10;
SBN 522). This is the initiation of the moral system ofpromise. In this way, people
make use ofpromise, which allows us to act relying on the will of others, sanctioned
by the whole spectrum ofmorality from legal systems to a mere dislike.
Unlike the Hobbesian quandary of complete isolation, people have already
attained the crucial first two steps ofjustice. The last problem is how to extend the
positive act ofmutuality that brings such a huge benefit to each by their non-
simultaneous cooperation. Promise is an artificial assurance to bind the future action
of a person, which is by definition beyond the reach of any other person. As in the
first and the second law ofjustice, the rule of keeping promise is founded on
convention. At this stage, it is not difficult for people to perform the promise,
because they have already acquired the first and the second laws ofjustice of
attaining self-interest through mutuality. Performing promises assumes a stronger
moral force in accordance with its utility for the interest of society. The rule of
keeping promises develops from the second rule of the transference ofproperty; it is
a transference of future action by consent. If the first and the second law ofjustice
are concerned with the spatial distribution of human goods, the third law ofjustice is
concerned with the temporal distribution of human goods that include future
behaviour. Hume's explanation demands no impracticable performance like the
Hobbesian renouncement of rights. Like other laws ofjustice, promise is a way to
achieve stable self-interest in a cooperative scheme, i.e. relying on the future
behaviour of other people. Because the morality of promise is based on interest in
247 The famous formulation is the prisoner's dilemma. For a discussion, see, e.g., Blackburn,
1998a: Ch. 6.
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self and others, it can easily prevail. Then performing promise becomes a strong
obligation, as it is natural to "every mortal" (T 3.2.5.11; SBN 522).
All they [moralists and politicians] can pretend to, is, to give a new
direction to those natural passions, and teach us that we can better
satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner, than by their
headlong and impetuous motion. Hence I learn to do a service to
another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I forsee, that
he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind,
and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with
me or with others. (T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521)
Hume points out another important feature of promise; the validity of
promise does not depend on the hidden intention of the promiser; even if the
promiser has "an intention of deceiving us", we are still "bound by his expression or
verbal promise, ifwe accept it" (T 3.2.5.13; SBN 524). This is concerned with the
ultimate authority ofpromise. It is significant to notice that this is understood as
Hume's phenomenalism ofmorality as a criticism of the Lockean concept ofperson
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as a moral substance whose "intention" endorses the promise. Promise depends
only on a formal feature ofwording. This is why promise can share public validity,
as in making a private will public. Therefore, it is possible to understand that Hume
replaces the moral intention of the person with the public endorsement, as the ground
ofmorality and the validity of promise. Promise assumes a force not because of the
will of the promiser, but owning to the convention publicly established. Through
promise, a new type of human causation is introduced; our personal intention
regarding our future actions, expressed in promise, are assumed to be quasi-facts. In
fact, as Hume establishes in his theory of external objects, this signifies the human
meaning of "fact".
Hume thus treats promise as causation.249 Like the other two rules ofjustice,
the promise is an artificial causation that exerts the same power as in the way
248 This is the implication of his theory of the external body (see chapter 4).
249 The causation that he discusses in Book 1 should be understood in exactly the same manner
(see Chapter 3).
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physical objects cause human behaviour. A promise, though it is physically a mere
"voice" or "ink", exerts causal power by producing certain beliefs in the people
concerned. Promises move people through their belief that breach will cause sanction.
Promisees have to arrange their future behaviour on the condition, expressed by the
promisers. The words of the promiser function just like any other belief in physical
reality. Promises set the framework for people's behaviour. Just as we walk on solid
ground and avoid cliffs, we plan our future behaviour taking the events predicted by
promise as quasi-facts. The artificial causation of promises is no different from
natural causation of objects as both influence human beings through their beliefs.
Promise-breaking infringes upon all behaviours within the framework ofjustice.
Hume compares promise to "transubstantiatiorf or "holy orders" (T 3.2.5.14; SBN
524) impressed that what is no more than "being mere sound" (T 3.2.5.14; SBN 525),
the vibration of the air, exerts such a physical force.250 Unlike the Lockean idea, the
moral power ofpromise does not derive its authority from "heaven". Promise is a
clear, non-mysterious prediction of future behaviour of other people. Besides that,
each party has a liberty to serve his own interest on the assumption of the promise. In
this way, people begin to make many arrangements to meet the new situation and to
increase individual interests.
Once the obligation to keep promises is established as a promise ofjustice,
it exerts a dramatically expanding force in society for producing new relations. This
formative power of promise has to do with its formality. As the law ofjustice is
restricted to performing promises, promises can be made regardless of their content
about whatever arrangement two parties are ready to consent on. Performing
promises is a final development of the laws ofjustice in that it can stipulate any law
including the first law of non-violation of other's possessions. In this sense, promises
accomplish the first and second laws ofjustice. This has led the theorists of the social
contract to mistake it to be the first law ofjustice rather than a subsequent, emergent
law. Such is the convenience and power ofpromises that eventually people organise
every social arrangement through promises as a system of law.
250
Hume apparently obtains this idea from Hobbes (cf. Leviathan 117).
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Once human activities start to be carried out through the system of promise,
it is impossible to get rid of the system; the contents of the rule can be changed but
the manner of acting by such rules cannot be obliterated other than at the cost of
complete social disintegration. As with the most fundamental conventions like
language, keeping promises is sine qua non for sustaining society. Hume says that "it
is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statues, and maxims,
and an idea of justice and honour" (EPM 4.20; SBN 210). This reflects the
fundamentally conventional nature ofhuman behaviour.
Just as it is in "the selfishness and confined generosity ofmen and the
scarce provision nature has made for his wants" that justice derives its origin, so the
origin of promise derives from the desire for compensating insufficient property with
the combined effect of selfishness and the limited generosity. These inconveniences
are set by nature. But they can bring invaluable pleasure and infinite wealth to human
society in the end. Thus Hume's theory ofjustice explains the basic structure of
social order in its full shape in both spatial and temporal dimensions.
5. The Origin of the Government as the Perfection of Justice
Hume's account of the establishment of government is founded on his theory of
justice. A central characteristic of Hume's theory ofjustice is that Hume separates the
origin ofjustice from morality. Society without government is logically possible
because convention is more fundamental as the bond of society than government.
However, this does not of course mean that government is redundant. Hume's task is
to explain the emergence of government. On the other hand, Hume clearly holds that
government is impossible without society. In this respect, Hume denies the
Hobbesian theory in favour of the Lockean theory about government. Locke
considers that government compensates for the imperfection of human beings;
because of imperfection, human beings cannot realise the prescription of natural law.
Thus, according to Locke, there are four major tasks of the government; to enact
laws, to judge cases, to administrate the law and judgement, and to deal with foreign
affairs.
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While Locke recognises the origin of government in the imperfection of
human beings, Hume does not take the moral weakness of human beings as
imperfection. It rightly represents the actual mechanism of human psychology, "that
men are mightily govern'd by the imagination, and proportion their affections more
to the light, under which any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic
value" (T 3.2.7.1; SBN 534). Even though the system ofjustice is known to procure
the general interest, justice requires the renouncement of one's direct pursuit of self-
interest. On the other hand, the benefit by breaching justice is specific and particular.
Although the particular benefit is much smaller than the general interest, it has a
more vivid influence on individual behaviour.
This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to
their known interest; and in particular why they prefer any trivial
advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which
so much depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of
every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to
counter-ballance any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it.
(T 3.2.7.3; SBN 535)
Because of the weakness of human beings, they tend to choose the particular,
but smaller interest rather than justice. "You have the same propension, that I have,
in favour of what is contiguous above what is remote" (T 3.2.7.3; SBN 535). The
imitative tendency of human nature provides a further reason to breach justice,
because to abide by justice among other people ignoring it makes us "the cully ofmy
integrity" (ibid.). Injustice is wrong not because it is contradictory, as in Kant, but
because it destroys the fabric of convention and causes dysfunction to the system of
justice. However, Hume asserts that the weakness holds at the same time the remedy,
because
When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute
distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to whatever is in
itself preferable, without considering its situation and circumstances . . .
My distance from the final determination makes all those minute
Chapter 8 261
Hume's General Point of View
difference vanish, nor am I affected by any thing, but the general and
more discernable qualities of good and evil (T 3.2.7.5; SBN 536).
It is evident that this explanation implies the general point of view as a
means for seeking for what is preferable in itself, correcting our immediate
judgements. Therefore, justice is reflected in the general point of view. As we have
seen, justice is involved in coordinating the interests of the individuals. Justice will
not perish, even if it contradicts individual interest, as long as people deal with their
interest in sustainable human relationships. Hume's moral principle identifies a
concrete means to realise it. Therefore, the requirement ofjustice clarifies a concrete
procedure for securing its observation. Thus Hume finds the origin of government in
the imperfection of the system ofjustice. As the initial incident for establishing
government, Hume cites "quarrels ... among different societies" (T 3.2.8.1; SBN
540). In conflicts with other societies, society in warfare needs a specific leader who
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administrates justice, otherwise the society will immediately collapse. The
personality of the administrator does not matter compared to his role of perceiving
the observance ofjustice as in his own interests.
These are persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and
their ministers, our governors and rulers, who being indifferent persons
to the greatest part of the state, have no interest, or but a remote one, in
any act of injustice; and being satisfied with their present condition,
and with their part in society, have an immediate interest in every
execution of justice, which is so necessary to the upholding of society.
Here then is the origin of civil government and allegiance (T 3.2.7.6;
SBN 537).
Government, once established, assumes the authority of settling all disputes
about justice. The benefit of government reaches further than that. Governments, by
all means, "force them [people] to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in
some common end or purpose" (T 3.2.7.8; SBN 538). The activities of government
251
Again, this is Hume's rephrasing of the Lockean assertion that consent is necessary to subject
oneself to a specific political authority in society (cf. Riley, 1976: 136-145).
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achieve the cooperation of people. Government has the physical capacity of enabling
people to engage in joint projects with a multitude of others. The system ofpromise
can have two neighbours "agree to drain a meadow" (ibid.). But promise cannot have
a thousand people concert and execute so complicated a design, because "each seeks
a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the whole burden
on others" (ibid.). Government extends the positive function of promise by
representing the multitudes of people. Therefore, only government embodies the
general point of view, and morality in its entire scale.
Thus bridges are built; harbours opend'd; ramparts rais'd; canals
form'd; fleets equip'd; and armies disciplin'd; every where, by the care
of government, which, tho' compos'd of men subject to all human
infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions
imaginable, a composition, that is, in some measure, exempted from all
these infirmities. (T 3.2.7.8; SBN 539)
In this way, Hume explains the establishment of government without
resorting to the concept of contract. Unlike the government prescribed by Hobbes
and Locke, Humean government is thought to produce unknown public interests. It is
crucial to notice that though the products of those interests are all perceivable,
government itself as the cause of these tangible interests is not at all directly
perceivable.252 There is no such substance as government. Hume calls government
"one of the finest and most subtle inventions, imaginable, a composition" (T 3.2.7.8;
SBN 539). Government exists only as a "function": something that embodies justice
that consists in the general interest. In this sense, the principle of government is the
general point of view. Humean government is established as the development of the
system ofjustice; it is required to sanction the system ofjustice. Unlike Hobbes,
government does not particularly aim to protect the life of people, and unlike Locke,
it does not particularly aim to protect the property ofpeople. Humean government
252 Let us remember that Hume includes "government", in a somewhat clumsy manner at that
point in the Treatise (T 1.1.7.14; SBN 23) as one of the examples of "abstract ideas". Now
Hume's underlying consistency is clear.
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realises stability and promotes the interest of society that, more concretely, is power,
ability, and security.
As Hume's theory of government is not founded on any contract, it has a
different objective from the contractarian theories. Hume's government is established
as the natural development of convention and has a role in sustaining the order
prescribed by the system ofjustice. Hume also gives a different explanation
regarding the rules to decide forms of government. In the previous chapter, we have
discussed the rules that decide property. Justice regarding the stability ofproperty
claims nothing about who should own what. The central point of the concept of
justice is that property does not exist as an inherent quality of objects. This is a result
of his scepticism about the essence of property; there is no quality in objects that
commends itself as the property of any specific possessor. Ownership by specific
persons is decided only by convention. It is significant that the same theory applies to
the establishment of government.
Hume asserts that "[a]s numerous and civiliz'd society cannot subsist
without government, so government is entirely useless without an exact obedience"
(T 3.2.10.1; SBN 553-554). The point is that strict obedience is due not to any
inherent quality of the government. Obedience is solely a matter of the attitude of the
citizens. Government formally requires compliance, but it is the people who realise it.
And it is Hume's fundamental theory that the interest ofjustice lies in this obedience
rather than in the government. It does not matter who governs, because people
submit themselves not to the sovereign but to the rules ofjustice. On the contrary, it
is the worst political system to rely on the personal capacity of the political authority,
precisely because it represents only his particular point of view.254 In this way, Hume
prescribes a theory of government based on the rule of law.
253 John Day discusses the similarity between Hume's arguments of property and allegiance.
However, he criticises Hume for oversimplifying the title of the government (Day, 1965: 55)
"Oversimplification" is the familier criticism Hume receives commonly regarding causation,
property and government.
254
Hume makes this even clearer in "That Politics may be reduced to a Science" in Essays.
Spinoza has a similar view (see Spinoza, 1958: 265).
255 Hume's position is perfectly consistent with his later "That Politics may be reduced to a
Science" in Essays.
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It is very important to understand Hume's theory of government in analogy
to the theory of the existence of external bodies. In his theory of the existence of
external bodies, Hume shows that external bodies are a requirement of the
perceptions of causation — that multiple perceptions are reduced to the qualities of
one object as their common source (cf. Chapter 4). In the same sense, laws ofjustice,
as they in fact arise from convention, are in themselves unstable. When disputes
occur, they are easily broken or neglected. In order, therefore, to render them more
solid, they are ascribed to one "substance" that supposedly issues the laws, has the
authority to implement them. This is the government, as human invention.
The creation of government derives from the convention of people in
general, and not from the personal behaviour of the governor. Therefore, the
principle for deciding a governor is that it should be in accordance with convention
as the natural embodiment of human nature. Hume's rules for explaining the
authority of governments are five in number: long possession or "prescription",
present possession, conquest as the analogue of "occupation", succession, and
positive laws, which derives its force from some of those principles. Just as in the
case of the rules of property, these rules are all based on the psychological sense of
attachment.
However, Hume by no means thinks that these rules confer strict legitimacy
to any government. As the evidence for this, he approves the right of resisting
757
government. The point is that Hume is convinced that the essence of government
does not lie in the initial determination of the object of allegiance. The social contract
theory mistakes the contract with the magistrate for the obligation of obedience. It is
one thing to decide the agent who personifies government and it is another to ascribe
an authority to government. To decide an agent is a minor task compared to ascribing
authority to government itself, because the former does not make sense without the
latter. Hume clarified that governmental function of administrating justice in fact
256 David Miller points out that Hume has the events of 1688 in mind in reference to the positive
rules, "when a monarch satisfying the replacements of long possession, present possession, and
succession was replaced by a parliamentary nominee" (Miller, 1981: 87).
257
He positively approves of the Glorious Revolution (T 3.2.10.16; SBN 563), which is evidence
that he is not a Tory conservative (see Phillipson, 1989: passim).
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depends on the allegiance ofpeople. The ultimate significance of the virtue of
obedience is not influenced by the choice ofmagistrate or the form of governance.
The real danger lies in the contrary claims for the alleged "best" political regime (cf.
Phillipson, 1989:51).
6. Allegiance to the Government
The central characteristic of Hume's theory of government is that he employs a
Copernican turn to clarify the nature of government. Hume clarifies that the essence
ofwell-functioning government consists in the spontaneous obedience of the people,
rather than the force of the sovereign or promises of allegiance. This is a turn from a
substance-centred to a relation-centred perspective. P. F. Brownsey alleges that
Hume does not succeed in providing legitimate grounds for obeying government. He
objects that Hume does not provide any explanation of legitimate political authority.
He claims:
Now as a rule Hume presents his utilitarian argument as a
non-contractarian way of establishing a moral obligation to obey
government.... Even if the argument succeeds in providing non-
contractarian grounds for the obligation to obey, it does not by that fact
demonstrate a non-contractarian source of rightful political authority.
And it does not refute the claim of contract theory that governments
can acquire rightful authority only in consequence of a social contract
(Brownsey, 1978: 145).
Because Hume explains the establishment of government in a naturalistic
way, he presents a non-contractarian theory for explaining the legitimacy of the
government. It is important to notice that Hume's theory about obedience to
government is supervened by his theory ofjustice. Hume finds that the role of
government is to take charge of the execution ofjustice. If the role of government is
to compel people to observe the laws ofjustice, government cannot be sustained by
promise. Therefore, Hume supposes a different principle than promise for producing
obedience. Thus, Hume recognises "allegiance" as a distinctive virtue. Hume thinks
that allegiance is initially grafted to the duty of promise, but in due course it obtains
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an original duty and authority independent of the promissory contract. Hume
explains that:
having found that natural, as well as civil justice, derives its origin
from human conventions, we shall quickly perceive, how fruitless it is
to resolve the one into other, and seek, in the laws of nature, a
stronger foundation for our political duties than interest, and human
conventions; while these laws themselves are built on the very same
foundation. On which-ever side we turn this subject, we shall find,
that these two kinds of duty are exactly on the same footing, and have
the same source both of their first invention and moral obligation.
They are contriv'd to remedy like inconveniences, and acquire their
moral sanction in the same manner, from their remedying those
inconveniences. (T 3.2.8.4; SBN 543)
As we have seen, government not only compensates for the moral weakness
ofpeople but perfects the system ofjustice. Therefore, the steady observance of
promise is an effect of the institution of government; but that the obedience to
government is not an effect of the obligation of a promise. Hume's fundamental view
is that allegiance is what makes up the essence of government, rather than
government producing allegiance. By observing the mutual interest in government,
the convention of obeying government is formed, and people ascribe moral authority
to government. The authority becomes stronger as people's interests are served
through the system ofjustice.
Hume's theory of government is conceived in parallel to his theory ofbelief
in the existence of objects. He shows that the most solid belief provided by nature is
the belief in an external object. Though it is in fact a fiction, we obtain enormous
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advantage and freedom by behaving according to the belief in external bodies. In a
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This is a Humean exegesis for Plato's famous parallel between the individual and the state. In
the argument of personal identity, Hume already states that he "cannot compare the soul more
properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which several members are united
by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who
propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). Justice
is taken to be a moral characteristic of the state, just as human characteristics are ascribed to a
person. Hume shows that the idea of the state and of a person are both fictions. David Miller also
notices the imaginative nature of authority. He says the wise man is "one who recognises that
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similar manner, belief in government, though it is a human "composition" or
"invention", provides people with the advantage and freedom that only a society and
a system ofjustice can provide. Government is not a substance nor does it exist by
itself, but is a product of human convention. In this way, Hobbes's theory that the
"Leviathan" is a composition of subjects has been converted into Hume's theory of
perception; government is composed not by gathering people's rights, but as an
object that is supposed into existence by the virtue of allegiance. Humean obedience
can be spontaneous because it is based on interest, which naturally contradicts the
possibility of despotic government. As Hume says, "a man living under an absolute
government, wou'd owe it no allegiance; since, by its very nature, it depends not on
consent" (T 3.2.8.9; SBN 549). Thus, to the degree that the general point of view
represents the public and establishes and maintains the government, Hume's
argument of government provides the empiricist idea of democratisation as the
identification of the principle of governance with the representation of the
governed.259
Now it is possible to answer Brownsey's criticism that Hume does not
explain legitimate political authority. Hume denies the idea that obedience is based
on any justification. As with the explanation of right, Hume would say that it is
incorrect to talk ofjustification before establishing government. The idea of the
justification of government implies a rejection of government when it cannot be
justified. But it is impossible to choose the judge, outside the established system of
justice, who is authorised to announce the final verdict against government. Thus,
allegiance is not based on any justification. Government has its root in human
conventions that exists prior to justification. Though it is possible to change the form
there are several criteria for ascribing authority, none of which should necessarily be given
precedence over the other. A typical vulgar error, for instance, is to suppose that long possession
must always outweigh present possession as a title to power" (Miller, 1981: 91).
259 Hume's theory of general ideas as the representation by a particular of other particulars serves
also as the epistemological basis of political "representation". Although usually Hobbes and
Spinoza are credited with initially providing the theory of modem democracy, Hume's theory
implies the same basic idea. Balibar describes Spinoza's political theory as a theory of
democratisation, which is valid for every regime, instead of a theory of democracy. The same
view can be found in Hume, as is evident in his "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" (Essays). See
(Balibar, 1998: 121). Douglas J. Den Uyl points out that "although Spinoza is an advocate of
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and agency of government, allegiance to government as such must remain if society
is to function through a system ofjustice.
7. The Right to Resist
The theory of allegiance reveals the understanding that underlies Hume's theory of
the right to resist. Most fundamentally, the right to resist is not a topic that can
positively be included in the theory of government, because there is no foundation in
the framework of government to support the right to resist. Hume like Hobbes, aims
to present a theory that will discourage it from happening. This is possible because
government is not the starting point of his theory of society. Hobbes strongly argues
against the right to resist, although he admits that it can be inevitable as a "Naturall
Punishments" (Leviathan 253); not subjects but nature itselfpunishes the
960 • •
sovereign. This happens when the sovereign breaches the law of nature despite
impeccable obedience on the side of his subjects. The point is that there is no
justification on the side of the people for bringing about the resistance. Therefore,
people need not be given legitimate reason for the cause of resistance. Resistance
takes place in the worst situation called the state of nature, which is outside the range
ofHobbes's civil theory. In other words, there is no perspective within the Leviathan
to comprehend the situation of its own death.261 However, writing after the Glorious
Revolution, Locke and Hume are more realistic about the possibility of resistance to
government than Hobbes. Hume admits,
As matter wou'd have been created in vain, were it depriv'd of a
power of resistance, without which no part of it cou'd preserve a
distinct existence, and the whole might be crowded up into a single
point: So 'tis a gross absurdity to suppose, in any government, a right
without a remedy, or allow, that the supreme power is shar'd with the
people, without allowing, that 'tis lawful for them to defend their
democracy, he is not a democratic enthusiast" (Den Uyl, 1983: 162). In this regard, Hume and
Spinoza are identical.
260 In contrast, Locke considers legitimate resistance as an "appeal to Heaven" (Two Treatises
379). In this case, punishment is done by people.
261 The idea of not knowing one's own death reflects Hobbes's Epicurean and Democritean
influence. As the body is composed of atoms, so the commonwealth is composed of individuals.
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share against every invader. Those, therefore, who wou'd seem to
respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have
renounc'd all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious
answer. (T 3.2.10.16; SBN 564)
In this way, Hume admits, as a matter of "common sense", the right of
resistance so that individuals are not deprived of their distinct existence. Hume's
intention regarding the discussion of the right of resistance, however, is to criticise
the Lockean social contract theory that recognises obedience as a rational behaviour,
969
even though Locke by no means encourages rebellions. Lockean theory is
mistaken in the understanding of the concept of "interest". The interest that is met by
obedience to government is different from the interest that is served by implementing
promise. Hume says,
And since there is a separate interest in the obedience to government,
from that in the performance of promises, we must also allow of a
separate obligation. To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to
preserve order and concord in society. To perform promises is
requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices
of life. The ends, as well as the means, are perfectly distinct; nor is the
one subordinate to the other. (T 3.2.8.5; SBN 544)
The interests of government are general and not particular in that
government provides a framework in which people can engage in their business
freely without coming into conflict. Like rules of a game where following rules does
not directly contribute to a particular player winning, following the rules ofjustice
does not serve particular interests. When the contractarian justifies the resistance to
government, his judgement, though alleged to be rational, can only be based on his
particular interests, and the individual interest is not what government is meant to
promote. It is true that the rules of the game can make the game impossible.
Therefore, Hume admits that in extreme cases that resistance is inevitable. The point
is, however, it is impossible to mark a clear line beyond which the rebellion will
262 For an argument of defending Locke, see Seliger, 1963.
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clearly be preferable to the status quo. Hume asserts that "'tis certainly impossible
for the laws, or even for philosophy, to establish anyparticular rules, by which we
may know when resistance is lawful; and decide all controversies, which may arise
on that subject" (T 3.2.10.16; SBN 563). Hume understands that there is no causal
guarantee that the removal of the bad government will produce good government.
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that resistance may bring with it all the
costs described by Hobbes as the state of nature. If the interest of the government is
order and stability, it is contradictory, at lease temporarily, to cause the disorder of
resistance in order to attain stability. Because the origin of government consists in
the secure administration ofjustice, the fact that people in general observe the rules
of justice indicates a functioning government, which is contrary to the resistance to
government. Thus, he is reluctant to sanction resistance:
I must confess, that I shall always incline to their side, who draw the
bond of allegiance very close, and consider an infringement of it as
the last refuge in desperate cases, when the public is in the highest
danger from violence and tyranny. (Essay-PO, 490)
One person's physical power is limited, and his life is also limited, so it
does not usually happen that people need to overturn the whole system ofjustice
• • •
simply because their sovereign is "bad". Most of all, it is absurd to suddenly
change a whole system of the government that has lasted many centuries (T
3.2.10.14; SBN 561). It is like proposing to change the national language. Moreover,
in a more advanced commercial society, it becomes more difficult for government to
conduct policies that are not supported by at lease a majority of people. And even if
the government abuses people, there is a better way of overturning it than by violent
rebellion. Hume believes in the progress of human society, its ability to organise a
moral point of view in the "general course of things" (Essay-C, 254).264 The more
commercial society advances, the more the social communication enriches the
263 Hume delineates this point in "Of the First Principle ofGovernment" in Essays.
264
Hume says that "it is the chief business of philosophers to regard the general course of things"
(Essay-C, 254). This represents Hume's fundamental conception of "true philosophy".
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general point of view. In a civilised commercial society, civil liberty is better
advanced through gradual improvement than through a political revolution.
Hume distinguishes the justification of the reigning government from the
justification of the system ofjustice. In western democratic society, it is no longer
necessary to resort to unlawful means to get rid of the presiding government. A
government owes its authority to the allegiance of the people, which reflects more
accurately the opinion of the people. If the general point of view does not
acknowledge the government, it cannot function as government, and naturally
collapses. Thus, in any case it is the general point of view rather than the condition of
a contract that lets a government stand or fall. In this way, Hume reveals that
government is a composition of the general point of view.
8. Concluding Remarks
We have examined Hume's theory of promise in reference to its critical implication
to the social contract theory. Hume's criticism is decisive in that he anatomises the
concept ofpromise itself, that the social contract theory finds directly in "heaven".
We can now see that the concept of the general point of view first revealed in
Hume's epistemology culminates in the establishment of government. This indicates
that Hume's Treatise as a whole has a goal in establishing a consistent moral and
political theory. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that Hume makes a
fundamental revision of the Hobbesian and the Lockean political theories.
Hobbes, Locke and Hume all agree that political society is formed as a
moral community; it is by means ofmoral principles that people constitute a society.
The focal point of their respective theories is how individuals relate to the
community beyond their immediate commitments. Hobbes refers to a sovereign
power as the locus of an accumulation of rights of his subjects. But Hobbes's
rationalist method of reconstruction confers on a single person absolute power,
which can produce despotism. Most of all, his negative argument for avoiding the
worst situation is incapable ofexplaining the natural formation of the moral
institutions participated in by people in general. Locke's social contract theory
separates the justification of government from the explanation of the standard of
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justice. The relationship of the system of governance with the justification of the
presiding government is not explained.
It is now possible to see that Hume offers a consistent theory of society that
consists in the interest of the general public in stability. The key lies in the formation
of the beliefs injustice and government. These beliefs are modelled on the beliefs in
causation and in external object. His theory of government is founded upon his
epistemology. In this way, he provides his moral and political theory with the most
valid foundation of nature. Hume's Treatise aims to understand the whole process of
human nature through which people establish morality and political society. It is
possible to recognise the general point of view as consistently leading the




Hume's General Point of View
Introduction
We have seen in the previous Chapters the development ofHume's theory of
perceptions, starting from merely particular perceptions which eventuate in the
perception of political authority as the guarantee of the order and stability of human
life. I have attempted to establish that the general point of view is the fundamental
principle in the creation of order and stability. In this concluding Chapter, I wish to
conduct two things. In section 1, in order to further convince the reader ofmy
originality, I contrast my reading with other commentators whose work shares a
fundamental intention of showing the consistency of the Treatise to highlight what is
distinctive about my argument. In section 2,1 offer a final general statement with
further evidence on the concept of general point of view.
1. Review of other Commentators
I take up the arguments of three renowned commentators: Pall Ardal, Annette Baier,
and Donald Livingston. Their works are commonly regarded as representative,
showing the highest standard ofHume scholarship. More importantly, all of them
regard Hume's Treatise as a unified work, and attempt to show the consistency of the
three Books in a respectively unique manner.
(a) Pall Ardal
Pall Ardal's Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (1966) is regarded as a watershed
work in the history ofHume commentary. His achievement can be summed up quite
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straightforwardly; it is to explore the significance ofBook 2 for Hume's moral theory
that is thematically developed in Book 3. Ardal says that
In Books 2 and 3, the main doctrine of Book 1 are indeed presupposed,
but the two later Books have a peculiar unity, in that both deal with
the active or 'passionate' side of human nature rather than the
understanding. (Ardal, 1966: 4)
Ardal has been highly credited for discussing very clearly the connection
between Hume's theory ofpassion and that of morals. Ardal asserts that Hume's
moral sentiments are indirect passions of love and hatred. His theory served to create
a new trend of the discussion of the classification ofHumean passions; the crossword
like puzzling between the simple and complex impressions, and the direct, indirect,
calm and violent passions (cf. Loeb, 1977). Direct passions are those that originate
from natural bodily reactions like hunger, anger, lust etc., and the indirect passions
are pride, humility, love and hate that are created via the mechanism of sympathy.
The problem was to clarify the nature of the most important passion of the
moral sentiment in Hume. For some time after Ardal's book, there were active
disputes regarding the allocation of moral sentiments in the above classification. The
problem was complicated because Hume's more explicit definition of the moral
sentiment is only that it is a peculiar sentiment. Ardal had stayed in the centre of the
controversy by insisting on a very clear stance that the moral sentiment is an indirect
passion of love and hatred (Ardal, 1977). However, in the mean time, the controversy
itself seemed to have vanished. It was not because Ardal's theory was decisive but,
as I see it, there is not much real philosophical attraction in the controversy.
Although there are many things that can be learned from his book, I have a
fundamental disagreement with Ardal's basic understanding ofHume's idea ofmoral
sentiment. It is fundamentally misleading to try to understand Hume's moral
sentiment exclusively in connection to Hume's theory of passions, because, for Hume,
morality is not primarily a matter of passion. It is a matter of perception including
(but not exclusively) passions. Ardal does not seem to doubt the separation of
understanding and passion. According to him, morals are classified as a topic related
Conclusion 275
Hume's General Point of View
more to passion, than to understanding. However, this dichotomy is wrong, because
morality is concerned with the entire human realm that includes understanding. All
the books of the Treatise deal with human perceptions as the basis of beliefs.
Although Ardal says Book 1 is "presupposed" in the discussion of the Books 2 and 3,
he does not explain in what sense this is so (Ardal, 1966: 4). I think this is the very
thing that should clearly be explained in detail.
It is true that Hume thinks that moral impressions can have an emotional
aspect that can be called love or hatred. However, love and hatred are not the same as
moral perceptions, because they represent an emotional state of an observer, and do
not represent the quality ofmoral object. It is the latter that Hume's moral perception
is primarily alleged to represent. It is important to note that Hume's method is to
replace a substance-centred system with a relation-centred one. In his moral theory,
Hume's concern is to analyse the mechanism how morality can be conceived as a
relation-centred system. Love and hatred are an attitude of an agent. Ifmoral
sentiments are essentially love and hatred, morality cannot be the formative force of
the new order of society. Ardal fails to notice that Hume emphasises that the
peculiarity ofmoral sentiments lies in the manner in which they are conceived, and
not in any content. My understanding is that the manner signifies the sense of
generality. So long as they are perceived from the general point of view any
sentiments, be it sorrow, joy, anger, etc., can be a moral perception.
Ardal scarcely discusses the concept of the general point of view, because
he fails to notice the significance of the generality of perception in morality. Also in
his explanation ofjustice, he discusses exclusively the virtue ofjustice, but cannot
explain how the moral sentiment realises the order of society through the three laws
ofjustice and the allegiance of government. By identifying moral sentiments with
love and hatred, Ardal loses sight of the dimension ofmorality that concerns the
development of social institutions beyond individual intention. We need to see the
moral sentiments centring on the concept of the general point of view to understand
how moral sentiments can sustain the system ofjustice.
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I think that the relation ofBook 1 to the whole Treatise is more important
than the relation between Books 2 and 3. Rather than founding morality on passion,
Hume's intention is to moralise the passions. Ardal's argument reveals discrepancies
because he does not discuss the epistemological role ofmoral impression. For
example, regarding objectivity of moral evaluation, he says 'To judge a situation
objectively is an acquired habit.' (Ardal, 1966: 118) But he does not explain what
objectivity means in Hume or how we can make objective judgement with love and
hatred. Ardal does not discuss the connection between causation or external object
and moral sentiments, because he does not find any consistent principle among them.
Hume discussed so extensively human passion because human passion is a
principle of realising sociability. Hume's theory of passion explains communication
and mutual understanding. The most significant function of passion is to produce
social evaluation through possessions. In this way, passion creates the idea of self
and others. It is more important to understand Hume's theory of passion as the
principle creating the system of property, and ultimately the civil society.
(b) Annette Baier
Annette Baier's The Progress ofSentiments (1991) is among the essential
commentaries that cover the whole Treatise. Baier's work like my dissertation is an
attempt to prove a consistency of the Treatise as a unified and coherent work. I
regard highly her attempt to show the unification ofHume's Treatise, but I must
dispute her fundamental idea of taking reason as the unifying concept.
Baier maintains that reason is conferred a different working in accordance
with the different stages of the Treatise. However, in my understanding, the
relationship between sentiments and reason is persistent throughout the Treatise.
Reason is subordinate to sentiments in all stages in the Treatise. I agree with her that
the chapters in the Treatise represent continuity rather than dealing with independent
and unrelated topics. But I do not agree with her that "reflection" is the driving force
that carries forward the progress of sentiments. Baier maintains that the Treatise
should be read as exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiment (Baier, 1991: viii).
She thinks that Hume's method and approach in the Treatise involves a process of
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continually correcting, amending and expanding on the principles and positions that
he has already taken up (Baier, 1991: 158). Most characteristically, she claims that
causal belief is acquired through the "successful reflectivity" (Baier, 1991: 99). She
holds that "all necessity derives from normative necessity, and all the norms
available to us are our human norms, the product of our reflection" (Baier, 1991:
100). It is true, as Baier says, that we can discover the normativity of causation by
careful observation. But unlike her understanding, Hume's point is that normativity is
known not because the observation is careful, but because experiences create custom.
Baier makes the reflectivity-claim based on Hume's remark that "there is but one
kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause, and that the common distinction
betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature. (T
1.3.14.33; SBN 171)" Hume clarifies that moral necessity and physical necessity are
fundamentally the same. Therefore, Baier understands that causal necessity, as well
as moral, is a product of reflection. However, contrary to her understanding, we
should learn from this passage that moral necessity is not a product of reflection, but
equally the product of custom.
Baier takes up the concluding part ofBook 1 of the Treatise, and claims that
Hume takes a philosophical "turn" which sends the reader in an entirely different
direction in Books 2 and 3. The turn allegedly involves a move away from the
solitary intellectualist reason of an isolated Cartesian intellect to the direction of a
more passionate and sociable successor (Baier, 1991: 21, 285). Hume begins the
Treatise by showing the fundamental limitations of rationalist reason. This is done in
order to lay the foundation for the "crucial Humean turn, from intellect to feeling"
(Baier, 1991: 20). This means reason is transformed into "active, socialized reason"
as guided by our calm moral sentiments (Baier, 1991: 288). For Hume, Baier argues,
it is "nonsense to see reason and passion as potentially opposed combatants" (Baier,
1991: 160). Baier's interpretation attempts to show that Hume's philosophy is
concerned to bring these elements of human life together - he seeks to "unite feeling
and thought" (Baier, 1991: 181). Rationalist reason, unguided by passion and
sentiment, brings human beings to a condition ofmelancholy and despair. But, Baier
says, this is not where Hume's philosophy leaves us. On the contrary, with reason
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"reconstituted" in the way described, we are left without "any hint ofmelancholy"
(Baier, 1991: 285).
I agree with Baier's basic claim that the Treatise should be read as
exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiment. She argues the consistency of
Hume's project by finding Humean reason more refined and sophisticated at each
stage. It is true that Hume's approach in the Treatise involves a process of
continually correcting, amending and expanding on the principles and positions that
he has already taken up. This is why Hume claims that his work "will acquire new
force as it advances" (T 3.1.1.1; SBN 455). But the problem is that Baier takes it that
the "new force" means reason increases the power of reflectivity of reason.
In my opinion, Hume presents a different theory from what Baier takes to be
the refinement of reason. I take it to be the development of the general point of view.
It is Hume's consistent method to inquire which human faculty produces the
impressions of "cause", "external objects", and "justice" — reason, sense, or
imagination. His answer is always "imagination", and not "reason"; imagination
represents the working of custom which associates new impression with similar past
impressions to produce a new belief. Therefore, it is clearly misleading that Baier
asserts that reason refines as the Treatise progresses.
Contrary to her argumentation, Hume recognises the limitation of reason,
and as the result he relies more on the working of feeling and custom. It is strange to
think that "reason" develops, though Baier implies reflectivity by it. Baier seems to
underestimate the significant role of the Humean custom. Reason works only in a
fixed manner and does not literally develop. On the other hand, custom is suited to be
understood as something that develops; it begins from a particular new action, which
when repeated, becomes natural and changes spontaneously. Therefore, it is more
appropriate to say that custom rather than reason develops.
Baier persistently contends that Hume's project all alone has not been so
much to dethrone reason as to enlarge our conception to it, to make it social and
passionate reason. Baier asserts that there is an element of certainty and reliability in
Books 2 and 3 that were not found in Book 1. But, my understanding is that the
certainty and reliability is presented in Book 1 whose task is to show how the sense
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of validity and reliability emerges not from reason but from the working of custom.
Hume's theory of causation and external object provide an explanation of the valid
and reliable belief without resorting to reason. Usually, what is reasonable is taken to
be valid and reliable. But Hume attempts to reverse this picture. Hume thinks that
truth can only be what is trustworthy and reliable. This is the Humean turn for which
Hume prepared the general point of view as the concurrent point ofmoral
recognitions. According to Hume, reason cannot detect what is valid or reliable
without consulting experiences; we obtain a stable view of the world not though
reason, but through custom. It is not because reason is defective, but because the
perceptions that we obtain through experiences are the only medium for our
interaction with the world.
Baier holds that by seeing ourselves as others see us, we acquire a better
understanding of ourselves. She holds that this is a working of reason. But in Hume,
the influence of reason is secondary to that of custom also in moral judgement. Baier
considers that it is crucial to Hume's moral system that we are capable of taking up
"a special and especially "steady and general" point of view" (Baier, 1991: 190),
from which we are able to articulate and share our moral evaluations with each other.
Baier thinks that the general standpoint is to "look for common features, ones for
which we have coined names in our moral language", and "is different from that of a
lover, whose "object" is a concrete unique person" (Baier, 1991: 191). Baier like
most other commentators does not explore the concept of the moral viewpoint, and
takes it for granted that it rests on commonality.
To sum up, my challenge to Baier's interpretation is that what she implies by
the concept of "enlarged" and "refined" reason can be more consistently described by
the concept of the general point of view. Baier claims that "[cjentral to a proper
understanding of the role of reason in human life is an understanding of the social
context of reason and the way that it depends on human passion". This "reason" is
realised by the function of the general point of view. Baier's new reason is not
Hume's reason. Her "reason" should be replaced by the general point of view so as to
reveal the consistency of the Treatise in a more illuminating manner.
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(c) Donald Livingston
Donald Livingston's Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium is a highly original
work that exceeds in its nature the scope ofHume commentary (Kail, 2001a, Frasca-
Spada, 2001). Livingston's intention is to clarify the very fundamental nature of
Hume's philosophy and its method. He thinks that the most noteworthy attempt of
Humean philosophy is to attain self-knowledge. By this he means that Hume's
philosophy presents the unified view of history, politics, religion, ethics and
literature. All of them, together with other disciplines, compose the science ofman.
First of all, Livingston tries to read Hume's work as a methodology of
philosophy. Livingston tries to explore Hume's work as a dialectic between custom
and reflection. Livingston's first claim is that Hume's is not an empiricist; Book 1 of
Treatise is not an epistemological theory of knowledge on the sure foundations of
sense experience, and instead Hume offers dialectic between reason and custom. The
task comprises two stages. The first is to refute the reason-based philosophies which
are called false philosophies, and this appears to be a sceptical argument of reason.
The second stage is brought about through reaction to the first one. It is to return to
the custom.
According to Livingston, Hume sees the philosophical act composed of
three principles; Ultimacy, Autonomy and Dominion. The Principle ofUltimacy is
that the end ofphilosophy is an understanding that is final, absolute and
unconditional. The Principle ofAutonomy is that philosophy is free of custom and
prejudice, and is a self-justifying enquiry (cf. Livingston, 1984: Ch. 1). The Principle
of Dominion is that one must regard the end product of philosophical reflection as
ultimate and exclusively correct. Hume claims that these are neither consistent with
each other nor with human nature. What the passages in the Book 1, part 4 shows is
that the Autonomy Principle must be abandoned, for it is neither possible nor
desirable. Philosophy is instead to be nothing but a more regular and methodical
operation of the custom of common life. Through this recognition, we can enter the
world of custom with confidence.
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Livingston seems to make a crucial point by proposing "custom" as the key
concept that takes the place of reason that is most fitted to the three concepts. In the
same spirit as Livingston, I maintain that custom, and not reason, is the best and only
candidate that is ultimate, autonomous, and dominant in their true form. First, custom
is ultimate in the sense it is the judge of nature. It is custom that reveals the falsity of
any other principle. Secondly, custom is ultimate in that it requires nothing other than
itself to exist and develop. And thirdly, custom is dominant because everything in the
long term eventually yields to custom. As the most fundamental principle of true
philosophy, custom is involved in every meaningful human activity, most of all in
epistemology and morality. In epistemology, custom is what refers a particular
perception to a class that is comprised by its similar kinds. My additional claim that I
submit beyond Livingstone's discussion is that custom, in so far as it concerns
human reflection, is embodied by 'the general point of view' that attains the
synthesis of the particular and the general.
My understanding diverges more radically from Livingston in the
interpretation of custom in moral matters. Livingston treats custom as common
practice, or an established social norm. But I think that Humean custom should be
seen as a principle that produces order and stability rather than as any established
social norm. As Livingston emphasises, Hume reaches custom as the philosophical
principle through the rout of scepticism of reason. At this point, custom is not an
ordinary concept any more. It has to be understood via the concept of the general
point of view to as the central element ofHume's explanation of the creation of
human nature. Unless we take custom as an epistemological concept, it does not
function as the counter-part of reason. What is worse, it may plunge into a mere
political ideology without philosophy. When Hume argues that the stability of
property occasions the rules ofjustice in the state of nature where there is no
government, no civil society yet, Hume's theory is about how the moral concepts
such as right, freedom, obligation come into being in the first place with the
265 The questionable aspect of this is shown in his discussion of secessionism in his Philosophical
Melancholy and Delirium. Livingston takes Hume's conservatism not as a philosophical but as a
political principle, presumably because he does not find the underlying principle in "common
life".
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emergence of property. Hume has nothing to do with the political conservatism of
our time.
Livingston takes up the example of the dialectic of the external object. The
"vulgar" view is useful and pleasant, though wrong, while that of reason is
destructive. I agree with Livingston in his emphasis of the importance of custom, but
I think that Hume's point is to explore custom as an epistemological concept that
represents the general point of view rather than to make custom combat with reason
as a blind force.
It makes sense to consider to whom Hume addresses himself in the Treatise.
Hobbes dedicates his Leviathan to "Mr Francis Godolphin of Godolphin" (Leviathan
3), Locke addresses his Essay to "Thomas, Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery"
(Essay 3). More significantly, Locke devoted his Two Treatises to no particular
person. These are certainly related to the fundamental intention and characteristic of
their work. Livingston argues that Hume's philosophy is a unique project of self-
knowledge. Livingston might think that Hume wrote the Treatise for himself to cure
himself of the philosophical melancholy and delirium. Livingston maintains that self-
knowledge is the goal of philosophy and the standard of philosophical truth
(Livingston, 1998: 11). Inquiry into all objects will not terminate unless it attains
self-knowledge. Hume first denies the substantial existence of self. Perceptions are
everything that composes the human world; to know our physical circumstances, our
psychological components, human relationship, society, government, and God. These
are all based on perceptions as the basic material that, according to Livingston,
composes the self-knowledge.
However, different from Livingston's unique reading, Hume's philosophy is
not private and more open to the public. I am tempted to think that Hume's theory is
more fundamentally addressed to society. The last sentence of the "Advertisement to
the Treatise" reads: "The approbation ofthe public L consider as the greatest reward
ofmy labours; but am determin 'd to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best
instruction. (T xii; SBN 2)" It is amazing that Hume, true to his word, decomposed
the marvellous system of the Treatise, and catered to the taste of "the public" in his
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later publication of the Enquiries. This is because I regard the general point of
view as the key concept that characterises Hume's intention of the Treatise. The
general point of view is the perspective of the society rather than the perspective of
self-knowledge. Most decidedly, the general point of view is the perspective of
conscience as the public perspective emerged through individual perception. Hume
describes how individuals are created out of the interaction with other people, and
how individuals obtain freedom through the system ofjustice. Therefore, Hume's
philosophy is oriented toward the realisation of the principle of society that includes
self-knowledge. Livingston's self-knowledge is different from the liberal value that
characterises Hume's ideal of sophisticated civilised society. This is because
Livingston does not note the more concrete moral significance of Hume's
epistemology in relation to the concept of custom.
2. SUB SPECIE GENERALI
Hume asks his friend in order to better understand the manuscript of the Treatise:
...to read once over le Recherche de la Verite of Pere Malebranche,
the Principle ofHuman Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more
metaphysical Articles of Bailes Dictionary; such as those [of] Zeno, &
Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations would also be useful but don't know
if you will find it easily among your Acquaintances. These Books will
make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts ofmy Reasoning
266
Even if he had known that his Treatise would be more appreciated some two hundred years
later, for his moral purpose it was critically important to hasten this process. In this sense, the
Enquiries are Hume's own exegesis of the practical thought, rather than the logic, of the Treatise,
and this is evidenced by the fact that Hume does not boast of any new discovery in the Enquiry.
John Rawls regrets seeing Hume deny the Treatise ( see Rawls, 2000: 102). However, this seems
to reflect Hume's consciousness of his role as an opinion leader of his time. In accordance with
this, Hume rephrases the "general point of view" with "the common point of view", "a point of
view, common to him with others" and the "principle of humanity". In this way, Hume returned
to the "cave" to enlighten the people and the place. See footnote 227.
267
Letter from Hume to his old friend Michael Ramsay ofMungale who was to read the
manuscript of the Treatise, on 26 August 1737 (see Mossner, 1980: 104).
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Among them, Spinoza appears six times by name in the Treatise, and is spiritedly
discussed. It is hardly conceivable that Hume did not have in mind Spinoza's
cliche: "SUB SPECIEAETERNITATlS" when he employs the phrase of the "general
point of view". This is further evidence that the concept of general point of view has
a substance in Hume's thought. As Hume inherits some ofhis naturalism from
Spinoza, he transforms it as based on human nature rather than pantheism, which
corresponds to his alternation of Spinoza's eternal perspective into the general
perspective.
In this dissertation, I have extensively explored the general point of view in
Hume's Treatise. In order for it to be the general point of view, it has to be
concerned with the entire argument of the Treatise. Thus the general point of view
has a manner of emerging naturally so long as the Treatise has a consistent principle.
Now, let me summarise the central concept of this dissertation to conclude. Part 3 of
Book 3 of the Treatise is titled "Of the other virtues and vices". After explaining the
establishment of government, and the rules and virtues concerning it, Hume devotes
most of the last part of the Treatise to the discussion of "natural virtues". And it is
there that Hume more frequently uses the notion of the "general point of view" or its
equivalents. Upon the argument we have had so far, I hope it is now clear what
Hume means by taking up the general point of view in making moral judgement.
And with it, the Humean sense ofmorality has been now clarified. Morality is to
create a stable relation with one's human and social circumstances, based on the
model we have acquired by our physical circumstance. The general point of view
provides the perceptions that make us believe in the qualities with which we must
deal to create stability. Human beings have been trained by nature to take the general
point of view and follow the beliefs produced from it.
On the other hand, it is true that the general point of view tends to be
obscure and even disappears. This has to do with the fundamental nature of
morality. Moral consciousness is best when it disappears into the background,
because morality produces the framework, good conditions ofhuman activities, and
268
Even Locke is referred to by name only four times in the Treatise. It is established that Hume
owes much to Spinoza (see McShea, 1968: 8; Baier, 1993b).
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is not itself the final aim of human activities. In this sense, Hume understands that
politics is extremely at risk when it relies on the personal virtue of the sovereign.
There is not much sense in morality for the sake ofmorality, not because morality is
unimportant but because morality is concerned with every activity of human beings.
Hume presents human beings as moral beings in the more comprehensive sense than
Locke or Hutcheson conceived it. Custom has a characteristic of losing its presence
from our consciousness, once it incorporates the relation between self and
surroundings into our mind. In a similar sense, where there is no moral problem or
conflict, there is no moral consciousness. Significantly, this is a condition of our free
activities. Freed from thinking of constraints on our condition of living, human
beings can concentrate their attention on their own productive activities.
It is possible to indicate another normative aspect of Hume's general point of
view, that it defines the condition of liberty. Hume clearly conceives the problem of
liberty as a counter concept ofnecessity. As there is no impression of liberty, liberty
has to be understood as a manner ofperceiving the behaviour of other people. It is
common to connect liberty with the concept of responsibility. People praise or blame
others as the agent (cause) of the action perceived. Therefore, liberty is understood as
the condition in which one's action is regarded as representing his own character
from the general point of view. Hume says,
It will be equally easy to prove, and for the same arguments,
that liberty, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all
men agree, is also essential to morality, and that no human actions,
where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the
objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects of our
moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal
character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they can give
rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these
principles, but are derived altogether from external violence. (EHU
8.31; SBN 99)
269
M. Baron seems to suggest this idea from a different direction (Baron, 1995: 139-55).
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Here is seen Hume's definition ofpolitical liberty. Political liberty can be
defined as a condition in which people can exert their own moral character.
Recognition of the character of a person is possible only if the effect of the action of
the person is recognised from the general point of view as not forced by any external
influence. Thus, the problem of personal freedom is reduced to the political condition
in which each person can exhibit his character. In this way, Hume shifts the problem
of liberty from the quality of an agent to the social condition in which each can
exerts his character through his activities. Rather than presupposing the free
individuals from the beginning, Hume's general point of view serves to produce free
individuals. This is a ramification of his criticism of the social contract theory.
Comparison ofHobbes, Locke, and Hume has spelled out the characteristic
of their thought about the origin ofpolitical authority. Very tersely, though Hobbes
seeks it in desire, and Locke seeks in reason, Hume seeks it in custom. It is possible
to characterise their theories by the viewpoint upon which they are based. Hobbes as
a material nominalist admits only the point of view of individuals. Locke as a
conceptualist attempts to view things from the point of view of reason. Hume's point
of view is based on custom which represents no specific, nor any universal, point of
view. It is the general point of view.
It is mistaken to think that Hume blindly approves custom and convention
by his conservative position. On the contrary, Hume's task is to clarify the normative
nature of custom, and to elucidate the standard to distinguish false custom from true
custom, and to distinguish true belief from false belief. This is why he argued the
essence of custom consists in the general point of view from the beginning of his
exposition. The normativity of custom can only be guaranteed when it is supported
by the general point of view. Therefore, the general point of view comes prior to the
custom. Custom, belief, and convention that cannot be supported by the general point
of view are superstitions, caught in the matrix of enthusiasm and fanaticism. Hume's
fundamental objective is to destroy those kinds of dangerous superstitions by
replacing them with social scientific thought. Hume induces us to take the general
point of view in moral judgement, rather than just to follow custom and convention.
This is the true philosophy. How are we to distinguish true belief from false belief?
Hume understands that only true belief can serve to explain reality; only true belief
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can produce moral science. And normativity must be based on the true belief that is
recognised as an explanation of reality. This is why Hume is persistently concerned
with causation as the theory of belief. And his thought in fact serves as the matrix of
the social science of the Scottish Enlightenment (cf. Wood, 2003).
Unless we clearly bear this point in mind, we will be inclined to take Hume
as a mediocre conservative in moral matters. And this is why we need to read the
Treatise from Book 1 as an order-creating moral theory. It is remarkable that Hume
finishes the Abstract by designating the principles of association as "the cement of
the universe" (T Appendix 35; SBN 662). Now we are allowed to take it in its fully
normative interpretation: just as "matter" associates with matter to create a universe,
human beings associate with each other to create a society.
Descartes argues that there must be something certain and unshakable in
order to recognise order in the world (Descartes, 1984-5: vol. 2: 16). Hume, however,
considers that that thing need not be an Archimedean point. The Humean point is not
single and fixed but general and constructive. SUB SPECIE GENERALI— Hume's
Treatise shows that the world appears orderly under the general point of view, not
because of the order inherent in the object, or designed by God, but because human
beings can create the order in this world when we behave accordingly.270 This is the
Humean constructivism of perceptions.
Let me conclude this dissertation with Hume's remark from the Enquires.
Hume confesses that:
I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning
[of the idea of necessary connection]. I am afraid that, should I
multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it
would only become more obscure and intricate. In all abstract
reasoning, there is one point of view, which, if we can happily hit, we
shall go farther towards illustrating the subject, than by all the
eloquence and copious expression in the world. This point of view we
270
Hume's concept of the general point of view appears to lead to Rousseau's "general will" in
his The Social Contract (1762). They also both have Hobbes and Spinoza as common sources of
their ideas. However, I only point this out, and leave more detailed discussion to other occasions.
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should endeavour to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for
subjects which are more adapted to them. (EHU 7.30; SBN 79)
My dissertation has proposed that the general point of view is this "one
point of view" in Hume's Treatise. Now we have two ways of reading Hume's whole
Treatise. One is to read it centring on the concept of the general point of view, and
the other is to read it without paying any attention to the general point of view except
in a few passages. No one before this dissertation has ever attempted to read the
Treatise in this way. I submit my reading treats the Treatise as an integrated theory
ofmorality, which provides the principle of normativity for creating order and
stability in society, realising human freedom, and bringing the fruits of industry and
civilization.
Conclusion 289
Hume's General Point of View
Bibliography
Aaron, R. I. (1942), "Hume's Theory of Universals", Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, vol.
42, pp. 117-40.
Aaron, R. I. (1971), John Locke, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abbruzzese, J. (2000), "Garrett on the Theological Objection to Hume's Compatibilism", British
Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 345-52.
Abramson, K. (1999), "Correcting Our Sentiments about Hume's Moral Point of View", The
Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 37, pp. 333-61.
Ainslie, D. C. (1995), "The Problem of the National Self in Hume's Theory of Justice", Hume
Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 289-313.
Ainslie, D. C. (1999), "Scepticism About Persons in Book II of Hume's Treatise", Journal of the
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 469-92.
Alexander, P. (1976-77), "The Names of Secondary Qualities", Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, vol. 77, pp. 203-20.
Alexander, P. (1977), "Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities" in Tipton, I. C.,
(ed.), Locke on Human Understanding, Oxford, p. 70
Altmann, R. W. (1980), "Hume on Sympathy", Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 18, pp. 123-
36.
Anderson, R. F. (1975), "Hume's Account of Knowledge of External Objects", History of
Philosophy, vol. 13, pp. 471-80.
Aquinas, T. (1951), Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Text, J. Gilby (ed.), Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Aquinas, T. (1959), Summa Theologica, excerpted in Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, A P.
D'Entreves, (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Aquinas, T. (1988), Saint Thomas Acquinas on Law, Morality, and Politics, W. P. Baumgarth
and R. J. Regan (eds.), Ind.: Hackett Press.
Ardal, P. (1966), Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Ardal, P. (1968), "And That's a Promise", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 18, pp. 225-37.
Ardal, P. (1969), "Reply to New of Promises", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 19, pp. 260-2.
Ardal, P. (1977), "Another Look at Hume's Account ofMoral Evaluation", Journal ofthe History
ofPhilosophy, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 408-21.
Ardal, P. (1989), "Hume and Davidson on Pride", Hume Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 387-94.
Ardal, P. (1994), "Passion & Value in Hume's Treatise", Journal of Indian Council of
Philosophical Research, vol. 11, pp. 148-54.
Armstrong, D. M. (1989), Universals: An Opinion Introduction, London: Westview Press.
Ashcraft, R. (1972), "John Locke Belimed: The Case for Political Philosophy", Political Studies,
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 190-4.
Ashcraft, R. (ed.) (1991), John Locke: Critical Assessments, 4 vols. London: Routledge.
Atkinson, R. F. (1976), "Hume on the Standard ofMorals", Southwestern Journal ofPhilosophy,
vol. 7, pp. 25-44.
Ayer, A. J. (1980), Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bibliography 290
Hume's General Point of View
Ayers, M. (1996), "Natures and Laws from Descartes to Hume" in G. A. J. Rogers and S.
Tomaselli (eds.), The Philosophical Canon in the 17th and 18th Centuries, pp. 83-108.
Bacon, F. (1937), Novum Organum: Essays, Advancement ofLearning, New Atlantis and Other
Pieces, F. Jones (ed.), N.Y.: Odyssey Press.
Baier, A. C. (1977), "The Intentionality of Intentions" Review ofMetaphysics, vol. 20, no. 3, pp.
389-414.
Baier, A. C. (1978), "Hume's Analysis of Pride", Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 75, pp. 27-40.
Baier, A. C. (1979), "Hume on Heaps and Bundles", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16,
no. 4, pp. 285-95.
Baier, A. C. (1980), "Helping Hume to "Complete the Union"", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 41, pp. 167-86.
Baier, A. C. (1981), "Frankena and Hume on Points of View", The Monist, vol. 64, pp. 343-58.
Baier, A. C. (1982), "Hume's Account of Our Absurd Passions", Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 74,
no. 11, pp. 643-52.
Baier, A. C. (1988), "Hume's Account of Social Artifice- Its Origins and Originality", Ethics, vol.
98, pp. 757-78.
Baier, A. C. (1991), A Progress of Sentiments. Reflections on Hume's Treatise, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Baier, A. C. (1992), "Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to
Gauthier", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 429-39.
Baier, A. C. (1993a), "Critical Notice", Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 23, no.l, pp. 107-
24.
Baier, A. C. (1993b) "David Hume, Spinozist", Hume Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 237-52.
Baier, A. C. (1993c), "How Can Individualists Share Responsibility?", Political Theory, vol.21,
no. 2, pp. 228-48.
Baier, A. C. (1993d), "Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant", Ethics, vol. 103,
pp. 436-57.
Baier, A. C. (1994), "Response to My Critics", Hume Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 211-18.
Baier, A. C. (1995a), "Moral Sentiments, and the Difference They Make, 1", Aristotelian Society,
supplement 69, pp. 15-30.
Baier, A. C. (1995b), "Hume's Account of Social Artifice: Its Origin and Originality" in S.
Tweyman (ed.), DavidHume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 75-97.
Baier, K. (2001), "Justified Morality" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, no. 2,
pp. 427-33.
Bailiff, J. D. (1964), "Some Comments on The 'Ideal Observer"', Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 24, pp. 423-8.
Balibar, E. (1998), Spinoza and Politics, trans. Peter Snowdon, London: Verso.
Baillie, J. (2000), Hume on Morality, London: Routledge.
Baron, M. (1982), "Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of His Artificial Virtues", Canadian Journal
ofPhilosophy, vol. 12, pp. 539-55.
Baron, M. (1984), "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty", The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 81, pp. 197-219.
Bibliography 291
Hume's General Point of View
Baron, M. (1988), "Morality as a Back-Up System: Hume's View?", Hume Studies, vol. 14, pp.
25-52.
Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barry, B. (1989), Theories ofJustice, London: Wheatsheaf.
Barry, N. P. (1995), An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, 3rd edn., London: Macmillan.
Barry, N. P. (1962), An Introduction to Roman Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bassford, H. A. (1995), "Hume on Legal Obligation: An 18th Century Answer to a Modern
Conundrum", in S. Tweyman (ed.), DavidHume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 186-92.
Basson, A. H. (1958), David Hume, London: Pelican.
Bauchamp, T. L. and Alexander Rosenberg, (1981), Hume and the Problem of Causation
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baumrin, B. H. (2000), "Hobbes' Christian Commonwealth", Hobbes Studies, vol. 13, pp. 3-11.
Beardsley, M. C. (1991), "Berkeley on 'Abstract Ideas'" in W. Creery (ed.), George Berkeley:
CriticalAssessments, vol. 2, pp. 123-33.
Becker, L. C. (1998), A New Stoicism, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Beiner, R. and Booth, W. J. (eds.) (1993), Kant & Political Philosophy: the Contemporary
Legacy, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Beiser, F. C. (1993), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Beiser, F. C. (1996), The Sovereignty ofReason, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Bell, M. (1997), "Hume and Causal Power: The Influences of Malebranche and Newton", The
British Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 67-86.
Bellamy, R. (1999), Liberalism and Pluralism, London: Routledge.
Benn, P. (1998), Ethics, London: UCL Press.
Bennett, J. (1971), Locke Berkeley Hume: Central Themes, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bennett, J. (2001a), Learningfrom Six Philosophers, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bennett, J. (2001b), Learningfrom Six Philosophers, vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bentham, J. (1955), Collected Works ofJeremy Bentham, vol. 1, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Bentham, J. (1988), A Fragment on Government, Burns, J. H. and Hart, H. L. A. (eds.),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 51.
Berger, F. R. (1984), Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of
John StuartMill, California: University of California Press.
Berkeley, G. (1949), The Works ofGeorge Berkeley, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), London:
Nelson.
Berkeley, G. (1949), An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in A. A. Luce, and T. E. Jessop
(eds.) The Works ofGeorge Berkeley.
Berkeley, G. (1949), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in A. A. Luce, and T. E.
Jessop (eds.) The Works ofGeorge Berkeley.
Berkeley, G. (1998), A Treatise concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge, J. Dandy (ed.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berry, C. J. (1977), "From Hume to Hegel: The Case of The Social Contract", Journal of the
History ofIdeas, vol. 38, pp. 691-703.
Bibliography 292
Hume's General Point of View
Berry, C. J. (1982), Hume, Hegel, and Human Nature, The Hague: M. Nijhoff
Blackburn, S. (1981), "Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism" in S. Holzman and S. Leich
(eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, London: Routledge, pp. 163-87.
Blackburn, S. (1984), Spreading the World, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Blackburn, S. (1990), "Hume and the Thick Connections", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. 50, pp. 237-50.
Blackburn, S. (1992), "Morality and Thick Concept", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
supplement, vol. 66, pp. 285-99.
Blackburn, S. (1993), Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. (1994), OxfordDictionary ofPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. (1995), "Practical Tortoise Raising", Mind, vol. 104, pp. 695-711.
Blackburn, S. (1998a), Ruling Passions: A Theory ofPractical Reasoning, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Blackburn, S. (1999), "Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?",
Inquiry, vol. 42, pp. 213-28.
Bloor, D. (1976), Knowledge and Social Imagery, London: The University ofChicago Press.
Bloor, D. (1983), Wittgenstein: A Social Theory ofKnowledge, London: Macmillan.
Boatright, J. R. (1976), "Hume's Account of Moral Sentiment", Revue Internationale de
Philosophic, vol. 30, pp. 79-90.
Bobbio, N. (1989), Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. D. Gobetti, Chicago:
the University of Chicago Press.
Bogen, J. and Farrell, D. M. (1978), "Freedom and Happiness in Mill's Defence of Liverty",
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 28, no.l 13, pp. 325-38.
Botwinick, A. (1977), "A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism", Journal of the History of
Philosophy, vol. 15, pp. 423-35.
Boucher, D. and Vincent, A. (2000), British Idealism and Political Theory, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Bowles, P. (1985), "The Origin of Property and the Development of Scottish Historical Science",
Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 46, pp. 197-210.
Bowman, R. S. (1994), "Smith, Mill, and Marshall on Human Capital Formation" in J. C. Wood
(ed.), Adam Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd series, vol. 7, pp. 70-89.
Box, M. (1990), The Suasive Art ofDavidHume, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Bracken, H. M. (1977), "Bayle, Berkeley, and Hume", Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 11, pp.
227-35.
Bracken, H. M. (1984), "Hume on the 'Distinction of Reason"', Hume Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, pp.
90-109.
Bradshaw, D. E. (1988), "Berkeley and Hume on Abstraction and Generalization", History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 11-22.
Branson, R. (1979), "James Madison and The Scottish Enlightenment", Journal of the History of
Ideas, vol. 40, pp. 235-50.
Brewer, A. (1994), "Economic Growth and Technical Change: John Rae's Critique of Adam
Smith" in J. C. Wood, (ed.), Adam Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 247-57.
Bricke, J. (1980), Hume's Philosophy ofMind, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Bibliography 293
Hume's General Point of View
Bricke, J. (1988), "Hume, Freedom to Act., and Personal Evaluation", History of Philosophy
Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 141-55.
Bricke, J. (1991), "Hume's Argument Concerning the Idea of Existence", Hume Studies, vol. 17,
no. 2, pp. 161-6.
Bricke, J. (1995), "Hume's Argument for the Artificiality of Justice", in S. Tweyman (ed.), David
Hume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 53-74.
Brink, D. O., (2001), "Impartiality and Associative Duties", Utilitas, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 152-72.
Broackes, J. (1993), "Did Hume Hold a Regularity Theory of Causation?", British Journal for
the History ofPhilosophy, vol.1, no. 1, pp. 99-114.
Broadie, A. (1990), The Tradition ofScottish Philosophy, Edinburgh: Polygon.
Broadie, A. (2000), Why Scottish Philosophy Matters, Edinburgh: The Saltire Society.
Broadie, S. (1991), Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brock, D. W. (2001), "Gert on the Limits of Morality's Requirements", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 435-40.
Broils, D. R. (1964), The Moral Philosophy ofDavid Hume, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Brongie, L. L. (2000), David Hume, 2nd ed., Ind.: Liberty Fund.
Broome, J. (1991), "Fairness", Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, vol. 91, pp. 87-101.
Broughton, J. (2000), "Explaining General Ideas", Hume Studies, vol. 26, no.2, pp. 279-89.
Brown, A. (1986), Modern Political Philosophy: Theories of the Just Society, London: Penguin
Books.
Brown, C. (1988), "Is Hume an Internalist ?", Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy , vol. 26, pp.
69-87.
Brown, C. (1994), "From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation", Hume Studies, vol.
20, no.l, 1994, pp. 19-35.
Brown, C. (2001), "Is the General Point of View the Moral Point of View?", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, no.l, pp. 197-203.
Brown, J. (1994), "Hirshleifer on Smith" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith Critical Assessments,
2nd Series, pp. 263-66
Brown, V. (1994), Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience, London:
Routledge.
Brownsey, P. F. (1978), "Hume and the Social Contract", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 28, no.
Ill, pp. 132-48.
Brykman, G. (1996), "Common Sensibles and Common Sense in Locke and Berkeley", in G. A.
J. Rogers and S. Tomaselli (eds.), The Philosophical Canon in the 17th and 19th Centuries, N.Y.,
University of Rochester Press, pp. 109-21.
Bryson, G. (1968), Man and Society, N.Y.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.
Buchanan, A. (1990), "Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice", Philosophical &
Public Affairs, vol. 19, pp. 227-52.
Buckle, S. and Castiglione, D. (1991) , "Hume's Critique of the Contract Theory", History of
Political Thought, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 457-80.
Buckle, S. (1991), Property andNatural Law Theories, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bibliography 294
Hume's General Point of View
Buckle, S. (2001), "Marvels, Miracles, and Mundane Order Hume's Critique of Religion in An
Equity Concerning Human Understanding", Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 79, no. 1,
pp. 1-31.
Burch, R. W. (1975), "Hume on Pride and Humility", New Scholas, vol. 49, pp. 177-88.
Burwood, S. and Gibert, P. and Lennon, K. (1999), Philosophy ofMind, London: UCL Press.
Butler, J. (1896), The Works ofJoseph Butler, 2 vols., W. E. Gladstone (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Butler, R. J. (1975-6), "Distinctiones Rationis, or The Cheshire Cat Which Left Its Smile Behind
It", Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, vol. 76, pp. 165-76.
Butts, R. E. (1959), "Hume's Scepticism", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 20, no.l, pp. 413-
19.
Calderwood, H. (1989), DavidHume 1989, Bristol: Thoemmess.
Calhoun, C. C. H. (1980), "The Humean Moral Sentiment; A Unique Feeling", Southwestern
Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 11, pp. 69-78.
Callaghan, G. K. (2001), "Nominalism, Abstraction, and Generality in Hobbes", History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 37-55.
Cameron, D. R. (1972), "Professor Derathe and Natural Law", Political Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, pp.
195-201.
Campbell, T. D. (1971), Adam Smith's Science ofMorals, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Campbell, T. D. and Ross, I. S. (1981), "Adam Smith on the Emergence of Morals: A Reply to
Eugene Heath", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 42, pp. 73-92.
Campbell, T. D. and Ross, I. S. (1984), "The Theory and Practice of the Wise and Virtuous Man:
Reflections on Adam Smith's Response to Hume's Deathbed Wish", Studies in Eighteenth-
Century Culture, vol. 11, pp. 65-74.
Campbell, T. D. (2001), Justice, 2nd edn., London: McMillan.
Capaldi, N. (1975), DavidHume: The Newtonian Philosopher, Boston: Twayne.
Capaldi, N. (1989), Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy, N.Y.: Peter Lang.
Capaldi, N. and James K. D. (1991), "The Hume Literature of The 1980's", American
Philosophical Quarterly vol. 28, no.4, pp. 255-72.
Capaldi, N. (1995), "Hume as Social Scientist", in Tweyman (ed.), David Hume: Critical
Assessments, S. vol. 6, pp. 3-23.
Cassirer, E. (1907), Die Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit,
vol. 2, Berlin: Verlag von Bruno Cassirer.
Chang, R. (2001), "Two Conceptions ofReasons for Action", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 447-53.
Chappell, V. C., et al. (1966), Hume, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966.
Charron, W. C. (1995), "Convention, Games of Strategy, and Hume's Philosophy of Law and
Government", in S. Tweyman (ed.), DavidHume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 171-85.
Choi, Y. B. (1994), "Smith's View on Human Nature: A Problem in the interpretation of The
Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith
CriticalAssessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 138-50.
Christman, J. (1986), "Can Ownership be Justified by Natural Rights?", Philosophy & Public
Affairs, pp. 156-177.
Bibliography 295
Hume's General Point of View
Cicero, M. T. (1959), De Officiis, trans. W. Miller, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Clark, C. M. A. (1994), "Adam Smith and Society as an Evolutionary Process" in J. C. Wood
(ed,),Adam Smith Critical, Assessments, 2nd Series, pp. 151-68.
Clark, S. R. L. (1985), "Hume, Animals and the Objectivity of Morals", The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 139, pp. 117-33.
Clatterbaugh, K., (1999), The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637-1739, London:
Routledge.
Cohen, M. F. (1990), "Obligation and Human Nature in Hume's Philosophy", The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 316-41.
Cohon, R. (1994), "On an Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology", Hume Studies,
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 179-94.
Cohon, R. (1997a), "The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 827-50.
Cohon, R. (1997b), "Hume's Difficulty with the Virtue of Honesty", Hume Studies, vol. 23, no. 1,
pp. 91-112.
Cohon, R. (2001a), "The Shackles of Virtue: Hume On Allegiance to Government", History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 18, no.4, pp. 393-413.
Cohon, R. (ed.) (2001b), Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Colby, M. (1998), "The Epistemological Foundations of Practical Reason", Inquiry, 42, pp. 25-
48.
Colman, J. (1983), John Locke's Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Coleman, D. (1992), "Hume's Internalism", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 331-47.
Cook, J. W. (1968), "Hume's Scepticism with Regard to the Senses", American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1-17.
Cooper, L. D. (1999), Rousseau Nature: the Problem of the Good Life, Penn.: The Pennsylvania
State University Press.
Copp, D. (2001), "Against Internalism About Reasons-Gert's Rational Options", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 455-61.
Costa, M. J. (1993), "Hobbes on Liberty and Necessity", Hobbes Studies, vol. 6, pp. 29-42.
Costa, M. J. (1995a), "Hume and Justified Belief' in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume: Critical
Assessments, vol. 1, pp. 174-82.
Costa, M. J. (1995b), "Why be Just? Hume's Response in the Inquiry" in S. Tweyman (ed.),
DavidHume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 98-109.
Cottingham, J. (1986), "Partiality, Favouritism and Morality", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.
36, no. 144, pp. 357-73.
Cottingham, J. (ed.) (1992), Cambridge Companion to Descartes, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cottingham, J. (1993), A Descartes Dictionary, London: Blackwell.
Cottingham, J. (1998), Philosophy and the Good Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cottingham, J. (ed.) (1998), Descartes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cottle, C. E. (1991) "Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise" in D. Livingston and M.
Marie (eds.), Hume as Philosopher ofSociety, Politics and History, N.Y.: Rochester University
Press, pp. 16-25.
Bibliography 296
Hume's General Point of View
Craig, E. (1967), "Berkeley's Attack on Abstract Ideas", Philosophical Review, vol. 77, pp. 425-
437.
Craig, E. (1979), David Hume: Eine Einfihrung in seine Philosophic , Frankfurt: Frankfurt-on-
Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Craig, E. (1987), TheMind ofGod and the Works ofMan, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Craig, E. (ed.) (1998), Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, 10 vols., London: Routledge.
Craig, E. (2000), 'Projectivist and Realist?' in Read, R., and K. A. Richman (eds), The New
Hume Debate, London: Routledge.
Craig, E. (2002), "The Idea of Necessary Connexion", in P. Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on
Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 221-9.
Creery, W. (ed.) (1991), George Berkeley: CriticalAssessments, 3 vols., London: Routledge.
Crisp, R. and Slote, M. (eds.), (1997), Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crossley, D. J. (1990), "Utilitarianism, Rights and Equality", Utilitas, vol. 2, pp. 40-54.
Cummins, P. D. (1991), "Hume on the Idea ofExistence", Hume Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1991, pp.
61-82.
Cummins, P. D. (1996), "Hume on Qualities", Hume Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 49-88.
Cummins, R. (1975), "Two Troublesome Claims About Qualities in Locke's Essay",
PhilosophicalReview, vol. 84, pp. 401-18.
Curley, E. M. (1972), "Locke, Boyle, and the Distinction between Primary and Secondary
Qualities", Philosophical Review, vol. 81, pp. 438-64.
Dagger, R. (1997), Civic Virtues, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dalgarno, M. T. (1975-76), "Analysing Hobbes's Contract", Proceeding of the Aristotelian
Society, vol. 76, pp. 209-26.
Damrosch Jr., L. (1979), "Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: Implications of the Free-Will
Controversy", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 40, pp. 339-52.
D'Arms, J. and Jacobson, D. (2000), "Sentiment and Value", Ethics, vol. 110, no. 4, pp. 722-48.
Darwall, S. (1995), The British Moralists and The Internal 'Ought' 1640-1740, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Dauer, F. W. (1980), "Hume's Skeptical Solution and The Casual Theory of Knowledge", The
PhilosophicalReview, vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 357-78.
Davidson, D. (1976), "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride", Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 73, pp.
744-57.
Davie, G. (1961), The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the Nineteenth
Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Davie, G. (1986), The Crisis ofthe Democratic Intellect, Edinburgh: Polygon Books.
Davie, G. (1994), A Passion for Ideas: Essays on the Scottish Enlightenment, vol. 2, Edinburgh:
Polygon.
Davie, W. (1998), "Hume's General Point of View", Hume Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 275-94.
Davis, J. B. (1994), "Smith's Invisible Hand and Hegel's Cunning ofReason" in J. C. Wood, (ed.),
Adam Smith Critical, Assessments, 2nd Series, pp. 300-20.
Davis, J. R. (1994), "Adam Smith on the Providential Reconciliation of Individual and Social
Interests: Is Man Led by an Invisible Hand or Misled by a Sleight of Hand?" in J. C. Wood, (ed.),
Adam Smith Critical Assessments, pp. 90-101.
Bibliography 297
Hume's General Point ofView
Davis, N. (1980), "Utilitarianism and Responsibility", Ratio, vol. 22, pp. 15-35.
Day, J. (1965), "Hume on Justice and Allegiance", Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 151, pp. 35-56.
Deigh, J. (1982), "Love, Guilt, and the Sense of Justice", Inquiry, vol. 25, pp. 391-416.
Den Uly, D. J., (1983), Power, State and Fredom; An Interpretation of Spinoza's Political
Theory, Assen: Van Gorcum.
Dancy, J. (1987), Berkeley: An Introduction, London: Blackwell.
Descartes R. (1984-5), The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, 2 vols., trans. J. Cottingham, R.
Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Descartes R. (1984), Principles ofPhilosophy in The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, vol. 1.
Descartes R. (1991), The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, vol. 3, trans. J. Cottingham, R.
Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, A. Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Diamond Jr. A. M. (1994), "The Impact of Smith's Philosophy of Science on His Economics" in
J. C. Wood, (ed.), Adam Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 6, pp. 25-33.
Dicker, G. (1998), Hume's Epistemology & Metaphysics, London: Routledge.
Double, R. (1999), "Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons", American
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 149-58.
Dower, N. (1998), World Ethics The New Agenda, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Drever, J. (1953), "A Note on Hume's Pyrrhonism", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 3, pp. 40-
50.
Drury, S. B. (1980), "John Locke: Natural Law and Innate Ideas", Dialogue, vol. 19, pp. 531-45.
Duncan, E. H. and Baird, R.M. (1977), "Thomas Reid's Criticisms of Adam Smith's Theory of
the Moral Sentiments", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 509-22.
Dunn, J. (1967), "Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke", Historical Journal, vol. 10, no.
2, pp. 153-82.
Dunn, J. (1969), The Political Thought ofJohn Locke: An historical Account of the Argument of
the "Two Treatises ofGovernment", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dunn, J. (1996), The History of Political Theory and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dunn, J. (1991), "Political Obligation", Political Theory Today, H. David (ed.), Stanford:
Stanford University Press, pp. 23-47.
Dunner, J. (1955), Baruch Spinoza and Western Democracy, N.Y.: Philosophical Library.
Dwyer, J. (1998), The Age ofThe Passion, Scotland: Tuckwell Press.
Ehrenberg, J. (1999), Civil Society: the Critical History ofan Idea, N.Y.: New York University
Press.
Emerson, R. (2003), "The Contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment", in B. Alexander (ed.),
Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Endres, A. M., (1994), "Adam Smith's Rhetoric of Economics: an Illustration Using 'Smithian'
Compositional Rules" in J. C. Wood, (ed.), Adam Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7,
pp. 202-22.
Engstrom, S. and Whiting, J. (eds.), (1996), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness
andDuty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Evensky, J. M., (1987), "The Two Voices of Adam Smith: Moral Philosopher and Social Critic",
History ofPolitical Economy, vol.19, no.3, pp. 447-68.
Bibliography 298
Hume's General Point of View
Evnine, S. (1993), "Hume, Conjectural History, and the Uniformity of Human Nature", Journal
ofThe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 31, no.4, pp. 589-606.
Falkenstein, L. and Welton, D. (2001), "Humean Contiguity", History ofPhilosophy Quarterly,
vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 279-96.
Farr, J. (1982), "Humean Explanations in the Moral Sciences", Inquiry, vol. 25, pp. 57-80.
Farr, J. (1986), "Consent and Slavely in Lock: I. 'So Vile and Miserable and Estate' The Problem
of Slavery in Locke's Political Thought", Political Theory, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 263-89.
Festenstein, M. (1997), Pragmatism & Political Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fieser, J. (1997), "Hume's Motivational Distinction between Natural and Artificial Virtues",
British Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 5, no. 2 pp. 371-88.
Fieser, J. (1992), "Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors", Hume Studies, vol.
18, no. 1, pp. 1-17.
Fine, G. (ed.), (1999), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, G. (ed.), (1999), Plato 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finnis, J. (1979), Natural Law andNatural Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finnis, J. (1983), Fundamentals ofEthics, Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press.
Finnis, J. (1986), Natural Law andNatural Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Flage, D. E. and Glass, R. J. (1984), "Hume on the Cartesian Theory of Substance",
Southwestern Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 22, pp. 497-508.
Flage, D. (1992), "Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.
369-82.
Flew, A. (1961), Hume's Philosophy ofBelief London: Routledge & Regan Paul.
Flew, A. (1986a), David Hume: Philosopher ofMoral Science, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Flew, A. (1986b), "Social Justice: From Rawls to Hume", Hume Studies, vol. 12, pp. 177-91.
Flew, A. (1995), "Three Questions About Justice in Hume's Treatise" in S. Tweyman (ed.),
DavidHume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 24-36.
Fogelin, R. J. (1984), "Hume and the Missing Shade of Blue", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 263-71.
Fogelin, R. (1985), Hume's Scepticism in the Treatise ofHuman Nature, London: Routledge &
Regan Paul.
Fogelin, R. (2001), Berkeley and the Principles ofHuman Knowledge, London: Routledge.
Forbes, D. (1975), Hume's Philosophical Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fosl, P. S. (1998), "Donald Livingston's Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's
Pathology of Philosophy", Hume Studies, vol. 24, no.2, pp. 355-66.
Fowler, R. B. and Orenstein, J. R. (1993), An Introduction to Political Theory, N.Y.: Harper
Collins College Publishers.
Frankena, W. (1955), "Hutcheson's Moral Sense", Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 16, pp.
356-75.
Franklin, J. H. (1996), "Allegiance and Jurisdiction in Locke's Doctrine of Tacit Consent",
Political Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 407-22.
Frasca-Spada, M. (1998), Marina Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bibliography 299
Hume's General Point of View
Friedman, R. Z. (1984), "The Importance and Function of Kant's Highest Good", Journal of the
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 22, pp. 325-42.
Freeman, S. (ed.) (2003), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Furuya, H. (2003), The 'Private Vices, Public Benefits' Controversy; the Response of the Scottish
Enlightenment to BernardMandeville, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Edinburgh.
Garrett, D. (ed.), (1996), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Garrett, D. (1997), Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Garrett, D. (1998), "Ideas, Reason, and Skepticism: Replies to my Critics", Hume Studies, vol. 24,
no. 1, 171-94.
Garrett, D. (2001a), "Precis of Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy: Book
symposium", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 185-9.
Garrett, D. (2001b), "Replies", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, no. 1, pp.
205-15.
Gaskin, J. C. A. (1974), "God, Hume and Natural Belief', Philosophy, vol. 49, pp. 281-94.
Gaskin, J. C. A. (1978), Hume's Philosophy ofReligion, London: Macmillan.
Gaukroger, S. (2001), Francis Bacon and the Tranformation of Early-Modern Philosophy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gauthier, D. (1992), "Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.
401-27.
Gay, J. H. (1963), "Matter and Freedom in the Thought of Samuel Clarke", Journal of the
History ofIdeas, vol. 24, pp. 85-105.
George, R. P. (1999), In Defence ofNatural Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gert, B. (1998), Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gert, B. (2001), "Replies: Book Symposium", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol.
62, no. 2, pp.463-81.
Gill, M. B. (1996), "A Philosopher in his Closet: Reflexivity and Justification in Hume's Moral
Theory", Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 231-56.
Glouberman, M. (1997), "Hume on Modes", Hume Studies, vol. 3, no.l, pp. 32-50.
Goldsmith, M. M. (1980), "Hobbes's Mortal God': Is There a Fallacy in Hobbes's Theory of
Sovereignty?", History ofPolitical Thought, vol. 1, pp. 33-50.
Goldsmith, M. M. (1988), "Regulating Anew The Moral and Political Sentiments of Mankind:
Bernard Mandeville and The Scottish Enlightenment", Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 49,
pp. 587-606.
Goldstick, D. (1987), "Secondary Qualities", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol.
48, no. 1, pp. 145-6.
Goodin, R. and Pettit, P. (eds.), (1993), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy,
Oxford: Blackwell.
Gordon, R. M. (1974), "The Aboutness ofEmotions", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 11,
no.l, pp. 27-36.
Gordon, R. M. (1995), "Sympathy, Simulation and the Impartial Spectator", Ethics, vol. 105, pp.
727-42.
Bibliography 300
Hume's General Point of View
Gorman, M. M. (1993), "Hume's Theory of Belief', Hume Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 89-101.
Gotterbarn, D. (1985), "Hume's Two Lights on Cause" in S. Tweyman, (ed.), David Hume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 3, pp.386-90.
Gouthie, D. (1995), "Artificial Virtue and the Sensible Knave" in S. Tweyman (ed.), David
Hume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 129-54.
Grant, R. W. (1987), John Locke's Liberalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Grant, R. W. (1988), "Locke's Political Anthropology and Lockean Individualism", Journal of
Politics, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 42-63.
Gray, J. (1995), Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and culture at the Close of the Modern Age,
N.Y.: Routledge.
Gray, J. (1998), Hayek on Liberty, 3rd edn., London: Routledge.
Green, T. H. and Grose, T. H. (1874-1875), The Philosophical Works of David Hume, vol. 4,
London: Longmans Green.
Greenleaf, W. H. (1972), "Hume, Burke and the General Will", Political Studies, vol. 20, no. 2,
pp. 131-40.
Greig, J. Y. T. and Beynon, H. (eds.) (1990), Calendar ofHume Mss. in the Possession of the
Royal Society ofEdinburgh, Bristol: Thoemmes.
Grene, M. (1994), "The Objects ofHume's Treatise", Hume Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 163-77.
Grey, J. (2002), "Hume on Liberty and the Market - a Twenty-First Century Perspective", The
David Hume Institute, Hume Occasional Paper, no. 60.
Grisworld, C. L. (1999), Adam Smith and the Virtue ofEnlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Grotius, H. (1901), The Rights ofWar and Peace, trans. A. C. Campbell, N.Y., M. Walter Dunne.
Gruner, R. (1991), "Berkeley on General Ideas" in W. Creery (ed.), George Berkeley: Critical
Assessments, vol. 2, pp. 147-51.
Gunn, R. (1988), "Civic Humanist Themes in Machiavelli", Waverley Papers, The University of
Edinburgh.
Gunn, R. (1988), "Recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit", Common Sense, vol. 4, pp.
40-68.
Gunn, R. (1995), "What do We Owe to the Scots? The Property form" Common Sense, vol. 17,
pp. 39-68.
Gunn, R. (2000-2001), "Speech-Acts in the 1638 National Covenant", Waverley Papers, The
University of Edinburgh.
Gutting, G. (1999), Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique ofModernity, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Guyer, P. (1992), The Cambridge Companion to Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haakonssen, K. (1981), The Science ofa Legislator, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haakonssen, K. (1982), "What Might Properly Be Called Natural Jurisprudence?" in R. H.
Campbell and S. S. Andrew (eds.), The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment,
Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd. pp. 205-25.
Haakonssen, K. (1990), "Natural Law and Moral Realism" in M. A. Stewart (ed.), Studies in the
Philosophy ofthe Scottish Enlightenment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 61-85.
Bibliography 301
Hume's General Point of View
Haakonssen, K. (1996), Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish
Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, J. (1979), Communication and the Evolution ofSociety, trans. T. McCarthy, Boston:
Beacon.
Hamowy, R. (1987), The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order,
Carbondale: S-Illinois University Press.
Hampton, J. (1997), Political Philosophy, Colo.: Westview Press.
Hardin, R. (1991), "Hobbesian Political Order", Political Theory, vol.19, no.2, pp. 156-80.
Harpham, E. J. (1984), "Liberalism, Civic Humanism, and the Case of Adam Smith", American
Political Science Review, vol. 78, pp. 764-74.
Harpham, E. J. (2000), "Hume Against Locke on the Causal Principle", British Journal for the
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 339-43.
Harris, I. (1994), The Mind ofJohn Locke: A Study ofPolitical Theory in the Intellectual Setting,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harris, I. (2000), "Locke on Justice" in M. A. Stewart (ed.), English Philosophy in the Age of
Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 49-85.
Harris, J. (1974), "Leibniz and Locke on Innate Ideas", Ratio, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 226-42.
Harrison, J. (1976), Hume's MoralEpistemology, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harrison, J. (1981), Hume's Theory ofJustice, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harrison, R. (1993), Democracy, London: Routledge.
Harrison, R. (2003), Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion's Masterpiece: An Examination of
Seventeenth-Century Political Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hart, H. L. A. (1994), The Concept ofLaw, 2nd edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hartogh, G. A. D. (1990), "Express Consent and Full Membership in Locke", Political Studies,
vol. 38, pp. 105-15.
Hayek, F. A. (1967), Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge.
Hayek, F. A. (1978), New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas,
London: Routledge.
Hearn, J. (2000), Claiming Scotland, Edinburgh: Polygon.
Hearn, J. (2001), "Taking Liberties: contesting Visions of the Civil society Project", Critique of
Antholopology, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 339-60.
Hearn, J. (2002), "Narative, Agency and Mood: On the Social Construction of National History
in Scotland", Comparative Studies in Society andHistory, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 745-69.
Hearn, J. (2003), "Big City: Civic Symbolism and Scottish Nationalism", Scottish Affairs, vol. 42,
57-82.
Hearn, T. K. Jr. (1970), "'General Rules' in Hume's Treatise", Journal of the History of
Philosophy, vol. 8, pp. 405-22.
Hearn, T. K. Jr. (1973), "Ardal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's Treatise", Philosophy, vol. 48,
no. 185, pp. 288-92.
Hearn, T. K. Jr. (1976), "General Rules and the Moral Sentiments in Hume's Treatise", Review of
Metaphysics, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 57-72.
Heath, E. (1995), "The Commerce of Sympathy: Adam Smith on the Emergence of Morals",
Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 447-66.
Bibliography 302
Hume's General Point of View
Hegel, G. W. F. (1832-1845), G. W. F. Hegel's Werke, 18 vols., P. Marheineke, et al (eds.),
Berlin: Duncker and Humblot.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1967), The Phenomenology ofMind, trans. J. B. Baillie, New York: Harper and
Row.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1975), Lectures on the Philosophy ofWorld History: Introduction: Reason in
History, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heilbroner, R. L. (1982), "The Socialization of the Individual in Adam Smith", History of
Political Economy, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 427-39.
Hendel, C. (1925), Studies in the Philosophy ofDavidHume, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Henderson,J. P. and Davis, J. B.(1994), "Adam Smith's Influence on Hegel's Philosophical
Writing" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith: Critical Assessments 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 283-302.
Henderson, R. S. (1990), "David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions", Hume
Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 33-44.
Henson, R. G. (1979), "What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and The Overdetermination
of Dutiful Action", The Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no.l, pp. 39-54.
Henze, D. F. (1969), "The Linguistic Aspect ofHume's Method", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas,
vol. 30, pp. 116-26.
Herdt, J. A. (1997), Religion and Fraction in Hume's Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Herman, B. (1981a), "Integrity and Impartiality", Philosophical Review, vol. 90, pp. 359-82.
Herman, B. (1981b), "On the Value of Acting From the Motive of Duty", The Philosophical
Review, vol. 90, no. 3, pp. 359-82.
Heywood, A. (1994), Political Ideas and Concepts An Introduction, London: Macmillan.
Hirst, E. W. (1934), "The Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule", Philosophy, vol. 9, pp.
328-35.
Hobbes, T. (1839), The English work ofThomas Hobbes, W. Molesworth (ed.), 11 vols. London:
John Bohn.
Hobbes, T. (1991), Leviathan, R. Tuck, (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes, T. (1998), On the Citizen, R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hochberg, H. (1986), "Casuality and Generality in the Treatise and The Tractatus", Hume Studies,
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 1-17.
Hodge, M and Lachs, J. (1995), "Hume on Belief' in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume: Critical
Assessments, vol. 1, pp. 144-57.
Honderich, T. (ed.) (1995), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hookway, C. (1990), Scepticism, London: Routledge.
Hope, V. (1984), "Smith's Demigod" in V. Hope (ed.), Philosophers of the Scottish
Enlightenment, pp. 157-67.
Hope, V. (ed.) (1984), Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Hope, V. (1989), Virtue by Consensus, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hubin, D. C. (1979), "The Scope of Justice", Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 9, no.l, pp. 3-24.
Bibliography 303
Hume's General Point of View
Hudson, S. D. (1986), Human Character and Morality: Reflections from the History of Ideas,
London: Routledge.
Hunter, G. (1962), "Hume on Is and Ought", Philosophy, vol. 37, no. 140, pp. 148-52.
Hume, D. (1875), The Philosophical Works ofDavid Hume, T. H. Green and T. H.Grose (eds.), 4
vols., London: Longman.
Hume, D. (1932), The Letters ofDavid Hume, J. Y. T. Creig (ed.), 2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Hume, D. (1954), New Letters ofDavid Hume, R. Klibansky, and E. C. Mossner (eds.), Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Hume, D. (1965), An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entitluled, A Treatise of Human
Nature, 1740, J. M. Keynes and P. Srafa (eds.), reprint. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books.
Hume, D. (1975), A Treatise ofHuman Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch (eds.),
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, D. (1978), Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principle of
Morals, 3rd ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch, (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, D. (1985), Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, F. M. Eugene (ed.), Ind.: Liberty
Classics.
Hume, D. (1988), The History ofEnglandfrom the Invasion ofJulius Caesar to The Revolution,
6 vols., Ind.: Liberty Classics.
Hume, D. (1991), David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in Focus, S. Tweyman
(ed.), London: Routledge.
Hume, D. (1994), Political Essays, K. Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hume, D. (2000), A Treatise ofHuman Nature, F. N. David and N. Mary (eds.), Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hutcheson, F. (1969), An Inquiry in the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, repr.,
England: Gregg International Publishers.
Hutcheson, F. (1973), An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design, 4th edn., P. Kivy
(ed.), The Hague: Nijhoff.
Hutcheson, F. (2002), On the Nature and Conduct of the Passion, repr., A. Garret (ed.),
Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Imlay, R. A. (1981), "Hume on Space and Geometry", Hume Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 121-36.
Imlay, R. A. (1992), "Berkeley and Scepticism: A Fatal Dalliance", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2,
pp. 501-10.
Inkster, I. (1994), "'Partly Solid and Partly Sophistical': Adam Smith as an Historian of
Economic Thought," in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp.
38-42.
Inwood, M. J. (1983), Hegel, London: Routledge.
Izumiya, S. (1996), Hume (in Japanese), Tokyo: Kenkyusya.
Jacquette, D. (1994), "Infinite Divisibility in Hume's First Enquiry", Hume Studies, vol. 20, no. 2,
pp. 219-40.
James, S. (1997), Passion andAction, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jensen, Henning, (1977), "Hume on Moral Agreement", Mind, vol. 86, pp. 497-513.
Bibliography 304
Hume's General Point of View
Jones, H. (1989), The Epicurean Tradition, London: Duckworth
Jones, P. (1982), Hume's Sentiments; Their Ciceronian and French Context, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Johnson, C. S. (1992), "Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume's
Ethical System", Journal ofPhilosophical Research, vol. 17, pp. 225-38.
Johnson, O. A. (1995), The Mind ofDavidHume, Illinois: the Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois.
Johnson, P. (1998), "Hume on Manners and the Civil Condition", British Journalfor the History
ofPhilosophy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 209-22.
Johnson, R. D. (1994), "Adam Smith's Radical Views on Property, Distributive Justice and the
Market" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith CriticalAssessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 102-21.
Jones, P. (1982), Hume's Sentiments, Their Ciceronian and French Context, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Jones, W. E. (2000), "Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism", The Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. 50, no. 201, pp. 433-51.
Joynton, O. (1984), "The Problem of Circularity in Wollaston's Moral Philosophy", Journal of
the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 435-43.
Kail, P. J. E. (2001a), "Reason, Custom and The True Philosophy", British Journal for the
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 361-6.
Kail, P. J. E. (2001b), "Hutcheson's Moral Sense: Skepticism, Realism, and Secondary Qualities",
History ofPhilosophy Quarterly, vol. 18, no.l, pp. 57-77.
Kail, P. J. E. (forthcoming), Projectionism and Realism in Hume, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Kalyvas, A. (1998), "Adam Ferguson Returns Liberalism through a Glass", Political Theory, vol.
26, no. 2, pp. 173-97.
Kamino, K. (1984), Hume Study (in Japanese), Kyoto: Minerva Shobo.
Kamino, K. (1996), Formation ofMoral Science (in Japanese), Nagoya: Nagoya University Press.
Kamooneh, K. (2003), "Hume's Beliefs", British Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 11,
no.l, pp. 41-56.
Kane, J. (1981), "Morality and Impartiality", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 4,
pp. 295-303.
Kane, J. (1996), "Justice, Impartiality, and Equality, Why the Concept of Justice Does Not
Presume Equality", Political Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 375-93.
Kant, I. (1900-), Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Deutsche Academie der Wissenschaften (eds.), 29
vols., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Kant, I. (1933), Critique ofPure Reason, 2nd edition, trans. N. Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan.
Kant, I. (1949a), Critique ofPractical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans.
Lewis White Beck, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kant, I. (1949b), Groundwork ofthe Metaphysic ofMorals, trans. H. J. Paton as The Moral Law,
London: Hutcheson.
Kant, I. (1953), Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. P. G. Lucas, Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Kant, I. (1996) "Toward Perpetual Peace" in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, trans. M. J.
Bibliography 305
Hume's General Point of View
Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katznelson, I. (1998), "Adam Ferguson Returns Liberalism through a Glass, Darkly", Political
Theory, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 173-97.
Kavka, G. S. (1983), "Rule By Fear", Nous, vol. 17, pp. 601-20.
Keat, R. (1981), The Politics ofSocial Theory: Habermas, Freud and the Critique ofPositivism,
Oxford: Blackwell.
Keat, R. (1991), "Phenomenology" in Understanding Phenomenology, Keat, R., M. Hammond
and J. Howarth (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Keat, R. (2000),Cultural Goods and the Limits ofthe Market, Basingtoke: Macmillan.
Keat, R. and Urry, J. (1975), Social Theory as Science, London: Routledge.
Kekes J. (1997), Against Liberalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kelly, J. M. (1992), A Short History ofWestern Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kelly, P. (ed.), (2000), Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Kemp Smith, N. (1941), The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and
Central Doctrines, London: Macmillan.
Kemp Smith, N. (1995a), "The Naturalism of Hume (1)" in S. Tweyman, (ed.), David Hume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 3, pp. 207-28.
Kemp Smith, N. (1995b), "The Naturalism of Hume (2)" in S. Tweyman, (ed.), David Hume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 3, pp. 229-39.
Kerr, F. (2002), AfterAquinas, Oxford: Blackwell.
Khalil, E. L. (1994), "Beyond Self-interest and Altruism: A Reconstruction of Adam Smith's
Theory of Human Conduct", Adam Smith Critical Assessments, J. C. Wood (ed.), 2nd Series, vol.
7, pp. 169-87.
King, J. (1988), "Hume and Ethical Monism", History ofPhilosophy Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.
157-71.
King, J. (1995), "Hume's Classical Theory of Justice", in S. Tweyman, (ed.), David Hume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 37-52.
King, P. (ed.) (1993), Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, 4 vols., London: Routledge.
Kleer, R. A. (1995), "Final Causes in Adam Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments", Journal ofthe
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 33, pp. 275-300.
Klein, L. E. (1984-5), "The Third Earl of Shaftesbury and the Progress of Politeness", Eighteenth
Century Studies, vol. 18, pp. 186-214.
Klein, L. E. (1993), Shaftesbury, Politeness and the Politics ofReligion, in Political Discourse in
Early Modern Britain, P. Nicholas and S. Quentin (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Klein, S. (1989), "Argument for the Moral Sense in the Treatise", Dialogs 53, pp. 25-50.
Knowles, D. (2000), "Conservative Utilitarianism", Utilitas, vol. 12, pp. 155-75.
Koizumi, T. (1990), The Thought ofJ. S. Mill (in Japanese). Tokyo: Kodansha.
Koizumi, T. (1997), John StuartMill (in Japanese), Tokyo: Kenkyusya.
Koizumi, T. (ed.) (2002), Reception and Development of Western Thoughts in Japan (in
Japanese), Tokyo: Keio University Press.
Bibliography 306
Hume's General Point ofView
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996), Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1999), "The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's
Ethics", Hume Studies, vol. 25, no.l and 2, pp. 3-41.
Krause, S. (2001), "Partial Justice", Political Theory, vol. 29 no. 3, pp. 315-36.
Kruse, V. (1990), Hume's Philosophy in His Principal Work A Treatise ofHuman Nature and in
His Essays, Bristol: Thoemmes.
Kymlicka, W. (2002), Contemporary Political Philosophy 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Laing, B. (1990), David Hume, Bristol: Thoemmes.
Laird, J. (1931), Hume's Philosophy ofHuman Nature, N.Y.: Dutton.
Langton, R. (1998), Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Larmore, C. E. (1987), Patterns ofMoral Complexity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Larmore, C. E. (1996), The Morals ofModernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laslett, P. (1967), "Introduction" to John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, P. Laslett (ed.),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laura K. (1998), "Reconsidering The Basis of Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction",
British Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 160-92.
Leavitt, F. J. (1991), "Hume Against Spinoza and Aristotle", Hume Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, pp.
203-8.
Lemos, R. M. (1975), "Locke's Theory ofProperty", Interpretation, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 226-44.
Letwin, S. R. (1975), "Hume: Inventor of a New Task for Philosophy", Political Theory, vol. 3,
no. 2, pp. 134-58.
Levy, D. (1978), "Adam Smith's 'Natural Law' and Contractual Society", Journal of the History
ofIdeas, vol. 39, pp. 665-74.
Levy, D. (1995), "The Partial Spectator Theory in the Wealth of Nations: A Robest
Utiritarinism", European Journal ofthe History ofEconomic Thought vol. 2, pp. 229-326.
Levey, A. (1997), "Under Constraint: Chastity and Modesty in Hume", Hume Studies, vol. 23,
no.2, pp. 213-26.
Levy, K. (2000), "Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections", Hume Studies, vol. 26, no. 1,
pp. 41-75.
Leyden, W. V. (1956), "John Locke and Natural Law", Philosophy, vol. 31, pp. 23-35.
Lipkin, R. J. (1987)," Altruism and Sympathy in Hume's Ethics", Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 65, pp. 18-32.
Livingston, D. W. (1984), Hume's Philosophy ofCommon Life, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Livingston, D. W. (1991)," A Sellarsian Hume?", Journal of The History ofPhilosophy, vol. 29,
no. 2, pp. 281-90.
Livingston, D. W. (1993), "Responses and Author's Reply", Journal of The History of
Philosophy, vol. 31, no.l, pp. 111-3.
Livingston, D. W. (1995a), "On Hume's Conservatism", Hume Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 151-64.
Bibliography 307
Hume's General Point of View
Livingston, D. W. (1995b), "Theism and the Rationale of Hume's Skepticism About Causation",
in S. Tweyman (ed), David Hume: Critical Assessments, vol. 3, pp. 482-95.
Livingston, D. W. (1998), Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Livingston, D. W. (2001), "Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's Pathology of
Philosophy", Mind, vol. 110, no. 439, pp. 783-87.
Lloyd, A. C. (1979), "Was Aristotle's Theory of Perception Lockean?" Ratio, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
135-48.
Lloyd Thomas, D. A. (1995), Locke on Government, London: Routledge.
Locke, J. (1963), The works ofJohn Locke, 11th edition, 10 vols, repr., Aalen: Scientia.
Locke, J. (1967), Two Treatises ofGovernment, P. Laslett (ed.), 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Locke, J. (1975), An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Nidditch, P. H., (ed.) Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Locke, J. (1983), A Letter Concerning Toleration, J. Tully (ed.), Ind.: Hackett Publishing.
Locke, J. (1993), Political Writings, D. Wootton (ed.), London: Penguin Books.
Loeb, L. E. (1977), "Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the Treatise'", Journal of the
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 15, pp. 395-403.
Loeb, L. E. (1992), "Causation, Extrinsic Relations, and Hume's Second Thoughts about Personal
Identity", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 219-31.
Loeb, L. E. (1994), "A Progress of Sentiments, Reflections on Hume's Treatise", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 467-75.
Loeb, L. E. (1995a), "Hume on Stability, Justification, and Unphilosophical Probability", Journal
ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 101-32.
Loeb, L. E. (1995b), "Instability and Uneasiness in Hume's Theories of Belief and Justification",
British Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 301-27.
Loeb, E. L. (2001), "Hume's Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs", The Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. 51, no. 203, pp. 145-64.
LoLordo, A. (2000), "Probability and Skepticism about Reason in Hume's Treatise", British
Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 419-46.
Long, D. G. (1990), "Utility' and the 'Utility Principle': Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill", Utilitas,
vol. 2, pp. 12-39.
Long, A. A. (1974), Hellenic Philosophy, London: Duckworth.
Lottenbach, (1996), "Hans, Monkish Virtues, Artificial Lives: On Hume's Genealogy ofMorals",
Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 367-88.
Loux, M. J. (2002), Metaphysics, 2nd edn., London: Routledge.
Lowe, E. J. (1995), Locke on Human Understanding, London: Routledge.
Lukes, S. (1991), "Equality and Liberty: Must they Conflict?" Political Theory Today by David
Held, pp. 48-66.
Luntley, M. (1995), "Moral Sentiments, and the Difference They Make II", Aristotelian Society,
suppl. 69, pp. 31-45.
Lyons, J. C. (2001), "General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume's Treatise"
Hume Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 247-77
Bibliography 308
Hume's General Point of View
Mabbott, J. D. (1973), John Locke, London: Macmillan.
MacCormick, N. (1981), "Adam Smith on Law", Valpparaiso University Law Review, vol. 15,
pp. 243-63.
Maclntyre, A. (1984), After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn., Notre dome Ind.:
University ofNotre Dame Press.
Maclntyre, A. (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality, Notre Dome Ind.: University ofNotre
Dame Press.
Maclntyre, A. (1990), Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and
Tradition, Notre Dome Ind.: University ofNotre Dame Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1974), The Cement ofthe Universe, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1976), Problemsfrom Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1980), Hume'sMoral Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Mackie, J. L. (1982), The Miracle ofTheism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
MacNabb, D. (1966), David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality, 2nd ed., Hamden,
Conn.: Archon Books.
Magri, T. (1996), "Natural Obligation and Normative Motivation in Hume's Treatise", Hume
Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 231-53.
Malebranche, N. (1980), The Search after Truth, trans. T. M. Lennon and P. J. Oscamp,
Columbus: Ohio State University.
Mandeville, B. (1924), The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, repr., F. B.
Kaye (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Margolis, J. (1982), "Berkeley and Others on the Problem of Universals" in C. Turbayne (ed.),
Berkeley Critical and Lnterpretative Essays, pp. 207-27, Mineapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Marshall, G. (1954), "David Hume and Political Scepticism", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 4, no.
16, pp. 247-57.
Marshall, J. (1997), "John Locke Resistance, Religion and Responsibility", Journal of The
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 189-91.
Martin, M. A. (1990), "Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume", Hume Studies,
vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 107-20.
Martin, M. A. (1993), "The Rational Warrant for Hume's General Rules", Journal ofThe History
ofPhilosophy, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 245-57.
Martin, D. A., (1994), "Economics as Ideology: On Making "the Invisible Hand" Invisible" in J.
C. Wood, (ed,),Adam Smith CriticalAssessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 123-37.
Matthew H. K. (1997), John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical
Explorations of Individualism, Community, and Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Maund, C. (1937), Hume's Theory ofKnowledge, London: Macmillan.
Maund, C. (1952), "On the Nature and Significance ofHume's Scepticism", Revue Internationale
De Philosophie TOME, vol. 1, pp. 168-83.
McGinn, M. (1997), Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London: Rougledge.
Mclntyre, J. (1990), "Character: a Humean Account", History ofPhilosophy Quarterly, vol. 7, no.
2, pp. 193-206.
Bibliography 309
Hume's General Point of View
McMahon, C. (1981), "Morality and the Invisible Hand", Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 10,
no. 3, pp. 247-77.
McNaughton, D. (1988), Moral Vision: an Introduction to Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell.
McPherson, T. H. (1949), "The Development of Bishop Butler's Ethics", Philosophy, vol. 24, no.
88, pp. 3-22.
McRae, R. J. (1969), "Hume on Meaning", Dialogue, vol. 8, pp. 486-91.
McShea, R. J. (1968), The Political Philosophy ofSpinoza, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.
Meeker, K. (1998), "Hume: Radical Sceptic or Naturalized Epistemologist?", Hume Studies, vol.
24, no. 1, pp. 31-52.
Megill, A. D. (1975), "Theory and Experience in Adam Smith", Journal of the History ofIdeas,
vol. 36, pp. 79-94.
Mercer, P. (1995), "Hume's Concept of Sympathy", in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume: Critical
Assessments, vol. 4, pp. 437-60.
Michael, A. (1991), Locke, 2 vols., London: Routledge.
Miller, D. (1980a), "Justice and Property", Ratio, vol. 22, pp. 1-14.
Miller, D. (1980b), "Hume and Possessive Individualism", History ofPolitical Thought, vol. 1,
no. 2, pp. 262-78.
Miller, D. (1982), Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Mitchell, J. (1993), "Hobbes and The Equality of All Under The One", Political Theory, vol. 21,
no. 1, pp. 78-100.
Moore, A. W. (1997), Points of View, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, J. (1977), "Hume's Political Science and Classical Republican Tradition", Canadian
Journal ofPolitical Science, vol.10, no. 4, pp. 809-39.
Moore, J. (1986), "Hume's Theory of Justice and Property", Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, pp.
103-19.
Morris, C. W. (ed.), (1999), The Social Contract Theorists, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Morris, W. E. (1997), "The Hume Literature", Hume Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 345-55.
Morrow, G. R. (1923), "The Significance of The Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam
Smith", Philosophical Review, vol. 32, pp. 60-78.
Morrow, G. R. (1925), "The Ethics of the Wealth ofNations", Philosophical Review, vol. 34, pp.
599-611.
Morrow, G. R. (1969), The Ethical Theory and Economic Theory ofAdam Smith, rept., N.Y.:
Kelly.
Mossner, E. C. (1980), The Life ofDavid Hume, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mounce, H. O. (1999), Hume's Naturalism, London: Routledge.
Murphy, J. G. (1978), "Hume and Kant on the Social Contract", Philosophical Studies, vol. 33,
pp. 65-79.
Myers, P. C. (1998), Our Only Star and Compass, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Inc.
Nagel, T. (1959), "Hobbes's Concept ofObligation", Philosophical Review, vol. 68, pp. 68-83.
Nagel, T. (1970), The Possibility ofAltruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bibliography 310
Hume's General Point of View
Nagel, T. (1986), The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Narveson, J. (2001), The Libertarian Idea, Toronto: Broadview Press
Naticchia, C. (1999), "Justice as Fairness: Epistemological not Political", The Southern Journal
ofPhilosophy, vol. 37, pp. 597-611.
Nelson, J. O. (1964), "The Conclusion of Book one, Part Four, of Hume's Treatise", Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, vol. 24, pp. 512-21.
New, C. G. (1969), "Ardal on Promises as Statements", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 19, pp.
159-60.
Nistico, S. (1994), "Prices and Distributive Antagonism in the Work of Smith and Kalecki", in J.
C. Wood (ed.), 2nd Series, Adam Smith Critical Assessments, pp. 232-46.
Nicholas, B. (1987), Introduction to Roman Law, 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Noel, M. (2002), Aspects ofHobbes, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nolan, R. (1994), "Getting Adam Smith Right", Adam Smith Critical Assessments, J. C. Wood
(ed.), 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 267-68.
Noonan, H. W. (1999), Hume on Knowledge, London: Routledge.
Norton, D. F. (1982), David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Norton, D. F. (1985), "Notes and Discussions Hutcheson's Moral Realism", Journal of the
History ofPhilosophy, vol. 23, pp. 397-418.
Norton, D. F. (ed.) (1993), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Noxon, J. (1973), Hume's Philosophical Development. A Study of His Methods, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Nozick, R. (1968), Anarchy, State, and Utopia, N.Y.: Basic Books.
Nuyen, A. T. (1986), "Hume's Justice as a Collective Good", Hume Studies, vol. 12, pp. 39-56.
O'Connor, D. (2001), Hume on Religion, London: Routledge.
Oakeshott, M. (1991), Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Ind.: Liberty Fund.
Olafson, F. A. (1966), "Thomas Hobbes and the Modern Theory of Natural Law", Journal of the
History ofIdeas, vol. 4, pp. 15-30.
Olivercorona, K. (1974), "Locke's Theory of Appropriation", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24,
no. 96, pp. 220-34
O'Hear, A. (1997), Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary
Explanation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
O'Neill, L. J. (1978), "Comments on 'Hume and The Idea of Casual Necessity"', Philosophical
Studies, vol. 33, pp. 61-3.
O'Neill, O. (1986), "Kantian Politics: I. The Public Use of Reason", Political Theory, vol.14, no.
4, pp. 523-51.
O'Neill, O. (1990), Constructions ofReason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Neill, O. (1996), Towards Justice and Virtues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Otteson, J. R. (2000), "Adam Smith on the Emergence of Morals: A Reply to Eugene Heath",
British Journalfor the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 545-51.
Bibliography 311
Hume's General Point of View
Owen, D. (1992), "Hume and the Lockean Background: Induction and the Uniformity Principle",
Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 179-207.
Owen, D. (1994), "Reason, Reflection, and Reductions", Hume Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 195-
210.
Owen, D. (1999), Hume's Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Owen, D. (ed.) (2000), Hume: General Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Owen, D. (2001), "Reason and Commitment", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol.
62, no. 1, pp. 191-96.
Palmer, D. (1976), "Boyle's Corpuscular Hypothesis and Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality
Distinction", Philosophical Studies, vol. 29, pp. 181-9.
Pappas, G. S. (1992), "Perception of the Self', Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 275-80.
Pappas, G. S. (1995), "Abstract General Ideas in Hume" in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 1, pp. 131-43.
Pappas, G. S. (1997), "Hume and Abstract General Ideas", Hume Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 17-31.
Parelman, M. A. (1994), "Adam Smith and Dependent Social Relations" in J. C. Wood (ed.),
Adam Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, pp. 1-17.
Passmore, J. (1980a), Hume's Intentions, 3rd edn., London: Duckworth.
Passmore, J. (1980b), "Locke and the Ethics of Belief', British Academy Proceedings, vol. 64, pp.
185-208.
Pears, D. (1990), Hume's System, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Penelhum, T. (1975), Hume, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Penelhum, T. (1992), "The Self of Book 1 and the Selves of Book 2", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no.
2, pp. 281-91.
Penelhum, T. (1992), David Hume an Introduction to his Philosophical System, Ind.: Purdue
University Press.
Pesciarelli, E. (1994), "On Adam Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam
Smith Critical, Assessments, 2nd Series, London: Routledge.
Pflaum, K. B. (1995), "Hume's Treatment of Belief' in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume: Critical
Assessments, vol. 1, London, Routledge, pp. 158-73.
Phillipson, N. (1973), "Toward a Definition of the Scottish Enlightenment" in P. Fritz and D.
Williams (eds.), City and Society, Toronto: Hakkert, pp. 125-47.
Phillipson, N. (1979), "Hume as a Moralist: a Social Historian's Perspective" in S. Brown (ed.),
The Philosophers ofthe Enlightenment, pp. 140-61.
Phillipson, N. (1981), "The Scottish Enlightenment" in R. Porter and M. Teich (eds.), The
Enlightenment in National Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-40.
Phillipson, N. (1983), "Adam Smith as Civic Moralist" in 1. Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth
and Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-202.
Phillipson, N. (1987), "Politics, Politeness and the Anglicisation of early Eighteenth Century
Scottish Culture" in R. Mason (ed.), Scotland and England 1286-1815, Edinburgh: John Donald,
pp. 226-46.
Phillipson, N. (1989), Hume, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Bibliography 312
Hume's General Point of View
Phillipson, N. (1993), "Propriety, Property and Prudence; David Hume and the Defence of the
Revolution" in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (eds.), Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain,
pp. 302-20.
Phillipson, N. and Mitchison, R. (eds.) (1970), Scotland in the Age of Improvement, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Phillipson, N. and Skinner, Q. (eds.) (1993), Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pietarinen, J. (2001), "Conatus as Active Power in Hobbes", Hobbes Studies, vol. 14, pp. 71-82.
Pitson, A. E. (1982), "Hume on Primary and Secondary Qualities", Hume Studies, vol. 8, pp.
125-38.
Pitson, A. E. (1988), "Hume on Promises and Their Obligation", Hume Studies, vol. 14, pp. 176-
90.
Plato, (1968), Republic, trans. A. Bloom, N.Y.: Basic Books.
Plato, (1980), Laws, trans. T. Pangle, N.Y.: Basic Books.
Plamenatz, J. (1963), Man and Society, London: Longman, vol. 1, pp. 309-10
Pompa, L. H. (1990), Nature and Historical Knowledge; Hume, Hegel and Vico, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Popkin, R. H. (1964), "So, Hume did Read Berkeley", Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 61, pp. 773-8.
Postema, G. J. (1986), Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Postema, G. J. (1995), "Hume's Reply to the Sensible Knave" in S. Tweyman (ed.), DavidHume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 110-28.
Prasch, R. E. (1994), "The Ethics of Growth in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations" in J. C. Wood
(ed.), Adam Smith Critical, Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 269-81.
Price, H. H. (1940), Hume's Theory ofthe External World, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Price, J. V. (1964), "Sceptics in Ciero and Hume", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 25, no. 1,
pp. 97-106.
Price, J. V. (1992), The Ironic Hume, Bristol: Thoemmes.
Price, K. B. (1950), "Hume's Analysis of Generality", Philosophical Review, vol. 59, no. 1, pp.
58-76.
Price, K. B. (1995), "Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine His Ethical Theory?" in S.
Tweyman (ed.), DavidHume; Critical Assessments, vol. 4, pp. 3-11.
Pufendorf, S. (1991), On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law, J. Tully (ed.),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Purviance, S. M. (1997), "The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions", Hume Studies, vol. 23, no. 2,
pp. 195-212.
Radcliffe, E. S. (1994), "Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the
Inculcation of'Morality'", Hume Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 37-58.
Railton, P. (1981), "Probability, Explanation, and Information", Synthese, vol. 48, pp. 233-56.
Railton, P. (1986), "Moral Realism", The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no.2, pp. 163-207.
Rapaczynski, A. (1987), Nature and Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies ofHobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Raphael, D. D. (1949), "Bishop Butler's View of Conscience", Philosophy, vol. 24, pp. 219-38.
Bibliography 313
Hume's General Point of View
Raphael, D. D. (1954-1955), "Universals, Resemblance, and Identity", Aristotelian Society New
Series, vol. 55, pp. 109-32.
Raphael, D. D. (1969), "Adam Smith and 'The Infection of David Hume's Society'", Journal of
the History ofIdeas, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 225-48.
Raphael, D. D. (ed.) (1969), British Moralists: 1650-1800, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raphael, D. D. (1973), "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility", The Aristotelian Society,
vol. 73, pp. 87-103.
Raphael, D. D. (1975) "Impartial Spectator" in A. Skinner and T. Wilson (eds.), Essays on Adam
Smith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 83-99.
Rashid, S. (1994), "Adam Smith as a Historian of Economic Thought: Reply" in J. C. Wood (ed.),
Adam, Smith: CriticalAssessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 43-5.
Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism, N.Y.: Columbia.
Rawls, J. (1999a), A Theory ofJustice, revised ed., Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999b), The Law ofPeoples, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (2000), Lectures on the History ofMoral Philosophy, B. Herman (ed.), Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Raynor, D. R. (1984), "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments", Journal
ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 22, no.l, pp. 51-79.
Raz, J. (1986), TheMorality ofFreedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Read, R. and Kenneth, A. R. (eds.) (2000), The New Hume Debate, London: Routledge.
Redhead, B. (ed.) (1984), Plato to Nato: Studies in Political Thought, London: Penguin Books.
Reeve, A. (1986), Property, London: Macmillan.
Reid, T. (1819), Essays on the Active Powers ofthe Human Mind, 3 vols., Edinburgh.
Reid, T. (1997), An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, D. R.
Brookes (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Reid, T. (2002), Essay on the Intellectual Powers ofMan, D. R. Brookes and K. Haakonssen
(eds.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Reiman, J. (1990), Justice andModern Moral Philosophy, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Reisman, D. A. (1994) "Alfred Marshall and Adam Smith" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith:
Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, pp. 223-31.
Rendall, J. (1978), The Origins ofthe Scottish Enlightenment, London: Macmillan.
Richard H. P. (1955-6), "The Skeptical Precursors of David Hume", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 16, pp. 61-71.
Richard, H. P. (1951), "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism", The
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 385-407.
Richard, I. A. (1971), John Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Richard, P. H. (1977), "Has Hume a Theory of Social Justice?", Hume Studies, vol. 3, pp. 72-93.
Richard, T. J. (1985), "Hume's Two Definition of 'Cause'" in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume:
CriticalAssessments, vol. 3, pp. 372-80.
Riley, P. (1974), "On Finding an Equilibrium between Consent and Natural Law in Locke's
Political Philosophy", Political Studies, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 432-52.
Bibliography 314
Hume's General Point of View
Riley, P. (1976), "Locke on 'Voluntary Agreement' and Political Power", Western Political
Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 136-45.
Riley, P. (1986), The General will before Rousseau: the Transformation of the Divine into the
Civic, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Robison, W. L. (1973), "Hume's Scepticism", Canadian Philosophical Review, vol. 12, no.l, pp.
87-99.
Robison, W L. (1974), "Hume on Personal Identity", History ofPhilosophy, vol. 12, pp. 181-93.
Robison, W. L. (1976), "Hume Ontological Commitments", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 26, pp.
39-47.
Robison, W. L. (1982), "One Consequence of Hume's Nominalism", Hume Studies, vol. 8, no. 2,
pp. 102-18.
Robinson, J. A. (1985), "Hume's Two Definitions of'Cause"' in S. Tweyman (ed.), David Hume:
Critical Assessments, vol. 3, pp. 361-71.
Rogers, G. A. J. (1994), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rogers, G. A. J. and Tomaselli, S. (eds.) (1996), The Philosophical Canon in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries: Essays in Honour ofJohn W. Yolton, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press.
Rolf, G. (1969), "Berkeley on General Ideas", Dialogue, vol. 8, pp. 481-5.
Roojen, M. V. (2002), "Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgments",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 26-49.
Rorty, A. O. (1978), "Butler on Benevolence and Conscience", Philosophy, vol. 53, pp. 171-84.
Rorty, A. O. (1982), "From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments", Philosophy, vol. 57, pp. 159-
72.
Rorty, A. O. (1990), "Pride Produces the Idea of Self: Hume on Moral Agency", Australasian
Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 255-69.
Rorty, R. (1989), Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosen, A. D. (1993), Kant's Theory ofJustice, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rosenberg, N. (1963), "Mandeville and Laissez-Faire", Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol.
24, pp. 183-96.
Rosenberg, N. (1994), "Adam Smith and the Stock ofMoral Capital" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam
Smith Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 46-62.
Ross, S. I. (1966), "Hutcheson on Hume's Treatise: An Unnoticed Letter", Journal ofthe History
ofPhilosophy, vol. 4, pp. 69-72.
Ross, S. I. (1995), The Life ofAdam Smith, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rupert, R and Richman, K. A. (eds.) (2000), The New Hume Debate, London: Routledge.
Rousseau, J-J. (1958), [1762] The Social Contract andDiscourses, G. Cole (ed.), London: Dent.
Russell, P. (1985), "Hume's Treatise and Hobbes's The Elements of Law", Journal of the
History ofIdeas, vol. 46, pp. 51 -64
Russell, P. (1986), "Consent and Slavely in Lock: II. Locke on Express and Tacit Consent,
Misinterpretations and Inconsistencies", Political Theory, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 291-306.
Russell, P. (1998), Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's way ofNaturalizing Responsibility,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, P. (1999), "Smith on Moral Sentiment and Moral Luck", History of Philosophy
Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 37-58.
Bibliography 315
Hume's General Point of View
Russell, P. (1998), "Hume's Moral Sense & Wide-Personsibility", unpublished paper delivered in
The 25th Hume Society Conference, The Hume Society, Sterling.
Sakamoto, T., (1995), David Hume's Civilized Society: Industry, Knowledge, Liberty (in
Japanese), Tokyo: Sobunsha.
Salter, J. (1999), "Sympathy with the Poor: Theories of Punishment in Hugo Grotius and Adam
Smith", History ofPolitical Thought, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 205-24.
Sayers, S. (1999), Plato's Republic; An Introduction, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Sayre-McCord, G. (1994), "On Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal-And Shouldn't
Be", Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 1, pp. 202-28.
Sayre-McCord, G. (1995), "Hume and the Bauhaus Theory of Ethics" Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, vol. 20, pp. 282-98.
Scaff, L. A. (1978), "Hume on Justice and the Original Contract", Philosophical Studies, vol. 33,
pp. 101-8.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Scarre, G. (1996), Utilitarianism, London: Routledge.
Schachter, J. P. (1978), "Hume's Argument against the Continuing Existence of Unperceived
Perceptions", Mind, vol. 87, pp. 436-42.
Scheffler, S. (2001), Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in
Liberal Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, K. (1999), "Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's way of Naturalizing
Responsibility/Paul Russell", Hume Studies vol. 25, no.l and 2, pp. 263-5.
Schneewind, J. B. (1998), The Invention ofAutonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
p. 361.
Scruton, R. (1995), A Short History ofModern Philosophy, 2nd edn., London: Routledge.
Sedivy, S. (1995), "Hume, Images and Abstraction", Hume Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 117-33.
Segal, G. (2000), "Beyond Subjectivity: Spinoza's Cognitivism of the Emotions", British Journal
for the History ofPhilosophy, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-19.
Seliger, M. (1963a), "Locke's Natural Law and the Foundation of Politics", Journal of the
History ofIdeas, vol. 24, pp. 337-54.
Seliger, M. (1963b), "Locke's Theory ofRevolutionary Action", Western Political Quarterly, vol.
16, no. 3, pp. 548-68.
Sessions, W. L. (2002), Reading Hume's Dialogues: a Veneration for True Religion, Ind.:
Indiana University Press.
Seung, T. K. (1994), Kant's Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Shelton, G. (1992), Morality and Sovereignty in the Philosophy ofHobbes, London: Macmillan.
Sher, R. B. (1985), Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment, N. J.: Princeton
University Press.
Simmons, J. (1992), The Lockean Theory ofRights, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
Simmons, J. (1993), On The Edge ofAnarchy, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Simpson, E. (1999), "Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics", The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 195, pp. 201-14.
Bibliography 316
Hume's General Point of View
Singer, B. J. (1999), Pragmatism, Rights, and Democracy, N.Y.: Fordam University Press.
Singer, P. (ed.), (1991), A Companion to Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell.
Skinner, A. S. (1996), A System ofSocial Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Skinner, Q. (1996), Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy ofHobbes, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Skinner, Q. (1999), "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State", Journal ofPolitical
Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1-29.
Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B. (eds.), (1973), Utilitarianism For & Against, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Smith, A. (1980), Essays on Philosophical Subjects, W. P. D. Wrightman and J. C. Bryce (eds.),
Ind.: Liberty Classics.
Smith, A. (1981), An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations, 2 vols., R. H.
Campbell and A. S. Skinner (eds.), Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
Smith, A. (1982a), The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (eds.), Ind.:
Liberty Classics.
Smith, A. (1982b), Lectures on Jurisprudence, R. L. Meek and D. D. Raphael (eds.), Ind.:
Liberty Classics.
Smith, S. B. (1997), Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question ofJewish Identity, New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Snyder, D. C. (1986), "Locke on Natural Laws and Property Rights", Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 723-50.
Sobel, J. H. (1997), "Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action", Philosophical Quarterly, vol.
47 no. 186, pp. 55-72.
Soles, D. E. (1987), "Intellectualism and Natural Law in Locke's 'Second Treatise'", History of
Political Thought, vol. 8, pp. 63-81.
Sorell, T. (1986), Hobbes, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Sparkes, A. W. (1973), "Trust and Teleology: Locke's Politics and His Doctrine of Creation",
Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 3, pp. 263-73.
Spector, J. (2003), "Value in Fact: Naturalism and Normativity in Hume's Moral Psychology",
Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 41, no.2, pp. 145-63.
Spinoza, B. (1927), The Correspondence ofSpinoza, ed. and trans. A. Wolf, N.Y.: Dial Press.
Spinoza, B. (1951), Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, N.Y.: Dover.
Spinoza, B. (1958), Political Treatise, in Spinoza, The Political Works, ed. and trans. A. G.
Wernham, Oxford: Clarendon.
Spinoza, B. (1985), Collected Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, N. J.: Princeton University
Press.
Spinoza, B. (1985), Ethics: Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, in Collected Works.
Sreenivaan, G. (2000), "What is the General Will?", The Philosophical Review, vol. 109, no. 4,
pp. 445-581.
Stainstreet, P. (2002), Hume's Scepticism and the Science ofHuman Nature, Aldershoot: Ashgate.
Stein, P. (1979), "Adam Smith's Jurisprudence-Between Morality and Economics", Cornell Law
Review, vol. 64, pp. 621-38.
Bibliography 317
Hume's General Point of View
Stein, P. (1994), "Adam Smith's Jurisprudence-Between Morality and Economics" in J. C. Wood
(ed.), Adam Smith Critical, Assessments, 2nd Series, pp. 31-44.
Stephen B. (1991), Natural Law and the Theory of Property, Grotius to Hume, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Stewart, C. (1976), "The Moral Point of View", Philosophy, vol. 5. no. 195, pp. 177-87.
Stewart, J. (1992), Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Stewart, M. A. (ed.) (1990), Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Stewart, M. A. (1991), "The Stoic Legacy in the Early Scottish Enlightenment" in M. J. Olsler
(ed.), Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 273-96.
Stewart, M. A. (1996), "Abstraction and Representation in Locke, Berkeley and Hume" in G. A.
J. Rogers and S. Tomaselli (eds.), The Philosophical Canon in the 17th and 19th Centuries, N.Y.,
University of Rochester Press, pp. 123-47.
Stewart, M. A. (2003), "Religion and Rational Theology" in Broadie, A. (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stewart, R. M. (1982), "John Clarke and Francis Hutcheson on Self-Love and Moral Motivation",
Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 261-77.
Stacker, M. (1970), "Morally Good Intentions", The Monist, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 124-41.
Stacker, M. (1973a), "Rightness and Goodness: Is There a Difference?" American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 87-98.
Stacker, M. (1973b), "Act and Agent Evaluations", Review ofMetaphysics, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 42-
61.
Stove, D. (1965), "Hume, Probability, and Induction", Philosophical Review, vol. 74, pp. 160-77.
Strauss, L. (1953), Natural right andHistory, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Strauss, L. (1959), What is Political Philosophy ?, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Strawson, G. (1989), The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Striker, G. (1996), Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Stroud, B. (1977), Hume, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Stroud, B. (1978), "Hume and the Idea of Casual Necessity", Philosophical Studies, vol. 33, pp.
39-59.
Sugden, R. (1991), "Impartiality and Mutual Advantage", Ethics, vol. 101, pp. 634-43.
Sullivan, R. J. (1983), "The Kantian Model ofMoral-Practical Reason", The Monist, vol. 66, no.l,
pp. 83-105.
Swain, C. (1992), "Passionate Objectivity", Nous, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 465-490.
Sweigart, J. (1964), "The Distance Between Hume and Emotivism", Philosophical Quarterly, vol.
14, pp. 229-36.
Swift, A. (2001), Political Philosophy: a Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Swinburne, R. (1979), The Existence ofGod, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bibliography 318
Hume's General Point of View
Tanaka, S. (1988), Natural Law Theory ofAdam Smith (in Japanese), Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo.
Tanaka, S. (1993), Natural Theology ofAdam Smith (in Japanese), Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo.
Taylor, C. C. W. (1978), "Berkeley's Theory of Abstract Ideas", The Philosophical Quarterly,
vol.28, no. Ill, pp. 97-115.
Taylor, C. (1989), Sources ofThe Self Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, G. (1971), "Hume's Views ofMoral Judgments", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 82,
pp. 64-8.
Taylor, J. (1998), "Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality in Hume's Treatise", Hume
Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 5-30.
Teichgraeber, R. F. (1981), "Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem", Journal ofBritish Studies,
vol. 20, pp. 106-23.
Tienson, J. L. (1988), "Resemblance and General Terms", Philosophical Studies, vol. 54, pp. 87-
108.
Tipton, I. C. (1994), Berkeley the Philosophy ofImmaterialism, Bristol: Thoemmes.
Thomas, J. A. C. (ed.) (1976), Textbook of Roman Law, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing
Company.
Tomaselli, S. (1996), "Introduction", The Philosophical Canon in the 17th and 18th Centuries, G.
A. J. Rogers and S. Tomaselli (eds.), N.Y., University of Rochester Press, pp. 1-8.
Tomida, Y. (2002), "Locke, Berkeley, and the Logic of Idealism", Locke Studies, vol. 2, pp. 225-
38.
Traiger, S. (1988), "The Ownership of Perceptions: A Study of Hume's Metaphysics", History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41-51.
Tuck, R. (1991), "Introduction" to T. Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck, (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Tueshita, R. (1983), Hume (in Japanese), Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
Tully, J. (1980), A Discourse on Property; John Locke and His Adversaries, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Tully, J. (1993), An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Tuck, R. (1979), Natural Rights Theories: their Origin and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Tuck, R. (1991), "Introduction" to Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Tur, R. H. S. (1978), "What is Jurisprudence?", Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 28, pp. 149-61.
Tweyman, S. (1974), "Hume on Separating the Inseparable" in W. Todd (ed.), Hume and the
Enlightenment, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 30-42.
Tweyman, S. (1992), "Some Reflections on Hume on Existence", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2,
pp. 137-49.
Tweyman, S. (1995), "Sympathy, Belief, and the Indirect Passions" in David Hume: Critical
Assessments, S. Tweyman (ed.), vol. 4, pp. 427-36.
Tweyman, S. (ed.) (1995), DavidHume: Critical Assessments, 6 vols., London: Routledge.
Uday S. M. (1992), The Anxiety ofFreedom, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Bibliography 319
Hume's General Point of View
Ushenko, A., (1955), "Hume's Theory of General Ideas", Review ofMetaphysics, vol. 9, pp. 236-
51.
Velk, T. and Riggs, A. R., (1995), "David Hume on Money, Inflation and the State" in S.
Tweyman (ed.), David Hume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 201-8.
Velk, T. and Riggs, A. R., (1995), "David Hume's Practical Economics" in S. Tweyman (ed.),
David Hume: Critical Assessments, vol. 6, pp. 193-200.
Velkley, R. L. (1989), Freedom and the End of Reason: on the Moral Foundation of Kant's
Critical Philosophy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Venning, C. (1976), "Hume on Property, Commerce, and Empire in The Good Society: The Role
ofHistorical Necessity", Journal ofHistory ofIdeas, vol. 37, pp. 79-92.
Viroli, M. (1988), Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the 'Well-ordered Society', Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Vision, G. (1979), "Hume's Attack on Abstract Ideas: Real and Imagined", Dialogue, vol. 18, pp.
528-37.
Vitek, W. (1986), "The Humean Promise: Whence Comes Its Obligation?", Hume Studies, vol.
12, pp. 160-76.
Waldman, T. (1959), "Origins of The Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt", Journal of the
History ofIdeas, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 413-9.
Waldron, J. (1993), Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Waldron, J. (1984), Theories ofRights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waldron, J. (2002), God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political
Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace, K. (2002), "Hume on Regulating Belief and Moral Sentiment", Hume Studies, vol. 28,
no. 1, pp. 83-111.
Walmsley, J. (2000), "The Development of Lockean Abstraction", British Journalfor the History
ofPhilosophy, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 395-418.
Wand, B. (1955), "A Note on Sympathy in Hume's Moral Theory", Philosophical Review, vol.
64, pp. 275-9.
Warnock, G. J. (1953), George Berkeley: Criticism and Interpretation, London: Basil Blackwell.
Waszek, N. (1984), "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its
Stoic Origin", Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 45, pp. 591-606.
Watling, J. (1954-1955), "Inference from the Known to the Unknown", Aristotelian Society New
Series, vol. 55, pp. 83-108.
Waxman, W. (1992), "Hume's Quandary Concerning Personal Identity", Hume Studies, vol. 18,
no. 2, pp. 233-53.
Waxman, W. (1994), Hume's Theory ofConsciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waxman, W. (1998), "The Point of Hume's Skepticism with Regard to Reason: the Primacy of
Facility Affect in the Theory ofHuman Understanding", Hume Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 235-73.
Wertz, S. K. (1975), "Hume, History, and Human Nature", Journal ofHistory of Ideas, vol. 36,
pp. 481-96.
Wertz, S. K. (2000), Between Hume's Philosophy and History: Historical Theory and Practice,
Md.: University Press ofAmerica.
Bibliography 320
Hume's General Point of View
Whelan, F. G. R. (1995), "Hume, and the Balance of Power", Hume Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
315-32.
White, F. C. (1988), "Justice and The Good of Others in Plato's Republic", History ofPhilosophy
Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 395-410.
Williams, B. (1973), Problems ofthe Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. (1981), Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. (1985), Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Williams, B. (1995), Making Sense ofHumanity, and Other Philosophical Papers, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Williams, C. J. F. (1969), "Are Primary Qualities Qualities?" The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.
19, pp. 310-23.
Wilson, F. (1991a), "Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins 'Hume on
the Idea ofExistence'", Hume Studies, vol. 17, no.2, pp. 167-201.
Wilson, F. (1991b), "Hume's Critical Realism: A Reply to Livingston", Journal of The History of
Philosophy, no. 29, no. 2, pp. 291-96.
Wilson, M. D. (1998), "On Garrett's Hume", Hume Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 131-39.
Winch, D. (1992), "Adam Smith: Scottish Moral Philosopher as Political Economist", The
Historical Journal, vol. 35, pp. 91-113.
Winch, D. (1994), "Adam Smith: The Prophet of Free Enterprise?", Adam Smith Critical
Assessments, Wood, J. C. (ed.), 2nd Series, pp. 258-62.
Winkler, K. P. (1985), "Hutcheson's Allegeded Realism", Journal of the History ofPhilosophy,
vol. 23, pp. 179-94.
Winkler, K. P. (1991), "The New Hume", The Philosophical Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 541-80.
Winkler, K. P. (1993), "Berkeley an Interpretation", Nous, vol. 27, pp. 539-46.
Wolff, J. (1991), "What is the Problem of Political Obligation?", Proceeding of the Aristotelian
Society, vol. 91, pp. 153-69.
Wolff, J. (1993), "Hume, Bentham, and the Social Contract", Utilitas, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 87-90.
Wolff, J. (1996), An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolterstorff, N. (1996), John Locke and the Ethics ofBelief, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Wood, A. W. (1990), Hegel's Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wood, J. C. (ed.) (1994), Adam Smith: Critical Assessments, 2nd series, 7 vols. London:
Routledge.
Wood, P. (2003), "Science in the Scottish Enlightenment", in Broadie, A. (ed.), Cambridge
companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Woolhouse, R. S. (1971), Locke's Philosophy of Science and Knowledge, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Woolhouse, R. S. (1988), The Empiricists, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woozley, A. D. (1978), "Hume on Justice", Philosophical Studies, vol. 33, pp. 81-99.
Workler, R. (1995), Rosseau, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bibliography 321
Hume's General Point ofView
Wright, C. (1988), "The Inaugural Address: Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities",
Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, vol. 88, pp. 1-26.
Wright, G. (1963), The Varieties ofGoodness, London: Routledge & Kengal Paul.
Wright, J. P. (1983), The Sceptical Realism ofDavidHume, Minn.: Minnesota University Press.
Wright, J. P., (1996), "Hume, Descartes, and The Materiality of The Soul" in G. A. J. Rogers and
S. Tomaselli (eds.), The Philosophical Canon in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.
Wright, J. P. (2000), "Hume's Causal Realism: Recovering a Traditional Interpretation" in R.
Rupert and K. Richman (eds.), The New Hume Debate, pp.88-99.
Yaffe, G. (2000), Liberty Worth The Name, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Yaffe, G. (2001), "Locke on Refraining, Suspending and The Freedom to Will", History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 373-91.
Yajima, N. (1991), Reason and Passion in Modern Moral Philosophy: a comparative study
between Kant and Hume, M. A. Thesis, Keio University.
Yajima, N. (2000) "Justice and the Stability of Property in Hume", Bulletin ofKeiwa College, no.
9, pp. 29-64.
Yajima, N. (2001), "Hume's General Point of View and Smith's Impartial Spectator":
Conference: Scottish Enlightenment in its European Context, The British Society for the
History of Philosophy, Glasgow, revised and published as (Yajima, 2003).
Yajima, N. (2002a), "Reconsideration of the theory of sympathy in Hume and Smith" in T.
Koizumi (ed.), Reception and development ofWestern Thoughts in Japan (in Japanese), Tokyo:
Keio University Press, pp. 109-31.
Yajima, N. (2002b), "The Humean Concept of Belief and Causation; A Moral Reading",
Bulletin ofKeiwa College, no. 11, pp. 17-52.
Yajima, N. (2002c), "Custom as the Humean Alternative to Locke's Abstract Ideas": a paper
delivered in The 29,h Hume Society Conference, The Hume Society, Helsinki.
Yajima, N. (2003), "Hume's General Point of View and Smith's Impartial Spectator", Bulletin
ofKeiwa College, no. 12, pp. 71-86.
Yajima, N. (2004a) "Sympathy and Communication in Hume", Bulletin ofKeiwa College, no.
13, pp. 33-49.
Yajima, N. (2004b), "The Epistemological Foundation of Justice in Hobbes, Locke and
Hume", ICU Comparative Culture, no. 36, pp. 1-31.
Yandell, K. E. (1990), Hume's "Inexplicable Mystery", Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Yolton, J. W. (1958), "Locke on the Law ofNature", Philosophical Review, vol. 67, pp. 477-98.
Yolton, J. W. (1970), Locke and the Compass ofHuman Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Yolton, J. W. (ed.) (1990), Philosophy, Religion and Science in the 17th and 18th Centuries,
Rochester: University of Rochester Press
Yolton, J. W. (1993), A Locke Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell.
Young, J. T., (1994a), "The Impartial Spectator and Natural Jurisprudence: An Interpretation of
Adam Smith's Theory of the Natural Price" in J. C. Wood (ed.), Adam Smith: Critical
Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 6, pp. 62-79.
Young, J. T. (1994b), "David Hume and Adam Smith on Value Premises in Economics" in J. C.
Wood (ed.), Adam Smith: Critical Assessments, 2nd Series, vol. 7, pp. 188-201.
Bibliography 322
Hume's General Point of View
Zaitchik, A., (1982), "Hobbes Reply to the Fool; The Problem of Consent and Obligation",
Political Theory, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 245-66.
Zbigniew R. (1995), Contractarianism versus Holism Reinterpreting Locke's Two Treatises of
Government, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc.
Bibliography 323
